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A b s t r a c t 
" O r d i n a r y Language Ph i lo sophy and S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r i s i n g " 
L e s l i e R. Gof ton . T h e s i s f o r Doctor of Ph i losophy Degree: 1979 
T h i s t h e s i s examines the r e l a t i o n between o r d i n a r y language and s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g i n the l i g h t of Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work on the problem of 
d u a l i s m . I t examines the work of Pe ter Winch and D. Lawrence Wieder i n t h e i r 
a t tempts to dea l w i t h , r e s p e c t i v e l y , the r o l e of convent ion and i n d e x i c a l i t y 
i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f s e n s e , and argues f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e view which t i e s 
these concepts t o g e t h e r r a t h e r than g i v i n g e i t h e r p r i o r i t y . 
I n an examinat ion of t h e o r e t i c ! t y , i t l o o k s a t the work of Harold G a r f i n k e l 
and T a l c o t t P a r s o n s , and f i n d s t h a t they exempl i fy twin a s p e c t s o f a c e n t r a l 
p r o b l e m a t i c - how to r e c o n c i l e n a t u r a l i s m , and the concepts o f the everyday 
w o r l d , w i t h the a n a l y t i c a l l y formal s t r u c t u r e s which a s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g 
r e q u i r e s . I t argues f o r the mutual in t er -dependence o f these r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
In the a n a l y s i s which i t o f f e r s of the work o f A l v i n Gouldner and A l a n Blum, 
i t f i n d s t h a t t h e i r re sponses to K a r l Mannheim's f o r m u l a t i o n o f the problem 
of h i s t o r i c i t y founder on the d i f f i c u l t i e s conta ined i n t h e i r concept ion of 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g . Whi le Gouldner espouses the 
n e c e s s i t y of a r a d i c a l commitment to emanc ipat ion a s the fundamental v a l u e 
d i s p l a y e d by the h i s t o r i c a l development of thought , and Blum argues f o r the 
degeneracy of any attempt to l o c a t e such a v a l u e i n the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l m , 
t h i s work argues t h a t both t h e o r i s t s i n f a c t o f f e r v e r s i o n s o f t h e o r i s i n g 
which proceed from a c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n , l e a d i n g to a fund-
a m e n t a l l y d u a l i s t i c concept ion o f language , and hence support an i n c o h e r e n t 
theory o f c e r t a i n t y . 
A l l o f t h e s e a n a l y s e s a r e s e t a g a i n s t the background of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work 
on o t h e r minds and c e r t a i n t y . I t proposes t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c r i t e r i a l 
theory o f s e n s e - c o n s t i t u t i o n , as o u t l i n e d i n the work of P. M. S. Hacker and 
Gordon B a k e r , o f f e r s a f r u i t f u l a l t e r n a t i v e to the c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i e s upon which much of the work d i s c u s s e d can be seen to r e s t . I t 
proposes to f i n d i n t h i s work a new way o f approaching s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , 
and a new approach to work which has a l r e a d y been produced, no tab ly t h a t of 
P a r s o n , G a r f i n k e l and Mannheim. 
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1. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
T h i s i s an a t t e m p t t o examine some p i e c e s o r s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i n t h e 
l i g h t c a s t by some o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work on t h e p r o b l e m o f l a n g u a g e . W i t t -
g e n s t e i n saw l anguage as g e n e r a t i n g i l l u s i o n w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h y ; i t i s my v i e w 
t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i s b e d e v i l l e d by c o n f u s i o n which i t i n h e r i t s 
f r o m o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , and as such , s t ands i n need o f t h e i n s i g h t i n t o i t s 
p rob lems w h i c h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remerks can p r o v i d e . T h i s s t u d y w i l l a im t o 
examine some o f t h e work w h i c h has been p roduced by s o c i o l o g i s t s m the a t t e m p t 
t o overcome the p rob l ems e n c o u n t e r e d when we, f i r s t o f a l l , t r y t o dea l w i t h 
t h e phenomena o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d i n t e r m s w h i c h p r o d u c e a ' s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ' 
s a t i s f a c t o r y a c c o u n t , and a l s o an account wh ich t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e meaning 
wh ich L h e i r a c t i o n and speech has f o r them as members o f t h a t s o c i a l w o r l d ; 
t h a t i s t o say , as members o f s o c i e t y . The i n i t i a l p r o b l e m , t h e n , i s t a k e n 
t o be the d i s c r e p a n c y w h i c h has come t o appear between the t h e o r e t i c a l a c c o u n t s 
p roduced by s o c i o l o g y u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f s c i e n c e , (as an a r t i f i c i a l l anguage 
game) and t h e ' n a t u r a l ' l anguage o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . T h i s w i l l be seen t o be 
t h e b a s i c p r o b l e m c o n f r o n t e d by t h e s u b j e c t s o f t h i s p i e c e under a v a r i e t y o f 
g u i s e s . I i n t r o d u c e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work i n o r d e r t o d i s p l a y some o f t h e 
c o n f u s i o n s a r i s i n g f r o m o u r a s sumpt ions about t h e way i n which language o p e r a t e s . 
I was i n t e r e s t e d , when I began t h i s s t u d y , i n some o f t h e more r e c e n t a p p r o a -
ches t o t h e w o r l d o f coramonsense and i t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e o r y w h i c h have d e v e l -
oped i n s o c i o l o g y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t he t h e o r i s t s who have d e v e l o p e d t h e i r work 
f r o m a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , (and a l s o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s ' o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e ' 
p h i l o s o p h y ) and t h o s e f r o m a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y - b a s e d t r a d i t i o n , m a i n l y 
i n f l u e n c e d by H u s s e r l , d i r e c t l y o r v i a t h e work o f h i s d i s c i p l e , A l f r e d S c h u t z . 
I have , t h e r e f o r e , j o i n e d t o g e t h e r some o f t h e work o f P e t e r w i n c h , a t t e m p t i n g 
t o amalgamate s o c i o l o g y w i t h e p i s t e m o l o g y , " e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g i s t s " H a r o l d 
G a r f i n k e l and D. L . W i e d e r , some o f t h e i d e a s d i s c u s s e d by T a l c o t t Parsons i n 
h i s s emina l p r e - w a r w r i t i n g , some d i s p a r a t e approaches t o t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f 
t h e S o c i o l o g y o f knowledge as i t i s e x p r e s s e d i n t h e work o f K a r l Mannheim 
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and a l s o A l v m G o u l d n e r ; t h e work o f t h e l a t t e r I d i s c u s s i n tandem w i t h t h a t 
o f A l a n Blum, s i n c e , w h i l e G o u l d n e r ' s work p roceeds f r o m a s t a n d a r d c r i t i q u e 
o f ' h i t h e r t o e x i s t i n g ' s o c i o l o g y , and t h a t o f Blum e x p l i c i t l y d e n i e s t h e 
e f f i c a c y o f any such e n t e r p r i s e , t hey sha re i n t e r e s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l ( as w e l l 
as p e r s o n a l ) b a c k g r o u n d . T h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e s , howeve r , a re d i s t i n c -
t i v e , as I hope t o show. 
I have a t t e m p t e d t o b r i n g t h e s e e l emen t s t o g e t h e r a g a i n s t the backdrop o f 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work on i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ( t h e b u l k o f w h i c h i s u s u a l l y b r o u g h t 
t o g e t h e r under t h e h e a d i n g o f t h e ' P r i v a t e Language ' a rgumen t ) and C e r t a i n t y . 
I acknowledge a t t h i s s t a g e , my i n e s t i m a b l e debt t o t h e e x e g e t i c work o f 
P. M. S. Hacker and Gordon B a k e r . I have based my a t t e m p t s t o a p p l y W i t t g e n -
s t e i n ' s work f i r m l y on t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( 1 ) w h i c h t h e y have p r o d u c e d o f t h e 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f ' c r i t e r i a ' i n t h i s w o r k . Any mi suse s o f t h e i r i d e a s , however , 
a re e n t i r e l y my own. 
The f i r s t s e c t i o n i s abou t the l i m i t s o f commonsense a c c o u n t s . Winch poses 
t h e q u e s t i o n ; s i n c e s o c i o l o g y must dea l w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w h i c h s u b j e c t s 
have o f a c t i o n s , e v e n t s and speeches w h i c h make up t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e 
w o r l d , how can we hope t o a r r i v e a t such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n l e s s we use t h e 
c o n c e p t s by means o f w h i c h such u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a r e a r r i v e d a t _by_ t h e s u b j e c t s ? 
S o c i o l o g y , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g a ( g e n e r a l i s i n g , o b j e c t i f y i n g ) s c i e n c e , s h o u l d 
be conce rned w i t h ' g r a s p i n g ' what i s g o i n g o n , s e e i n g i n a s o c i a l event an 
i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e rms o f the c o n c e p t s employed by members 
o f t h e s o c i a l g roup who f o r m t h e s u b j e c t s o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . However, i t 
seems t h a t , t h e r e b y , a c o n c e n t r a t i o n on t h e r u l e s t o w h i c h members o r i e n t i n 
t h e i r language uses , i n mak ing t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e y f i n d t h e m s e l v e s 
i n t e l l i g i b l e and o r d e r l y , c o n s t r a i n s a c c o u n t s t o c o n v e n t i o n s w h i c h can be 
a s c e r t a i n e d a b o u t s i t u a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ; i t seems u n a b l e t o d e a l w i t h t he 
p r o b l e m o f t h e i n n o v a t i v e l o c a t e d i n t e r r e l a t i o n between c o n v e n t i o n s and c o n t e x t 
(what has come t o be c a l l e d t h e p r o b l e m o f • i n d e x i c a l i t y • ( 2 ) ) . 
3. 
T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y t h e p r o b l e m r e c o g n i s e d by Wieder i n h i s work on " c o n v i c t 
codes" ( 3 ) . S t a n d a r d e t h n o g r a p h i c uses o f such codes t r e a t them as maxims 
w h i c h can be used as t h e c o n v e n t i o n s by means o f w h i c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s 
a c h i e v e d by members i n s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h t hey can be l e g i t i m a t e l y employed . 
S o c i a l a c t i o n has sense ( o r d e r , p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ) n o t , however , s i m p l y because 
o f t h e ' r u l e ' o f c o n v e n t i o n , b u t because u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h e m s e l v e s c o n s t i t u t e 
t h e e v e n t s o f w h i c h t h e y f o r m t h e e l e m e n t s . Removed f r o m c o n t e x t , he a r g u e s , 
c o n c e p t s do n o t p e r m i t o f u n e q u i v o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , bu t f i t a number o f 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; i n f a c t , i t i s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h t h e y p e r m i t wh ich g i v e 
t o them t h e i r m e a n i n g - b e s t o w i n g f a c i l i t y . The o n l y way, t h e n , t o a v o i d 
s p e c u l a t i v e r esponses i s t o f o c u s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e work on the o r d e r c o n s t r u c t i n g 
p r o c e s s , t o see t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f o r d e r by the i n v e s t i g a t o r as a document 
e x h i b i t i n g t h e f e a t u r e s u n d e r l y i n g sense a s sembly . Wieder t h u s r e t r e a t s f r o m 
the ' v a g u e n e s s ' o f sense as a momentary accompl i shmen t back t o t h e i n c o r r i g -
i b i l i t y o f t h e p r o c e s s whereby t h i s a ccompl i shmen t i s r e a l i s e d - t h a t i s t o 
say , the ( p r i v a t e ? ) e x p e r i e n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I f I Own an 
e x p e r i e n c e , t h e n s u r e l y I , among a l l , canno t f a i l t o know what i t i s ? 
Both t hese p o s i t i o n s s u f f e r , i n my c o n t e n t i o n , f r o m a m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e 
n a t u r e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; I a rgue t h a t c o l l e c t i v e o r i n d i v i d u a l o w n e r s h i p o f 
e x p e r i e n c e does n o t c o n s t i t u t e g rounds f o r r e j e c t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t 
o t h e r s c o u l d sha re i t ; i n d e e d , i t i s o n l y p o s s i b l e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s o r g r o u p s 
t o u n d e r s t a n d i n t h e way t h a t they do because t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s based 
on a c c o u n t s w h i c h can be spoken , s i n c e sense i s d e r i v e d f r o m m t e r s u b j e e t i v e 
e x p e r i e n c e . I f t h e r e b y , we seem t o have a new p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h e s o c i a l *->orld w h i c h i s n o t l i m i t e d ( o r r u l e d o u t o f c o u r t ) by t h e domina-
t i o n o f g roup o r i n d i v i d u a l ( o r e v e r y d a y ) usage , can we, t h e n , p roduce s c i e n -
t i f i c a ccoun t s o f s o c i a l r e g u l a r i t i e s w h i c h are m a n i f e s t i n t h e o r d e r wh ich 
v»e i nhab i t? 
T a l c o t t Parsons SdW t h i s as t he c e n t r a l t a s k o f S o c i o l o g y . For Pa r sons , t h e 
c r i t e r i a o f v a l i d i t y o f knowledge i s t o be f o u n d i n ( K a n t i a n ) p r i m a l i n v a r i a n t 
c a t e g o r i e s . H i s s t r a t e g y i s founded on a co r r e spondence t h e o r y o f r e a l i t y . 
4. 
T h i s r e l i e s on t h e d e m o n s t r a b l e v a r i e t y o f p e r c e p t i o n s o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d 
( i n c l u d i n g Uie s o c i a l ) , and p r e s u m p t i v e l y , d i f f e r e n c e s between such p e r c e p t i o n s 
and the ' c o n c r e t e ' o b j e c t as i t e x i s t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the a c t o f p e r c e i v i n g 
i t . The number o f f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h can be made about such an o b j e c t 
c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , be e x h a u s t e d ! any body o f t h e o r e t i c a l w o r k , i f i t a ims t o 
apprehend t h i s c o n c r e t e n e s s m u s t . t h e n , be founded on a schema o f c a t e g o r i e s 
w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e t h i s c o n c r e t e n e s s . I n t h i s v i e w , t h e schema w h i c h a p p r o x -
i m a t e s t h i s most c l o s e l y i s t h a t o f l o g i c o = e x p e r i m e n t a l ( s c i e n t i f i c ) methods , 
s i n c e these a r e based on " u n i v e r s a l and u n c h a n g i n g " p r i m a r y c a t e g o r i e s o f 
a p p r e h e n s i o n , g i v i n g t o t he p r o p e r l y q u a l i f i e d o b s e r v e r a v i e w o f t he w o r l d 
o f r e a l o b j e c t s w h i c h i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e 
o b s e r v e r ' s c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Now t h i s , i t has been a rgued (A) t i e s t h e q u a l i t i e s o f t he r e a l w o r l d t o t h e 
( a r t i f i c i a l , a n a l y t i c a l ) p r o p e r t i e s o f f o r m a l l o g i c . The u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h 
i s p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h i s schema i s l i m i t e d t o t he c o n c e i v a b l e r e l a t i o n s o f 
meaning wh ich a r e w a r r a n t e d on l o g i c a l g r o u n d s , and w h i c h : 
" . . . can be p r o j e c t e d i n t o t h e s i g n s y n t a x o f a f o r m a l i s e d 
l a n g u a g e " . ( 5 ) 
As A p e l comments; 
" I f i t ^e re t r u e - as was assumed by t h e ' l o g i c a l a t o m i s m ' 
o f R u s s e l l and t h e Young W i t t g e n s t e i n - t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y 
one l o g i c a l f o r m o f l anguage t o d e s c r i b e t h e w o r l d , and 
a c c o r d i n g l y , o n l y one t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s e m a n t i c s f o r t h e 
l anguage o f s c i e n c e , t h e l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s c o u l d hope 
t o s o l v e the p r o b l e m o f l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g by 
c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e s e m a n t i c a l sys tem f o r t h e language o f 
u n i f i e d s c i e n c e c o m p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e l a n g u a g e -
h e r m e n e u t i c a l work i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g G e i s t e s w i s s e n -
s c h a f t e n ( i n c l u d i n g the h e r m e n e u t i c a l h i s t o r y o f s c i e n c e ) . 
But a c t u a l l y t h e L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s t s have l o n g s i n c e g i v e n 
up t h a t t h o u g h t and now j u s t demand t h a t t h e o b j e c t 
l anguage be i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e . . . The s en t ences 
o f t h e l anguage o f s c i ence do no t d e s c r i b e f a c t s ' j u s t as 
t h e y a r e ' , bu t r a t h e r f a c t s o f t h e b e h a v i o u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t 
o f t h e s c i e n t i s t s who i n t e r p r e t t h e s en tences by u s i n g them. 
I n t h e language o f t h e G e i s t e s w i s s e n s c h a f t e n we c o u l d say ; 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s i g n s have meaning canno t 
be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g a mean ing i n t e n t i o n 
w h i c h e x p r e s s e s i t s e l f i n t h e s i g n s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , n o t 
even t h e f a c t s o f s c i e n c e a r e f a c t s f o r t he u n c h a n g i n g 
" s u b j e c t as s u c h " ( o f " t h e l anguage as s u c h " ) but t h e y a re 
c o n s t i t u t e d i n a c o n c r e t e and t h e r e f o r e h i s t o r i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d 
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human h o r i z o n o f m e a n i n g s . " ( 6 ) 
Thus , t o r e t u r n t o t h e r e a l w o r l d , t h e f o r m a l l anguage o f s c i e n t i f i c a c c o u n t i n g 
i s t i e d n o t t o t h e a b s o l u t e c a t e g o r i e s o f t he t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l o g i c a l r e a l m , 
but t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o b t a i n i n g i n c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s as t h e y 
have e v o l v e d w i t h i n a communi ty o f s c i e n t i f i c p r a c t i t i o n e r s . Pa r sons may w e l l 
hope f o r ' a s e p t i c space ' i n w h i c h t o a c c o m p l i s h h i s a n a l y s i s ( 7 ) , b u t l i k e 
H u s s e r l , he i s condemned t o h i s t o r y . The g r e a t n e s s o f Parsons l i e s , as 
G a r f i n k e l r e a l i s e d , i n the f a c t t h a t he g rasped t h i s ; f o r P a r s o n s , t h e escape 
f r o m the reg ime o f cotnmonsense n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s i d e a l i s a t i o n . I t i s a 
p r i c e , so t o s a y , w h i c h must be b o r n e . The t a s k o f t h e s o c i a l a n a l y s t l i e s 
i n f i n d i n g t h e way back f r o m t h e 'way o f s e e i n g ' o f w h i c h s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y 
c o n s i s t s , t o t h e f a c t i c i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i n h a b i t e d by t h e s u b j e c t s o f i t s 
s t u d y . P a r s o n s ' f a i l u r e , l i k e t h a t o f H u s s e r l , t a k e s n o t h i n g away f r o m h i s 
a c h i e v e m e n t s . N e i t h e r p r o m i s e d a n y t h i n g b u t g r e a t s t r u g g l e , n e i t h e r s u f f e r e d 
f r o m d e l u s i o n s as t o what t hey had a c c o m p l i s h e d a t any s tage o f t h e i r w o r k . 
G a r f i n k e l sees t h e p rob lems w h i c h Parsons f a c e s ; w h i l e a c c e p t i n g t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g o f t h e l o g i c o - e x p e r i m e n t a l ( N e o - P o s i t i v i s t , N e o - K a n t i a n ) b r a n c h o f 
human s t u d i e s , he p r e f e r s t o r e f o r m u l a t e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m i n t e r m s 
o f t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h . W h i l e Parsons sought p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l s t a t u s 
f o r h i s f r a m e w o r k on the b a s i s o f i t s ( e s s e n t i a l l y K a n t i a n ) c a t e g o r i c a l 
i m p e r a t i v e s , t h u s d e r i v i n g f r o m the 'means -end ' schema ( l o g i c o - e x p e r i m e n t a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y ) t h e neces sa ry o r d e r l i n e s s o f t h e s o c i a l , t h i s i s t o p r o c e e d 
p r e c i s e l y f r o m the p o i n t w h i c h t h e phenomenology o f H u s s e r l and Schu tz w o u l d 
seek t o r e a c h . The co r r e spondence be tween t h e w o r l d o f o b j e c t s and t h o u g h t 
i s , i n t h i s v i e w a ' m y s t e r y * w h i c h can o n l y be a c c e p t e d w i t h i n t h e K a n t i a n 
t r a d i t i o n , H u s s e r l sought t o address i t s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . 
E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , t h i s approach adop t s a congruence t h e o r y o f r e a l i t y . The 
p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t o f t he ' o u t e r ' w o r l d , i n t e rms o f t h i s t h e o r y , i s t he 
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c o n c r e t e o b j e c t . The two t e r m s , " p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t " and " c o n c r e t e o b j e c t " 
a r e synonymous and i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . The w o r l d i s j u s t as i t a p p e a r s ; t h e r e 
i s n o t h i n g b e h i n d i t . Ra ther t h a n b e i n g the c o n t e n t s , sensory e v i d e n c e s a re 
t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p e r c e p t i o n s . 
C o n c r e t e n e s s i s o n l y p o s s i b l e i n s o f a r as t h e r e i s a s t a n d a r d i n the n o n - p e r c e p -
t u a l o r d e r w h i c h r ema ins i n v a r i a n t ; i t i s t h e r e b y a p r o p e r t y o f t h e o b j e c t 
c o n s t i t u t e d as a u n i t y o f m e a n i n g s . An a c t u a l o b j e c t , t h e n , i s a u n i f i e d se t 
o f e x p e r i e n c e s , however t h e s e a r e f o u n d e d . The q u e s t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e 
" o b j e c t i v e " w o r l d i s abandoned i n f a v o u r o f an accep t ance o f m u l t i p l e r e a l i t i e s , 
o f v a r i e t i e s o f o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e . 
G a r f i n k e l , a p p l y i n g t h i s t o t he s o c i a l r e a l m , p roposes t h e r e b y t h a t the w o r l d 
o f commonsense, f a r f r o m b e i n g e x p l i c a b l e m te rms o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ( p r i m a l , 
i n v a r i a n t ) c a t e g o r i e s , i s r a t h e r t o be t r e a t e d as an o b j e c t i v e r e a l m , accomp-
l i s h e d by uhe v a r i e t i e s o f commonsense r a t i o n a l i t i e s employed by a c t o r s i n 
t h e p r a c t i c e s o f w h i c h i t i s composed. T h e r e b y , o u r a p p r e h e n s i o n o f i t i n 
t e rms o f t h e c r i t e r i a o f s c i e n t i f i c l anguage games v i o l a t e s t h e o b j e c t i v i t y 
o f a c t o r s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f r e a l i t y i n f a v o u r o f i d e a l c a t e g o r i e s , removed 
f r o m t h e i r i n c a r n a t i o n i n some c o n c r e t e p r a x i s . 
Our r e s p o n s e , he a r g u e s , s h o u l d r a t h e r be t o adopt a p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i f f e r e n c e 
t o r e a l i t y o u t s i d e t h a t wh ich i s c o n s t i t u t e d i n t h e a c t i o n s and t a l k o f o u r 
s u b j e c t s , and t o a t t e m p t t o d i s p l a y t h e competences w h i c h e n a b l e any 'member ' 
( c a r e f u l l y b o r r o w i n g P a r s o n s ' t e c h n i c a l usage o f t h i s t e r m ) , t o make sense o f 
t h a t r e a l i t y . 
He f i n d s h i m s e l f f a c i n g H u s s e r l ' s p r o b l e m , however . I n t he s e a r c h f o r 
o b j e c t i v e knowledge w h i c h does n o t depend on a s e t o f ( h i s t o r i c a l , f o r m a l ) 
a n a l y t i c c a t e g o r i e s he i s back t o u n c r i t i c a l accep tance o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e , 
( l e a d by t h e epoche) i n t h e sense t h a t , i n a c c e p t i n g commonsense r a t i o n a l i t y 
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u n c r i t i c a l l y , b u t b e i n g i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e r e a l i t y w h i c h i t c o n s t i t u t e s , he 
i s l e f t o n l y w i t h che u n f o r r n u l a b l e d i s p l a y o f p r o c e s s e s , o f competences w h i c h 
a r e ' t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d ' , u n s p e c i f l a b l e . 
Now, t h i s w o u l d seem s i m i l a r t o the p o s i t i o n a r r i v e d a t i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
w o r k . As Specht p u t s i t : 
" T h e r e a r e , so t o s a y , o n l y o b j e c t i v e o b j e c t s o f r e a l i t y 
i n t h e language game, w i t h t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l i n g u i s t i c 
s i g n s ' o b j e c t i v e o b j e c t ' , ' r e a l i t y ' , e t c . " (8 ) 
However , w h i l e f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s e r v e d t o l i m i t t h e e x t e n t 
t o w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d g i v e m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n t hose cases 
where p rob lems c a n n o t be s o l v e d a l o n g a n a l y t i c a l l i n e s , G a r f i n k e l p roposes t o 
f o u n d a programme o f e m p i r i c a l s t udy on t h i s b a s i s . Specht d e s c r i b e s t h i s 
k i n d o f a im i n a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e p r o j e c t s o f Kant and H u s s e r l ; 
" H e r e , o n t o l o g i c a l knowledge o f o b j e c t s a l w a y s amounts 
t o g r a s p i n g t h e s t r u c t u r a l sy s t em o f appearances drawn 
up by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r by c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Language , 
h o w e v e r , r e m a i n s o u t s i d e o f o n t o l o g i c a l (my emphas i s ) 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The appearances a r e a d m i t t e d l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
by p e o p l e b u t t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n i s e f f e c t e d b e f o r e l a n g u a g e . 
Thus t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i d e a s o f t h e a t o m i c m o d e l , a c c o r d i n g 
t o w h i c h t h i n g s e x i s t b e f o r e l a n g u a g e , p r e v a i l s i n b o t h 
A r i s t o t l e s ' s r e a l i s t o n t o l o g y , and a l s o i n c o n s t i t u t i o n 
t h e o r i e s . I n b o t h a p p r o a c h e s , o n t o l o g i c a l knowledge r e f e r s 
t o a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c o b j e c t i v i t y , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n , 
r e q u i r e s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r s u b s t a n t i a t i o n o f an e x t r a -
l i n g u i s t i c n a t u r e " . ( 9 ) 
I n c o n t r a s t s , Specht a r g u e s , W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n t h e o r y sees o n t o l o -
g i c a l knowledge as an o b j e c t i v i t y c o n s t i t u t e d by l a n g u a g e ; 
" I t has i t s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b a s i s i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f o b j e c t s w h i c h a r e f i x e d by 
s p e c i f i c l i n g u i s t i c u sage" . (10) 
However, W i t t g e n s t e i n n e v e r c o n s i d e r e d a s y s t e m a t i c s t u d y o f l anguage games 
and the o b j e c t s c o n s t i t u t e d by them; i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t G a r f i n k e l ' s 
p r o j e c t m i g h t be r e - w r i t t e n as t h a t c o n s i d e r e d p o s s i b l e by S p e c h t , t o w h i t : 
" . . . as c o m p l e t e as p o s s i b l e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o and 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l l anguage games i n w h i c h 
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f o b j e c t s i s e f f e c t e d . " (11) 
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The p r o b l e m w i t h t h i s k i n d o f p r o j e c t , however , as W i t t g e n s t e i n r e a l i s e d , was 
t h a t i t a r r i v e s , i n A p e l ' s t e r m s , a t 
" . . . a k i n d o f monadology o f d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l sys t ems" (12) 
A f u r t h e r consequence , he n o t e s , i s r a d i c a l r e l a t i v i s m ; the k i n d o f knowledge 
w h i c h m i g h t be a r r i v e d a t w o u l d have no f i x e d p a r a m e t e r s ( s i n c e i t must 
a c c e p t t he i n f i n i t e c h a n g e a b i l i t y o f l anguage games) no c r i t e r i a o f c e r t a i n t y 
( s i n c e i t t r a n s f o r m s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y t i c schema i n t o an e m p i r i c a l r e a l m 
w i t h o u t a d o p t i n g t h e c r i t e r i a w h i c h w a r r a n t s t a t e m e n t s w i t h i n t h i s l anguage 
game) . 
The t r u l y r a d i c a l i m p o r t o f ' W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work i n t e r m s o f t h e p rob l ems exem-
p l i f i e d by Parsons and G a r f i n k e l l i e s i n t h e m u l t i v a r i a t e n a t u r e o f u n d e r s t a n -
d i n g w h i c h h i s a n a l y s e s b r i n g o u t . The A n t i p a t h y between s c i e n c e and common-
sense r a t i o n a l i t i e s i s n o t an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e p r o b l e m , and t h e ach ievemen t o f 
t h e s e two t h e o r i s t s l i e s , I w o u l d a r g u e , i n p r o v i d i n g an a r t i c u l a t i o n between 
two o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n s o f s o c i o l o g y . I a rgue t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n 
between the work o f these two t h e o r i s t s p r o v i d e s p o w e r f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e 
p r o b l e m s g e n e r a t e d by t h e t w i n t h e o r i e s o f e p i s t e m o l o g y s h a r i n g a common 
o n t o l o g y , u n d e r l y i n g most o f s o c i o l o g y , and p o i n t s t o w a r d s t h e u r g e n t n e c e s s i t y 
o f f i n d i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e way o f c o n c e p t u a l i s i n g t h e m a t e r i a l . 
The p r o b l e m o f ' h i s t o r i c i s m ' has been seen t o be s t r o n g l y l i n k e d t o e p i s t e m o -
l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s w h i c h r e l a t e ' c e r t a i n t y ' t o t he c o n s t i t u t i o n o f meaning i n 
t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y o u t s i d e o f l a n g u a g e , t o t he 
p r a c t i c e s o f c o m m u n i t i e s o r i n d i v i d u a l s . K a r l Mannhe im ' s a c c o u n t o f t h e 
h i s t o r y o f t h e ' S o c i o l o g y o f K n o w l e d g e ' (13) shows t h a t t h i s can be t i e d t o 
s p e c i f i c deve lopmen t s i n t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y and s c i e n c e . R a t h e r t h a n 
s i m p l y a t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , t h e s e l f r e l a t i v i s a t i o n o f knowledge becomes 
a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h t h e emergence o f s c i e n c e as a b o u r g e o i s o p p o s i -
t i o n t o m e t a p h y s i c s and t h e o l o g y . I t i s sn a t t a c k on a t h e o r e t i c a l system 
r a t h e r than an i n d i v i d u a l ; i t a r i s e s , he a r g u e s , f r o m a d e s i r e t o w a r d the 
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a b s o l u t e w h i c h f o r m s t h e b a s i s o f p o s i t i v i s m and s c i e n c e , and t h e need t o 
g ra sp s y s t e m i c t o t a l i t y on t h e p a r t o f t h e i d e a l i s t h i s t o r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n . 
N o t e , t h e n , t h a t Mannheim i s p o i n t i n g t o t h e same c o n j u n c t i o n ( A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m , 
H u s s e r l and K a n t ) w h i c h has j u s t been t h e s u b j e c t o f S p e c h t ' s a n a l y s i s . 
S h a r i n g , as t h e y do , an a t o m i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , whereby o b j e c t s e x i s t b e f o r e 
l a n g u a g e , t h e h i s t o r i c i s a c i o n o f such meaning i s a g e n e r i c c o n d i t i o n w h i c h 
can o n l y be modera ted by an appea l t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e l e m e n t s i n a t h e o r e t i c a l 
schema. Seen as a deve lopment m t h e h i s t o r y o f t h o u g h t , t he S o c i o l o g y o f 
Knowledge , f o r Mannheim, o n l y become, r, p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h t h e r i s e 
o f s c i e u c e j f l a n k e d by p o s i t i v i s m and the i d e a l i s t - a n a l y t i c a l s c h o o l s o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t . For c l a s s i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , e s p e c i a l l y P l a t o and S o c r a t e s , 
h i s t o r i c i t y . as n o t an i s s u e , however , bu t the i s s u e . The Very a c t i v i t y o f 
P h i l o s o p h i c t h o u g h t was t h e a t t e m p t t o escape f r o m o p i n i o n , and i g n o r a n c e , 
i n t o t r u t h , 
H e i d e g g e r sees t h e ' h i s t o r y o f t h o u g h t ' between t h e modern age and the Greeks 
as a d e n i a l o f t h e o r i g i n a r y p r o j e c t ; t h o u g h t has become " m a t h e m a t i c i s e d " , 
t h e power o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has d e l u d e d w e s t e r n t h i n k e r s i n t o t he p u r s u i t o f 
i l l u s o r y g o a l s o f a b s o l u t e , c o n c r e t e , r e a l i t y , a p r e c i s e and l o g i c a l s t r u c -
t u r i n g o f t h e w o r l d o f ' r e a l ' o b j e c t s and t h o u g h t . ( 1 4 ) . w h i l e Mannheim sees 
r e l a t i v i s m as an i s s u e a r i s i n g f r o m t h e c o n f l i c t o f s c i e n c e w i t h t h e o l o g y , 
f o r H e i d e g g e r , r e l a t i v i s m i s a p r o b l e m f o r s c i e n c e as a t h e o l o g y i t s e l f . The 
d e s i r e o f t n e m a t h e m a t i c a l t h i n k e r i s t o a c h i e v e c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y ; t o e x t e n d 
h i s e m p i r i c a l e m p i r e ove r t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e w o r l d ( 1 5 ) . 
I n Modern S o c i o l o g y , we f i n d t h e ana logues o f Mannheim and He idegge r i n t h e 
work o f A l v i n Gouldner and A l a n Blum. For G o u l d n e r , t h e h i s t o r i c i s a t i o n o f 
s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s i s an endemic c o n d i t i o n . The p u r s u i t o f ' v a l u e - f r e e d o m ' 
i s t o be abandoned i n p u r s u i t o f a s o c i o l o g y w h i c h sees i t s e l f as c o m m i t t e d 
t o t h e r e f l e x i v e d i a l e c t i c e x p l i c a t i o n o f i t s own g r o u n d s . Pace Mannheim, 
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he c a l l s f o r t h e a t t e m p t t o open up the awareness o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l communi ty 
t o the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e s o c i e t y i n which a c c o u n t s a r e p r o d u c e d . W h i l e , 
f o r Mannheim, t h i s i n v o l v e s an a n a l y s i s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n o f 
v h a t e v e r f o r m w h i c h e x i s t i n t he s o c i a l m i l l i e u i n w h i c h t h e a c c o u n t i s 
p r o d u c e d , f o r G o u l d n e r , t h i s r e f l e x i v i t y g rounds i t s a n a l y s i s i n a Marx i sm 
w h i c h a p p l i e s i t s own c r i t e r i a o f c r i t i c i s m t o i t s p r o d u c t s ( 1 6 ) . W h i l e 
Mannheim sought t o e s t a b l i s h , as an u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i o n o f v a l i d i t y , t h a t w h i c h : 
p o i n t s t o t h e most comprehens ive outcome o f t h e 
d i s c u r s i v e i n t e r a c t i o n o f o p p o s i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s , and 
. . . r e p u d i a t e s any a t t e m p t ( i n t he name o f s c i e n t i f i c 
o r i n t he name o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ) t o a b r o g a t e t h i s 
p r o c e s s . " ( 1 7 ) 
Gou ldne r d i v i n e s i n the h i s t o r i c a l movement t o w a r d s e m a n c i p a t i o n t h e u l t i m a t e 
v a l u e t o w a r d w h i c h such a r e f l e x i v e programme S^° 1 JI'-1 move. For G o u l d n e r , a 
r e f l e x i v e s o c i o l o g y i s r a d i c a l o r i t i s n o t r e f l e x i v e , bu t a p o l o g e t i c , and hence 
i d e o l o g i c a l . For Mannheim, t h e c r i t e r i a o f a r e f l e x i v e s o c i o l o g y d e r i v e 
f r o m t h e p r o b l e m a t i c i t s e l f ; t h e y a r e p a r t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f m o v i n g t o w a r d 
t h e i d e a l o f a t o t a l v i e w , on t h e way t o a t h e o r e t i c a l l anguage wh ich seeks 
t o d e v e l o p f r o m c o n t r a s t i n g v i e w s and the s o c i a l c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h t h e y a re 
p r o d u c e d a s y n t h e s i s o f " c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e x t s " ( 1 8 ) . 
L i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n , Mannheim r e a l i s e d t h a t c o n f l i c t i n g a c c o u n t s c o u l d no t be 
r e c o n c i l e d w i t h o u t t h i s p r o c e s s o f c o m p a r i s o n , b u t t h a t t h i s p r o c e s s o f comp-
a r i s o n v i o l a t e s t h e m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f t h e a c c o u n t s u n l e s s i t g i v e s t o them, 
where t h i s i s f e a s i b l e , i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i n t e rms o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h 
e x i s t i n t he i n t e r - r e l a t e d language games o f w h i c h t h e y a re a p a r t . For 
G o u l d n e r , t h e commitment t o r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s , and t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
t o t a k e an a c t i v e p a r t i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l movement t o w a r d s e m a n c i p a t i o n , a r e 
e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s o f t h e r e f l e x i v e e n t e r p r i s e . The commitment t o t h e 
g o a l o f e m a n c i p a t i o n becomes t h e o r g a n i s i n g p r i n c i p l e i n h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
t he s o c i o l o g i c a l p r a c t i c e s w h i c h f o r m the o b j e c t s o f h i s c r i t i q u e . 
I n B l u m ' s d a r k l y H e i d e g g e r r i a n " work ( 1 9 ) , we f i n d t h e h i s t o r i c i s t c r i t i q u e 
o f s o c i o l o g y -worked o u t i n t o a s o c r a t i c de t achmen t ; t h e p u r s u i t o f s t a n d a r d 
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s o c i o l o g i c a l themes i s abandoned , i n f a v o u r o f an a n a l y s i s w h i c h seeks t o 
r e t u r n t o t h e • m e d i c i n a l ' a ims o f the Greeks . S ince d i s c u r s i v e reason i s a l l 
t h a t modern t h o u g h t can o f f e r , t h e n a g a i n s t t h i s n i h i l i s m Blum seeks a r e t u r n 
t o t h e p u r s u i t o f T r u t h (and B e i n g ) as t h a t w h i c h l anguage c a n n o t c a p t u r e , 
w i t h t h e i r o n i c and i c o n i c e l e m e n t s o f speech e s t a b l i s h e d as t h e p r i m a r y 
' m e t h o d o l o g i c a l ' p r i n c i p l e s t o w h i c h such a d e s p a i r can o n l y l e a d . Language, 
r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e r n i n g i t s e l f w i t h t h e ( c o n c r e t e ) a c c o u n t i n g o f t h e a p p a r e n t , 
t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l , t h e i l l u s i o n s o f t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l w o r l d v i e w , becomes i n s t e a d 
t h e means by w h i c h t h e g rounds w h i c h s t a n d unde r u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be a l l u d e d 
t o , i f n o t s een , g ra sped o r s a i d . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s s i l e n c e i n t h e " T r a c t a t u s " came abou t f o r s i m i l a r r e a s o n s , bu t 
w h i l e t h e l o g i c a l c a l c u l u s t o w h i c h t h i s m y s t i c i s m seemed t o p o i n t t u r n e d o u t 
t o be c h i m e r i c a l , f o r t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r 
f o r m o f t h e o r e t i c l i f e s e r v e d as an e s s e n t i a l p r e l i m i n a r y t o h i s r e - i n v o l v e -
ment i n t h e p r o b l e m s o f l anguage and t h o u g h t w h i c h had n o t been a n a l y s e d away. 
U n l i k e Blum, and He idegge r however , t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n d i d n o t see t h e 
p r o b l e m s o f l anguage as l e a d i n g t o d e s p a i r w i t h i t s f e a t u r e s . These a r e , f o r 
W i t t g e n s t e i n , t o be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s s o l v e d ; d e s p a i r w i t h t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l 
s t a n d a r d s o f c e r t a i n t y does n o t l e a d t o a r e t r e a t f r o m ( d i s c u r s i v e ) r e a s o n , 
b u t t o a r i g o r o u s r e - d i s c o v e r i n g o f t h e g rounds upon w h i c h our f o r m o f r e p -
r e s e n t a t i o n i s ba sed , and t h e work o f d i s p e l l i n g t h e i l l u s i o n s i n t o w h i c h o u r 
grammar m i s - l e a d s u s . I f B l u m ' s work does n o t c o n v i n c e us o f t h e f a i l u r e o f 
s o c i o l o g y t o p r o v i d e us w i t h w o r t h w h i l e g o a l s , as a f o r m o f t h e o r e t i c a c t i v i t y , 
t h e n i t s e n t e r p r i s e must be seen i n t h i s l i g h t - t h a t i t s ' d e s p a i r ' i s p rem-
a t u r e , and s o c i o l o g y may, a f t e r a l l be w o r t h d o i n g . 
I f my arguments s e rve t o make a t l e a s t t h i s p o i n t , t h e n I s h a l l have succeeded . 
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CHAPTER I 
ORDINARY LANGUAGE; CONVENTION AND CONTEXT 
The Work o f Peter Winch 
"The Idea of a Social Science", Peter Winch's best known work, has not 
created a l e g i o n of f o l l o w e r s f o r i t s author; there are few, i f any Winchians 
f o r i t seems gen e r a l l y agreed t h a t the book does not lead us t o a p o s i t i v e 
programme of work, but warns o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g some of the programmes 
already i n existence. Yet i t had, and indeed continues t o have an e x t r a -
o r d i n a r y e f f e c t on the teaching of So c i o l o g i c a l theory. The issues which 
are raised i n the book are important, and they must be faced by any programme 
of s o c i o l o g i c a l accounting. I do not wish t o claim t h a t very much t h a t i s 
p o s i t i v e does emerge from t h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n i f we f o l l o w Winch's l i n e , but 
I hope t o show t h a t there are some issues on which he moved i n the wrong 
d i r e c t i o n a f t e r r a i s i n g them f o r the r i g h t reasons. (1) 
The Place of Philosophy 
In "The Idea o f a Social Science", Winch sees himself as concerned w i t h 2 
main tasks; a c r i t i c i s m o f one no t i o n of the nature of philosophy, and a 
c r i t i c i s m o f one n o t i o n of the nature of s o c i a l science. For Winch, however, 
h i s c r i t i q u e s w i l l be brought together by h i s u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e , t h a t 
"any worthwhile study of society must be p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n character and any worthwhile philosophy must be 
concerned w i t h the nature of human s o c i e t y " . (2) 
He then goes on to att a c k the underlabourer conception of philosophy. Winch 
denies i t a l l but the r o l e o f c l e a r i n g away the rubbish t h a t l i e s on the 
ground upon which science ('true' or 'new' knowledge) i s t o b u i l d . Philosophy 
i s t o be simply a conceptual handyman, keeping the t o o l s of language i n 
proper working order. This r o l e i s r e j e c t e d as inadequate by Winch on the 
grounds t h a t the c e n t r a l concerns of philosophy i n metaphysics and e p i s t e -
mology e x i s t autonomously of other d i s c i p l i n e s , yet bear c e n t r a l l y upon 
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p h i l o s o p h i c a l concerns w i t h i n areas such as science, a r t , p o l i t i c s , r e l i g i o n 
and so on. Winch moves on t o attack the Humean concept of experience; Hume's 
argument i s t h a t since a l l knowledge of r e l a t i o n s between events i n the world 
i s a r r i v e d at through experience, p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the nature 
of r e a l i t y r e l y i n g as i t does on a p r i o r i processes of t h i n k i n g can never 
achieve what science can i n t h i s area. At the same time, i f i t admits t h i s , 
then the very nature of i t s e n t e r p r i s e requires d r a s t i c r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
This Winch asserts i s p l a i n l y based on f a l l a c i o u s reasoning; "The i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n of the nature of r e a l i t y " involves d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t e n t e r p r i s e s 
fo r science and philosophy. The question of man's r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y i s 
not one which could be s e t t l e d by s c i e n t i f i c enquiry any more than the physi c a l 
p r o p e r t i e s of r e a l i t y could be unravelled by an a p r i o r i process of reasoning. 
Philosophy's concerns are conceptual. Moore's'proof' o f the existence of 
the e x t e r n a l world by c i t i n g h i s own hands as examples serves not as a scien-
t i f i c or experimental proof but as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the way i n which we do 
a c t u a l l y t a l k about " e x t e r n a l i t i e s ' . The issue here i s not one of proof or 
otherwise, but of concepts. 
Winch p o i n t s out t h a t a large p a r t of philosophy's task i s concerned w i t h the 
e l u c i d a t i o n of concepts, of c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t usage of l i n g u i s t i c expressions, 
i n s o f a r as these throw l i g h t on the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of r e a l i t y . This i n t e l l -
i g i b i l i t y r e s t s on the connection between thought and r e a l i t y , and thought 
brings us t o language. These are inseparably bound together, according t o 
Winch. He discusses Wittgenstein's d o c t r i n e , both i n the 'Tractatus' and 
• I n v e s t i g a t i o n s ' t h a t .... "The concepts we have s e t t l e f o r us the form of 
experience we have o f the world". (3) This summation expresses Winch's c e n t r a l 
idea; I s h a l l argue t h a t t h i s leads to the problems which his c r i t i c s have 
pointed out, and i n s o f a r as t h i s i s not the correct conclusion t o draw from 
Wittgenstein's work, leads t o i n c o r r e c t conclusions about i t s value f o r s o c i a l 
science. 
"We cannot say, then (....) t h a t the problems of 
Philosophy a r i s e out of language rather than out 
of the wor l d , because i n discussing language, 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , we are i n f a c t discussing what 
counts as belonging t o the world. Our idea of 
what belongs t o the realm of r e a l i t y i s given f o r 
us i n the language t h a t we use. The concepts 
t h a t we have s e t t l e f o r us the form of the exper-
ience we have of the world. I t may be worth 
reminding ourselves of the t r u i s m that when we 
speak of the world, we are speaking of what we 
i n f a c t mean by the expression "the world"; 
there i s no way of g e t t i n g outside the concepts 
i n terms of which we t h i n k of the world (....) 
The w o r l d i s f o r us what i s presented through those 
concepts. That i s not to say t h a t our concepts may 
not change; but when they do, t h a t means t h a t our 
concept of the world has changed too". (4) 
Winch i s t y i n g any i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the s o c i a l world t o i n v e s t i g a t i o n of 
the concepts which we use t o describe t h a t world. I t i s at t h i s p o i n t that 
the problems which have been r a i s e d by c r i t i c s o f Winch, and W i t t g e n s t e i n 
occur. Before d e t a i l i n g e x a c t l y how the f o r m u l a t i o n i s erroneous (both i n 
i t s claimed d e r i v a t i o n from W i t t g e n s t e i n , and i n terms of i t s own l o g i c ) , 
I propose t o o u t l i n e the consequences which Winch derives from t h i s f o r the 
s o c i a l sciences. 
Concepts and Enquiries: Winch's view of the Social Sciences 
F i r s t , Winch argues t h a t philosophy i s too keen t o underestimate the extent 
to which what should be conceptual, a p r i o r i areas are i n f a c t to be taken 
to be e m p i r i c a l e n q u i r i e s based on experience. I n t h i s he says, philosophers 
are o v e r - r e a c t i n g t o the claims of science t h a t a l l statements about r e a l i t y 
must be e m p i r i c a l . Arguing against Hume's analysis of c a u s a l i t y , he maintains 
that the unwill i n g n e s s t o accept a p r i o r i l e g i s l a t i o n on the nature of f u t u r e 
events on the basis of past experience - thus assuming a l o g i c a l l y ordered and 
unchanging n a t u r a l world = should not i n v a l i d a t e the ways i n which we a c t u a l l y 
do use our conceptual apparatus = f o r w i t h o u t i t , we are i n no p o s i t i o n t o 
describe a n y t h i n g ? o r operate at a l l i n everyday l i f e . While philosophy i s 
indeed concerned w i t h the e l u c i d a t i o n of the concepts which Hume i s discussing, 
the continued existence of these concepts i s of fundamental importance t o the 
world i n which they are used, and i s no small matter. 
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Winch proposes, then, that r a t h e r than being e m p i r i c a l , matters depending 
upon the r e a l i t i e s o f the world - many fundamental s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
should be conceptual i n nature. With regard t o Social Science, ( f o r instance) 
s o c i a l behaviour i s t o be derived from an e l u c i d a t i o n of the concept of 
soc i a l behaviour - how i s i t used, and what consequences do these uses have 
fo r Social Science? 
•Elucidation* i s the next concept on Winch's agenda, i n f a c t ; " t o make some-
t h i n g i n t e l l i g i b l e " , he p o i n t o u t , acquires a s y s t e m a t i c a l l y ambiguous sense 
as we study the v a r i a t i o n s which occur i n the d i f f e r e n t contexts i n which i t 
i s used. The o b j e c t i v e s of d i f f e r e n t kinds o f i n v e s t i g a t o r s may be very 
d i f f e r e n t yet they would a l l lay claim t o being " a f t e r " i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . 
Using Wittgenstein's n o t i o n o f a language game, Winch p o i n t s out t h a t , 
l i k e w i s e , these forms of games may have d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s , yet only bear 
a f a m i l y resemblance t o each other i n the form t h a t they take. 
Accordingly, the o b j e c t i v e s , concerns, subject matter, methods, e t c . , of 
each game should be a f f o r d e d i t s own p h i l o s o p h i c a l enquiry; these w i l l be 
mutually comparable, and indeed, overlapping, and such comparative studies 
would c e r t a i n l y lead t o an increased understanding of the not i o n of i n t e l l -
i g i b i l i t y . 
The f a c t t h a t there are no immediate and obvious gross comparisons t o be 
made does not however e l i m i n a t e the subject of epistemology; r a t h e r than 
p r o v i d i n g c r i t e r i a f o r some master-concept of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , he argues 
tha t t h i s should describe the c o n d i t i o n s under which there can be any c r i t e r i a 
of understanding. 
Epistemological considerations bear c e n t r a l l y on the r o l e of philosophy 
also; Burnett (5) had posed as h i s question; what d i f f e r e n c e w i l l i t make t o 
the l i f e o f man i f h i s mind can have contact w i t h r e a l i t y ? The epistemologist 
Winch argues i s concerned w i t h the problem of why understanding, i n the form 
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t h a t i t does take, i s important i n the s o c i e t i e s i n which i t occurs - how 
i s i t possible? ( i n Kant's terms). This i n v o l v e s , he says, an ana l y s i s of 
the concept of s o c i a l l i f e , u l t i m a t e l y , f o r t o show the c e n t r a l r o l e played 
by the concept of understanding i n the a c t i v i t i e s which characterise human 
society involves a discussion of the nature of the s o c i a l l i f e which i s 
c o n s t i t u t e d by these a c t i v i t i e s . 
Indeed, r a t h e r than simply saying t h a t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are permeated w i t h 
ideas about r e a l i t y , Winch says " s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are expressions of ideas 
about r e a l i t y " . (6) 
Winch i s here arguing t h a t s o c i a l l i f e i s the product of the s p e c i f i c 
context-bound ideas of those who c o n s t i t u t e i t and can only be understood m 
terms of the ideas which create i t , as they are held by those concerned i n 
t h i s c r e a t i o n . This i s a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h many other s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s , 
as he p o i n t s out. Durkheim, f o r instance, held t h a t s o c i a l l i f e should not 
be explained according t o the notions of those who comprise the s o c i a l group 
i n question, but r a t h e r i n the underlying causes "unperceived" by "conscious-
ness" which d i c t a t e how these groups are c o n s t i t u t e d . (7) 
So c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , f o r Winch, must involve a n a l y s i s of the ideas o f 
which these s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are expressions. 
For Winch, then, the c e n t r a l problem of sociology, " g i v i n g an account o f the 
nature o f s o c i a l phenomena i n general", i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l - e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
problem, and one which must be confronted i n a con s i d e r a t i o n of the nature 
of language, r a t h e r than some "imaginary independent e n t i t y " such as "human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s " , or "group l i f e " , since these e n t i t i e s are not separable from 
the language which as concepts c o n s t i t u t e s them. Discussing Weber's famous (8) 
d e f i n i t i o n of human a c t i o n , he notes t h a t meaningful behaviour, as behaviour 
which has some sense, motive or reason attached t o i t , can be so only because 
of the way i t uses symbols, and not because of some a c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l t o the 
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mind of i t s agent, ( s i n c e , f o l l o w i n g the p r i v a t e language argument symbols 
have a s o c i a l genesis, and l i f e t h e r e a f t e r only i n the s o c i a l w o r l d ) . These 
formulations place emphasis on the c e n t r a l i t y of language; note that he (Winch) 
removes from consideration " r e a l i t y " apart from the concepts which describe 
i t ( o b j e c t i v i t y , o b j e c t s i n themselves) and r e a l i t y as the experience which 
the i n d i v i d u a l uses language t o describe ( s u b j e c t i v i t y , s tates of mind), 
This would seem t o be an attempt to get round the problem of dualism by 
ta k i n g as the object to be i n v e s t i g a t e d what we have i n the speech of actors 
as the a c t i o n i t s e l f - that i s t o say, i n v e s t i g a t i n g the ways i n which 
language i s used t o c o n s t i t u t e meaningfulness i n the s o c i a l world. To para-
phrase Schutz, (9) despite the problem of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , meaning i s 
communicable, people make sense of each other. For Winch, t h i s i s possible 
because of the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of speech a c t s , the f a c t that the uses of 
speech are instances of a t t e n t i o n to r u l e s , or instances of r u l e f o l l o w i n g . 
He argues th a t the use of words does not cons i s t of simply naming o b j e c t s ( 1 0 ) . 
Learning how to apply words cannot f o l l o w from simply r e l a t i n g sounds t o 
ob j e c t s . "Learning t o mean something by making a noise" means t o l e a r n t h a t 
t h i s word can be used to s i g n i f y t h i s o b j e c t , (as i n p o i n t i n g t o , ostensive 
d e f i n i t i o n ) , but how t h i s i s s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplished i s not shown by the 
i d e n t i t y o f t h i s instance of naming w i t h other instances of naming - o r , we 
cannot i n f e r from the "same" word being used i n conjunction w i t h the same 
physical object that the same meaning i s intended. Rather than there being a 
simple correspondence between words and the world, what we have i n f a c t i s 
the a b i l i t y t o evaluate usage; i e . , t o decide i n terms of the context i n 
which the words are used whether or not they make sense. I n the case of the 
i d e n t i t y o f usage what we have t o have i s a means of deciding t h a t on d i f f e r e n t 
occasions, a word i_s used t o "mean" the same t h i n g . For Winch, t h i s means o f 
deciding i s accountable ( f o r ) i n terms of a r u l e , f o r " i t i s only i n terms of 
a given r u l e t h a t we can a t t a c h a s p e c i f i c sense to the words 'the same1 ".(11) 
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An immediate d i f f i c u l t y , f o r Winch, i s t h a t a l l instances can be brought 
under the r u l e of some formula ( t h i n k here of cases of i n s a n i t y , and how, 
f o r instance, R. D. Laing deals w i t h them, a l s o , o f course, Freud)(12), even 
when we would say t h a t we cannot discern the r u l e , or t h a t the only r u l e t h a t 
i s being followed i s t o create a new one. 
In f a c t , W i t t g e n s t e i n answers t h i s very n e a t l y i n a passage not c i t e d by 
Winch (13). 
"What s o r t of supposition i s t h i s ; we cannot have 
miscalculated i n 12 x 12 = 144? I t must s u r e l y be 
a p r o p o s i t i o n of l o g i c - but now, i s i t not the 
same, or doesn't i t come to the same as the s t a t e -
ment (my e) 12 x 12 - 144? 
I f you demand a r u l e from which i t f o l l o w s t h a t there 
can't have been a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n here, the answer 
i s t h a t we di d not le a r n t h i s through a r u l e but by 
le a r n i n g t o c a l c u l a t e . 
We got t o know the nature of c a l c u l a t i n g by l e a r n i n g 
t o c a l c u l a t e . 
But then, can't i t be described how we s a t i s f y 
ourselves of the r e l i a b i l i t y o f a c a l c u l a t i o n ? Oh 
yesi Yet no r u l e emerges when we do so - but the 
most important t h i n g i s ; the r u l e i s not needed. 
Nothing i s l a c k i n g . We do c a l c u l a t e according t o a 
r u l e and th a t i s enough." 
Thus " r u l e " only "makes sense" given that we possess the competence ( " t r a i n i n g 
t o recognise i t as an instance of behaviour which i s a "matter of course" -
i e . , relevant i n t h i s a c t i v i t y or "game". Rule does not appear as a pres-
c r i p t i o n i n i t s u l t i m a t e form. 
No, f o r Winch, being able t o account instances of r u l e f o l l o w i n g comes only 
"when i t i s possible f o r someone else t o grasp what he i s doing, by being 
brought to the p i t c h of himself going on i n t h a t way as a 'matter of course'". 
Thus grasping when something i s an instance of the f o l l o w i n g THIS r u l e i s only 
possible f o r competent members, i e . , speakers of the same language i n the f u l l 
sense (what Garfin k e l c a l l s a 'natural language') (1 5 ) . At the same time, 
t h i s does not imply t h a t we can capture the way i n which sense i s accomplished 
by p r e s c r i b i n g a l i s t of ru l e s of human a c t i v i t y . As W i t t g e n s t e i n i n the 
example c i t e d makes p e r f e c t l y c l e a r , the t e s t o f the a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e 
( i e . , the meaningfulness of an a c t i v i t y ) does not r e s t i n the capacity t o 
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formulate the r u l e , but whether there i s a r i g h t and a wrong way to do what 
has been done - does i t make sense t o imagine things t o be other than they 
are? That i s the c r i t e r i o n (16) of competent performance; not the a p p l i c a -
t i o n o f a c r i t e r i o n i n i t s e l f , but a display of c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n . (17) 
Where t h i s d i s p l a y i s missing ( i n the Garfinkel student c o u s e l l i n g e x p e r i -
ments) ( f o r example), t o be sensible, the background t o the " a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the c r i t e r i o n " must be f i l l e d i n (what Someone 'must have' meant, thought 
etc. ) 
Rule i s displayed i n being able t o 'go on' (1 8 ) . That i s , i t shows i t s e l f 
where something concretely d i f f e r e n t e x h i b i t s a n a l y t i c a l l y the same features 
(both are instances of r u l e ) . Here we might consider Wittgenstein's example 
of c o n t i n u i n g a se r i e s of numbers. (19) I f we wished t o r e l a t e actions by 
imputing reasons or motives t o an a c t o r , we do so w i t h i n "accepted standards 
of reasonable behaviour, current i n the society i n question". To i d e n t i f y 
instances of reasonable behaviour as subsumable under standards i m p l i e s 
r e c o g n i t i o n of them as ' t h i s or th a t k i n d of event' - t h a t i s , making a 
judgment of i d e n t i t y . As such, of course, t h i s necessitates a r e c o g n i t i o n o f 
an a p p l i c a t i o n of c r i t e r i o n , and thus, r u l e . Such a p p l i c a t i o n s of c r i t e r i o n 
( i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s o f r e g u l a r i t y ) are d i s c e r n i b l e only w i t h i n relevant modes 
of human behaviour, governed by t h e i r own r u l e s . (20) 
Science as a form of l i f e 
Learning t o recognise competence (apply r u l e s ) then, comes from a s o c i a l 
context of common a c t i v i t y which stands i t s e l f as a body of r u l e s w i t h i n 
which such competence has i t s own i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Thus p r e f e r r e d r u l e s of 
play i n a game only have i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y w i t h i n the s o c i a l context (body of 
r u l e s ) w i t h i n which the game i s i n t e l l i g i b l e , e t c . 
Winch claims t h a t the aim o f the s o c i a l sciences should be t o 'grasp the 
p o i n t ' of what i s going on i n the s o c i a l world. This cannot involve a process 
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of Verstehen, as Weber seems t o c a l l f o r i t , since what i s involved here i s 
sense or meaning divorced from the s o c i a l nexus; what i s involved i n 
Verstehen, f o r Weber, i s grasping the ideas of the actor ( h i s s u b j e c t i v e 
s t a t e ) by a sympathetic i n t u i t i v e reconstructi«j^("nachbild") by methodo-
l o g i c a l r e c o n s t i t u t i n g the s i t u a t i o n e x t e r n a l l y . (21) Winch claims t h a t 
understanding i s possible only as an i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between elements 
i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n ; such r e l a t i o n s are conventional, and thus understandin 
any human a c t i v i t y depends upon grasping i t s conventions, - t h a t i s t o say, 
the conventional usages i n the speech and concepts which are used i n , or as, 
or f o r the a c t i v i t y . As such, i t involves grasping the a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e 
and standards of competence i n such a p p l i c a t i o n s (uses). 
To sum up, f o r Winch; 
(a) Understanding consists of grasping the point 
of what i s going on. 
(b) This consists i n an i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between 
elements of the s i t u a t i o n of i n t e r a c t i o n . 
(c) Grasping the nature of t h i s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n 
i s seeing i n i t the a p p l i c a t i o n o f c r i t e r i a o f 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ( r u l e s ) . 
(d) The nature of t h i s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s 
i n the usage (conventions) which govern the use 
of language, however, 
(e) displays of r u l e f o l l o w i n g i n language cannot 
be reduced to a p r e s c r i p t i o n of r u l e ; the 
disp l a y shows the r u l e , but we cannot look f o r 
the ground which warrants the l e g i t i m a c y of the 
usage, f o r speeches are pa r t of the a c t i v i t i e s 
t o which they supply sense; the sense th a t they 
supply derives i n large part from t h e i r place 
i n those a c t i v i t i e s ; there i s no exter n a l view 
of the r o l e and nature of speech. 
( f ) The nature of usage ( f o r instance, c a l c u l a t i o n ) 
consists u l t i m a t e l y i n the a c t i v i t y i t s e l f ; i t 
makes no sense t o go beyond i t except f o r s p e c i f i c 
p r a c t i c a l reasons. I take usage here t o mean r u l e 
governed p r a c t i c e s . 
(g) Representation or judgment of instances or 
i d e n t i t y , derives only and e n t i r e l y from i n d i f f -
erence t o the nature of r e a l i t y beyond t h i s a c t i v i t y 
( n a t u r e ) . (22) 
What then i s Winch c a l l i n g for? I t i s c l e a r t h a t he wishes t o r u l e c e r t a i n 
kinds of account (explanation) out of sociology, i n so f a r as they make 
unwarranted claims f o r t h e i r exhaustiveness, completeness, s u p e r i o r i t y e t c . , 
p r i m a r i l y the p o s i t i v i s t - s c i e n t i f i c model. In i t s place, he seems t o be 
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c a l l i n g f o r a serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c u l t u r a l ( l i n g u i s t i c - s y m b o l i c ) 
resources, as a c t i v i t i e s w i t h t h e i r own l i f e ; standards, i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , 
e t h i c s , r u l e s of s e n s i b i l i t y , competence. 
Given h i s v i e " of the p r o p e r t i e s of language, what could t h i s be l i k e , 
however? I s h a l l t a l k a l i t t l e about some aspects of Winch's s o c i a l science 
which f o l l o w from the ideas he endorses. 
Many of h i s c r i t i c s have pointed out t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of a c t i v i t y are 
immediately i n d e f e n s i b l e , given h i s view of s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c accounting -
notably s t r u c t u r a l , h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c , Marxist and e m p i r i c a l - s t a t i s t i c a l 
analyses. I do not propose to consider the t r u t h of these claims, but my 
own f e e l i n g i s t h a t t h i s misses Winch's p o i n t . W i t t g e n s t e i n has been accused 
of s i m i l a r aims, but he i s very c l e a r about h i s c r i t i c i s m s of these systems; 
he might be aiming t o l i m i t or reformulate t h e i r claims, but he cannot, 
except perhaps f o r h i m s e l f , dismiss them. 
" B i t by b i t there forms a system of what i s believed, 
and i n t h a t system some t h i n g s stand unshakeably 
f a s t , and some are more or less l i a b l e t o s h i f t . 
What stands f a s t does so not because i t i s i n t r i n s -
i c a l l y obvious or convincing; i t i s r a t h e r held 
f a s t by what l i e s around i t . " (23) 
Wittgenstein c e r t a i n l y sees Social Science i n v o l v i n g understanding by 
analysis of language uses. On Frazer's "The Golden Bough" he wrote, 
"Our speech contains the p r e c i p i t a t e of a complete 
mythology. We must plough through the complete 
language". (24) 
His work i s r e p l e t e w i t h appeals t o see the sense i n a c t i v i t i e s - and sense 
shows i t s e l f through the usages of language. What seem t o emerge f o r me are 
2 c e n t r a l problems, one of which I i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r . F i r s t l y , the power 
of c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y ( r u l e ) t o l i m i t speech, and second the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l 
character o f speech. 
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Conventionality and Representation 
Winch c i t e s Wittgenstein t o the e f f e c t t h a t rules do not always emerge, 
cannot be used t o prescribe what meaning i s i n any p a r t i c u l a r instance; they 
show themselves i n the way an a c t i v i t y or a speech usage i s accepted as 
successful or warranted i n the s o c i a l world. Any attempt t o accuse Winch 
of c a l l i n g f o r formulae or recipes t o account s o c i a l behaviour would c l e a r l y 
be wrong. What he does c a l l f o r however, apparently f o l l o w i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
i s DESCRIPTION, a d e s c r i p t i o n of the co n d i t i o n s which must be s a t i s f i e d i f 
there are t o be any c r i t e r i a o f understanding at a l l . (25) 
Now a d i f f i c u l t y immediately presents i t s e l f ; the d i f f i c u l t y of t r a n s l a t i o n . 
I do not mean by t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n from one language i n t o another - t h a t e x i s t s 
apart from Winch's c e n t r a l t h e s i s , and i s , I would argue, not r e l a t e d t o the 
point I have i n mind. George Steiner expresses t h i s very w e l l when he says 
that the e f f i c i e n c y of Esperanto i n t r a n s l a t i o n i s undisputed, but p r e c i s e l y 
because i t abstracts "those imprecise and redundant energies which make 
possible the communication", i t misses "the l o c a l mobile p l u r a l i s m " which 
enables speech t o perform i t s i n f i n i t e , endlessly v a r i e d , endlessly unique 
r o l e } ..Uonly the more generalised i n e r t , aspects of s i g n i f i c a n c e s u r v i v e " . (26) 
This i s the f a t e of a l l u n i v e r s a l or ' i d e a l ' language. 
What I do have i n mind are p r e c i s e l y the conventions which Winch po i n t s t o as 
the acknowledged commonality which gives speech i t s l i f e . W i t t g e n s t e i n gave 
the name "Form of L i f e " t o the aggregate of a c t i v i t i e s ( o r language games) of 
which speaking a language c o n s i s t s . The problem ( f o r Winch) would seem t o 
consist of the f a c t that each use of language/application of r u l e creates 
meaning/has l i f e i n the context of i t s p roduction, (language measures/rules 
the r e a l i t y i t represents, i n the context i n which i t occurs). (This i s the 
property of m d e x i c a l i t y t o which Garfinkel r e f e r s . ) (27) 
Given the f a c t , how are we t o have access to i t s meaning i n any other context? 
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I f the l i f e of a concept derives from i t s use, i t s meaning i s then a v a i l a b l e 
to us only i n use. There would not be a problem f o r Winch had he not c a l l e d 
f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of co n d i t i o n s i n which i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s p o s s i b l e . Such 
a d e s c r i p t i o n can only serve as a r e - t r a n s l a t i o n of the meaning. We cannot 
have, i n a d e s c r i p t i o n of the conditions of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y as they are 
concretely set out , any necessary c o n s t i t u t i v e framework w i t h i n which meaning 
comes t o be accomplished. I t was p r e c i s e l y t o avoid the problem of i n d e x i -
c a l i t y ( c r e a t i n g as i t does, an i n f i n i t e regress s i t u a t i o n i n which meta-rules, 
meta-meta-rules e t c . , are needed) th a t Wittgenstein proposed the form of l i f e 
as the u l t i m a t e a c t i v i t y . I t i s a display o f actual performance which i s t o 
serve not simply as a concrete f o r m u l a t i o n of what we do, t o e x h i b i t i t 
(although i t does t h a t ) but also an occasion t o confront the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between speech and the world. I t does so through proposing t h a t we f i n d , i n 
i t s concreteness, both an account of i t s e l f and a p o i n t i n g to i t s nature 
(as a l i m i t ) , as a p o i n t i n g . Thus i n the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of language games 
w i t h i n a form o f l i f e we are faced w i t h ways of using language which do not 
only aim t o represent r e a l i t y , but c a l l on us t o see the e s s e n t i a l inadequacy 
of representations i n language of what they are not (what warrants them, 
grounds them). 
Conventionality (Rule) gives the language game l i f e , but i t i s only accessible 
to us when a f o r m u l a t i o n aims to dis p l a y i t s p a r t i a l i t y - against the claims 
of i m p a r t i a l i t y and i n d i f f e r e n c e which concrete representations would aim t o 
make - and t o o f f e r us the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a n a l y s i s . Descriptions such as 
Winch seems t o be c a l l i n g f o r could not be r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l ; they would 
n e c e s s a r i l y be p o s s i b i l i t i e s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o speculate and t h e o r i z e . The 
question a r i s e s - would they s t i l l be 'descriptions'? Are not d e s c r i p t i o n s 
e s s e n t i a l l y representational? 
Bernard Williams makes a s i m i l a r point when he w r i t e s i n "Understanding 
W i t t g e n s t e i n " ; 
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"For i f our t a l k (about numbers - i n s e r t ) has been 
determined by our decisions, then one r e s u l t of our 
decisions i s t h a t i t must be nonsense t o say t h a t 
anything (about concepts numbers systems) has been 
determined by our decisions. The dependence ( o f such 
phenomena) on our decisions i n the only sense i n which 
i t obtains - f o r c l e a r l y there cannot be meant an 
e m p i r i c a l dependence on h i s t o r i c a l decisions - i s 
something which shows i t s e l f i n what we are and are 
not prepared t o regard as sense and i s not to be 
state d i n remarks about decisions: and s i m i l a r l y i n 
other cases. 
The p o i n t conies out i n the thought t h a t the determin-
acy of r e a l i t y aames from what we have decided or are 
prepared t o count as determinate. ( Z e t t e l 351) "We 
have a colour system as we have a number system. Do 
the systems reside i n our nature or i n the nature o f 
t h i n g s . How are we t o put i t ? Not i n the nature of 
t h i n g s . " 
The d i f f e r e n c e comes once more from a problem f a m i l i a r 
i n the Tractatus, How to put a supposed p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t r u t h which, i f i t i s u t t e r e d must be taken t o mean an 
e m p i r i c a l falsehood, or worse. (28) 
What I hope has emerged so f a r from t h i s discussion of Winch's work i s the 
fundamental importance which he attaches to language as a c o n s t i t u t i v e f eature 
of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ; he has argued the case f o r the c e n t r a l place of language 
i n the understanding of s o c i a l behaviour, which he sees as a system of i n t e r n a l 
r e l a t i o n s framed i n the context of rules which govern the usages of which t h i s 
i s made up. 
What consequences would t h i s have f o r Social Science? To begin w i t h , Winch 
e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t human a c t i v i t y cannot be summed up i n a set of precepts; 
such formulae so obviously r e l y themselves on f u r t h e r precepts, and so on, 
t h a t the regress problem generated deprives the i n i t i a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f any 
u t i l i t y . We cannot thereby move on t o argue t h a t i f we can f i n d behaviour which 
i s not formulated i n accordance w i t h a r u l e which the actor could formulate, 
t h i s w i l l count as n o n - r e f l e c t i v e or h a b i t u a l behaviour ( 2 9 ) . The importance 
of rule, Winch argues resides i n the f a c t t h a t the l e a r n i n g how t o apply c r i t e r i a 
as t o what i s t o count as cor r e c t i n the performance of the a c t i v i t y . That i s 
to say, the l e a r n i n g of a c t i v i t y involves r u l e - o r i e n t a t i o n r a t h e r than 
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r u l e - d i r e c t i o n . Winch argues that the d i s t i n c t i v e l y human feature of 
behaviour, however mechanical or h a b i t u a l i t may be, i s the basis of 
r e f l e c t i o n which i t performance by human beings necessarily r e t a i n s as 
t h e i r fundamental c o n d i t i o n or p o s s i b i l i t y . 
Now, he goes on t o argue, against Oakeshott, (30) t h a t changes i n modes 
of behaviour can only be meaningfully said t o occur i n an environment which 
"contains w i t h i n i t s e l f the means of assessing the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the behaviour 
which i t p r e s c r i b e s " (31). Although h a b i t s may change, h i s t o r y involves more 
than simply a catalogue of such changes, and i s also, more i m p o r t a n t l y , about 
the c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the c u l t u r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ideas which p e r s i s t or 
are transformed, or disappear, as men confront new so c i a l and environmental 
c o n d i t i o n s . 
Note, the claim i s that grasp of what i s going on i n a changing s o c i e t y i s 
only meaningful t o those w i t h i n the society i n the rea l sense that only they 
understand what i s going on; while a student of soc i e t y w i l l f i n d i t necessary 
to employ concepts which are not used nor would be understood i n the soc i e t y 
under i n v e s t i g a t i o n , these nevertheless PRESUPPOSE a previous understanding 
of the concepts a c t u a l l y employed i n the s i t u a t i o n under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . (32) 
Winch argues t h a t the concepts which s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s employ are l o g i c a l l y 
t i e d t o the concepts which a c t u a l l y do enter i n t o the a c t i v i t y under examina-
t i o n . Thus, while understanding i s ne c e s s a r i l y a real feature of everyday 
s i t u a t i o n s , the kind of understanding t o which i t i s possible f o r the s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i s t t o a s p i r e , must be t i e d t o the co n d i t i o n s which govern such under-
standing i n the everyday world, although i t may aim to transcend the l i m i t s 
of t h i s everyday world i n s o f a r as the concepts which i t employs and the degree 
of r e f l e c t i v e n e s s i s of a d i f f e r e n t order. 
Nevertheless, there are rea l l i m i t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d ; the aim of casual explana-
t i o n , and p r e d i c t i o n , o f t e n held to be c e n t r a l planks of the s c i e n t i f i c enter-
p r i s e , are r u l e d out f o r Winch. Science, he argues, applies i t s c r i t e r i a as 
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t o what i s sensible, or i n t e l l i g i b l e , " unselfconsciously"; t h i s i s nece s s a r i l y 
the case, f o r t o be s e l f conscious i s to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l , r a t h e r than 
s c i e n t i f i c . I n i n v e s t i g a t i n g human s o c i e t y , however, t h i s i s t o t a l l y 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e , f o r i t s very nature c o n s i s t s of " d i f f e r e n t and competing ways 
of l i f e , each o f f e r i n g a d i f f e r e n t account of the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f things".(33) 
C r u c i a l l y , then, we would seem to have no business evaluating ( e x p l i c i t l y or 
i m p l i c i t l y ) the standards of r a t i o n a l i t y which occur i n s o c i e t i e s or groups 
other than our own; what r e a l i t y i s l i k e ^ o r " o b j e c t i v e " r e a l i t y , h a s no f o o t -
hold i n our actual use o f language, but these are rath e r context bound or 
context dependent. What i s r e a l or unreal shows i t s e l f i n the p a r t i c u l a r 
language used, and i n the context of i t s use. 
"The c r i t e r i a of l o g i c are not a d i r e c t g i f t o f 
God, but a r i s e out o f , and are only i n t e l l i g i b l e 
i n the context of ways of l i v i n g or modes of 
so c i a l l i f e " (34) 
This means t h a t t o apply ( f o r instance) s c i e n t i f i c c r i t e r i a of r a t i o n a l i t y 
when assessing, say, magical b e l i e f s , i s t o commit a category mistake, f o r 
c r i t e r i a o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , and hence of r a t i o n a l i t y , are i n t e r n a l t o the 
mode of l i f e i n v o l v e d , so that r a t i o n a l i t y can only be assessed i n terms 
of the p r a c t i c e s involved i n t h a t mode of l i f e . (35) 
This, then, i s the r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of r u l e s ; i t i s not ,,htat the p r a c t i c e i s 
reducible t o the framework which c o n s t i t u t e s i t , but that i t i s only and 
e n t i r e l y a v a i l a b l e AS t h a t framework. To understand a p r a c t i c e i s t o grasp 
the way of going on of which the p r a c t i c e c o n s i s t s . To describe the p r a c t i c e 
so as to make i t accessible t o o u t s i d e r s ( i e . , t o apply ' e x t e r n a l 1 c r i t e r i a 
of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ) v i o l a t e s the sense of the p r a c t i c e since on the one hand, 
by i t s nature, i t s sense consists of the i n t e r n a l r ules of which i t i s a 
di s p l a y , and on the ot h e r , i t i s i n the context of i t s own c r i t e r i a t h a t i t 
expresses the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which should be the object of s o c i a l i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n . 
There are, then, aside from purely formal or otherwise non-substantive 
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c r i t e r i a , no general c r i t e r i a of r a t i o n a l i t y or i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , these consist 
only of the actual p r a c t i c e s of people i n diverse c u l t u r e s , or forms of l i f e . 
C r i t i c s , at t h i s p o i n t , leap up and demand to know how, i n t h a t case, do we 
ever know t h a t t h i s argument i s r i g h t ? Surely i t i s only as we confront a 
common r e a l i t y that we are able, f o r instance, t o communicate w i t h h i t h e r t o 
unknown t r i b e s w i t h strange languages, customs and p r a c t i c e s . While we do n o t , 
perhaps, have to agree w i t h the b e l i e f s of the t r i b e i n question, and can 
t o l e r a t e the u n t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y of perhaps major aspects o f t h e i r c u l t u r e , but 
there must be agreement as to what ( f o r instance) i t i s to make a t r u e or a 
false statement, and how t o agree about what i s e m p i r i c a l l y there or not there, 
or how t o i d e n t i f y o b j e c t s ( e t c . ) . (36) Since t h i s does i n f a c t happen, then 
i t f o l l o w s t h a t we do share a common c r i t e r i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y , on t h i s l e v e l 
at l e a s t . Lukes (37) also argues t h a t a l l s o c i e t i e s depend on a commonly 
shared r e a l i t y ( at l e a s t assumed) on the basis of which the p r e d i c t i o n s which 
form such a v i t a l p a r t of everyday l i f e can be made. 
H o l l i s (38) argues along somewhat s i m i l a r l i n e s t h a t when we t r y t o understand 
the utterances of a strange language, we must r e l a t e those utterances t o the 
world; what we have, i n the f i r s t place, are d i f f e r e n t classes of utterance 
r e l a t e d t o each other i n a way which i s mysterious t o the o u t s i d e r . The only 
way we can have access t o the r e l a t i o n s between these classes of utterances i s 
to i s o l a t e a class of utterances which correspond i n some way w i t h our own 
perceptions of what i s there. H o l l i s argues t h a t we must i n the end r e l y on 
our perceptions of what i s there and assume t h a t these c o i n c i d e , i n general, 
w i t h those of the subjects of our i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Communication between c u l t u r e s 
i s only p o s s i b l e , H o l l i s argues, i f we assume both t h a t we see more or less the 
same thi n g s as those we are t r y i n g t o understand, and t h a t we would say roughly 
the same thi n g s about them as our subjects would say. 
H o l l i s and Lukes claim to have established a c r i t e r i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y which i s 
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n o t c o n t e x t o r c u l t u r e dependent; such t r a n s c u l t u r a l ' b r i d g e h e a d s 1 depend f o r 
t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y on t h e v e r i f i a b i l i t y o f b e l i e f s by d i r e c t appeal t o e m p i r i c a l 
c r i t e r i a . (39) A b e l i e f i s i n correspondence w i t h r e a l i t y i f i t can be v e r i -
f i e d i n accordance w i t h c e r t a i n m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e means; i t i s i r r a t i o n a l 
when i t does n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o r e a l i t y , s i n c e , v h i l e i t p u r p o r t s t o c l a i m (so 
and so) t h i s i s e i t h e r f a l s i f i e d by e m p i r i c a l means o r i t i s i n p r i n c i p l e 
n e i t h e r d i r e c t l y v e r i f i a b l e n o r f a l s i f i e d by e m p i r i c a l means. (40) T h i s seems 
t o be n e i t h e r c o n t e x t bound n o r o p t i o n a l , and i n t e r - c u l t u r a l communication 
would seem t o depend upon i t . 
H o l l i s and Lukes a l s o argue t h a t s u r e l y , t h e r e i s a n o t h e r t r a n s - c u l t u r a l 
c r i t e r i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y ; a b e l i e f cannot be r a t i o n a l i f i t i s e i t h e r i n c o n s i s -
t e n t , s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , o r c o n s i s t s o f or r e l i e s on i n v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s . At 
t h e same t i m e , t h e o p e r a b l e l o g i c a l r u l e s w h i c h would s p e c i f y what i s t o count 
as an i n c o n s i s t e n c y , s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n o r i n v a l i d i n f e r e n c e , cannot be m a t t e r s 
o f pure c o n v e n t i o n , s i n c e i f we accept t h i s , t h e n t h e a d m i s s i o n must be made 
t h a t a language c o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e as p a r t o f i t s form o f l i f e , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t t h e laws o f n e g a t i o n , i d e n t i t y and n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n need n o t o p e r a t e . 
T h i s would make such a language t o t a l l y i n a c c e s s i b l e t o us, and hence we c o u l d 
never know t h a t t h i s was t h e case. 
T h i s would seem a p o w e r f u l argument a g a i n s t what i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d t h e 
" R e l a t i v i s t " p o s i t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h Winch. However, I would argue, ( f o l l o w i n g 
N e i l sen) (41) t h a t t h e r e i s no r e a l disagreement between Winch and these c r i t i c s 
winch's p o s i t i o n i s such t h a t these o b j e c t i o n s do n o t t o u c h h i s c e n t r a l argument 
Now Winch n o t e d " t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o u r g r a s p i n g forms o f r a t i o n a l i t y 
d i f f e r e n t f rom o u r s i n an a l i e n c u l t u r e .... a r e l i m i t e d by c e r t a i n f o r m a l 
r e q u i r e m e n t s c e n t r i n g round t h e demand f o r c o n s i s t e n c y " . ( 4 2 ) He goes on t o 
argue t h a t t h i s i s a l l but u s e l e s s , however, f o r s e p a r a t i n g r a t i o n a l b e l i e f s 
f rom i r r a t i o n a l ones, f o r t h e s e ' f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s ' t e l l ' \ J S n o t h i n g about 
what i n p a r t i c u l a r i s t o count as c o n s i s t e n c y , j u s t as t h e r u l e s o f t h e 
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p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s l i m i t , but do n o t themselves d e t e r m i n e what a re t o be 
p r o p e r v a l u e s o f P, Q, e t c . " ( 4 3 ) Lukes sees t h i s as s i m p l y a m i s l e a d i n g way 
o f s a y i n g t h a t a f t e r a l l i t i s the c o n t e n t o f p r o p o s i t i o n s n o t t h e l o g i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s between them which i s dependent on the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s between 
men. ( 4 4 ) 
As N e i l s e n p o i n t s o u t , i f we t a k e the f o r m a l c r i t e r i o n o f c o n s i s t e n c y a l o n e , 
t h e n i t i s n o t t h e case t h a t i t t e l l s us n o t h i n g } a l t h o u g h l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s 
a r e a l l t o p i c n e u t r a l , a l o n g w i t h ' s e v e r a l ' , 'most', ' a l t h o u g h ' , 'perhaps' and 
so on; th e s e t e r m s , even a p a r t f r o m t h e i r c o n t e x t , t e l l us a g r e a t deal about 
the f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s between t h e elements w h i c h t h e y are used t o r e l a t e . ( 4 5 ) 
However, most o f o u r t e r m s , and a g r e a t number o f s c i e n t i f i c a l l y and p h i l o s o p h -
i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g ones, a r e n o t t o p i c n e u t r a l . They have t h e i r own " d i s t i n c t i v e , 
i n f o r m a l , l o g i c a l powers" whi c h a r e o n l y a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h a grasp o f t h e i r 
usage. P r o p o s i t i o n s can be n e g a t i o n s , o r c o n t r a d i c t i o n s but c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m 
terms such t h a t o n l y a grasp o f t h e l o g i c a l powers o f these t o p i c n o n - n e u t r a l 
e x p r e s s i o n s w i l l enable us t o u n d e r s t a n d them; t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s 
i s o t h e r w i s e m e a n i n g l e s s . I t i s p r e c i s e l y these powers which d e r i v e from t h e 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s between men, t h e i r forms o f l i f e , and t h e i r embedded language 
games. The argument here i s between t h o s e who s u b s c r i b e t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
argument a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p r i v a t e language, o f whom Winch i s one, 
and those who r e j e c t t h i s argument, f o l l o w i n g (among o t h e r s ) A y e r and Strawson, 
o f whom H o l l i s i s one. Lukes, however, makes t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e r e may i n d e e d 
be c o n t e x t u a l c r i t e r i a a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e reasons f o r a c t i o n may be j u d g e d . I n 
any e v e n t , t h e f o r c e o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r aspect o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s p u t f o r w a r d 
by Lukes and H o l l i s depends upon t h e i r a r g u i n g a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a 
p r i v a t e language, and i n t h e e v e n t , n e i t h e r produces any s i g n i f i c a n t arguments. 
The p o i n t i s t h a t i t does n o t depend upon what t h e y c l a i m , t h a t Winch i s d e n y i n g 
th e need f o r f i e l d i n d e p e n d e n t , f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f c o n s i s t e n c y . T h i s i s 
s i m p l y n o t t h e case. ( 46) 
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The argument f o r a common c o n c e p t i o n o f r e a l i t y u n d e r l y i n g c u l t u r a l v a r i a b i l i t y 
i s c e r t a i n l y a more d i f f i c u l t problem. There i s some u n c e r t a i n t y as t o what 
Winch i s i n f a c t a r g u i n g f o r i n h i s work. I f he c l a i m s t h a t c r i t e r i a o f 
r a t i o n a l i t y a r e c o m p l e t e l y c o n t e x t dependent, t h e n t h e r e i s s u r e l y a head on 
c o l l i s i o n between h i m s e l f , and H o l l i s and Lukes. T h i s i s , f a i r l y c l e a r l y , n o t 
what he wants t o c l a i m , however. The f i n a l s e c t i o n o f " U n d e r s t a n d i n g a 
P r i m i t i v e S o c i e t y " c o n s i s t s o f Winch a r g u i n g f o r B i r t h , Death and P r o c r e a t i o n 
as p r e c i s e l y t h e s e s i g n i f i c a n t areas o f o v e r l a p between c u l t u r e s . Thus, w h i l e 
he r e c o g n i s e s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e r e t o be these i m p o r t a n t a r e a s t o be 
comparable, he n o n e t h e l e s s m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e y may w e l l have d i s t i n c t , d i v e r s e 
forms o f l i f e g i v i n g r i s e t o i n d i v i d u a l and p o s s i b l y incommensurable concep-
t i o n s o f r e a l i t y . The q u e s t i o n t h e n becomes; can we th e n use such c o n c e p t i o n s 
t o show t h a t a way o f l i f e i s i r r a t i o n a l ? 
vie have a l r e a d y been p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e argument t h a t , i f we a r e t o have any 
c r o s s - c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we must sh a r e a range o f everyday b e l i e f s ; we 
must a l s o s h a r e a n o t i o n o f how t h e t r u t h o f t h e s e as expressed i n s t a t e m e n t s 
i s t o be v e r i f i e d . H o l l i s wants t o move on from t h i s t o argue t h a t , a p a r t 
from everyday b e l i e f s , most c u l t u r e s have ' r i t u a l b e l i e f s ' o r ' m e t a p h y s i c a l 
b e l i e f s w h i c h i n f o r m everyday a c t i o n * . ( 4 7 ) These, a c c o r d i n g t o H o l l i s , do n o t 
have o b j e c t i v e l y s p e c i f i a b l e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , u n l i k e everyday b e l i e f s , f o r 
they do n o t depend upon d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t o e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , but a r e r a t h e r 
dependent upon each o t h e r f o r c r i t e r i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n (a coherence t h e o r y o f 
t r u t h ) . Thus, he wants t o ar g u e , w h i l e these b e l i e f s a r e u n v e r i f i a b l e , t h e y 
a r e n o n e t h e l e s s b e l i e f s f o r w h i c h reasons can be g i v e n , i n a v e r y good and 
r e c o g n i s a b l e sense o f r a t i o n a l i t y . B e l i e f s form ' c l u s t e r s ' ; one b e l i e f 
depends upon a n o t h e r t o s u p p l y i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
I n t h i s c o n t e x t , as a b e l i e f here c o r r e s p o n d s t o no i d e n t i f i a b l e r e a l i t y , 
w h i l e r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s i s t s i n t h e r e l a t i o n between b e l i e f s , t r u t h cannot be 
3 1 . 
a m a t t e r o f correspondence. Rather, where we have r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between 
r i t u a l b e l i e f s , we may speak o f ' m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h s ' . 
Given, however, t h a t H o l l i s and Lukes p r e v i o u s l y have argued t h e case, v e r y 
c o n v i n c i n g l y , f o r t h e n e c e s s a r y e x i s t e n c e o f a b r i d g e h e a d o f e m p i r i c a l b e l i e f s 
w h i c h make t h e s e concepts a c c e s s i b l e t o o t h e r c u l t u r a l o u t s i d e r s , a t some 
p o i n t t h e i r c i r c l e o f coherence must be broken o u t o f and some o f t h e b e l i e f s 
i n t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l m r e l a t e d t o t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d . Now, i t i s c l e a r l y 
p o s s i b l e t o read Winch so t h a t he i s t a k e n as n o t d e n y i n g t h e necessary 
e x i s t e n c e o f some u n i v e r s a l ( c u l t u r a l ) forms o f l i f e and t h e i r r e l a t e d l a n g -
uage games, t o do w i t h a c c o u n t i n g everyday o b j e c t s i n a •commonsensical' 
f a s h i o n . I n s o f a r as t h i s seems t o be n e c e s s a r i l y t h e case i f we a r e t o have 
th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n t e r - c u l t u r a l communication, i t would be d i f f i c u l t f o r 
Winch t o s u s t a i n a p o s i t i o n where he d i d n o t a l l o w a t l e a s t t h i s minimum l e v e l 
o f c o m p a r a b i l i t y . 
T h i s i s n o t t o say, however, t h a t t h e r e b y , s o c i e t i e s share a c o n c e p t i o n o f 
r e a l i t y f o r t h e s e shared c o n c e p t i o n s seem t o c o n s i s t o f o n l y a s m a l l a rea 
where common c r i t e r i a may be r e c o g n i s e d by members o f d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s . I t 
i s a l s o c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t , as H o l l i s has argued, t h e r e a r e d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a 
o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s , t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f w h i c h makes them, 
except a t any i m p o s s i b l y remote p o i n t o f c o n t a c t , incommensurable w i t h t h o s e 
h e l d i n o t h e r c u l t u r e s . 
W h i l e we must acc e p t t h a t t h e r e a r e areas h e l d i n common by d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , 
and i t i s t h i s which makes them comparable, t h e r e i s no way we can d e c i d e 
t h a t t h e common area i s t h e s o l e r e a l i t y , o r even t h e most i m p o r t a n t one. As 
Humpty Dumpty says i n "Through t h e L o o k i n g G l a s s " , "The q u e s t i o n i s who i s t o 
be m a s t e r , t h a t i s a l l " . I have a l r e a d y r e f e r e n c e d S t e i n e r ' s comments on t h e 
problems o f u n i v e r s a l language and t r a n s l a t i o n - ' o n l y t h e more i n e r t a s p e c t s 
o f s i g n i f i c a n c e s u r v i v e ' . ( 4 8 ) 
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Many t y p e s o f b e l i e f s a r e s i m p l y incommensurable because we do n o t h o l d 
c r i t e r i a i n common whic h c o u l d be MEANINGFULLY used t o assess them - f o r 
i n s t a n c e , r i t u a l b e l i e f s about heaven, o r s p i r i t s . We c o u l d n o t m e a n i n g f u l l y 
c o n f i r m o r d i s c o n f i r m such b e l i e f s f o r t h e l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s necessary t o 
t i e them t o a common e m p i r i c a l w o r l d cannot e x i s t . On t h e o t h e r hand, such 
b e l i e f s w i l l be i n t e r n a l l y connected (remember W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s comments on 
• p l o u g h i n g t h r o u g h t h e whole l a n g u a g e ' ) , so as t o s u p p o r t each o t h e r ; so 
complex i s t h e 'complete m y t h o l o g y ' c o n t a i n e d i n t h e language t h a t even a 
s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k on c e r t a i n p e r i p h e r a l b e l i e f s cannot t h r e a t e n t h e c e n t r a l 
f e a t u r e s o f t h e b e l i e f system. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks on t h e n a t u r e o f c e r t a i n t y are h i g h l y r e l e v a n t h e r e ; he 
b e l i e v e d t h a t knowledge was o n l y p o s s i b l e on t h e b a s i s o f grounds w h i c h c o u l d 
be s a i d t o be n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e . 
670 We m i g h t speak o f t h e 'fundamental p r i n c i p l e s o f 
human e n q u i r y ' . 
671 I f l y from here t o a p a r t o f t h e w o r l d where t h e 
peo p l e have o n l y i n d e f i n i t e i n f o r m a t i o n , o r none 
a t a l l , about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f l y i n g . I t e l l them 
I have j u s t f l o w n t h e r e f r o m .... They ask me i f I 
m i g h t be m i s t a k e n - t h e y have o b v i o u s l y a f a l s e 
i m p r e s s i o n o f how t h e t h i n g happens. ( I f I were 
packed up i n a box, i t w o u l d be p o s s i b l e f o r me t o 
be m i s t a k e n about t h e way I had t r a v e l l e d ) . I f I 
s i m p l y t e l l them t h a t I c a n ' t be m i s t a k e n , t h a t won't 
perhaps c o n v i n c e them; but i t w i l l i f I d e s c r i b e t h e 
a c t u a l p r o c e d u r e t o them. Then they w i l l c e r t a i n l y 
n o t b r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a m i s t a k e i n t o t h e 
q u e s t i o n . But f o r a l l t h a t - even i f t h e y t r u s t me -
t h e y m i g h t b e l i e v e I had been dreaming o r t h a t magic 
had made me imagine i t . ( 4 9 ) 
There a r e c e r t a i n o f our own b e l i e f s , W i t t g e n s t e i n says, w h i c h we cannot be 
s e n s i b l y s a i d t o d o u b t , f o r we cannot i m a g i n e what d i s c o n f i r m a t i o n here would 
l o o k l i k e . These w o u l d , i n l a r g e p a r t , f o r m t h e k i n d s o f knowledge on whic h 
t h e i n t e r c u l t u r a l b r i d g e h e a d s a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d c o u l d be b u i l t . Claims t o 
knowledge, he says, c o n s i s t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which one i s p r e p a r e d t o g i v e 
c o m p e l l i n g grounds, t o demonstrate t h e c l a i m . 
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However, t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n k i n d s o f b e l i e f o f which t h e grounds w h i c h might 
be g i v e n a r e no s u r e r t h a n t h e a s s e r t i o n - f o r i n s t a n c e , ' I have a body' o r 
•The w o r l d e x i s t e d l o n g b e f o r e I was b o r n 1 ; he argues t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e 
t o imagine what t h e d i s c o n f i r m a t i o n o f such c l a i m s might be l i k e . About 
such e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , no doubt can e x i s t , i f making judgments i s t o be 
p o s s i b l e a t a l l . ( 5 0) 
C o n t i n u i n g doubt a b o u t , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e meaning o f words, o r t h e j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n o f i n d u c t i v e arguments, o r t h e r e a l i t y o f m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , o r t h e i r 
p e r s i s t e n c e i s n o t something w h i c h can be s e t t l e d by p r o d u c i n g i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e 
e v i d e n c e , but i s something w h i c h ceases t o be s e n s i b l e i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e 
a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n w h i c h i t m i g h t o c c u r ; these are q u e s t i o n s w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y 
do n o t a r i s e a t a l l - a t l e a s t i n t h e u s u a l c o n t e x t s - w h i c h i s n o t t o say 
t h a t such doubts m i g h t n o t serve some purpose w i t h i n o t h e r language games, 
such as p h i l o s o p h y . 
Here we seem t o have an argument a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c r o s s c u l t u r a l 
a n a l y s i s ; w h i l e Winch has r e c e n t l y s t a t e d t h a t he most c e r t a i n l y does n o t w i s h 
t o c l a i m t h a t ' t h e ways i n w h i c h we l i v e never be c r i t i c i s e d , n or t h a t a way 
o f l i v i n g can n e v e r be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as i n any sense i r r a t i o n a l ; s t i l l l e s s 
do I argue t h a t men who b e l o n g t o one c u l t u r e can never u n d e r s t a n d l i v e s l e d 
i n a n o t h e r c u l t u r e ' ( 5 1 ) , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how t h i s can be d e r i v e d from 
what he a c t u a l l y w r i t e s . S t a n l e y S t e i n ( 5 2 ) and Kai N e i l s e n ( 5 3 ) b o t h m a i n t a i n 
t h a t Winch's d e n i a l o f what seems t o be t h e c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n s o f h i s work i s 
on t h e b a s i s o f i t s c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e n a t u r e ; i t seems u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e t o us 
t h a t we would want t o be a b l e t o c r i t i c i s e , say, l i f e amongst t h e I k , o r i n 
th e T h i r d Reich o r amongst t h e Dobuans. S t e i n has proposed t h a t t h i s i n t u i -
t i v e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t we can c r i t i c i s e a way o f l i f e as a whole i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
t i e d t o an i n c o h e r e n t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e s i s ; N e i l s e n o b j e c t s t h a t t h i s has n o t 
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been e s t a b l i s h e d e i t h e r by S t e i n or d i n c h , and 'on t h e f a c e o f i t a t l e a s t , t h e 
c l a i m seems q u i t e i m p l a u s i b l e 1 ( 5 4 ) . What a r e t h e reasons, t h e n , t h a t Winch 
seems t o f i n d h i m s e l f i n such a c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e p o s i t i o n ? I want t o argue 
t h a t t h i s d e r i v e s from c e r t a i n o f h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and t h a t , 
f u r t h e r , these cannot be d e r i v e d from what he c l a i m s i s t h e i r s o u r c e , t h e 
l a t e r work o f W i t t g e n s t e i n . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n and Winch 
You w i l l r e c a l l t h a t e a r l y i n 'The Idea o f a S o c i a l Science', Winch f o r m u l a t e s 
h i s c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e as t h e i d e a t h a t 'The concepts t h a t we have s e t t l e f o r 
us t h e f o r m o f e x p e r i e n c e we have o f t h e w o r l d ' . ( 5 5 ) F u r t h e r , he proposed 
t h a t ' S o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a r e e x p r e s s i o n s o f i d e a s about r e a l i t y ' ( 5 6 ) , and t h a t 
•each system o f i d e a s , i t s component ele m e n t s b e i n g i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t e r n a l l y , 
has t o be u n d e r s t o o d i n and f o r i t s e l f . ( 5 7 ) I hope t o have shown how t h i s 
l e a d s Winch t o t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t he f i n d s h i m s e l f i n , b u t t h e q u e s t i o n now 
becomes - what i s i t about h i s o p e r a t i n g p r e c e p t s t h a t l e a d s him t h e r e ? 
To b e g i n w i t h , Winch argues t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e n a t u r e o f S o c i a l 
phenomena i n g e n e r a l , t h e e l u c i d a t i o n o f t h e concept 'form o f l i f e ' belongs 
n o t t o S o c i o l o g y , but t o Epistemology ( 5 8 ) ; a t t h e v e r y l e a s t , t h e i r r e l a t i o n -
s h i p i s much c l o s e r t h a n i s u s u a l l y supposed. The c e n t r a l problem o f s o c i o l o g y , 
t h a t o f g i v i n g an account o f t h e n a t u r e o f s o c i a l phenomena i n g e n e r a l , belongs 
t o p h i l o s o p h y ; s o c i o l o g y here i s r e a l l y a ' m i s b e g o t t e n e p i s t e m o l o g y ' ( 5 9 ) . 
The s o c i o l o g i s t i s faced w i t h t h e problem t h a t t h e r u l e s w h i c h govern s o c i o -
l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n cannot p r o v i d e c r i t e r i a i n terms o f which he may i d e n t i f y 
what i s g o i n g on i n two o r more s i t u a t i o n s , r a t h e r , i t i s t h e c r i t e r i a w h i c h 
a r e a p p l i e d by t h o s e whom he i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h i c h w i l l d e cide t h a t . ( 60) 
At t h i s p o i n t , Winch i s a r g u i n g t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n t h e s o c i o l o g i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
s o c i e t y i n t h e way t h a t a s c i e n t i s t o r an e n g i n e e r u n d e r s t a n d s a machine, he 
i s more l i k e l y t o u n d e r s t a n d i t i n t h e way t h a t he u n d e r s t a n d s how h i s 
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c o l l e a g u e s a re o p e r a t i n g i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . S o c i o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f o r 
Winch, can o n l y be based on t h e c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g a c t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t 
i n q u e s t i o n . T h i s i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h e language t h a t i s used, and 'speaking 
a language' i n l a r g e p a r t c o n s i s t s o f knowing how t o go on i n p a r t i c u l a r 
s i t u a t i o n s . 
The p o i n t s h o u l d be made, and i n d e e d , W i t t g e n s t e i n makes t h e p o i n t v e r y c l e a r l y , 
t h a t t h i s c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t account i s n o t a l l t h e r e i s t o sp e a k i n g a language. 
Hunter makes t h e p o i n t : 
" .... u n l i k e most o r d i n a r y games, language games 
are i n t r i c a t e l y bound up w i t h o t h e r a s p e c t s o f 
l i f e , w i t h p l a n s and f e a r s and t h o u g h t s and a c t i v i t i e s , 
and cannot be u n d e r s t o o d i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m t h e s e " ( 6 1 ) 
That i s t o say, r a t h e r t h a n s e e i n g t h e language speakers as u n d e r s t a n d a b l e 
p u r e l y i n terms o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e language t h a t t h e y use t o 
r e p r e s e n t t h e w o r l d , we must r e c o g n i s e t h a t every member o f s o c i e t y i s a f f o r d e d , 
i n t h e r e f l e c t i v e ( o r r e f l e x i v e ) f a c u l t y w h i c h i s a necessary f e a t u r e o f h i s 
(human) c o n d i t i o n , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f , i n h i s a c t i o n s and speech, a t t e n d i n g t o 
th e r e l a t i o n between h i s speech o r a c t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d , and c r e a t i v e l y r e -
f o r m u l a t i n g t h a t r e l a t i o n ( 6 2 ) . 
The d i f f e r e n c e may h i n g e on t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n g i v e n t o t h e n o t i o n o f a con-
v e n t i o n . S t a n l e y C a v e l l expresses t h e p o i n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way: 
"That t h a t s h o u l d express boredom or anger o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
i s n o t n e c e s s a r y ; someone may have t o be s a i d ' t o under-
s t a n d s u d d e n l y ' , and t h e n always f a i l t o m a n i f e s t t h e 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g f i v e m i n u t e s l a t e r , j u s t as someone may be 
bored by an e a r t h q u a k e , o r by t h e death o f h i s c h i l d , o r 
th e d e c l a r a t i o n o f m a r t i a l l aw, o r may be ang r y a t a p i n , 
a c l o u d o r a f i s h , j u s t as someone may q u i e t l y ( b u t 
c o m f o r t a b l y ? ) s i t on a c h a i r o f n a i l s . That human b e i n g s 
on t h e whole do n o t respond i n these ways, i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
s e r i o u s l y r e f e r r e d t o as c o n v e n t i o n a l ; but now we a r e t h i n k i n g 
o f c o n v e n t i o n n o t as t h e arrangements a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e 
has found c o n v e n i e n t Here the a r r a y o f c o n v e n t i o n s a re 
not p a t t e r n s o f l i f e w hich d i f f e r e n t i a t e men f r o m one a n o t h e r , 
but t h o s e e x i g e n c i e s o f conduct w h i c h a l l men s h a r e . " ( 6 3 ) 
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T h i s makes r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r u l e - o r i e n t a t i o n o f members o f a s o c i e t y , t o 
a t t e n d t o r u l e s i s necessary i f what we do i s t o 'come o f f as a w a r r a n t e d 
performance. However, we s h o u l d , a t t h e same t i m e r e c o g n i s e t h a t c o n v e n t i o n s 
do n o t s p e c i f y t h e meaning o f t h e a c t i o n f o r t h e p e r f o r m e r ; these may be 
a c c e s s i b l e i n c o n t e x t , but i t i s by no means c l e a r a t a l l t h a t what i s 
a c c e s s i b l e i s an e x h a u s t i v e , c l e a r l y d e f i n e d n o r in d e e d c l e a r l y d e f i n a b l e 
s e t o f c r i t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s ; even i f t h i s were t h e case, i t i s by no means 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e w a r r a n t , o r t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s 
i n v o l v e d c o u l d p r o v i d e t h e meaning o r t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e speech f o r t h e 
speaker and o t h e r s i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . Nor, I would argue, i s t h i s a consequence 
o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s arguments f o r t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r i v a t e language. 
T h i n k , o f n e c e s s a r i l y ambiguous o r vague meaning a t t a c h e d t o a c t i o n o r speech 
i n everyday s i t u a t i o n s ; most m a r r i a g e s , a re f u l l o f d i f f e r e n t 'atmospheres' 
where s u b t l e nuances o f emotion may be a v a i l a b l e o n l y t o the main p a r t i c i p a n t s 
because o v e r l a p p i n g s e t s o f c o n v e n t i o n s may be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n p l a y ; H a r o l d 
G a r f i n k e l demonstrated t h a t when, f o r i n s t a n c e , we c o n s c i o u s l y r u p t u r e such 
i n t i m a t e c o n t e x t s , by, f o r example, b e i n g e x t r a - p o l i t e i n o u r own home, we 
c r e a t e t r o u b l e , n o t because c o n v e n t i o n s a re b e i n g v i o l a t e d , but because a p a r t 
from t h e a c t o r n e c e s s a r i l y h a v i n g t o a t t e n d t o t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g speech and 
a c t i o n , t h e a c t o r must a l s o 'take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' f o r t h e c h o i c e s t h a t he makes 
amongst those r u l e s . ( 6 4 ) I f o u r concepts d i d i n d e e d s e t t l e f o r us t h e fo r m 
o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t we have o f t h e w o r l d , and u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n s i s t e d s i m p l y o f 
g r a s p i n g how t o go on w i t h t h o s e c o n c e p t s , t h e n such t r o u b l e s c o u l d n o t a r i s e , 
f o r we c o u l d s i m p l y impose t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t o u r competence as members 
o f s o c i e t y g i v e s us o n t o e v e r y o c c a s i o n o f i n t e r a c t i o n . 
Of what c o u l d such competence c o n s i s t , however? We must a c c e p t t h a t language 
games, a l t h o u g h t h e y must serve as t h e s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h speech o r a c t i o n 
i s ' e v a l u a t e d ' ( r a t h e r t h a n de-coded), n o n e t h e l e s s change c o n t i n u a l l y , a c c o r d i n g 
t o t h e changes i n t h e environment t o w h i c h , i n p a r t t h e y a r e a response, and 
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t o t h e c r e a t i v e a c t i o n s o f those who p l a y them. I f t h i s were not t h e case, 
t h e n s o c i e t i e s c e r t a i n l y would n o t have e v o l v e d , and c o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t e x i s t . 
H i l a r y Putnam makes t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t : 
"Assume (as i s p l a u s i b l e ) t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d a 
st a t e m e n t i s t o be e x p l a i n e d as 'knowing i t s 
t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ' . I f t r u t h i s correspondence 
t o r e a l i t y , i t would seem as i f o f what t h e 
correspondence i s i s pre-supposed by knowledge 
t h a t such and such a s t a t e m e n t s t a n d s i n t h e 
r e l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n t o a n y t h i n g o r does not 
s t a n d i n t h e r e l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n t o a n y t h i n g . 
And i f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t i s equated 
w i t h knowing what i t i s f o r , i t seems t o be 
t h e case t h a t i t stands o r does n o t s t a n d i n 
t h e r e l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n t o a p p r o p r i a t e e n t i t i e s , 
t h e n knowledge o f what t h e correspondence i s , i s 
pre-supposed i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e v e r y s t a t e m e n t . 
But i n what c o u l d t h i s knowledge - w h i c h does n o t 
c o n s i s t i n t h e acceptance o f s t a t e m e n t s , because i t 
i s p r i o r t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a l l s t a t e m e n t s -
c o n s i s t ? ( 6 5 ) 
Putnam argues t h a t t h e c l a i m t h a t we know what a st a t e m e n t means by v i r t u e 
o f t h e f a c t t h a t we have a p r i o r ( e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c ) c o n c e p t i o n o f i t s r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e r e a l i t y i t p u r p o r t s t o d e s c r i b e i s i n c o h e r e n t ; t o l e a r n a language 
one does n o t need t o know t h a t t h e r e i s a correspondence between words and 
e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t i e s ; t h a t t h e r e i s , i n f a c t , such a correspondence 
accounts f o r t h e success o f t h e language, but i s n o t necessary f o r t h e language 
t o o p e r a t e i n t h e way t h a t i t i n f a c t does. The language r a t h e r , o p e r a t e d as 
a r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y IN USE; we can (and do) t a l k about a n y t h i n g , once we have 
t h i s f a c u l t y ; we are c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e grammar o f t h e language, r a t h e r t h a n 
by t h e necessary r e l a t i o n s between i t s s t a t e m e n t s and t h a t t o whi c h i t may r e f e 
Now t h i s i s n o t a c l a i m t h a t we cannot ( e m p i r i c a l l y ) have such knowledge; 
r a t h e r , i f we t a k e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o i n t , t h e r e i s a c o n f u s i o n here between a 
c o n c e p t u a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e grammar o f t h e language games i n v o l v e d , and an 
e m p i r i c a l a c c o u n t o f t h e n a t u r e o f human knowledge. The c r i t e r i a w h i c h j u s t i f y 
t h e s e n s i b l e use o f a s t a t e m e n t a re p a r t o f t h e grammar o f t h e language game 
i n which i t i s employed; t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s a r e 
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aecessary r e l a t i o n s between language and r e a l i t y ; r a t h e r , t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n 
i s a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n , a p r i o r i , n o n - i n d u c t i v e c o n v e n t i o n a l evidence w h i c h 
j u s t i f i e s t h e sentences employed i n a language game. (66) 
How do these arguments r e l a t e t o winch's problem, then? R e c a l l my c o n t e n t i o n 
t h a t t h i s p r o b l e m d e r i v e s from t h e way i n which he i n t e r p r e t s t h e n o t i o n t h a t 
o u r concepts s e t t l e f o r us t h e form o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t we have o f the w o r l d , 
and f u r t h e r , t h a t these c o n c e p t s have meaning o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i r 
employment, by v i r t u e o f t h e i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e l y a v a i l a b l e r u l e s o r c o n v e n t i o n s 
w h i c h members o r i e n t t o i n t h e i r employment. The problem a r i s e s f o r Winch when 
he i s c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t communication between c u l t u r e s does, i n 
f a c t , t a k e p l a c e . He must concede t h a t t h e r e a r e m i n i m a l a r e a s w i t h i n w h i c h 
comparison must be p o s s i b l e , g i v e n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s g o v e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e ( i t 
would seem) o f a l l human r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . At the same t i m e , 
he argues t h a t t h e s e b a s i c 'bridgeheads' between c u l t u r e s cannot be used t o 
j u s t i f y comparisons between what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e v a s t b u l k o f c u l t u r a l b e l i e f 
systems, c o n s i s t i n g as t h e y do o f a huge amount o f s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h r e l y f o r 
t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y upon the s u p p o r t o f t h e i n t e r n a l 'mythology' o f t h e language 
w h i c h t h e y make up. 
I t would be h e l p f u l , h e r e , i f we c o u l d s e p a r a t e o u t t h e c o n c e p t u a l from t h e 
e m p i r i c a l a r e a s , i n s o f a r as t h i s i s p o s s i b l e . W i t t g e n s t e i n c l e a r l y c o n s i d e r s 
t h i s t o be a key problem, and n o t one w h i c h can o f f e r hope o f a ready s o l u t i o n . 
Thus, he i n q u i r e s , " I s i t t h a t r u l e and e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n merge i n t o one 
a n o t h e r ? " (67) 
Winch's account o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t r a d e s on t h e i d e a t h a t language i s i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v e l y a v a i l a b l e because o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f r u l e s , w h i c h enable sense 
t o be made o f i t s s t a t e m e n t s ; these r u l e s a re c o n v e n t i o n a l , and p r o v i d e us w i t h 
t h e concepts w h i c h we have about t h e r e a l i t y w h i c h we i n h a b i t - indeed, t h e 
concepts w h i c h we have c o n s t i t u t e f o r us t h e r e a l i t y which we i n h a b i t . The 
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Form o f L i f e c o n s i s t s i n t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e w o r l d , and o u r f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f i t . These a r e i n d i v i s i b l e , n e i t h e r h a v i n g sense a p a r t from t h e i r r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e o t h e r . As i s w e l l known, t h i s i s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s ' s o l u t i o n ' t o t h e 
p r o b l e m o f d u a l i s m . 
To argue t h a t o u r concepts s e t t l e t h e form o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t we have seems 
t o me t o r e - i n s t a t e j u s t such d u a l i s m , however, Winch c l e a r l y t a k e s from t h i s 
a ccount o f the r e l a t i o n o f speech t o the w o r l d t h e i d e a t h a t , t h e r e b y , t h e 
o n l y access we have t o t h e meaning o f t h e w o r l d i n h a b i t e d i s t h r o u g h speech. 
Now, i f t h i s were t h e case, t h e n t h e problems w h i c h have been s e t o u t would 
i n d e e d f o l l o w , s i n c E w o r l d - v i e w s would be incommensurable, and t h e r e would be 
no way o f d e c i d i n g between them. ( 6 8 ) As has been d i s c u s s e d , some c o n t a c t w i t h 
t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i s a necessary f e a t u r e o f any f o r m o f l i f e i f we a r e t o 
even be a b l e t o communicate w i t h each o t h e r , l e t a l o n e p e o p l e i n o t h e r c u l t u r e s . 
I t would seem t h a t we a r e faced w i t h e i t h e r t a k i n g t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d f o r 
g r a n t e d ( i t must be t h e same f o r a l l p e o p l e s ) o r e l s e assuming t h a t t h e d i f f -
e rences between t h e c o n c e p t u a l schemes wh i c h d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s employ makes 
them i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t o each o t h e r , e x c e p t on a m i n i m a l l e v e l . 
I would argue, however, t h a t t h i s o n l y comes about 1 f we accept t h e n o t i o n 
t h a t our c o n c e p t s d e t e r m i n e our e x p e r i e n c e . We have seen what t h e consequences 
o f t h i s d o c t r i n e are f o r s o c i a l s c i e n c e as Winch would have i t ; what i s t h e 
w a r r a n t f o r t h i s d o c t r i n e i t s e l f ? 
Our concepts have meaning f o r us o n l y because we can i n t e r p r e t them a c c o r d i n g 
t o r u l e . F o l l o w i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s account o f t h e e s s e n t i a l l y p u b l i c n a t u r e 
o f language and meaning, Winch argues t h a t i t i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t an i n d i v -
i d u a l s h o u l d 'have' a p r i v a t e meaning f o r any e x p e r i e n c e ; naming o r a c c o u n t i n g 
e x p e r i e n c e can o n l y t a k e p l a c e because we have l e a r n e d a language w i t h i n which 
i t i s s e n s i b l e t o a s c r i b e t h i s o r t h a t p r o p e r t y t o any e v e n t . Thought l e a d s 
us t o language, because o n l y i n terms o f language i s i t p o s s i b l e t o imagine 
t h o u g h t . Sense i s a p u b l i c phenomenon because i t i s an o r d e r e d phenomenon; 
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o u r language p e r m i t s us t o make sense, and t h i s c o n s i s t s i n making s t a t e m e n t s , 
or h a v i n g t h o u g h t s w h i c h we r e c o g n i s e i n accordance w i t h t h e c o n v e n t i o n s which 
o b t a i n , r e g a r d l e s s o f o u r w i l l , i n t h e c o n t e x t s , i n t h e s o c i e t y o f w h i c h we 
are members. 
Imagine, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t we went t o t h e Amazon, and d i s c o v e r e d a new s p e c i e s 
o f f i s h , o r a n i m a l . We c o u l d n o t s e n s i b l y d e c i d e t o use any name whic h we 
mig h t care t o i n v e n t as t h e name o f t h e c r e a t u r e w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g , b e f o r e h a n d , 
t o those w i t h whom we wanted t o use t h e name, some d e t a i l s about what t h e animal 
was l i k e , i t s s i z e , c o l o u r , p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s , d i e t e t c . Only t h e n w o u l d i t 
be s e n s i b l e f o r us t o b e g i n t o use a name. Here, t h e c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g 
the use o f t h e name would r e q u i r e us t o p r o v i d e a w a r r a n t ( i n t h e f o r m o f t h e 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f what one was l i k e ) b e f o r e we c o u l d 'make sense* i n u s i n g t h e 
name. 
When such background knowledge i s m i s s i n g , t h e n language can be used t o p r o v i d e 
the necessary w a r r a n t ; sometimes t h i s i s ' e x p e r t knowledge', but i n g e n e r a l , 
the meaning o f a word need not i n c l u d e t h i s k i n d o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . As W i t t g e n -
s t e i n says, language i s a m o t l e y , and r a t h e r t h a n t h e r e b e i n g one s t a n d a r d 
w h i c h f i x e s what t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s i n g a word must be, t h e r e a r e r a t h e r , 
w i d e l y v a r y i n g s t a n d a r d s , a p p r o p r i a t e i n d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f c o n t e x t . I t i s 
d e f i n i t e l y n o t t h e case t h a t t he r u l e s w h i c h govern t h e w a r r a n t a b l e use o f a 
word can be reduced t o one k i n d o f e v i d e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t , f o r we do n o t o n l y 
c l a s s i f y , v e r i f y o r f a l s i f y when we use words,but a l s o d i s c u s s . ( 69) 
i f f i n c h ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e w o r l d i s s e t t l e d f o r us i n t h e concepts w h i c h we have 
o f i t i s t a k e n as l i t e r a l , seems a l s o t o be a c l a i m t h a t such e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e 
w o r l d i s o u r s (we own i t , as i n d i v i d u a l members o f a community d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
from o t h e r c o m m u n i t i e s , w h i c h , l i k e w i s e , own t h e i r d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s o f 
p u t a t i v e l y t h e same w o r l d ) . I t must be t h e case t h a t Winch i s i n d i f f e r e n t t o 
th e n a t u r e o f t h e e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c w o r l d , f o r i n terms o f h i s own argument, t h i s 
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i s n o t a p o s s i b l e a r e a o f a n a l y s i s . Now, t h i s r esembles, i n some r e s p e c t s , 
t h e c l a i m o f t h e p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p a s s o c i a t e d w i t h Locke, w h i c h i s t h e s u b j e c t 
o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a t t a c k s i n h i s l a t e r work. (70) ( I t i s n o t , o f c o u r s e , a 
p r i v a t e language i n t h e sense which Locke i n t e n d e d , s i n c e t h i s i s a language 
based on t h e p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e o f one i n d i v i d u a l . ) 
There a re s i m i l a r i t i e s , however; a p a r t from t h e f a c t t h a t Winch i s a r g u i n g 
t h a t o n l y t h e members o f one c u l t u r e , r a t h e r t h a n one i n d i v i d u a l can own an 
e x p e r i e n c e , t h s c l a i m s make by Winch are v e r y s i m i l a r . W i t h i n one c u l t u r e , 
Winch i s c l a i m i n g , t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d a v a i l a b l e t o members o f t h a t 
c u l t u r e i s known by them i n a way n o t a v a i l a b l e t o members o f an o u t s i d e 
s o c i e t y ; w i t h o u t t h e concepts a v a i l a b l e t o t h e members o f t h a t c u l t u r e , no 
o u t s i d e r c o u l d have access t o t h e w o r l d i n h a b i t e d by i t s p e o p l e , s i n c e t h e i r 
e x p e r i e n c e i s o n l y a v a i l a b l e t o them t h r o u g h t h e i r ( ' p r i v a t e ' ) c o n c e p t s . 
Now t h e d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t s f o r winch i n t h e idea t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e 
c u l t u r e p r o v i d e t h e w a r r a n t f o r t h e j u s t i f i a b l e use o f words i n t h e language 
o f t h e s o c i e t y . I f Winch i s i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c 
w o r l d t o which t h e concepts r e f e r , t h e n he i s r e l y i n g on t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f 
competence by t h e members o f t h e s o c i e t y i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which they can 
p r o v i d e f o r t h e usage t h a t t h e y employ. That i s t o say, becoming a member o f 
a s o c i e t y must i n v o l v e l e a r n i n g t o a p p l y language i n accordance w i t h a s e t o f 
c o n v e n t i o n s i n t e r n a l t o t h e language. I f language i s n o t p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r 
o f o s t e n s i v e d e f i n i t i o n , which seems t o be t h e consequence o f Winch's exchanges 
w i t h H o l l i s and Lukes, t h e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e which i t s c o ncepts p r o v i d e f o r i t s 
members must be a p r o d u c t o f t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e sentences 
o f w h i c h i t c o n s i s t s . These must, f u r t h e r m o r e , be such t h a t t h e meaning o f 
t h e concepts i s a v a i l a b l e t o members fr o m the c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e i r 
employment. These language games p r o v i d e t h e u l t i m a t e p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e ; 
t h e n meaning c o n s i s t s o f 'goin g on i n t h i s way'; we must, a t some p o i n t , 
s i m p l y say ' t h i s i s what we do*. 
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What seems t o be m i s s i n g f r o m Winch's a c c o u n t , however, i s t h e idea o f language 
as an a c t i v i t y , o r as p a r t o f an a c t i v i t y . As A u s t i n p o i n t s out ( 7 1 ) , ' I do' 
as an u t t e r a n c e , i s p a r t o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f m a r r y i n g someone; when we say 
' I do', i t i s n o t j u s t t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e 'makes sense' i n t h e c o n t e x t i n 
w h i c h i t i s employed, w i t h o u r c o n v e n t i o n s about how i t i s t o be employed i n 
t h i s c o n t e x t i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y i n which we do l i v e . To say * I do' 
s i m p l y i s m a r r y i n g someone; i t i s a p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e . 
The p o i n t t o be made i s t h a t , w h i l e we can agree w i t h Winch t h a t our concepts 
w i l l p r o v i d e us w i t h a good account o f how t o go on i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g , 
i s i t a l s o t h e case t h a t t h i s knowledge comes t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e 
meaning o f t h e a c t i o n f o r t h o s e i n v o l v e d ? On t h e b a s i s o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t 
a c c o u n t , we w o u l d have t o say t h a t i f we can r e c o g n i s e t h e c o n v e n t i o n s t o 
which t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d can w a r r a n t a b l y be s a i d t o be o r i e n t i n g , on 
t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r a c t i o n s , t h e n we u n d e r s t a n d t h e meaning o f those a c t i o n s 
f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l s concerned. 
Now t h i s would be t h e case i f those concerned were automata, f o r whom t h e 
a c t i o n s c o u l d have o n l y t h e r e c o g n i s a b l e c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning; s u r e l y t h e r e 
must be, i n a l l cases, more t o t h e meaning o f t h e a c t i o n s f o r t h o s e concerned, 
however? As w e l l as b e i n g an u t t e r l y c o n v e n t i o n a l ceremony, m a r r i a g e i s a l s o 
t h e s e t t i n g f o r innumerable e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s - a p a r t from l o v e , f e a r , 
shame, re s e n t m e n t , h o s t i l i t y , j e a l o u s y , remorse, humour, k i n d n e s s and so on 
almost ad i n f i n i t u m . Now, u n l e s s these a r e expressed i n terms o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s 
i n v o l v e d , i n t h e s e t t i n g i n v o l v e d , t h e r e i s no p l a c e f o r them i n Winch's 
a c c o u n t . 
T h i s seems, t h e n , t o set l i m i t s t o t h e k i n d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t i s p o s s i b l e 
g i v e n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t a c c o u n t . Now, i t might be argued t h a t t h i s i s an 
i n e s c a p a b l e f e a t u r e o f human i n t e r a c t i o n ; t h a t people do have p r i v a t e t h o u g h t s , 
e m o t i o n s , f e e l i n g s which t h e y 'keep h i d d e n ' and t o which we cannot be p r i v y . 
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E x a c t l y so; however, t h i s , I would argue, i s a s e r i o u s i n c o n v e n i e n c e t o any 
account which i s c l a i m i n g t o be able t o e x p l i c a t e t h e meaning o f u t t e r a n c e s 
and a c t i o n s , s i n c e s u r e l y i t i s t o g e t round t h e n o t i o n o f a p r i v a t e e x p e r i -
ence t h a t Winch proposes language as t h e p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e medium o f sense. 
S u r e l y t h e ' p r i v a t e ' f e e l i n g s o f t h e a c t o r s i n v o l v e d are p r e c i s e l y what 
c o n s t i t u t e t h e meaning o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e f o r him o r her? 
Now, i t i s n o t t h e case t h a t t h e f e e l i n g s o f t h e a c t o r s a re incommunicable, 
f o r t h e p o i n t W i t t g e n s t e i n makes i s t h a t , w h i l e t h e se p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e s are 
n o n e t h e l e s s i n t e r n a l t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s concerned, they a r e i n p r i n c i p l e 
communicable; i t i s j u s t t h a t t h e y c o u l d not e n t e r t a i n a p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e 
w h i c h t h e y c o u l d n o t i n p r i n c i p l e communicate, f o r i f t h e y c o u l d n o t communi-
c a t e i t , now c o u l d t h e y e x p e r i e n c e i t ? I f these a r e n o t t h e k i n d s o f meaning 
whi c h Winch can c l a i m t o e x p l i c a t e from t h e p u b l i c performances a v a i l a b l e t o 
him, t h e n what i s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f h i s c l a i m t o have, i n t h e concepts w h i c h 
members o f a s o c i e t y h o l d , t h e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t they have o f t h e w o r l d ? We 
must t a k e c a r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s which any a n a l y s i s can o f f e r 
from t h e c l a i m s w h i c h an a n a l y s i s such as t h a t o f Winch would seem t o want t o 
make. The p o i n t i s n o t t h a t s i n c e Winch cannot o f f e r us the i n t e r n a l m e n t a l 
s t a t e s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l members o f a s o c i e t y , t h e r e b y h i s a n a l y s i s i s t o t a l l y 
u s e l e s s . As W i t t g e n s t e i n makes c l e a r , t h e search f o r t h e 'mental s t a t e s ' which 
c o r r e s p o n d t o how we a c t i n t h e w o r l d i s f u t i l e ; a l l we have a r e t h e a c t i o n s 
o f men, p h y s i c a l and v e r b a l . The r e a l q u e s t i o n i s n o t - how can we make sense 
o f t h e m y s t e r i o u s p r i v a t e e x i s t e n c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s ? But r a t h e r - what k i n d 
o f sense do we IN FACT make o f t h e p u b l i c w o r l d i n w h i c h we LIVE? 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y i n c l a i m i n g t h a t t he meaning o f p u b l i c l i f e comes down t o t h e 
c o n v e n t i o n s t o whi c h i t s a c t o r s a t t e n d t h a t Winch's v e r s i o n o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e 
i s u n w a r r a n t e d . Rather t h a n t h e concepts t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s have s e t t l i n g t h e i r 
e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d , i t i s t h e r e l a t i o n between those concepts and t h e i r 
employment i n t h e l i v e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s such e x p e r i e n c e . I t 
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i s not t h a t concepts d i c t a t e what the meaning o f t h e a c t i o n w i l l come t o , but 
t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f emp l o y i n g t h e concepts i n r e l a t i o n t o the e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c 
w o r l d , i n t h e ways t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s concerned a c t u a l l y do employ them, 
which c o n s t i t u t e s t h e meaning. (72) 
CODES, CONVENTIONS AND CONTEXT 
Now, e x p l a n a t i o n s o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r w h i c h u t i l i z e t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f t h e 
s u b j e c t s o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e maxims, c o n v e n t i o n s , o r r u l e s w h i c h guide t h e i r 
b e h a v i o u r are a s t a n d a r d p a r t o f s o c i o l o g y . Deviance i s one ar e a i n which 
these have, f o r many years formed an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a t t e m p t s t o account f o r 
t h e phenomena concerned. D. L. Wieder n o t e s ( 7 3 ) : 
"The c o n v i c t code i s t h e c l a s s i c a l o r t r a d i t i o n a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h o s e forms o f d e v i a n t b e h a v i o u r 
engaged i n by i n m a t e s , c o n v i c t s , o r r e s i d e n t s o f 
r e - h a b i l i t a t i o n e s t a b l i s h m e n t s o r o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
I n t r a d i t i o n a l a n a l y s e s o f d e v i a n t b e h a v i o u r , some 
s u b v e r s i v e o r c o n t r a c u l t u r a l n o r m a t i v e o r d e r i s 
searched o u t by t h e a n a l y s t and u t i l i z e d by him as 
an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s he has 
obse r v e d . " ( 7 4 ) 
Wieder goes on t o d e s c r i b e t h e s p e c i f i c s o f t h e code, wh i c h i s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f inmates and s t a f f about forms o f b e h a v i o u r r e c o g n i s e d by b o t h as c o n t r a r y 
t o t h e 'pro p e r ' ( i n inmate t e r m s ) r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two. I t i s 
b e h a v i o u r which i n v o l v e s ' s n i t c h i n g ' , 'copping o u t ' , t a k i n g advantage o f 
o t h e r r e s i d e n t s , s h a r i n g what you have, h e l p i n g o t h e r r e s i d e n t s , 'not messing 
w i t h o t h e r r e s i d e n t s ' i n t e r e s t s ' , n o t t r u s t i n g s t a f f , and showing l o y a l t y t o 
the r e s i d e n t s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r u l e s o f t h e code have been t r e a t e d as 
maxims o f conduct w h i c h r e s i d e n t s f o l l o w and e n f o r c e upon one a n o t h e r , and 
t h i s i s taken t o be a s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e r e g u l a r p a t t e r n s o f 
d e v i a n t b e h a v i o u r found amongst t h e in m a t e s . P a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o u r among 
inmates a r e ' p r o t e c t e d , s u p p o r t e d and encouraged by t h e code, though t h e y are 
n o t d i r e c t l y p r e s c r i b e d " . ( 7 5 ) The code, Wieder a r g u e s , p r o v i d e s t h e m o t i v a -
t i o n s t o engage i n p a t t e r n s o f d e v i a n t b e h a v i o u r , t o s a n c t i o n those p a t t e r n s 
p o s i t i v e l y , and n o t t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h o se p a t t e r n s even i f i t were i n t h e 
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r e s i d e n t s ' own i n t e r e s t t o do so. I n t h i s sense, an account o f t h e code i s 
an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o u r i t r e l a t e s t o . S t a f f a l s o used 
the code, Wieder says, because i t enabled them t o : 
i d e n t i f y o r name i n d i v i d u a l a c t s and p a t t e r n s 
o f r e p e t i t i v e a c t i o n and t o c o l l e c t t h e d i v e r s e a c t i o n s 
under t h e r u b r i c o f a s i n g l e m o t i v e and, i n t u r n , t o 
name them as t h e same k i n d o f a c t . They rendered 
r e s i d e n t a c t i o n s e n s i b l e o r r a t i o n a l by n o t i n g t he ways 
i n which r e s i d e n t a c t i o n was r u l e governed and d i r e c t e d 
t o w a r d s a c h i e v i n g g o a l s t h a t were s p e c i f i e d by t h e code 
.... R e s i d e n t s ' a c t i o n s were r e a s o n a b l e i n t h e sense 
t h a t t h e y had no c h o i c e but t o behave i n t h e f a s h i o n 
t h a t t h e y d i d . " ( 7 6) 
S t a f f were i n v o l v e d i n u s i n g , e x p l i c i t l y o r i m p l i c i t l y , a wide range o f s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s i n t h e i r use o f t h e code t o account inmates' b e h a v i o u r ; 
r u l e - g o v e r n e d a c t i o n , g o a l d i r e c t e d a c t i o n , i n t e n d e d and u n i n t e n d e d outcomes 
o f a c t i o n , n o r m a t i v e l y r e q u i r e d and n o r m a t i v e l y o p t i o n a l means o f a c h i e v i n g a 
m o r a l l y v a l u e d end, r o l e s , r o l e - b o u n d b e h a v i o u r and d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . 
The code t h u s s t r u c t u r e d s t a f f ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e b e h a v i o u r o f inmat e s . I t 
a l s o made t h e 'environment' ( r e l a t i o n w i t h i n m a t e s ) u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t r a n s -
s i t u a t i o n a l l y , t h a t i s t o say, u n d e r s t a n d i n g was n o n - s i t u a t i o n s p e c i f i c . 
M o t i v e s f o r inmate b e h a v i o u r c o u l d be r e l a t e d t o g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s o f t h e form 
o f l i f e o f t h e i n m a t e , r a t h e r t han r e l a t i n g them t o , say, d i r e c t p e r s o n a l 
f e e l i n g s t o w a r d i n d i v i d u a l s t a f f members. 
So f a r , the account which we have seems t o conform t o t h e k i n d o f e x p l a n a t i o n 
w h i c h M n c h would see as l e g i t i m a t e f o r s o c i a l s c i e n c e ; he would p o i n t o u t t h a t 
these men share a c u l t u r e w h i c h enables them t o 'see the p o i n t ' o f a c t i o n s i n 
the c o n t e x t s w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y o c c u r . Wieder goes on t o argue, however, t h a t 
one c o u l d see t h e code, as i t was employed by r e s i d e n t s , as a means o f p r o v i d i n g , 
f o r o u t s i d e r s and perhaps f o r themselves the ' s o c i a l f a c t ' c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; t h a t i s t o say, the code as a s e t o f convent&ons a c c o u n t s f o r 
compliance t o a n o r m a t i v e o r d e r , which i s e x t e r n a l and c o n s t r a i n i n g . To see 
i t as t h i s , however, i s t o make i t r a t h e r l i k e a t r a v e l o g u e n a r r a t i v e , o r a 
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s t o r y t o l d about e v e n t s w h i c h a r e happening on t h e s c r e e n . ( 7 7 ) 
P r e c i s e l y l i k e t h e n a r r a t i v e , Wieder a r g u e s , s e e i n g t h e t e l l i n g o f t h e code 
i n t h e s e terms i s t o de a l w i t h i t as an account t o be p a s s i v e l y absorbed i n 
i s o l a t i o n from t h e scenes w i t h i n w h i c h , IN FACT, i t i s a c o n t i n u o u s connected 
p a r t m a n i f e s t e d as an a c t i v e c o n s e q u e n t i a l a c t w i t h i n i t . 
T a k i n g t h e t a l k t h a t o c c u r r e d w i t h i n t h e scenes t h a t i n v o k e d t h e code, r e f e r r e d 
t o t h e code, o r r e l i e d on t h e code f o r t h e i r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y as m e r e l y a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f l i f e , an account o f t h e meaning o f t h e a c t i o n s f o r t h e a c t o r s 
concerned i s t o i g n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t , a t t h e same t i m e , t h i s t a l k was p a r t 
o f t h e a c t i o n i n v o l v e d i n t h o s e scenes, indeed - p a r t t h a t was i n c l u d e d w i t h i n 
t h e scope o f t h i n g s over w h i c h t h e code had j u r i s d i c t i o n . That i s t o say, t a l k 
i n v o l v i n g t h e code was ' r e f l e x i v e w i t h i n t h e s e t t i n g o f i t s o c c u r r e n c e ' . ( 7 8 ) 
Rather than b e i n g a d i s i n t e r e s t e d r e p o r t , the code, when i t was b e i n g t o l d , 
was i n v o k e d i n response t o m a t t e r s w h i c h were c r i t i c a l t o the h e a r e r and 
l i s t e n e r , s i n c e i t was a l i m i t and a p a r t o f t h e i r j o i n t a c t i o n . S i n g l e 
u t t e r a n c e s do many k i n d s o f 'work' i n t h e c o n t e x t s w i t h i n which t h e y o c c u r . 
They f o r m u l a t e t h e a c t i o n , and have consequence f o r i t , b o t h as i t o c c u r s , 
and as t h a t o c c u r r e n c e s t a n d s as p a r t o f t h e s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e ( s u b ) 
c u l t u r e w h i c h i s t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i v e e s t a b l i s h m e n t . 
Wieder goes on t o a n a l y s e t h e ways i n which a s i n g l e u t t e r a n c e c o u l d be r e -
w r i t t e n by e i t h e r n a i v e o r p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t p r i v y t o t h e code as 
a m u l t i f a c e t e d e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g the c o n t e x t w i t h i n 
w h i c h i t o c c u r s , and a l s o t h e p r a c t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e a l l i f e 
r e l a t i o n s between speaker and h e a r e r ( s ) . F u r t h e r , he p o i n t s o u t , i n d i v i d u a l 
u t t e r a n c e s s t a n d themselves as s t r a t e g i c moves whic h p o i n t t o and s u b t l e y o r 
d i r e c t l y m o d i f y t h e c o n t i n g e n c i e s w i t h i n t h e f i e l d o f p l a y o f w h i c h t h e 
c o n t e x t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e c o n s t i t u t e s . U t t e r a n c e s where t h e code was t o l d 
were always c o n s e q u e n t i a l ; a s i d e from i t s s t a t u s as a d e s c r i p t i o n , t h e code 
47. 
was a l s o , when i t was t o l d , produced as a move i n some o t h e r game - s t a f f 
who e x p l a i n e d i n m a t e s 1 b e h a v i o u r by c i t i n g t h e code would be j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r 
competence as s t a f f , o r d e f e n d i n g t h e i r a c t i o n s , o r a t t a c k i n g some o t h e r 
member o f s t a f f o r t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n , and so on. 
The code, ^'ieder p o i n t s o u t , i s a l s o n e c e s s a r i l y f l e x i b l e ; any s e t o f r u l e s 
i n use as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t r a n s - s i t u a t i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n o r d e s c r i p t i o n must 
r e t a i n an open c h a r a c t e r ; by i t s v e r y n a t u r e i t does not c o n s i s t o f a f i x e d 
s e t o f maxims, nor d i d such maxims as m i g h t be i n v o k e d a t a g i v e n t i m e have a 
d e f i n i t e scope o f a p p l i c a t i o n . When t h e code was i n v o k e d , i t was up t h e 
h e a r e r t o i d e n t i f y (make sense o f ) t h e s p e c i f i c u t t e r a n c e as p a r t o f t h e code. 
Since t h e code was n o t a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e ' f i n i s h e d ' f o r m a l r e a d y d e t a i l e d , 
any h e a r e r would o n l y have t h i s k i n d o f i n v o c a t i o n on which t o b u i l d up an 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s i n v o l v e d . Thus, at no time c o u l d t h e r e be 
s a i d t o be one s i n g l e p r o p e r o r c o r r e c t s e t o f u n e q u i v o c a l maxims; i t i s 
n o n e t h e l e s s t r u e t h a t n o t j u s t any p r o p o s a l would be a c c e p t a b l e , but how such 
judgments might be reached i s no t open t o any c l e a r f o r m u l a t i o n , s i n c e t h e 
v e r y f l e x i b i l i t y o f the code n e c e s s a r i l y l e a v e s open t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f mani-
p u l a t i o n and n e g o t i a t i o n . Given t h e m u l t i - f o r m u l a t i v e and m u l t i - c o n s e q u e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r o f t e l l i n g t h e code, Wieder r e c o g n i s e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t s t a f f 
were a c t i v e l y m a n i p u l a t e d by r e s i d e n t s when t h e code was t o l d , one t o t h e o t h e r , 
w i t h , p r o b a b l y as a necessary f e a t u r e o f t h e code's r e l a t i o n t o i t s own 
t e l l i n g , one l i n e f o r t h e inmates amongst t h e m s e l v e s , and a n o t h e r f o r inmates 
t o s t a f f . 
Wieder goes on t o argue t h a t s i n c e t e l l i n g t h e code c r e a t e s t h e s o c i a l r e a l i t y 
w hich t h e p erson i n v o l v e d o r i e n t s t o , a showing o f how t e l l i n g t h e code was 
p r o d u c t i v e o f a s o c i a l w o r l d o f r e a l e v e n t s r e q u i r e s n o t a ( c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t ) 
account OF t h e code, but a d e s c r i p t i o n of how 'some p a r t i c i p a n t .... went 
about t h e t a s k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g what he heard and saw as he was s e e i n g o r 
h e a r i n g i t ' . ( 7 9 ) He argues t h a t t h e m u l t i p l e f a c e t s o f t h e code, i f we a r e 
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t o u n d e r s t a n d them i n t h e ways t h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y o p e r a t e f o r the p e r s o n 
h e a r i n g them, r e q u i r e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e 'ongoing course o f d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e ' . 
That i s t o say, he a r g u e s , what we need i s n o t a d e s c r i p t i o n o f o b j e c t s as 
they were e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e o b s e r v e r , but a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e course o f 
e x p e r i e n c i n g those o c c u r r e n c e s ( t h e o b j e c t s w h i c h were e x p e r i e n c e d ) as 
themselves o b j e c t s . 
He t h e n goes on t o g i v e , n o t an account o f ' t h e code' but o f h i s c o l l e c t i n g 
of t h e code; what emerges from h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t , w h i l e he can produce, 
from inmcite^ t a l k and a c t i o n , a s e t o f r u l e s t o p l a u s i b l y account ( o r i f you 
l i k e , j u s t i f y ) members' t a l k and a c t i o n , w h i l e t h i s o r g a n i s e s and c l a s s i f i e s 
s p e c i f i c s i n t o c l a s s i f i a b l e t y p e s , t h i s s et o f r u l e s i t s e l f r e - f o r m u l a t e s 
and re-composes t h e p e r c e i v e d o r g a n i s a t i o n o f any scene t o which i t i s a p p l i e d . 
D i s p a r a t e b e h a v i o u r s become seen as i n s t a n c e s o f ' t h e same t h i n g ' . 
Now, w i e d e r p o i n t s o u t , i f we, i n f a c t , a t t e m p t t o e x p l i c a t e from any f o r m u l a t e d 
r u l e s p e c i f i c s o f inmate b e h a v i o u r , we w i l l f i n d t h a t t h e r u l e does n o t a l l o w 
us t o do so, except w i t h a t r i v i a l degree o f correspondence t o a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r . 
At the same t i m e , he a r g u e s , many r u l e s would seem t o p e r m i t o f d i r e c t l y 
o p p o s i t e p r e d i c t a b l e b e h a v i o u r s . (SO) While r u l e s may be e x p e r i e n c e d as 
p r e d i c t i v e ( i n t h e s e t t i n g s i n w h i c h t h e y o c c u r , they r e n d e r b e h a v i o u r b o t h 
i n t e l l i g i b l e and, as i t were, e x p e c t a b l e o r f a m i l i a r ) , t h e y are i n f a c t opera-
t i n g as i n t e r p r e t a t i v e d e v i c e s ; t h e i r openness o r f l e x i b i l i t y p e r m i t s a v a r i e t y 
o f p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , w h i c h may be s u b s c r i b e d t o by p a r t i c i p a n t s o r 
o b s e r v e r s on t h e b a s i s o f any number o f p o s s i b l e m o t i v a t i o n s . 
Any p r o d u c t i o n o f r u l e s t o account c o n v i c t b e h a v i o u r would be a p r o d u c t i o n 
open t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f t h e a c t i o n s o f those whom i t p u r p o r t e d l y 
accounts. That i s t o say, i t would have t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what i s done 
and s a i d by those who do and say i t ; but these r u l e s , Wieder p o i n t s o u t , cannot 
be an adequate e x p l a n a t i o n o f p a t t e r n s o f a c t i o n under t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f a 
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d e d u c t i v e t h e o r y , because i n t h e i n s t a n c e s where i t does e x p l a i n , s i t u a t i o n s , 
a c t i o n s and r u l e s cannot be INDEPENDENT elements. Thus we a r e bro u g h t back 
t o W i t t g e n s t e i n a g a i n . Not o n l y i s i t the case t h a t 'words o n l y have l i f e on 
t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e i r u t t e r a n c e , but here we have a good example o f ' r u l e ' 
and ' e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n ' merging i n t o one a n o t h e r . I s i t a l s o t he case 
t h a t ' a t some p o i n t one has t o pass from e x p l a n a t i o n t o mere d e s c r i p t i o n ? ' ( 8 1) 
As Wieder comments: 
"Thus, t e l l i n g t h e code, and any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e o f 
f o r m u l a t i n g t h e code e x h i b i t s , r a t h e r t h a n d e s c r i b e s o r 
e x p l a i n s , t h e o r d e r t h a t members ac h i e v e t h r o u g h t h e i r 
p r a c t i c e s o f showing and t e l l i n g each o t h e r t h a n p a r t i c u l a r 
e n c o u n t e r e d f e a t u r e s a r e t y p i c a l , r e g u l a r , o r d e r l y c o h e r e n t 
m o t i v a t e d o u t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f n o r m a t i v e c o n s t r a i n t and 
t h e l i k e . " ( 8 2) 
Wieder argues t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n s e e i n g ( d u a l i s t i c a l l y ) t h e two e v e n t s o f 'the 
s o c i a l a c t i o n t o be d e s c r i b e d ' and 'the d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l a c t i o n ' , 
( a l o n g w i t h i t s method) as two s e p a r a t e e v e n t s , what we must do i s t o produce 
'the a c c o u n t i n g - o f - s o c i a l - a c t i o n ' as a s i n g l e phenomenon; t h i s e x h i b i t s v i a 
th e o c c a s i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i n g such an a c c o u n t , i n t h e b e h a v i o u r s r e p o r t e d i n i t 
and t h e n o r m a t i v e o r d e r behind i t t h e o b s e r v a b l e and r e p o r t a b l e i n s t a n c e o f 
p a t t e r n e d , r e c u r r e n t and connected m o t i v a t e d a c t i o n s i n t h e i r s o c i a l l y s t a n d -
a r d i s e d s i t u a t i o n s , ( 8 3 ) 
For W i e d e r , e x p l a n a t i o n must g i v e way t o d e s c r i p t i o n , but n o t e , t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s 
w hich we g i v e have t h a t s t a t u s n o t because t h e y c l a i m t o be d i v o r c e d from 
i n t e r e s t s , but because t h e y do n o t c l a i m t o be l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f s o c i a l 
a c t i o n , but are o f f e r e d as one f u r t h e r i n s t a n c e o f t h e p r o d u c t which r e s u l t s 
from t h e l i v i n g p r a c t i c e s w h i c h a r e t h e t e l l i n g o f t h e code, f o r i n s t a n c e . 
They have b o t h t h e same l o g i c a l s t a t u s as t h e t e l l i n g o f t h e code has i n t h e 
s e t t i n g s i n whic h i t o c c u r s , and a l s o t h e same phenomenal s t a t u s , s i n c e t h e i r 
t e l l i n g o f t h e code may be read o r t r e a t e d as a source o f a d v i c e o r j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n by persons i n those s e t t i n g s , and may w e l l be so used. 
The l i n e drawn between Wieder's inmates and s t a f f , and t h e problems i n v o l v e d 
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are p r e c i s e l y t h e same. The i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f b e l i e f systems comes t o be 
the problem t h a t i t i s f o r Winch p r e c i s e l y because h i s view o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
l e a d s him t o expect t h a t s i n c e t h e problem o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g each o t h e r seems 
t o be s o l v e d w i t h i n c u l t u r e s , on t h e b a s i s o f h i s r e a d i n g o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
account o f t h e p u b l i c n a t u r e o f meaning and t h o u g h t , t h e d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h we 
have w i t h o t h e r c u l t u r e s n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s , s i n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s l i k e w i s e 
o n l y an everyday m a t t e r f o r members o f o t h e r c u l t u r e s on t h e same b a s i s . I f , 
however, we proceed n o t from t h e i d e a t h a t o u r concepts s e t t l e f o r us t h e 
form o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t we have o f t h e w o r l d , but r a t h e r , examine t h e way i n 
which t h e concepts ( t h i n k o f t h e code, and t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f f o r m u l a t i n g a 
c l e a r and u n e q u i v o c a l s e t o f r u l e s ) a c t u a l l y f u n c t i o n i n t h e s e t t i n g s i n 
which t h e y a re used, t h e n a whole new set o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s emerge. 
We cannot expect t h a t o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e meaning o f s o c i a l a c t i o n s i n 
o t h e r c u l t u r e s w i l l be o f a f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t o r d e r than o u r under-
s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l a c t i o n s i n o u r own c u l t u r e , however t h a t c u l t u r e be d e f i n e d , 
w i e d e r ' s s t u d y argues v e r y c o g e n t l y t h e problems i n v o l v e d i n g a i n i n g access 
t o the r u l e s which o p e r a t e i n a s o c i a l s e t t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f o u r own 
s o c i e t y . Should ue expect t o have a s u p e r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e Azande 
than we can have o f members o f our own s o c i e t y ? 
Note a l s o t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i n k i n g o f c o n c e p t s as 'o u r s ' . Winch has 
c i t e d W i t t g e n s t e i n t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t these are i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e phenomena, y e t , 
we are c o n s t a n t l y l e d back t o t h e ide a t h a t t h e s e c o n s t i t u t e our e x p e r i e n c e . 
Now, i n Wieder's a c c o u n t , i t i s c l e a r l y b r o u g h t o u t t h a t t h e code i s o n l y 
a v a i l a b l e t o anyone as t h e s p e c i f i c and d i s p a r a t e a c t i o n s and t a l k i n which 
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d u l g e i n the s e t t i n g s i n w h i c h i t may be i n v o k e d . As he makes 
c l e a r , w h i l e t h e code may be e x p e r i e n c e d as p r e d i c t i v e , t h i s i s n o t how i t 
can, i n f a c t , o p e r a t e , s i n c e as a s e t o f maxims, i t does n o t p e r m i t o f p r e -
d i c t i o n , but o n l y o f f e r s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h i s i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h e p o i n t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i s making about t h e 'grammar' o f language. 
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I n t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s he says: 
" U n d e r s t a n d i n g a sentence i s much more a k i n t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
a theme i n music t h a n one may t h i n k . What I mean i s t h a t 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a sentence l i e s n e a r e r than one t h i n k s t o what 
i s o r d i n a r i l y c a l l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m u s i c a l theme. Why i s 
j u s t t h i s t h e p a t t e r n o f v a r i a t i o n i n loudness and tempo? 
One would l i k e t o say "because I know what i t ' s a l l a b o u t " , 
but what i s i t a l l about? I s h o u l d n o t be a b l e t o say. I n 
o r d e r t o ' e x p l a i n ' I c o u l d o n l y compare i t w i t h something 
e l s e w h i c h has t h e same rythm ( I mean t h e same p a t t e r n ) 
(One says 'Don't you see, t h i s i s as i f a c o n c l u s i o n were 
b e i n g drawn' o r ' t h i s i s , as i t were, a p a r e n t h e s i s * e t c . 
How does one j u s t i f y such comparisons? - There are v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n h e r e ) .... ,fe speak o f 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a sentence i n t h e sense i n w h i c h i t can be 
r e p l a c e d by a n o t h e r w h i c h says t h e same, but a l s o i n t h e 
sense i n w h i c h i t cannot be r e p l a c e d by any o t h e r (any more 
than one m u s i c a l theme can be r e p l a c e d by a n o t h e r ) .... 
Then has ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' two d i f f e r e n t meanings here? I 
would r a t h e r say t h a t these k i n d s o f use o f ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' 
make up i t s meaning make up my concept o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
For I want t o a p p l y t h e word ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o a l l t h i s " . ( 8 5 ) 
' W i t t g e n s t e i n goes on t o say t h a t the e x p l a n a t i o n o f an e x p r e s s i o n , o r t h e 
meaning o f a poem i s ac c o m p l i s h e d by ' l e a d i n g ' someone t o hear i t i n t h i s o r 
t h a t sense. Thus, w i t h i n our own c u l t u r e , o u r d i f f e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f 
the sense o f u t t e r a n c e s o r a c t i o n s , w h i l e based on c o n v e n t i o n s , i s a l s o a m a t t e r 
o f b e i n g l e d t o use these c o n v e n t i o n s i n t h i s o r t h a t uay. I t i s n o t t h e case 
t h a t we n e c e s s a r i l y u n d e r s t a n d sentences o r a c t i o n s i n t h i s way o r t h a t , but 
r a t h e r t h a t we can be brought t o see them i n t h e s e k i n d s o f ways. 
S i m i l a r l y , w i t h c r o s s - c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we can be brought t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r , when we have ' l e a r n e d t h e language', by b e i n g l e d t o , o r 
o f f e r e d , t h e k i n d s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w h i c h members o f t h a t c u l t u r e may be a b l e 
t o o f f e r . L i k e Wieder's i n m a t e s , such inmates w i l l n o t themselves be ' e x p e r t ' 
i n t h e t o t a l meaning o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s t o which t h e y a t t e n d i n p e r f o r m i n g such 
a c t i o n s , f o r t h e 'codes' i n v o l v e d w i l l always have t h e f r a g m e n t a r y o r u n e x p l i c a -
t e d c h a r a c t e r a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d . I t i s p a r t o f t h e c h a r a c t e r o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h a t i t w i l l not have t h i s k i n d o f E i n a l complete or ' o n c e - a n d - f o r - a l 1 ' c h a r a c t e r . 
I n G a r f i n l c e l ' s p h r a s e , t h e r e i s always an ' e t c e t e r a ' c l a u s e i n v o l v e d , l e a v i n g 
the r u l e s open t o t h e e x i g e n c i e s o f p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h may a r i s e . 
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Winch's c l a i m i s t h a t t he u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f members o f a c u l t u r e o f t h e s o c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which c o n s t i t u t e t h e c u l t u r e i s s u p e r i o r t o t h a t o f those who 
are n o t members o f t h e c u l t u r e ; now, i t may be the case t h a t we cannot c l a i m 
t o u n d e r s t a n d a c u l t u r e u n l e s s we t a k e i n t o account t h e c o n v e n t i o n s t o which 
members can j u s t i f i a b l y be s a i d t o a t t e n d when they r e l a t e t o each o t h e r , but 
t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what members do i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h each o t h e r . Such 
r e l a t i o n s can c e r t a i n l y be framed i n terms o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s i n v o l v e d , but 
t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how t h e s e c o n v e n t i o n s r e l a t e t o t h e i r a c t i o n s i s an 
e l e c t i o n , framed i n accordance w i t h t h e p r a c t i c a l concerns i n v o l v e d , and 
p o t e n t i a l l y , f o r t n u l a b l e by anyone, i n c l u d i n g themselves i n b o t h i n t e r and 
t r a n s - c u l t u r a l t e r m s . George S t e i n e r d i s c u s s e s t h i s v e r y w e l l ( i n ' A f t e r 
Babel') i n h i s account o f 'language s w i t c h i n g ' i n t h i n k i n g . ( 8 6) 
U n d e r s t a n d i n g does n o t c o n s i s t o f one k i n d o f t h i n g , b u t , l i k e language, i t 
i s a ' m o t l e y ' . Thus, w i t h i n o u r own c u l t u r e , would we want t o say t h a t t he 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g which inmates have o f the c o n v i c t code i s s u p e r i o r t o t h e under-
s t a n d i n g w h i c h , say, s t a f f a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s i n v o l v e d may have? Or s u p e r i o r 
t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h Wieder, o r any o t h e r e t h n o g r a p h e r may have? would 
t h e e t h n o g r a p h y produced by a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t who was a l s o an inmate be 
s u p e r i o r o r i n f e r i o r ? Would t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g which a l l inmates have be o f 
the same k i n d , o r have t h e same s t a t u s ? 
Here we come a c r o s s an i n t e r e s t i n g set o f arguments. I n t u i t i v e l y , we would 
want t o bay t h a t , i n t h e case o f the c o n v i c t code, t h e p e r s o n who i s a b l e t o 
e x p l i c a t e ( v h e t h e r o r n o t he does so) t h e most complete f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e 
c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e code s h o u l d be s a i d t o have the ' b e s t ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h a t 
code. Does t h i s i m p l y t h a t t h o s e w i t h a l e s s complete knowledge o f t h e code 
t h e r e b y have a l e s s complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e meaning o f t h e i r a c t i o n s ? 
T h i s seems u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , f o r we would want t o say t h a t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , when 
they do t e l l i n g t h e code, t h e y u n d e r s t a n d what they a re abou t . However, winch 
would seem t o want t o argue t h a t , at one and t h e same t i m e , because t h e y a re 
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members o f the c u l t u r e , t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e i r 'knowing how t o go on' i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e 
c u l t u r e so t h a t t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n each case i s both t h e same ( s i n c e i t i s 
based on t h e same c o n v e n t i o n s ) and o f equal s t a t u s , i f t h e y are competent 
members. I f ve a c c e p t winch's f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t o u r concepts d e t e r m i n e t h e 
ex p e r i e n c e w h i c h ve have o f the w o r l d , and i f these concepts a r e o n l y a v a i l a b l e 
t o us t h r o u g h a shared language, then we must g r a n t equal s t a t u s t o t h e under-
s t a n d i n g t h a t each member o f a c u l t u r e has s i n c e these must p o t e n t i a l l y be 
t h e same i n each case. 
We have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d Wieder's account o f how t h e c o n v i c t code was a v a i l a b l e 
t o anyone, so t h a t , c l e a r l y , i t f u n c t i o n e d as a r e s o u r c e which o f f e r e d v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r employment f o r d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s who used i t , 
b o t h as s t a f f and inmates and s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , b o t h n a i v e and p r o f e s s i o n a l . 
' U n d e r s t a n d i n g ' , ' j u s t i f y i n g ' , ' e x p l a i n i n g ' were j u s t some o f t h e uses t o w h i c h 
t h e code was p u t . I t seems a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h e s t a t u s o f those uses was a 
m a t t e r n o t j u s t o r even o f t h e s u p e r i o r o r i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n i n terms o f know l -
edge o r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e person u s i n g i t , a l t h o u g h t h i s m i g h t be r e l e v a n t i n 
e v a l u a t i n g such usage, but was always more d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h t h e p r a c t i c a l 
e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e o c c a s i o n o f usage. I f t h e code was accepted as be i n g com-
p e t e n t l y i n v o k e d , then t h i s would count as a d i s p l a y o f competence by t h e 
members concerned. I n t h i s sense, t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e code shared by a l l 
competent members c o u l d be s a i d t o be o f equal 'value*. But t h i s i s not t o say 
t h a t , on d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s , f o r d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c a l purposes, t h e competences 
o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e uses o f the code c o u l d a c c o m p l i s h t h e same 
t h i n g s . T hink here o f d i f f e r e n c e s between n o v i c e s and o l d l a g s , s t a f f and 
in m a t e s , new s t a f f and o l d hands. I t i s n o t t h e case t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f one i n d i v i d u a l would n e c e s s a r i l y be b e t t e r t h a n t h a t o f a n o t h e r , but t h a t 
t h i s would be d e c i d e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e knowledge and e x p e r t i s e which t h e y 
c o u l d d i s p l a y t o w a r r a n t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r w h i c h t h e y might argue. 
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The s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n c u l t u r e s cannot s p e c i f i e d 
s i m p l y as t h e p o s s e s s i o n , by members o f those c u l t u r e s , o f t h e same s e t o f 
i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e r e s o u r c e s . R a t h e r , i t i s an accomplishment, by members, 
by t h e s t r a t e g i c deployment o f those r e s o u r c e s i n accordance w i t h •grammar' 
w h i c h o f f e r s them the p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t h e d i f f e r e n t purposes t o which 
language i s p u t . T h i s c o n j o i n s b o t h t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y w h i c h t r a d i t i o n 
hands down t o t h e incumbent p a r t i c i p a n t i n a c u l t u r e , and t h e c r e a t i v i t y 
a f f o r d e d by, on t h e one hand, the changing e x i g e n c i e s o f p r a c t i c a l c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s , and t h e necessary openness and f l e x i b i l i t y always p r e s e n t i n c o n d i t i o n s 
w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e ad h o e i n g , s i n c e t h e y o f f e r no f i n a l and complete f o r m u l a t i o n . 
Now, t h i s seems t o me t o a l t e r b o t h t h e s t a t u ? o f ac c o u n t s w h i c h c o u l d be 
o f f e r e d o f t h e s o c i a l phenomena i n q u e s t i o n , and t h e p o s i t i o n o f any i n v e s t -
i g a t o r i n r e l a t i o n t o such phenomena. I f t h e p r a c t i c a l c oncerns o f members 
bear d i r e c t l y on t h e uses t o w h i c h t h e y p u t t h e c o n v e n t i o n s which they s h a r e , 
and have c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e sense i n w h i c h we c o u l d t a l k o f such uses 
as c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e i r meaning, t h e n p r e c i s e l y t h e same c o n d i t i o n s a p p l y t o t h e 
uses t o w h i c h such c o n v e n t i o n s might be p u t by any s o c i a l i n v e s t i g a t o r , e i t h e r 
n a t i v e o r o u t s i d e r . The s t a t u s o f any u n d e r s t a n d i n g argued by a s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i s t would be d e c i d a b l e i n terms o f w a r r a n t w h i c h m i g h t be produced t o 
r e j e c t , a c c e p t , q u a l i f y , m o d i f y ( e t c . , ) any o f t h e account by t h o s e competent 
t o do so i n terms o f t h e r u l e s o f t h e game w h i c h t h e y d e c i d e t o i n v o k e . That 
some u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be reached i s a f e a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n between a l l 
men o f a l l c u l t u r e s ; i t i s the adequacy o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h then 
becomes t h e p r o b l e m , and i t i s t o t h i s end t h a t subsequent exchanges between 
men m i g h t be d i r e c t e d . Between men f r o m d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , i t i s a p r a c t i c a l 
p r o b l e m t o succeed i n c o n v e y i n g t o each o t h e r t h e meaning which they g i v e t o 
d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s , a c t i o n s , f e e l i n g s e t c . That t h e y do so between t h e m s e l v e s , 
as members o f t h e i r own c u l t u r e s , i s s u r e l y p r e c i s e l y what b e i n g a member o f 
a s o c i e t y i s . Now, i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f A u g u s t i n e ' s account o f t h e a c q u i s i t i o n 
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o f language, W i t t g e n s t e i n o b j e c t s t h a t A u g u s t i n e ' s account i s n o t l i k e t h a t 
o f someone i n i t i a l l y a c q u i r i n g language f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , but r a t h e r , l i k e 
t h a t o f a person coming t o a f o r e i g n l a n d a l r e a d y i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f a 
language. ( 8 7 ) I n l e a r n i n g language f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , i t i s n o t j u s t t he 
o s t e n s i v e d e f i n i t i o n s ( t h i s name goes w i t h t h i s o b j e c t o r a c t i o n ) t h a t we 
l e a r n ; r a t h e r , we l e a r n a set o f p r a c t i c e s , t h a t i s language use has a p o i n t , 
i t i s a p r a c t i c a l c o n c e r n ; we p i c k o u t some t h i n g s , r a t h e r t h a n o t h e r s , t o 
d e s c r i b e as ' f o o d ' , we pay a t t e n t i o n t o snakes i n t h i s way, stones i n t h a t . 
Once we have l e a r n e d what i t i s t o go on as competent members o f a s o c i e t y 
do, t h e n we c e r t a i n l y can be s a i d t o have a c e r t a i n s t o c k o f common under-
s t a n d i n g s ; a r e n o t our l i v e s t h r o u g h o u t , however, t o a g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r 
e x t e n t , a pro c e s s o f a d d i n g t o , c h a n g i n g , m o d i f y i n g , d i s p e n s i n g w i t h , such 
common u n d e r s t a n d i n g s ? ( 8 8 ) I n t e r - c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t i s today a f a i r l y common 
source o f such e x p e r i e n c e s - t h i n k o f t h e ways i n which American c u l t u r e 
i n f l u e n c e s t h e w o r l d . The p o i n t i s , t h e q u e s t i o n o f our a b i l i t y t o i n c o r p o r -
a t e such processes i n t o o ur u n d e r s t a n d i n g does n o t a r i s e . 
We do n o t l e a r n a f o r e i g n language i n t h e same way t h a t a baby l e a r n s t o t a l k 
f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e ; b u t , n o t e , t h i s i s a l s o t o say t h a t when we l e a r n a 
f o r e i g n language we do not do so i n t h e same way t h a t a baby l e a r n s t o t a l k 
a t a l l . That i s t o say, our l e a r n i n g o f t h e language i s i n terms o f t h e 
language w h i c h we a l r e a d y possess; would we want t o say o f someone who l e a r n s 
a second language t h a t BECAUSE he does n o t l e a r n i t i n t h e same way as a 
n a t i v e baby does t h a t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e language o r h i s speech, i s 
t h e r e b y i n f e r i o r t o t h a t o f t h e baby, o r d e f i c i e n t i n some r a d i c a l way? 
S u r e l y we c o u l d n o t s e n s i b l y c l a i m t h i s , f o r many people do speak more than 
one language. But i f our j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r c l a i m i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d r e s t upon 
t h i s competence, t h e n s u r e l y we c o u l d n o t a l s o c l a i m t h a t someone d i d n o t 
un d e r s t a n d s i m p l y because he was n o t a member o f t h e c u l t u r e i n q u e s t i o n , 
r a t h e r t h a n because he d i d n o t speak t h e language i n q u e s t i o n , s i n c e our own 
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c l a i m s , about our own p r a c t i c e s r e s t u l t i m a t e l y on t h i s c l a i m ( t o speak 
• E n g l i s h 1 ) , r a t h e r t han on e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c knowledge. T h i s i s n o t t o say 
t h a t t h e r e do n o t e x i s t p r a c t i c e s which one c o u l d c a l l ' t h e E n g l i s h way o f 
l i f e ' which would a u t o m a t i c a l l y become a v a i l a b l e t o someone who l e a r n e d t o 
speak E n g l i s h ; t h i n k o f j o k e s about f o r e i g n e r s o r s p i e s who make s o c i a l 
g a f f e s , and so on. The p o i n t i s t h a t 'the E n g l i s h way o f l i f e ' c o n s i s t s o f 
p r a c t i c e s w i t h i n which language i s t h e means by whic h t h e y make sense. Now 
t e a - t i m e m i g h t mean something d i f f e r e n t i f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n employed German 
r a t h e r t h a n E n g l i s h words; t h i n k o f c r i c k e t w i t h a new s e t o f s i g n a l s , o r t h e 
umpires' d e c i s i o n s shouted o u t i n some f o r e i g n language ( U r d u ? ) . The p o i n t i s , 
these are p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h e x i s t as p a r t o f t h e p r a c t i c e s ; a r g u i n g t h a t 
such v i o l a t i o n s o f our c o n v e n t i o n s about how t h e s e p r a c t i c e s should be c a r r i e d 
on cannot i n v o l v e s a y i n g t h e y a r e Incommensurable; one k i n d o f p r a c t i c e r e l a t e s 
t o a n o t h e r i n t h a t t h e y have a ' f a m i l y resemblance*. U n d e r s t a n d i n g one 
r a t h e r t han a n o t h e r may i n v o l v e i n c o r p o r a t i n g d i f f e r e n t i t e m s t o be c o n s i d e r e d 
s i g n i f i c a n t , o r may i n v o l v e comparing one w i t h a n o t h e r , but we s h o u l d s t i l l 
be s a i d t o u n d e r s t a n d them. Our c o n c e p t i o n o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e 
Japanese t e a ceremony, s u r e l y , t r a d e s on our own c o n c e p t i o n o f t e a t i m e ; our 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Buddhism may i n v o l v e comparison w i t h w e s t e r n t h e o l o g y . I f 
we want t o argue t h a t one cannot u n d e r s t a n d Buddhism u n l e s s one i s a B u d d h i s t , 
then how do we ever know what i t i s t h a t we cannot u n d e r s t a n d , o r i n d e e d , i n 
what sense i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r anyone t o ever become a B u d d h i s t ( C h r i s t i a n , 
M a r x i s t , e t c ? ) 
My argument i s t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y those processes which enable anyone t o 
a r r i v e a t an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h a r e a necessary 
f e a t u r e o f language use; t h a t i s t o say, the v a r i e t y o f p o s s i b l e ways i n whi c h 
we can be s a i d t o u n d e r s t a n d , r a t h e r than t h e v a r i e t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w h i c h 
we can be s a i d t o have. There i s no way i n whic h we can s t i p u l a t e what i t i s 
f o r someone t o u n d e r s t a n d c o r r e c t l y , a p a r t f r o m the ways i n which such u n d e i -
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s t a n d i n g i s made ( i n G a r f i n k e l ' s p h r a s e ) o b s e r v a b l e and r e p o r t a b l e i n t h e 
p r a c t i c e s o£ any language use i n w h i c h such a c l a i m i s a s s e s s a b l e ; i t i s n o t 
th e case t h a t we can r e j e c t as inadequate any account o f s o c i a l phenomena 
produced except on t h e grounds t h a t t h e c l a i m s o f t h e account f a i l t o conform 
t o c r i t e r i a w h i c h we can produce such t h a t t h e s e can then be seen as u n j u s t i f i e d 
i n terms o f r e c o g n i s e d e x i g e n c i e s g o v e r n i n g such p r a c t i c e s . 
My p o i n t i s t h a t any a c c o u n t , whether produced by an ' i n s i d e r 3 o r ' o u t s i d e r ' 
( t e r m s w h i c h , i n t h e d i f f e r e n c e s a r e c o n s t r u e d t o e x i s t between them, themselves 
t r a d e on, I would a r g u e , a f a l s e l y d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f language 
as a p r a c t i c e w i t h i n o t h e r k i n d s o f p r a c t i c e , r a t h e r t h a n r e c o g n i s i n g t h e i r 
i n d i v i s i b i l i t y from those p r a c t i c e s ) i s always produced by someone f o r a purpose 
I t s adequacy must, t h e r e f o r e , be c o n d i t i o n a l upon the e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e s i t u a -
t i o n i n w h i c h i t i s produced. To be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an account expresses t h e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s incumbent upon t h e a u t h o r i n h i s r e l a t i o n t o those t o whom t h e 
account i s addressed - t h a t i s , t o produce an account w h i c h a t t e n d s t o i t s own 
consequences, t h a t i s t o say, expresses m t h e c o n v e n t i o n s t o whi c h i t a t t e n d s , 
as w a r r a n t a b l e i n s t a n c e o f t h e o r i s i n g ( i n t h i s way), an awareness o f i t s 
p r a c t i c a l n a t u r e , o r r a t h e r , sees i t s e l f as a p r a c t i c e o f s e e i n g . An account 
i s , a t one and t h e same t i m e , a l e a d i n g o f t h e audience (see i t i n t h i s way) 
and a l s o a b e i n g l e d ( c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y , o r 'we must see s e e i n g i t i n t h i s way as 
one among t h e ways t h a t we can see a t a l l ' ) . I t i s both an e l e c t i o n , and a 
c e l e b r a t i o n o r ceremony; i t must, t o make sense, be u n d e r s t a n d a b l e i n terms o f 
some c o n v e n t i o n s , but i t must a l s o a c c o m p l i s h t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f i t s a u t h o r , and 
t o r e c o g n i s e i t as d o i n g so i n v o l v e s c h o o s i n g amongst a l t e r n a t i v e s . What these 
SHOULD be i s n o t something which can be d e c i d e d a p a r t from t h e o c c a s i o n o f i t s 
p r o d u c t i o n ; what i t s outcome w i l l be depends upon t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e 
reader and t h e t e x t . 
Now, i n t h e case o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e , i t s a c c o u n t s , I have argued, seem t o be 
faced w i t h t h e dual r e q u i r e m e n t s o f ( 1 ) a t t e n d i n g t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n s w h i c h r u l e 
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t h e sense making p r a c t i c e s o f i t s s u b j e c t s , and ( 2 ) t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e c o n t e x t s 
which p r o v i d e i t w i t h i t s s p e c i f i c usages, we have had arguments, on t h e one 
hand, w h i c h m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e meaning o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r i s o n l y t o be found 
i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( 1 s t a n d i n g - u n d e r ' ) o f t h e r u l e s t o w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s 
o r i e n t ; and on t h e o t h e r , we have t h e argument t h a t t h e c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h t h e s e 
usages have t h e i r l i f e i s so s p e c i f i c and m u l t i - f a c e t e d t h a t t o a t t e m p t t o 
u n d e r s t a n d , o u t s i d e o f t h e c o n t e x t i s t o v i o l a t e t h e a u t h o r i t y o f p a r t i c i p a n t s 
( t h e i r a u t h o r - s h i p ) . 
But we have seen a l s o , t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s n o t 'of a p i e c e 1 ; we say t h a t we 
under s t a n d i n a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t senses, and on t h e b a s i s o f many d i f f e r e n t 
k i n d s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , arguments, ' i n t u i t i o n s ' , i n s p i r a t i o n s and so on, b u t 
not t h a t o u r n o t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g may, t h e r e f o r e , be broken down i n t o 
d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t s . These d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a re a l l p a r t o f 
our concept o f what i t i s t o u n d e r s t a n d . 
Any u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s n o t , however, as good as any o t h e r i n t h e p r a c t i c a l c i r c u m 
stances o f everyday l i f e ; some can be j u s t i f i e d , some r e j e c t e d as f a l s e o r 
f l a w e d , some g i v e n credence, o t h e r s r e g a r d e d as f a n c i f u l , and so on. N e i t h e r 
i s i t t h e case t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c a c c o unts are ' j u s t t a l k ' among o t h e r t a l k 
t h e y may be good o r bad o r i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m 'any o t h e r t a l k ' , b u t t h a t i s 
n e i t h e r something w h i c h can be d e c i d e d w i t h o u t an e v a l u a t i o n by some a u d i e n c e , 
n o r i s such an e v a l u a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y the same f o r a l l o r most o f t h a t audience 
a l t h o u g h i t may be, on some c l e a r l y common grounds ( f o r i n s t a n c e , u n i n t e l l i g -
i b i l i t y ) . 
The key q u e s t i o n has now become - what k i n d o f language game i s s o c i a l s c i e nce? 
And what are i t s c o n v e n t i o n s ? Here we are f a c e d a g a i n w i t h t h e m u l t i - c o n s e q u e n 
t i a l c h a r a c t e r o f language, i n s o f a r as t h e p r a c t i c a l concerns o f s o c i a l s c i e n -
t i s t s and t h e i r consequent speech and a c t i o n c o n s i s t o f t h e d i s p l a y o f r u l e -
o r i e n t e d p r a c t i c e s t o a c c o m p l i s h such ends, t h e s e a r e , o n l y and e n t i r e l y , t h e 
corpus o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e ; t h a t i t i s done d e t e r m i n e s t h a t i t i s , t h e r e b y , a 
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r u l e governed a c t i v i t y ; what i s done d i s p l a y s t h e r u l e s and e x i g e n c i e s t o which 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a t t e n d . 
But i t i s n o t a game i n which t h e p l a y e r s can d e c i d e , i n one sense, t o do what 
t h e y l i k e ; i t may De p l a y e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways ( p r e f e r r e d r u l e s o f p l a y i n g -
t h i n k o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s example o f 'how hard we h i t a t e n n i s b a l l ' ) , b u t , t o 
make sense AS an a c t i v i t y , i t must a t t e n d t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g what i t 
i s t o be an i n s t a n c e o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e . I t has, however, p r e c i s e l y t h e f e a t u r e s 
o f r u l e governed p r a c t i c e s d e t a i l e d above; w h i l e i t i s a p u b l i c phenomenon -
t o count as s o c i o l o g y , a p r a c t i c e must be w a r r a n t e d as such - i t i s a l s o 
concerned w i t h c o n c r e t e problems; t h a t i s t o say, as a p r a c t i c e , i t e l e c t s t o 
proceed i n t h e way t h a t i t does t o some acknowledged and l e g i t i m a t e end. 
Now, i t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s can and w i l l be produced t o 
ac c o m p l i s h v a r i o u s ends whi c h can be i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n che r u b r i c o f a s i n g l e 
concept o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Rather than t r y i n g t o de c i d e what counts as under-
s t a n d i n g , s i n c e t h i s i s b o t h a c o n v e n t i o n a l and an occ a s i o n e d phenomenon, we 
should r e c o g n i s e t h a t o u r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s c o n s i s t s r a t h e r 
o f our r e l a t i o n t o our audience. Any account must be produced n o t as a c i t a t i o n 
o f r u l e s w h i c h deny i t s s t a t u s as a p l a n f u l p r a c t i c a l accomplishment i n i t s own 
r i g h t , s i n c e t h i s i s an endemic f e a t u r e o f an a c c o u n t , as such; but r a t h e r , 
t h e a u t h o r s h o u l d respond t o , and be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i v e i n v o l v m e n t o f 
the audience i n h i s t e x t . T h i s i s t o r e c o g n i s e and acknowledge t h e s t a t u s o f 
t h i s and a l l accounts as n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i f i e d i n terms o f c r x t e r i a l ( 8 9 ) 
r e l a t i o n s between i t s e l f and the community and t r a d i t i o n o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e . 
T h i s i s t o say t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c a c c o u n t s s h o u l d be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
• r e l a t i n g ' ( t e l l i n g ) themselves and t h a t - t o - w h i c h - t h e y - r e f e r as one and t h e 
same accomplishment, but an accomplishment w h i c h , on each and every o c c a s i o n 
t h a t i t i s r e a l i s e d i s o n l y p o s s i b l e because o f , on t h e one hand, t h e t r a d i t i o n 
t o which i t i s h e i r , and on the o t h e r t h e community, o r r u l e o r i e n t e d e l e c t i o n s 
w hich c o n s t i t u t e , t r a n s f o r m and t r a n s c e n d t h a t t r a d i t i o n . 
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I n more p r o s a i c t e r m s , I am a r g u i n g t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n c e can a c c o m p l i s h under-
s t a n d i n g o f o t h e r c u l t u r e s , and can j u d ge o t h e r c u l t u r e s p r e c i s e l y because 
t h i s i s what we do w i t h i n our own c u l t u r e . What t h i s w i l l come t o o r c o n s i s t 
o f , o r t h e s t a t u s o f i t s e v a l u a t i o n s , however, i s l i k e w i s e s u b j e c t t o t h e 
e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which these a c c o u n t s are produced and themselves 
e v a l u a t e d . -v'hat can be o r w i l l be t h e c r i t e r i a employed here cannot be a 
m a t t e r t o be p r e v i o u s l y d e t e r m i n e d , any more o r l e s s than t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h 
we are s u b j e c t t o such d e t e r m i n a t i o n from the p a s t ; i n s o f a r as we a r e , t h e n t o 
t h a t e x t e n t , so s h a l l f u t u r e speakers and audiences be a l s o . 
That we w i l l c o n t i n u e t o combine w i t h i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e d i v e r s e forms o f account 
( v a r i a t i o n s o f p r e f e r r e d r u l e s o f p l a y ? ) seems t o me t h e endemic c o n d i t i o n o f 
any a t t e m p t t o d e a l w i t h t h e m u l t i p l e dimensions o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d . I f r u l e 
and e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n merge i n t o each o t h e r (and I t h i n k we have seen t h a t 
t h e y do) t h e n i t f o l l o w s t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l phenomena w i l l c o n t i n u e 
t o be a v a r i e t y o f d i v e r s e p r a c t i c e s , w i t h d i f f e r e n t ends and d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a 
t o w a r r a n t t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s , w h i l e accounts w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y a t t e n d t o d i f f e r e n t 
s i g n i f i c a n c e s , t h e y must a l s o a t t e n d t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t t h e y make, o r t h e i r 
own consequence ( w o r t h , w e i g h t , v a l u e ) . That s o c i a l accounts are r e f l e x i v e on 
t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n i s a necessary f e a t u r e o f t h e i r s t a t u s as 
a c t i o n u n d e r t a k e n t o some end; i t i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t 
t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e r e a d e r r e c o g n i s i n g t h i s i n a d i s p l a y o f h i s own r e c o g n i t i o n . 
I f t h i s i s an opaque r e q u i r e m e n t , perhaps we c o u l d i l l u m i n a t e i t by t a l k i n g 
about t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h (as W i t t g e n s t e i n says) ' d e s c r i p t i o n ' t a k e s t h e p l a c e 
o f ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' . Now, i n view o f what we have s a i d about the n a t u r e o f 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t w o u ld seem t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e processes i n v o l v e d i n 
e l e c t i n g t o a t t e n d t o t h i s o r t h a t aspect o f c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y i s i t s e l f a p r e -
decided ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' o r ' d e s c r i p t i o n ' o f t h e phenomena. However, we a l l 
acknowledge t h a t , i n everyday t e r m s , a d e s c r i p t i o n o r an e x p l a n a t i o n i n v o l v e s 
a c t i n g so as t o make an event mo re a c c e s s i b l e , o r a c c e s s i b l e i n t h i s or t h a t 
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p a r t i c u l a r way. The p o i n t i s t h a t f o r some k i n d s o f phenomena, e x p l a n a t i o n 
w i l l r e q u i r e c e r t a i n k i n d s o f evidence w h i c h our p r a c t i c e s d i c t a t e i s approp-
r i a t e ; we e m p i r i c a l l y , count c e r t a i n t h i n g s (eggs) but n o t o t h e r s ( r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) . I t i s n o t t h a t o ur c e r t a i n t y o f some t h i n g s i s t h e r e b y assured 
( I have a body) but n o t o t h e r s (he i s i n p a i n ) , but t h a t c e r t a i n t y i s i t s e l f a 
m a t t e r t o be acco m p l i s h e d i n p a r t i c u l a r cases i n terms o f t h e grammar o f our 
language i n u s i n g such terms. D e s c r i p t i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n p l a y d i f f e r e n t p a r t s 
i n d i f f e r e n t games, but these p a r t s are d e t e r m i n e d by what we can be b r o u g h t t o 
accept as c o r r e c t o r a p p r o p r i a t e usage o f t h e s e p r a c t i c e s . 
Now d e s c r i p t i o n t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f e x p l a n a t i o n a t j u s t t h e p o i n t where i t no 
l o n g e r makes sense t o doub t ; t h a t i s , e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e game t o 
p l a y when we can j u s t i f i a b l y i n v o k e e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t , w h i l e x m i g h t be 
the case, i n f a c t , z i s the case because y c o n d i t i o n s acount f o r i t . A t a 
c e r t a i n p o i n t , t h i s i s no l o n g e r an a p p r o p r i a t e game t o p l a y because i t does 
n o t make sense t o propose any evide n c e f o r x b e i n g t h e case, because i t does 
n o t make sense t o imagine a n y t h i n g e l s e ; c e r t a i n t y o n l y e x i s t s where t h e r e i s 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d o u b t , and t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h we cannot s e n s i b l y doubt are 
n o t s u b j e c t e i t h e r t o p r o o f , o r d i s p r o o f , s i n c e we cannot imagine what e i t h e r 
would be l i k e ( t h e w o r l d e x i s t e d b e f o r e 1 was b o r n ) . These can o n l y be d e s c r i b e d . 
Now, n o t e , d e s c r i p t i o n t a k e s j u s t t h e form t h a t i t does on t h e b a s i s o f t h e 
c o n v e n t i o n a l and p r a c t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s which we have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d ( 9 0 ) . 
That i s t o say, we are bound by t h e a u t h o r i t y o f our communal r u l e s as t o what 
i t i s t h a t r e a l i t y can r e a s o n a b l y be accounted as 'coming t o ' , and w i t h i n o u r 
language, we cannot doubt t h a t i t comes t o t h i s ; n o n e t h e l e s s , t h i s means t h a t 
t h e o b j e c t s o f our d e s c r i p t i o n s here a r e a t t h e same t i m e n o t t o be known i n 
t h e same way as those w h i c h we can e s t a b l i s h w i t h e v i d e n c e ; they are c o n s t i t u t e d 
by and themselves c o n s t i t u t e t h e language w i t h which we d e s c r i b e . 
T h i n k , h e r e , o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s aim t o b r i n g about 
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e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t s o f t h e i r a c c o u n t s . A t one and t h e same t i m e , t h e i r 
a ccounts f o r m u l a t e t h e scenes w h i c h t h e y d e s c r i b e , and a l s o d i s p l a y t h e con-
v e n t i o n s on which such a d e s c r i p t i o n r e l i e s ( i t s g r o u n d ) . Doubt about t h e 
account qua account w o u l d make no sense t o us, s i n c e we cannot s e n s i b l y i magine 
what i t would be l i k e f o r us t o hear i t as n o t h i n g ( n o t one o f a s e t o f p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s ) r a t h e r t h a n something; we c o u l d n o t de c i d e n o t t o make some k i n d o f 
sense o f i t . 
However, t h i s t r a n s f o r m s i t s sense, and how t h a t makes sense, i n t o s o m e t hing 
about w h i c h we c o u l d n o t have knowledge i n t h e same way as we might have about 
o t h e r s o c i a l phenomena. Yet as s o c i a l i n v e s t i g a t o r s , i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s s e t 
o f c o n v e n t i o n s which i s o n l y made up o f t h e a c t i o n s and t a l k which i s members 
be h a v i o u r - i e . , i t i s an e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n . So t h a t a t one 
and t h e same t i m e , we have, i n c a r n a t e i n t h e c o n c r e t e phenomenon, both the 
p o s s i b l e o b j e c t o f an e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n , and an i n s t a n c e o f r u l e , an a n a l -
y t i c c a t e g o r y . How a r e we, as i s our avowed aim, t o account f o r both? 
The 'answer' o f c o u r s e , i s t h a t w h i l e t h e e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n can be accounted 
q u i t e p r o p e r l y i n terms o f what co u n t s as a w a r r a n t e d s t a t e m e n t , on t h e b a s i s 
o f e v i d e n c e , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r u l e i s d i s p l a y e d i n t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s between 
t h e s e n t e n c e w h i c h e x p r e s s the meaning o f t h e s t a t e m e n t . To b r i n g a t t e n t i o n t o 
t h i s i s t h e f u r t h e r t a s k o f t h e s o c i a l a n a l y s t , and t h i s may o n l y be ac c o m p l i s h e d 
by b e i n g r e s p o n s i v e t o , and t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , t h e m u l t i - f o r m u l a t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r o f any and a l l r e a d i n g , w r i t i n g , h e a r i n g , s p e a k i n g , a c t i n g . T h i s 
i s a necessary f e a t u r e o f a l l a c c o u n t i n g - t h a t i t has consequences on eacn and 
every o c c a s i o n o f i t s p r o d u c t i o n , g i v e n t h a t f i r s t and l a t e r p r o d u c t i o n s (each 
o c c a s i o n o f r e a d i n g ) i s e l e c t i v e as w e l l as r u l e o r i e n t e d . To t a k e r e s p o n s i b i -
l i t y i s t o r e c o g n i s e , acknowledge and c e l e b r a t e i n the d i s p l a y o f t h i s f e a t u r e 
i t s i n e v i t a b i l i t y , and t h e consequent i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f o n g o i n g c r e a t i v e r e -
f o r m u l a t i o n i n every a c t o f r e a d i n g . 
Winch's c l a i m t h e n , t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r on t h e b a s i s o f t h e 
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c o n v e n t i o n s t o which p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e s u b j e c t , f a i l s t o account f o r t h e under-
s t a n d i n g b o t h o f t h e s u b j e c t s o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e , and o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s 
t h e m selves, because i t i g n o r e s d i f f e r e n c e s i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a p r a c t i c e , 
and i n s t e a d t r e a t s t h i s as a s i n g l e concept d e t e r m i n e d by c o n v e n t i o n r a t h e r 
t h a n s e e i n g t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g b o t h e x e r c i s e s c o n v e n t i o n and as a p r a c t i c e , 
i n v o l v i n g t h e ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n o f changing c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o n s t i t u t e s those 
c o n v e n t i o n s , changes and r e - f o r m u l a t e s them as i t uses them t o deal w i t h each 
moment o f r e a l i t y . The s t r o n g c l a i m t h a t I have made, t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s 
bo t h p o s s i b l e and n e c e s s a r y , proceeds from t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t because o f 
c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y , b o t h w i t h i n and between c u l t u r e s , t he aim o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
i s b o t h a d e s i r a b l e accomplishment, as a s e l f c o n s c i o u s p r a c t i c e , and a l s o a 
b a s i c human need. But i t i s t h i s v e r y d i v e r s i t y which g i v e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s 
p l a c e i n human p r a c t i c e s ; Winch's work seems t o me t o l e a d t o the c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t i t i s o n l y homogeneity which p e r m i t s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
The q u e s t i o n seems t o rem a i n , however, as t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e between what I have 
proposed as a u n i v e r s a l human c a p a b i l i t y o r p o s s i b i l i t y , and a s p e c i a l c l a i m t o 
be a b l e t o do t h i s ' b e t t e r ' on b e h a l f o f one group o f p r a c t i t i o n e r s . I n deed, 
t h i s would seem t o be t h e c l a i m w h i c h was b e i n g r e j e c t e d by Wieder's account 
o f t h e c o n v i c t code, w h i l e such a r e j e c t i o n was i m p l i c i t i n winch's argument 
f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m . Wieder n o t e s t h a t , i n s t a f f uses o f t h e code, we c o u l d 
see t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c c oncepts - s t a f f and inmates 
used t h e code i n j u s t t h e same ways as s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t o e x p l a i n t h e i r 
b e h a v i o u r , and t o j u s t i f y i n f e r e n c e s about auses and m o t i v a t i o n s . Given t h e 
c o n t e x t bounded n a t u r e o f such usages, we cannot hope f o r l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s 
o f such usages, n o r c o u l d we hope t o produce adequate e x p l a n a t i o n s o f p a t t e r n s 
o f a c t i o n s w h i c h would s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f d e d u c t i v e t h e o r y , because 
i n i t s e x p l a n a t o r y uses, s i t u a t i o n s a c t i o n s and r u l e s a r e n o t independent 
elements ( 9 1 ) . A l l we can have, on t h i s v i e w , i s an account o f how, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , t e l l i n g t h e code was p r o d u c t i v e o f a s o c i a l w o r l d o f r e a l e v e n t s , 
and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h e a r i n g t a l k and a c t i o n as h e a r a b l e / s e e a b l e i n t h i s way. 
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I n o t h e r words, what we must have i s not an account o f how t h e code e x p l a i n s 
s o c i a l a c t i o n , but r a t h e r , a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o b s e r v e r as 
he observed t h e s o c i a l a c t i o n o f t h e way t h a t he observed i t . 
I s h a l l t a l k i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l about e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l work i n my n e x t 
c h a p t e r ; however, t h i s c l a i m r e q u i r e s some comment a t t h i s p o i n t . Note, t o 
beg i n w i t h , t h e ass u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a hard d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between 
t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e d and t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c i n g those 
o b j e c t s . Wieder i s , i n f a c t a r g u i n g t h a t , t o e x p l a i n how an o b j e c t was seen 
as i t was, we can t u r n t o some o t h e r c l a s s o f knowledge w h i c h we know i n a 
d i f f e r e n t way f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g o f t h e o b j e c t . He i s t r a d i n g on t h e 
r e f l e c t i v e f a c u l t y , o ur a b i l i t y t o make our own judgments t h e o b j e c t s o f our 
spe e c h / t h o u g h t , t o make t h e c l a i m t h a t , t h e r e b y when we r e q u i r e an account o f 
how our concepts d e t e r m i n e s o c i a l r e a l i t y , we must t u r n t o our p r i v a t e exper-
i e n c e , f o r ' t h e r e i s no ocher p l a c e t o go i f we need access co t h e o n g o i n g 
course o f d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e ' ( 9 2 ) . Now, n o t e , these cannot be l i t e r a l d e s c r i p -
t i o n s , s i n c e Wieder a l s o argued t h a t t h e code i s always known o n l y on t h e o a s i s 
o f p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i n an i m p l i c i t and i n d e f i n i t e f a s h i o n . Thus, t h e 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e o n g o i n g course o f d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e becomes a c o n c r e t e 
account o f t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e o b s e r v e r on h i s own e x p e r i e n c e s ( w h i c h i s 
p a r t i a l and s p e c i f i c ) but a l s o a d i s p l a y o f t h e competences o r c o n v e n t i o n s 
wh i c h , presumably, anyone would o p e r a t e w i t h i n p r o d u c i n g such an a c c o u n t . 
Presumably, however, f o r t h e account t o make sense, w i e d e r i s assuming t h a t we 
can be b r o u g h t t o see t h e reasonableness ( r a t i o n a l i t y ) o f t h e account on t h e 
b a s i s o f c o n v e n t i o n s w h i c h we a l r e a d y share w i t h him; i n a n o t h e r way, we can 
come t o have knowledge o f t h a t about w h i c h Wieder i s s p e a k i n g because he can 
produce j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ( e v i d e n c e ) f o r t h e s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h he makes - we c o u l d 
doubt them, but Wieder g i v e s us reasons f o r a c c e p t i n g what he says. 
Now, i f t h i s i s t h e case, then presumably what we cannot have knowledge o f 
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(because we cannot s e n s i b l y doubt i t ) are t h e c o n v e n t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f 
w h i c h we do make judgments i n t h i s case; these a r e what i s d i s p l a y e d i n 
Wieder's t a l k . 
The c l a i m was t h a t we must t u r n t o t h e o b s e r v e r s d e s c r i p t i o n o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e 
o f making sense o f t h e inmate b e h a v i o u r f o r a d i s p l a y o f t h e processes by which 
r e a l i t y was s t r u c t u r e d by t h e concepts used t o d e s c r i b e i t ; i n what sense can 
we say t h a t o ur r e c o g n i t i o n o f a d i s p l a y o f c o n v e n t i o n s used t o d e s c r i b e 
• i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e ' i s d i f f e r e n t f rom our r e c o g n i t i o n o f such a d i s p l a y i n t h e 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e d as r e a l i t y ? W i t t g e n s t e i n says t h a t we may 
be l e d t o s e e i n g o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g an o b j e c t o f e x p e r i e n c e i n t h i s o r t h a t way; 
Wieder i s l e a d i n g us t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e proc e s s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g as an e x p e r i -
ence p r e d i c a t e d upon r e f l e c t i o n , but a l s o p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e d i f f e r e n c e s 
between t h e r e f l e c t i o n s w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s have. The f a c t t h a t we can e l e c t 
t o c o n s t r u e t h e meaning o f a c t i o n , on t h e b a s i s o f i n d e f i n i t e s e t s o f conven-
t i o n s , i n t h i s way o r t h a t , i s t a k e n by Wieder t o have the consequence t h a t a l l 
we have, g i v e n t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e p r a c t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s c f t h e c o n t e x t s 
i n w h i c h these c o n v e n t i o n s are employed, i s t h e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f our own 
e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p r o c e s s o f e x p e r i e n c i n g . 
Thus, w h i l e Winch was a r g u i n g f o r t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l 
e x p e r i e n c e s o f r e a l i t y on the b a s i s t h a t w i t h i n a c u l t u r e c o n cepts s t r u c t u r e 
t h e common r e a l i t y which o n l y members o f t h a t c u l t u r e s h a r e , Mieder seems t o be 
a r g u i n g t h a t , w i t h j n a c u l t u r e , such a r e t h e c o n t e x t u a l v a r i a t i o n s t o v h i c h t h e 
employment o f common u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a r e s u b j e c t , t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f d i f f e r e n t 
i n d i v i d u a l s o f t h e meaning which these common u n d e r s t a n d i n g s can be used t o 
c o n s t r u e i s n o t s p e c i f i a b l e except i n terms o f t h e c e r t a i n processes on whic h 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l can r e f l e c t as h a v i n g a t t e n d e d t o . Thus, w h i l e f o r w i n c h , 
p u b l i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y e x p l a i n s t h e meanings w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s a t t a c h t o t h e i r 
speech and a c t i o n s , f o r Wieder p u b l i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y v i o l a t e s t h e c o n t e x t u a l i t y 
o f such meanings. 
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T h i s account t r a d e s , however, on t h e n o t i o n t h a t , i n t a k i n g a p r i v a t e account 
o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f s e e i n g as our o b j e c t , we somehow have an account w h i c h 
i s t r u e r o f t h e process o f e x p e r i e n c i n g . I have a l r e a d y argued t h a t t h e n o t i o n 
t h a t t r u t h i s t i e d t o c e r t a i n t y must face t h e f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n t y i s t i e d t o 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d o u b t , and t h a t o n l y c e r t a i n k i n d s o f p r o p o s i t i o n a r e open 
t o doubt. To ar g u e , as Wieder does, t h a t t h e r e f l e c t i o n on t h e proc e s s o f 
e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e o n l y p l a c e we have t o go i f we seek an account o f how 
concepts d e t e r m i n e r e a l i t y i s t o argue t h a t t h i s i s because h e r e , i n our 
e x p e r i e n c e , we cannot be m i s t a k e n , f o r t h i s i_s how t h i n g s a r e w i t h us. We 
seem, t h e r e b y , t o be assured o f a g r e a t e r degree o f c e r t a i n t y t h a n i f we s i m p l y 
say, t h i s i s how t h i n g s seem t o us i n t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d . 
T h i s p o s i t i o n i s founded however, on a r a d i c a l doubt about a n y t h i n g o u t s i d e 
t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f w h i c h i t c l a i m s c e r t a i n knowledge; i f we argue t h a t our 
account o f our e x p e r i e n c e s o n l y has t h e sense t h a t i t has f o r us on t h e b a s i s 
o f t h i s (naming a s e t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ) , t h e n t h i s i s t h e c l a i m t h a t , s i m u l -
t a n e o u s l y , a n o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t c o u l d n o t have t h e same e x p e r i e n c e , s i n c e he 
would p r o b a b l y produce a d i f f e r e n t s e r i e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e meaning 
o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e t o him. Now, w h i l e i t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t our e x p e r i e n c e s 
a r e o u r s , i n t h e sense t h a t we have them, i t i s by no means t r u e t h a t any 
e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e r e b y o u r s i n t h e sense t h a t o n l y we can have i t - eg., t o o t h a c h e . 
For Wieder t o r e l y on h i s e x p e r i e n c e o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e i n o r d e r t o c l a i m t h a t 
s i n c e he c o u l d n o t be m i s t a k e n about how he e x p e r i e n c e d h i s e x p e r i e n c e , t h e r e -
f o r e t h i s d i s p l a y s t h e b a s i s on w h i c h o t h e r s a r r i v e a t t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e , he 
must c l a i m t h a t h i s r e f l e c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e e v i d e n c e f o r t h e assumption. What 
does t h i s c l a i m come t o , however? H i s account o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e ( o f e x p e r i e n c i n g ) 
makes sense o n l y i f we t a k e f o r g r a n t e d t h e r e a l i t y which i t j u s t i f i e s i t s e l f 
as d e s c r i b i n g ; as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r e x p e r i e n c e , i t must appeal t o 'what i t i s 
reasonable f o r anyone t o make o f r e a l i t y ' r a t h e r t h a n p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e as an 
o b j e c t , t o be p o i n t e d t o . That i s t o say, t h e ' c e r t a i n t y ' o f h i s i n n e r 
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e x p e r i e n c e r e s t s n o t on HIS e x p e r i e n c i n g i t , b ut upon t h e i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e l y 
agreed c o n v e n t i o n s w i t h i n which i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r him t o account i t . 
T hink c f s a y i n g ' I c o u l d n ' t b e l i e v e my eyes"; when we say t h i s , we r e f e r t o t h e 
f a c t , i n l o t s o f cases, t h a t we would have t o , i n an account o f what we saw, 
d e s c r i b e A scene whi c h c o u l d o n l y be acc e p t e d by someone e l s e s e e i n g i t ; i n 
terms o f o r d i n a r y c o n v e n t i o n s , we c o u l d n o t account i t , s a t i s f a c t o n l y . 
Thus, w h i l s t Winch was i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e r e a l i t y o u t s i d e o f language because 
he saw t n i s as u n i f o r m l y c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e p u b l i c l y a c c o u n t a b l e c o n v e n t i o n s o f 
language use, Wieder t r a d e s on t h e u n i f o r m i t y o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g r e a l i t y t o 
j u s t i f y t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e s o f r e a l i t y i n w h i c h , 
f o r him, t h e c o n t e x t etnbeddedness o f e x p e r i e n c e r e s u l t s . Many ethnomethodolo-
g i s t s c l a i m chat c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i a l s c i e n c e v i o l a t e s t h e i n c a r n a t e n a t u r e o f 
meaning by imposing o n t o i t c o n c e p t u a l u n i t y where i t does n o t ( c a n n o t ) match 
the meaning o f t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s . To c l a i m t h i s , however, t h e y 
must r e j e c t t h e n o t i o n t h a t r e a l i t y i s e x p e r i e n c e d as u n i f o r m i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
id e a t h a t any such a c t u a l o r d e r l i n e s s i s an accomplishment i n c o n t e x t , a nego-
t i a t i o n r e s o l v e d f r o m among the d i s p a r a t e meaning p o s s i b i l i t i e s a c c e s s i b l e t o 
th e i n d i v i d u a l s concerned. T h i s i s t h e consequence, f o r Wieder, o f t h e p a r t i a l 
and f r a g m e n t a r y corpus occasioned i n a c t u a l usages o f t h e code. 
However, w h i l e i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e makes o f t h e code a p a r t i a l , f r a g m e n t e d 
and open ended s o c i a l o r d e r , t h e assumption w i t h which i n d i v i d u a l s a c t u a l l y do 
operaLe, he i n s i s t s , i s o f a u n i f i e d and s t a b l e s o c i a l o r d e r ; t e l l i n g t h e 
code i n v o l v e s a s s e r t i n g i t s f a c t i c i t y , i t s c h a r a c t e r as a ' r e a l ' s o c i a l con-
s t r a i n t . The code cannot p r e d i c t b e h a v i o u r , he argues, but i t i s e x p e r i e n c e d 
as d o i n g so, a l t h o u g h i n f a c t i t s f u n c t i o n i s i n t e r p r e t i v e . 
The whole model i s i n h e r e n t l y d u a l i s t i c ; w h i l e Wieder c l a i m s t h e c o n d i t i o n a l l y 
o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e , h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r d o i n g so r e s t upon t h e 
assumption o f a u n i f i e d r e a l i t y . >ve cannot rescue meaning from i t s c o n d i t i o n -
a l i t y , but we can be shown how meaning i s c o n s t r u c t e d . I f r e a l i t y i s u n i f o r m , 
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and meaning i s based on common u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , however, why cannot we rescue 
meaning? The argument i s based d i r e c t l y on t h e n o t i o n t h a t p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e 
o f meaning i s t o o complex and t r a n s i e n t t o be r e c o v e r a b l e 'from the o p e r a t i n g 
t a b l e ' ( i n G a r f i n k e l ' s m e t a p h o r ) . (93) 
T h i s , however, i s a view which t r a d e s on a n o t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h i s , 
l i k e t h a t o f Winch, h i g h l y s p e c i f i c and a l s o u n i - d i m e n s i o n a l . I t may be t r u e 
t h a t we cannot r e c o v e r meaning i n c o n t e x t , j u s t as we cannot have a n o t h e r ' s 
p a i n , but i t seems t o me t h a t t h i s does n o t have t h e consequences f o r s o c i o -
l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g w h i c h Wieder o u t l i n e s . Rather t h a n b e i n g a p r e s c r i p t i o n on 
p o s s i b i l i t y , i t i s s i m p l y t o say t h a t we are always i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r e s e n t ; 
i t i s one o f t h e 'bounds o f sense*, where sense i s taken t o mean b o t h p e r c e p t i o n 
and a l s o x a t i o n a l i t y . I t may seem o b v i o u s , when we are l e d t o see t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n o f meaning i n t h i s way, t h a t t h e se p r a c t i c a l i t i e s , m o t i v a t i o n s , hopes, 
f e a r s , d e p r e s s i o n s , e t c . , are gone, and we a r e h e r e , now, so t h a t any r e c a l l 
o f them v i o l a t e s t h e i r i n c a r n a t i o n as a moment o f usage. But, s e e i n g t h i s i n 
a n o t h e r way, we c o u l d argue t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e moment and i t s meaning 
i s n o t g u a r a n t e e d t h e r e b y . T h i s i s t o say t h a t when we de c i d e t o account s o c i a l 
r e a l i t y as laymen o r p r o f e s s i o n a l s , we do so i n terms o f c r i t e r i a w h i c h we a l l 
share. I t makes no sense t o argue t h a t we cannot do so, because i t s t r u e 
meaning i s u n a v a i l a b l e t o us now, because, i f t h a t were the case, we c o u l d 
never 'know' such a meaning i n t h e way t h a t we must c l a i m , i n f a c t t h a t we do. 
I f t r u e meaning i s o n l y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l as he e x p e r i e n c e s i t i n 
the o n g o i n g course o f d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e , i t i s t h e r e b y h i s p r i v a t e o b j e c t , t o 
w h i c h , by d e f i n i t i o n , o t h e r s a r e e x c l u d e d access. T h i s i s a form o f s o l i p s i s m , 
and i s s u b j e c t t o t h e o b j e c t i o n s which W i t t g e n s t e i n r a i s e d i n t h e work o f h i s 
l a t e r p e r i o d . 
For Wieder t o c l a i m t h a t t h e ongoing course o f h i s d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e i s a l l 
t h a t we can have when we l o o k f o r t h e processes w h i c h show how meaning i s con-
s t i t u t e d i n s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e i s f o r him t o c l a i m t h a t , f o r o t h e r s t o have t h e 
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same k i n d o f e x p e r i e n c e i s o n l y a l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y 1 f we acce p t t h a t t h e 
v e r i f i c a t i o n o f p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e i n v o l v e s d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n s 
between t h e e x p e r i e n c e and the owner t h a n does t h e c l a i m t h a t o t h e r s have t h e 
e x p e r i e n c e ; i n t h e f o r m e r case, i f we t a k e t h e e x p e r i e n c e as sense datum, t h e n 
the v e r i f i c a t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e owner, w h i l e , i n 
t h e l a t t e r , w h i l e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e owner e n t e r s i n t o t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e does n o t i n v o l v e t h e 
concept o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e as a sense datum i n t h e same way, because i t i n v o l v e s 
a d i f f e r e n t method o f v e r i f i c a t i o n ( 9 4 ) . We are here under t h e i l l u s i o n t h a t , 
i n t a k i n g e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l as t h e mono c e n t r e o f language, t h e s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n 
o f t h i s language v i s - a - v i s i t s c e n t r e l i e s i n i t s b e i n g compared d i r e c t l y w i t h 
p r i m a r y e x p e r i e n c e f o r i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n , and s i n c e t h i s p r i m a r y e x p e r i e n c e i s 
unique and i n c o m p a r a b l e , and d i f f e r e n t languages d i f f e r o n l y i n t h e i r a p p l i c a -
t i o n , t h e n a l l t h a t can be expressed about them i s t h e i r e q u i v a l e n c e , and t h e i r 
uniqueness i s i n e x p r e s s i b l e ( t h i n k here o f t h e im p o r t a n c e o f d i s p l a y i n fctfieder's 
a c c o u n t ) . 
Now, t h i s k i n d o f b a f f l e m e n t , a l t h o u g h i t runs c o u n t e r t o common sense, i s n o t 
r e f u t e d by i t ; r a t h e r , i n t h e c l a i m t h a t w i t h i n common sense we do n o t have t h e 
t r u e p i c t u r e o f t h e way i n whic h meaning o p e r a t e s , and t h a t i t cannot be t r a n s -
f e r a b l e m t h e way t h a t we assume i t t o be, we have a c l a i m f o r grammar b e i n g 
j u s t i f i e d by r e f e r e n c e t o what i t d e p i c t s , and t h e c l a i m f o r t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i s ' r e a l ' w o r l d i n terms o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y accepted 
grammar. 
I s h a l l n o t go t h r o u g h a l l o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s arguments a g a i n s t p r i v a t e language 
and s o l i p s i s m ; i n t h e case o f Wieder, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o p o i n t o u t t h a t h i s 
c l a i m t o kno<< the processes on w h i c h h i s d i r e c t o ngoing e x p e r i e n c e i s based i n 
a way t h a t he cannot know t h a t o f o t h e r s , c a n n o t , t h e r e b y , produce a d i f f e r e n t 
account o f h i s own e x p e r i e n c e s t h a n he would produce o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f 
o t h e r s . N ote, t h i s i s double edged; i f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r h i s account o f 
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h i s own e x p e r i e n c e a r e t h e same as h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r sentences a c c o u n t i n g 
the e x p e r i e n c e o f o t h e r s , r e l y i n g as t h e y do on t h e grammar o f t h e language 
w i t h i n w h i c h such e x p e r i e n c e s are r e p r e s e n t e d f o r anyone, t h e n t h e s p e c i a l 
s t a t u s g i v e n t o h i s e x p e r i e n c e OVER t h a t o f o t h e r i s m e r e l y c o n t i n g e n t ; i t i s 
merely a f o r m a l u n iqueness, g e o m e t r i c a l r a t h e r t h a n p h y s i c a l , s i n c e t h e un i q u e 
s e l f t o w h i c h t h e e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e r e b y connected does n o t e n t e r i n t o t h e scene 
which i t sees. The d i s p l a y o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e s t o which we a t t e n d when we 
assemble t h e sense o f ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n i s t h e r e b y a v a i l a b l e i n any a c c o u n t , 
and n o t i n some s p e c i a l way i n an account w h i c h sees i t s e l f as f o c u s s i n g on 
i t s e l f . P r e c i s e l y because o f t h e c o n t e x t embeddedness o f t h e ongoing e x p e r i e n c e 
o f meaning, i t i s a f o r m a l p r o p e r t y o f cons c i o u s n e s s t h a t , w h i l e o n l y t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l has t h e e x p e r i e n c e s which he has, these are o n l y a v a i l a b l e t o him 
t h r o u g h t h e grammar o f t h e language a v a i l a b l e f o r him t o use, and he cannot 
c l a i m a s p e c i a l knowledge o f h i s own e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i s n o t t r a n s f e r a b l e i n 
terms o f such a language. 
I t does n o t f o l l o w , t h e r e b y , t h a t a l l e x p e r i e n c e i s r e c o v e r a b l e i n terms o f 
the c o n v e n t i o n s w h i c h o p e r a t e i n such a language, f o r , as I have a l r e a d y a rgued, 
t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y i s such t h a t i t i s o n l y and e n t i r e l y a v a i l -
a b l e on i t s o c c a s i o n . But n e i t h e r does i t f o l l o w from t h i s t h a t i t i s t h e r e b y 
a p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e , s i n c e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , we can r e f l e c t on i t o n l y i n terms 
o f t he grammar win c h our language g i v e s us. The showing o f how t h i s grammar 
o p e r a t e s does n o t r e q u i r e s p e c i a l e v i d e n t i a l s t a t u s f o r such r e f l e c t i o n s , but 
i s r a t h e r a p o s s i b i l i t y a v a i l a b l e t o us i n t h e a c c o u n t i n g o r r e - f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
any e x p e r i e n c e , s i n c e what i s o p e r a t i n g i s n o t an ' e m p i r i c a l ' process except 
i n t h e sense t h a t our u t t e r a n c e s p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e data on w h i c h t h e work o f 
a n a l y s i s may proceed. Given Wieder's a n a l y s i s o f how t h e code o p e r a t e s , t h e 
c l a i m t h a t s o c i o l o g i s t s cannot produce adequate d e s c r i p t i o n s o f how t h e code 
o p e r a t e s t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e r e a l i t y w h i c h inmates i n h a b i t proceeds d i r e c t l y from 
h i s view o f t h e s p e c i a l s t a t u s o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e ; i n terms o f i t s own 
i n s i s t e n c e on t h e acco m p l i s h e d n a t u r e o f o r d e r i n any p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g , 
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however, Wieder must a l s o r e c o g n i s e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s t a t u s o f accounted 
uses o f t h e code. I f we c o u l d n o t come t o know t h e i n d i v i d u a l uses t o w h i c h 
t h e code uas p u t because o f t h e c o n t e x t embeddedness o f those uses, t h e n any 
use o f t h e code would be as good as any o t h e r ; as Wiener n o t e s : 
"The h e a r e r was n o t i n any p o s i t i o n t o make h a r s h 
judgments about the r e l e v a n c e o f any s p e c i f i c t e l l i n g 
t o what he u n d e r - s t o o d as a p r o p e r ' t e l l i n g o f t h e code'. 
T h i s i s n o t t o suggest t h a t any p r o p o s a l whatsoever would 
have been a c c e p t a b l e but j u s t how such judgments would 
have been r e n d e r e d i s , a t the l e a s t , open t o c o n s i d e r a b l e 
m a n i p u l a t i o n , s i n c e t h e open f l e x i b l e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e 
code p r e c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f comparing some p r e s e n t 
s t o r y w i t h what i s d e f i n i t e l y known about what a t e l l i n g 
o f t n e code s h o u l d c o n s i s t o f . " (95) 
The m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e code by r e s i d e n t s t o t h w a r t s t a f f and o b s e r v e r i s an 
ongoing p o s s i b i l i t y f o r Wieder p r e c i s e l y because he i s concerned t o g i v e a l l 
i n s t a n c e s o f t e l l i n g t h e code t h e same s t a t u s ; what t h e code comes t o , f o r 
Wieder, i s n o t j u s t a s e t o f r u l e s , but a set o f r u l e s w i t h o u t c r i t e r i a w h i c h 
enable us t o d i s t i n g u i s h c o r r e c t f r o m i l l i c i t moves. The c o n v e n t i o n a l s o c i o -
l o g i c a l usage o f t h i s s e t t o account f o r inmate b e h a v i o u r v i o l a t e s , he a r g u e s , 
t h e v a r i e t y o f ways i n wh i c h t h e r u l e s o p e r a t e . I n i n t r o d u c i n g t h i s v a r i e t y , 
however, Wieder obs c u r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p r e c i s e l y which c r i t e r i a e x i s t f o r 
them t o f u n c t i o n as a s e t o f r u l e s a t a l l . 
what i s m i s s i n g from Wleder's account o f t h e t e l l i n g o f t h e code i s an account 
of how t h e code r e l a t e s t o t h e e x i g e n c i e s o f c o n v i c t l i f e ; i t does n o t , except 
i n a f o r m a l and u n i n t e r e s t i n g sense e x i s t a p a r t f r o m i t s p l a c e w i t h i n t h e s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s between t h e members o f t h e community wh i c h i s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n . 
«Iieder i s r i g h t t o argue t h a t t h e code f o r m u l a t e s and expresses those r e l a t i o n -
s h i p s , b u t i n e'nphasising t h i s , he e x c l u d e s from c o n s i d e r a t i o n , by c o n c e n t r a t i n g 
on t h e u t t e r a n c e s w i t h i n which t h e code i s i n c a r n a t e d , p r e c i s e l y t h o s e s i g n i -
f i c a n c e s w h i c h u n d e r l i e u t t e r a n c e and d e t e r m i n e what s t a t u s t h e u t t e r a n c e w i l l 
come t o have i n t h e c o n t e x t i n which i t i s employed - f o r i n s t a n c e , the r e l a t i o n 
between s t a f f and inmate. T h i s e x p l a i n s why he must accept t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
m a n i p u l a t i o n , f o r any account w h i c h i s produced s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y a p a r t from 
the ' r e a l ' occasion cannot claim any spec i a l status over any other account, 
apart from 
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i t s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . What i t must do, however, i s t o r e l y on everyday 
c o n c e p t i o n s o f r e l a t i o n s between s p e a k e r s ; f o r Wieder t o make sense o f t h e 
code as a t e l l i n g t r a d e s on h i s and the r e a d e r ' s commonsense c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e 
p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t o which members a t t e n d when t h e y t e l l t h e code; what 
grounds Wieder's t e l l i n g , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s a c c o u n t , i s t h e 'occasioned corpus 
o f c u l t u r a l e l e m e n t s ' w h i c h he c o l l e c t s v i a 'the documentary method o f i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n ' , ( 9 6 ) whereby a c t u a l appearances are t r e a t e d as t h e document o f t h e 
pre-supposed u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n d e r i v e d from i t s i n d i v i d u a l documentary e v i d e n c e s 
and e l a b o r a t i n g t h a t e v i d e n c e . Wieder e x p l a i n s how t h i s works by c i t i n g how he 
heard a q u e s t i o n by an inmate ('Where can I f i n d t h a t meeting where I can get 
an o v e r n i g h t pass?') as e x p r e s s i n g l o y a l t y t o r e s i d e n t s because o f t h e i m p l i c a -
t i o n s o f t h e remark f o r him and t h e inmate on t h e o c c a s i o n on whi c h i t was 
s a i d . (97) Ke was a b l e t o see t h e sense o f t h e remark i n terms o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s 
he had heard up t o t h a t p o i n t and l a t e r , i n terms o f o t h e r u t t e r a n c e s he was 
y e t to hear. W h i l e , o f c o u r s e , i t may be q u i t e j u s t i f i a b l e f o r (Hieder t o d e r i v e 
t h o s e i m p l i c a t i o n s from t h e remark, t h a t he can do so d e r i v e s n o t from t h e 
r e l a t i o n between a c t u a l appearance and pre-supposed u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n ; t h e 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s h e a r i n g t h e remark i n the way t h a t he e x p l i c a t e s i t does 
not r e s i d e i n an account o f how i t was p o s s i b l e f o r him t o hear t h e remark, but 
t h i s i s r a t h e r , a d e s c r i p t i o n o f r e c o g n i s i n g w h i c h t r a d e s on, o r i s l o g i c a l l y 
p a r a s i t i c on t h e r e c o g n i s i n g o f t h e o b j e c t as i t i s done. L e a r n i n g t o r e c o g n i s e 
t h e 'pre-supposed u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n ' i n v o l v e s l e a r n i n g t o r e c o g n i s e t h e con-
d i t i o n s under w h i c h one i s j u s t i f i e d i n a c c o u n t i n g i n s t a n c e s o f t h a t p a t t e r n . 
To say ' I used t h a t p a t t e r n here t o make sense o f t h i s u t t e r a n c e ' d e s c r i b e s the 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s , but cannot i n v o l v e c l a i m i n g t o r e c o g n i s e t h e 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n d i t i o n s , s i n c e h e r e , i t makes no sense t o ask 
'how do you know', s i n c e t h i s i s b o t h a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e mastery o f t h e 
p a t t e r n , p r e - s u p p o s i n g a knowledge o f i t s c r i t e r i a , and a l s o a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f 
t h e component concepts o f t h e p a t t e r n c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n i t s d e s c r i p t i v e use. 
I n s h o r t , Wieder r e l i e s , i n h i s account o f how t h e code i s t o be t o l d , on making 
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a d i f f e r e n c e between r e a l i t y and i t s pre-supposed u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n so t h a t 
he can c l a i m t o d e s c r i b e t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h a t r e a l i t y . 
Rather, we s h o u l d see t h e pre-supposed u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n as c o n s t i t u t i v e 
o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which one i s j u s t i f i e d i n a c c o u n t i n g i t s i n s t a n c e s , 
and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e d those i n s t a n c e s ( m a n i f e s t e d i n them) 
but t h a t we c a n n o t , because i t does n o t make sense,aim t o r e c o g n i s e t h e recog-
n i t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s . 
Wieder's appeal t o t h e o b s e r v e r ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f ongoing r e a l i t y depends upon 
making a d i f f e r e n c e between an a c c o u n t , and a c c o u n t i n g o f an a c c o u n t , r a t h e r 
t h a n , as he c l a i m s , u n i f y i n g t h e two i n t h e n o t i o n o f a n ' a c c o u n t i n g - o f - s o c i a l -
a c t i o n ' . For what an account does, as w e l l as s p e c i f y an o b j e c t , i s t o serve 
as a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e mastery o f t h e c r i t e r i a on w h i c h , t o be s e n s i b l e , 
i t depends. 
Resume 
Now i n rny t r e a t m e n t o f Winch and ^ i e d e r , I have walked a l i n e w h i c h i s v e r y 
t h i n and tenuous. Both argue f o r a s p e c t s o f t h e r o l e o f c o n v e n t i o n and c o n t e x t 
which are b o t h i m p o r t a n t and a l s o f l a w e d . What I have t r i e d t o do i s t o show 
how these can be bro u g h t t o g e t h e r t o g i v e us a b a s i s f o r d o i n g s o c i a l s c i e n c e , 
/anch i s r i g h t t o s t r e s s t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f language make meaning i n t o 
a p u b l i c , r a t h e r t h a n a p r i v a t e phenomenon, but wrong t o argue t h a t p u b l i c 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y has t h e consequence o f c u l t u r a l h e r m e t i c i s m . P r e c i s e l y because 
the p r o b l e m o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t a n d s t o be r e s o l v e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n t h e 
d i v e r s e p r a c t i c e s o f a l l human s o c i e t y , g i v e n t h e u n i v e r s a l n a t u r e o f i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v i t y , as d e t a i l e d by Wieder, so c u l t u r e s can and do become a c c e s s i b l e 
t o each o t h e r . (98) The q u e s t i o n o f t h e i r c o m p a r a b i l i t y depends, s i m i l a r l y , 
on an argument f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s o c i a l s c i e n c e . ( 9 9 ) Accounts come 
t o be seen as n o t the same t h i n g t h a t t h e s u b j e c t would say, but a t t e n d 
i n s t e a d t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e language game o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e , w h i c h b o t h 
w a r r a n t s and assesses t h e accounts produced. I t i s not t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n c e 
w a r r a n t s a l l a c c o u n t s , but r a t h e r w a r r a n t s them m terms o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s 
74. 
a v a i l a b l e i n the community and t r a d i t i o n o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e w h i c h t h e y i n v o k e . 
w h i l e Wieder's account demonstrates t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f c o n t e x t , i t cannot 
produce s o c i a l s c i e n c e which i s w a r r a n t e d by t h e r u l e s o f such a game; i n d e e d 
i t aims t o demarcate i t s p r o j e c t f r o m those o f c o n v e n t i o n a l s o c i a l s c i e n c e . 
One i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s argument i s t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n c e makes a f a l s e c l a i m 
about t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s t h a t i t makes - t h a t i s t o say, i t s 
' e x p l a n a t i o n s ' v i o l a t e t h e sense o f t h e meanings i t d e r i v e s from s u b j e c t s 
a c t i o n s by b e i n g u n a b l e t o account t h e m u l t i - f a c e t e d ways i n which t h e i r t a l k 
and a c t i o n o p e r a t e s i n i t s c o n t e x t s . I t makes t h i s c l a i m , however, on t h e 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f reasoned ev i d e n c e f o r t h e m u l t i - f o r m u l a t e d and m u l t i - c o n s e q u -
e n t i a l r o l e o f u t t e r a n c e s , based on t h e c a p a c i t y t o r e f l e c t on those u t t e r a n c e s . 
I argue, however, t h a t t h i s c a p a c i t y t o r e f l e c t does n o t p r o v i d e f o r any 
d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f account as a p r a c t i c e i t s e l f , but r a t h e r i s a necessary 
f e a t u r e o f any a c c o u n t ; t h a t i s t o say, r e g r e s s t o t h e a t t e m p t t o r e c o g n i s e 
a r e c o g n i t i o n does no u s e f u l work i n t h e o r y , s i n c e i t i s always a f e a t u r e o f 
any r e a d i n g . 
F u n d a mentally, Wieder's account Lrades on, but has no p l a c e f o r t h e a c t i v e r o l e 
o f t h e o r y ; w h i l e i t r e j e c t s c o n v e n t i o n a l s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g ( a t l e a s t 
i m p l i c i t l y ) i t stands i t s e l f as j u s t such an i n s t a n c e o f t h e o r i s i n g , s i n c e i t 
f o r m u l a t e s a r o l e f o r t h e o r i s i n g which i s a n t i t h e o r e t i c a l . 
For i t proposes no d i f f e r e n c e s between any man's s o c i a l t h e o r i e s ; i n s o f a r as 
everyday a c t o r s employ i m p l i c i t s o c i o l o g i c a l concepts i n t h e i r a c c o u n t i n g , 
f o r t hemselves and o t h e r s , o f s o c i a l a c t i o n s , and s o c i o l o g i s t s employ everyday 
usages i n t h e same way as t h e i r s u b j e c t s t o account t h e s e a c t i o n s , t h e o n l y 
d i f f e r e n c e between them i s t h e i r c l a i m s f o r t h i s work; t h e same t h i n g i s done 
as p r a c t i c a l i t y by t h e former and s c i e n c e by t h e l a t t e r . I t i s t h e n a t u r e and 
s t a t u s o f t h e o r i s i n g which I s h a l l address i n my n e x t c h a p t e r . 
For Wieder, t h e n o t i o n o f ' a c c o u n t i n g - s o c i a l - a c t i o n ' expresses t h e d e s i r e t o 
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show how a l l members come t o see ( t a l k , a c t i o n ) i n t h e same way, by e x p l i c a t i n g 
h i s s e e i n g as i t i s b e i n g done. Now, a t t h e same t i m e , he emphasises, such 
s e e i n g t r a d e s on h i s knowledge as a member i n t h e same way t h a t he presumes 
o t h e r s s e e i n g t r a d e s on t h e i r knowledge as members; t h i s i s what j u s t i f i e s t he 
assumption t h a t i n a c c o u n t i n g t h e a c c o u n t i n g o f s o c i a l a c t i o n , we d i s p l a y t h e 
methods o f g i v i n g and r e c e i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r s e e i n g and d e s c r i b i n g a s o c i a l 
o r d e r , f o r ' t h e i n t e r - p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e o f s o c i a l o r d e r s and t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y 
t o p e r c e p t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n i s t h e achievement o f t h e v a r i o u s methods 
e n t a i l e d i n t h e a c c o u n t i n g - o f - s o c i a l - a c t i o n ' . (100) 
I n a n o t h e r p i e c e , Wieder s t a t e s 'by f o c u s i n g on how members a c t u a l l y use t i t l e s , 
names, c a t e g o r i e s and c r i t e r i a i n on g o i n g s i t u a t i o n s , t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
p r o d u c i n g s u b s t a n t i v e t r a n s i t u a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f such t h i n g s as ' d e f i n i t i o n 
o f t h e s i t u a t i o n ' , ' l i f e space', ' t h e a c t o r s o r i e n t a t i o n t o h i s s i t u a t i o n * and 
' c o g n i t i v e maps' i s abandoned as the a n a l y s t s t a s k and becomes i n s t e a d a f u r t h e r 
i n s t a n c e o f t h e work t h a t members do i n making t h e o r d e r l y p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e 
s e t t i n g s i n w h i c h they a c t v i s i b l e t o each o t h e r ' , ( 101) and a g a i n , 'We do n o t 
ta k e i t t h a t p e r s o n s share t h e same meanings and d e f i n i t i o n s . I n s t e a d we 
a t t e m p t t o show t h a t members c o n t i n u o u s l y r e l y on, and i f p r e s s e d , i n s i s t upon, 
the c a p a c i t i e s o f o t h e r s t o f i n d a p r e s u m p t i v e l y shared sense i n what t h e y a re 
s a y i n g ' . (102) 
Wieder's ethnomethodology, t h e r e b y , seeks above a l l t o p r e s e r v e t h e a u t h o r i t y 
o f o r d i n a r y usage; such a n a l y s i s can, by i t s own a d m i s s i o n , produce o n l y 
i n s t a n c e s o f t h e c a p a c i t y t o do t h i s w h i c h themselves r e l y on our c a p a c i t y t o 
read them as such. The argument i s t h a t , s i n c e s e e i n g s r e l y on a method, i f 
t h e o b s e r v e r s t i p u l a t e s c o n c r e t e l y how i t i s done, t h i s e x h i b i t s t h e p r o c e d u r e s 
which produce o r d e r f o r any members i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . His r u l e s f o r s e e i n g 
become c o n c r e t e i n s t a n c e s - t h i n k here o f H u s s e r l ' s famous s t a t e m e n t 'We a r e 
t h e r e a l e m p i r i c i s t s ' . Wieder does n o t c l a i m t h a t h i s r u l e s , as c o n c r e t e l y 
produced, are t h e r u l e s w h i c h members a t t e n d t o , n o r can he. T h i s work i s 
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ongoing because i t does not have an 'end i n v i e w ' , except f o r i n s i s t i n g on 
the v a r i e t y of p o s s i b i l i t i e s e n t a i l e d i n concre te f o r m u l a t i o n s ; i t r e f u s e s 
the r o l e of theory p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as i t t r e a t s the v a r i e t y of conrete 
f o r m u l a t i o n s as ' a l l we can h a v e ' , and thereby d e n i e s any d i f f e r e n c e s between 
accounts which can be produced; that accounts can be produced s e r v e s m e r e l y , 
f o r Wieder, as a resource which i s u s e f u l , r a t h e r than i n t e r e s t i n g , f o r , i n 
s p i t e of what he sees h i m s e l f as do ing , he i s i n f a c t producing a c o n c r e t e 
normative o r d e r f o r c r e a t i n g s e n s i b l e events i n which only he ( h i s p e r s p e c t i v e ) 
i s what i s accompl i shed; i n s a y i n g ' t h i s i s a l l we can have' Wieder den ies 
both the i n t e r e s t i n how h i s account i s i t s e l f s e n s i b l e , and the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of t r a n s f o r m i n g the s u b j e c t of h i s account i n t o something o ther than what i t 
c o n c r e t e l y i s . 
T h i s i s not to argue f o r the i l l e g i t i m a c y of h i s a c t i v i t y so much as i t s 
e s s e n t i a l i r r e l e v a n c y ; on i t s own t e r m s , i t has i t s p o s s i b i l i t y on the b a s i s 
of the e s s e n t i a l l y p e r s p e c t i v a l b a s i s of a l l a c c o u n t i n g methods, and f o r m u l a t e s 
i t s e l f as concerned with the i n s t a n t i a t i o n of p e r s p e c t i v e , r a t h e r than i t s 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . I f we see t h i s as a l l that i t can do, then we can argue about 
whether t h i s i s i n t e r e s t i n g or not ; and we must s u r e l y , see i t i n t h i s way, 
f o r i t d i s c l a i m s the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s e l f doing anyth ing e l s e . I t i s q u i t e 
another t h i n g , however, f o r i t to c l a i m that t h i s i s a l l anyone can do, and 
here ethnomethodologists seem to d i f f e r i n t h e i r c l a i m s f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the approach. For i t to do that would be to c l a i m that the 
e l e c t i o n which i t makes i s the only e l e c t i o n to be made, and h e r e , i t would 
have to produce reasons f o r doing so ( g r o u n d s ) , what these might be, and the 
reasons which might be produced f o r r e j e c t i n g them, I propose to c o n s i d e r n e x t . 
77. 
CHAPTER 2 
ORDINARY LANGUAGE • U ' - ' / ^ 1 1 ^ ! f\nl> O ^ t ^ 1 
I n the work of -'inch and Wieder we f i n d a c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the f e a t u r e s o f 
n a t u r a l language which r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y to the s o c i o l o g i c a l work of 
r e l a t i n g such uses to accounts of s o c i a l a c t i o n . The commonsense world of 
everyday a c t o r s i s the focus f o r t h e i r a c c o u n t s ; s o c i o l o g y has a l s o , however, 
been concerned to e x p l a i n the o v e r a r c h i n g framework which p r e s e n t s i t s e l f to 
the i n d i v i d u a l as s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . How are we to b r i n g toge ther 
t h i s e n t e r p r i s e w i t h the account ing of s o c i a l a c t i o n i n terms of the meanings 
which everyday a c t o r s employ? - Indeed, can t h i s be done? 
T a l c o t t Parsons has seen h i m s e l f as concerned w i t h j u s t such a p r o j e c t ; i n h i s 
e y e s , s o c i o l o g i c a l theory at both s o c i e t a l and i n t e r p e r s o n a l l e v e l s d i s p l a y s 
an i n h e r e n t , but u n r e a l i z e d , t rend towards u n i t y , which he has taken as h i s 
fundamental p r o j e c t . The s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e of h i s p r o j e c t i s not to be 
reviewed i n the present work. What i s of i n t e r e s t to me are the f e a t u r e s which 
Parsons holds to be n e c e s s a r y f o r any s o c i o l o g i c a l account ing to be clone. I 
s h a l l argue t h a t these proceed d i r e c t l y from p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s d e r i v e d 
from K a n t , and f u r t h e r , t h a t p r i n c i p l e s of some s o r t do form the parameters 
f o r any cumula t ive work, that i s to s a y , work which prov ides for any p r o c e s s e s 
of comparison and e v a l u a t i o n . T h i s i s to say that s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , i f 
i t i s to aim f o r any knowledge o ther than t h a t a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n comrnonsense, 
must be demarcated i n terms of some such s e t of p r i n c i p l e s . 
G a r f i n k e l proceeds from t h i s view of s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t i n g , but o b j e c t s to 
what he takes to be i t s consequence; t h a t i t cannot , s i n c e i t p r o v i d e s f o r 
i t s e l f i n terms of an IDEAL r a t i o n a l i t y , dea l wi th the ways i n which language , 
i n f a c t o p e r a t e s to accompl i sh meaning in the everyday wor ld . While h i s p r o j e c t 
d i s p l a y s awareness o f i t s t h e o r e t i c a l grounds , I s h a l l argue t h a t the attempt 
to c o n s t i t u t e grounds f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e p r o j e c t cannot s u c c e e d , and that the 
proposed a l t e r n a t i v e grounds cannot p r o v i d e f o r a t r u l y t h e o r e t i c a l a c c o u n t i n g 
of i t s phenomena without r e l y i n g on the p r i n c i p l e s which i t r e j e c t s . 
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"There has been of l a t e a s t rong c u r r e n t of pess imism i n 
the thought of s t u d e n t s of the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , 
e x p e c i a l l y those who c a l l themselves s o c i o l o g i s t s . We 
are t o l d that t h e r e are as many systems of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
theory as t h e r e are s o c i o l o g i s t s , that there i s no 
common b a s i s , that a l l i s a r b i t r a r y and s u b j e c t i v e . To 
the presen t w r i t e r t h i s c u r r e n t of sent iment has two 
e q u a l l y u n f o r t u n a t e i m p l i c a t i o n s . On the one hand, i t 
encourages the view that the on ly sound work i n the s o c i a l 
f i e l d i s d e t a i l e d f a c t u a l s tudy , wi thout b e n e f i t of t h e o r y . 
On the o ther hand, f o r those who r e f u s e to be s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h t h i s , i t encourages t i dangerous i r r a t i o n a l 1 sm which 
l e t s go of s c i e n t i f i c s t a n d a r d s a l t o g e t h e r . We are t o l d 
s o c i o l o g y i s an ar t , that what i s v a l u a b l e i n i t i s to be 
measured by the s tandards of i n t u i t i o n and i n s p i r a t i o n , 
that i t i s not s u b j e c t to the canons of r i g o r o u s l o g i c 
and e m p i r i c a l v e r i f J c a t i o n . " (1 ) 
Throughout h i s work, Parsons has mainta ined l u s commitment to the s t r a t e g y of 
• a n a l y t i c a l r e a l i s m ' which he expounded i n 'The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n ' . 
T h i s proceeds from an acceptance of the Kant ian f o r m u l a t i o n of the b a s i c 
problem of epis temology; I t i s a f a c t that we have v a l i d e m p i r i c a l knowledge 
of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; ho,-/ i s t h i s p o s s i b l e ? In o t h e r words, the f a c t i c i t y of 
the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e wor ld i s a s s e r t e d , and the problem i s posed by the way i n 
which i t i s p o s s i b l e to address t h i s o b j e c t i v e rea lm ( s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y ) g iven 
the f a c t t h a t men e n t e r t a i n ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' ( i e . , n o n - s c i e n t i f i c ) i d e a s , i n 
a t t a c h i n g s u b j e c t i v e meaning (mot ive s , f e e l i n g s , i d e a s ) to t h e i r ( c o n c r e t e l y 
and s y m b o l i c a l l y ) m a n i f e s t e d behav iour . The problem, for P a r s o n ' s a n a l y s i s 
o f human a c t i o n , i s to uncover the 'immanent p r o c e s s of the development of 
s c i e n c e i t s e l f i n the f a c e of the g iven determinate and r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n -
sh ip between the e x i s t e n t i a l ( n o n - s c i e n t i f i c ) and the i m p e r a t i v e ( r a t i o n a l ) 
e lements of t h i s corpus of knowledge. 
R e a l i t y must be o r d e r e d , he a r g u e s , by conceptual schemes which a r e , i n S c i e n c 
e x p l i c i t , s o p h i s t i c a t e d and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , and in common s e n s e , inherent i n 
the s t r u c t u r e of language. T h i s o r d e r i n g i s i n no sense a r e f l e c t i o n of 
r e a l i t y , but a s e l e c t i v e s t r u c t u r i n g of a grea t mass of p o s s i b l e e m p i r i c a l 
o b s e r v a t i o n s , a d e s c r i p t i o n i n terms of a frame of r e f e r e n c e by means of which 
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a concre te phenomenon i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d ( c o n c e p t u a l i s e d ) in r e l a t i o n to a 
p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n ( e l e c t i o n ) of s c i e n t i f i c or comroonsense i n t e r e s t . Con-
c e p t u a l i s a t i o n i s founded on a s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n of i n t e r e s t , and concepts 
have a r e f e r e n c e on ly i n terms of the frame of i n t e r e s t employed. 
Now, f o r s c i e n c e , aiming at g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , e x p l a n a t i o n , measurement, e t c . , 
the concepts wtuch i t employs must, i n an important s e n s e , be a r b i t r a r y . They 
a r e p a r t s i n t h e o r e t i c a l sy s t ems , w i t h o r g a n i c r e l a t i o n s of in ter -dependence 
p r e v e n t i n g them from l o g i c a l l y , being s e p a r a b l e . The r e l a t i o n s o f the p a r t s 
determine the p r o p e r t i e s of the whole; when t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y , e i t h e r con-
c e p t u a l l y or f a c t u a l l y , i t i s no longer the same, i t becomes, so to speak, a 
f i c t i o n . The p r o c e s s of e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i n v o l v e s an a r b i t r a r y l e v e l 
being f i x e d f o r u n i t s of a n a l y s i s , from which ' g e n e r a l s tatements about the 
p o s s i b l e or probable behaviour of such c o n c r e t e l y e x i s t i n g ( o r h y p o t h e t i c a l ) 
p a r t s of c o n c r e t e phenomena or v a r i o u s combinat ions of them, under g iven t y p i c a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' can be made. (2) An important mechanism i n f i x i n g the u l t i m a t e 
l e v e l of the u n i t of a n a l y s i s i s the f a c t t h a t , as phenomena are d i v i d e d i n t o 
more and more e lementary u n i t s o f a n a l y s i s ( a n d l o g i c a l l y t h e r e i s no i n h e r e n t 
l i m i t to the extent to which t h i s i s p o s s i b l e , " p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as the 
phenomena are o r g a n i c " ) , the more a b s t r a c t or empty i t s concept becomes. 
P a r s o n s comments t h a t the l i m i t to t h i s proces s seems to be determined by the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the u n i t , i t s l e v e l of a b s t r a c t n e s s , and the degree to 
which i t i s ' o r g a n i c ' . The f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n i s o f f e r e d . 
" I . A u n i t in a c o n c r e t e system i s the e n t i t y which 
c o n s t i t u t e s the common r e f e r e n c e of a combination o f 
s ta tements o f f a c t made w i t h i n a frame of r e f e r e n c e 
i n such a way that the combinat ion may, f o r purposes 
of the t h e o r e t i c a l system i n q u e s t i o n , be cons idered 
an adequate d e s c r i p t i o n of any e n t i t y w h i c h , w i t h i n 
the frame of r e f e r e n c e , c o n c e i v a b l y e x i s t s independent ly . 
The t h e o r e t i c a l u n i t i s the s p e c i f i c combinat ion of 
T o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l s i n s p e c i f i c l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
to each o ther i n t o which these s tatements a r e f i t t e d . " (3) 
T h i s type of c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n , u s i n g ' t y p e - p a r t s ' to produce ' e m p i r i c a l gen-
e r a l i s a t i o n s i s , he argues , l o g i c a l l y q u i t e d i s t i n c t from the use of ' a n a l y t i c a l 
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c o n c e p t s ' . T h i s has r e f e r e n c e to a g e n e r a l property of a ( c o n c r e t e or con-
c e p t u a l ) u n i t , w h i l e what we may observe i s only i t s va lue (a l o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l = 
e g . , M a s s ) . Thus a b s t r a c t i o n comes about , i n t h i s c a s e , f o r q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t 
reason than i n the case of type p a r t s ; these come i n t o being as the r e s u l t of 
a c o n c e i v a b l e c o n c r e t e e n t i t y being a n a l y s e d i n t o ' conven ient f i c t i o n s ' , 
a b s t r a c t i o n s which cannot be observed e x i s t i n g c o n c r e t e l y a p a r t from t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to the whole . A n a l y t i c a l elements are d e f i n e d a s : 
any u m v e r s a l s (or combinat ion of u n i v e r s a l s ) 
of which the corresponding v a l u e s (or combination of 
v a l u e s ) may be s t a t e d as f a c t s which i n p a r t determine 
a c l a s s of c o n c r e t e phenomena. 'Determine ' here means 
t h a t a change i n these v a l u e s w i t h i n the framework of 
the same u n i v e r s a l s i n v o l v e s a corresponding change i n 
the concre te phenomena i n r e s p e c t s important to the 
t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m . " (4) 
That i s to s a y , t h i s i s an a b s t r a c t i o n because i t r e f e r s to a g e n e r a l p r o p e r t y , 
w h i l e we observe o n l y i t s p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e . 
F a c t s , for P a r s o n s , e x i s t on ly i n r e l a t i o n to a conceptua l scheme; he i s d i s -
m i s s i v e of the v a r i e t i e s o f e m p i r i c i s m which attempt to (1) r e i f y genera l 
t h e o r e t i c a l systems and c l a i m e i t h e r t h a t the c o n c r e t e phenomena to which the 
theory i s a p p l i c a b l e are e x c l u s i v e l y unders tandable i n terms of the c a t e g o r i e s 
of t h i s system, or that a l l changes i n such phenomena must be p r e d i c t a b l e from 
knowledge of the v a l u e s o f the v a r i a b l e s o f the system ( p o s i t i v i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m ) 
or ( 2 ) r e p u d i a t e the v a l i d i t y o f genera l t h e o r e t i c a l concepts f o r any purpose 
in r e l a t i o n to the concre te phenomena i n q u e s t i o n , a s s e r t i n g e i t h e r t h a t on ly 
o b j e c t i v e knowledge i s p o s s i b l e of the d e t a i l s of concre te t h i n g s and events 
( they can o n l y be observed and d e s c r i b e d , and p l a c e d i n temporal sequence, and 
not c a s u a l l y r e l a t e d i n terms of g e n e r a l concept s ) or that conceptua l schemes 
can only formulate the unique i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a c o n c r e t e phenomenon, and that 
t h i s cannot then be f u r t h e r broken down or subsumed under g e n e r a l c a t e g o r i e s of 
any s o r t . At the same t ime , he holds t h a t at l e a s t some of the concepts o f 
s c i e n c e ' adequate ly grasp c o n c r e t e a s p e c t s o f the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . ' 
8 1 . 
He does not endorse the view t h a t convenient f i c t i o n s a r e the n e c e s s a r y outcome 
of the i n h e r e n t p r o c e s s e s of a b s t r a c t i o n by which conceptua l schemes are r e l a t e d 
to the r e a l w o r l d . 
Our e x p e r i e n c e , he notes ( 5 ) i s of the p a r t i c u l a r , and so our knowledge of 
u n i v e r s a l s must, from a g e n e r a l c r i t i c a l point of v i e w , be m e t a p h y s i c a l , o u t s i d e 
the range of e x p e r i e n c e . Such e n t i t i e s a r e r e a l i n the sense t h a t i t i s a 
f a c t that men b e l i e v e i n them. These b e l i e f s , and t h e i r interdependence w i t h 
o t h e r s o c i a l f a c t s , i s the b a s i s of s o c i a l o r d e r l i n e s s ; they a r e observed 
e lements of the a c t o r ' s s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n , and thus have the s t a t u s of f a c t s i n 
any account o f s o c i a l a c t i o n . 
They a r e , a t the same t ime , on ly a n a l y t i c a l l y s e p a r a b l e from o t h e r elements i n 
concre te phenomena, and are not c la imed e i t h e r to correspond to concre te pheno-
mena, or to d e s c r i D e c o m p l e t e l y , as e lements or as l o g i c a l l y coherent s y s t e m s , 
any concrete t h i n g or e v e n t . (6 ) 
T h i s , then , i s a n a l y t i c a l r e a l i s m ; i t i s founded on P a r s o n s ' commitment to the 
s y s t e m a t i c n a t u r e of s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , and the p o s s i b i l i t y o f having s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge o f i t , on a commitment to the fundamental importance of a n a l y t i c a l 
conceptua l schemes i n f o r m u l a t i n g our knowledge of the w o r l d , and on a b e l i e f 
that we can uncover and develop a corpus of s c i e n t i f i c a l l y r i g o r o u s and l o g i c a l 
knowledge about s o c i a l a c t i o n . Bershady ( 7 ) has noted how c l o s e l y P a r s o n s ' 
l o g i c a l s t r a t e g y p a r a l l e l s t h a t of K a n t ; each aims to e s t a b l i s h c a t e g o r i e s n e c -
e s s a r y f o r knowledge; each c l a i m s thac without a c e r t a i n s e t of c a t e g o r i e s 
( A c t i o n framework, Space-Time framework) knowledge i s not a p o s s i b i l i t y . T h i s 
i s so , Bershady n o t e s , because each at tempts to s o l v e the g e n e r a l problem of 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s c e p t i c i s m and a l though i t i s never e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d , P a r s o n s ' 
concern w i t h deve loping the c l a i m of s o c i o l o g y to s c i e n t i f i c s t a t u s as a r e -
s tatement of Simmel's u n d e r t a k i n g l o c a t e s him f i r m l y as an adherent to K a n t i a n 
procedure . (S ) 
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The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f r e a l i s m , then can be made out ; i e . , "no apparent 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y of o b s e r v a t i o n s tatements should l e a d us to deny the 
o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of e n t i t i e s r e f e r r e d to by terms i n the t h e o r e t i c a l language; 
r a t h e r than attempts to d e f i n e t h e o r e t i c a l terms i n o b s e r v a t i o n a l ones , o b s e r -
v a t i o n s should be seen as g i v i n g us the means of i d e n t i f y i n g the presence and 
n a t u r e of unobservable e n t i t i e s . " ( 9 ) Correspondence r u l e s , i n p o s i t i v i s t t erms , 
can o f t e n be seen as c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , r a t h e r than meaning r u l e s , and the 
t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t y becomes the c e n t r a l f e a t u r e of s c i e n t i f i c a c c o u n t s , r a t h e r 
than a t h e o r e t i c a l problem. I n the case o f P a r s o n s , t h i s i s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d 
i n h i s r e p l y to Wrongs "Over S o c i a l i s e d Conception of Man" (10) c r i t i c i s m s ; h i s 
(wrong's ) b iggest mis take . . . . " i s the sugges t ion t h a t when faced w i t h the 
a l t e r n a t i v e of p u r s u i n g the t e c h n i c a l problems of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a component of 
a c t i o n p r o c e s s such as the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of v a l u e s , or of immediate ly a s s e s s i n g 
i t s e m p i r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n terms of the prime ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' problems of the 
human c o n d i t i o n , the l a t t e r must a lways be chosen. T h i s way l i e s the p e r p e t u a t i o n 
of the regime o f nonsense not the development of s c i e n c e . " (11 ) A n a l y t i c a l 
r e a l i s m thus aims at a d d r e s s i n g the o r d e r l i n e s s of the s o c i a l wor ld from a 
p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t , s ee ing t h i s as the on ly way p o s s i b l e 
f o r any k ind o f a d d r e s s i n g to be done; t h u s , by the use of one p a r t i c u l a r l o g i c a l 
s t r a t e g y , a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e f i n e d c o n c r e t e a r e a becomes formulated as a system 
of r e l a t e d e lements which s t r u c t u r e human a c t i o n . T h i s emphasis on the a n a l y t -
i c a l l e v e l i n v o l v e s an e x p l i c i t d i savowal o f the o n l o l o g i c a l r e f e r e n c e of i t s 
e lements s p e c i f y i n g that . . . . " I t i s never l e g i t i m a t e , except f o r the s p e c i f i c 
purposes of a n a l y t i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n , to t h i n k of an a c t o r apart from a s i t u a t i o n , 
and f o r almost a l l purposes of a c t i o n t h e o r y , by f a r the most important o b j e c t s 
i n the s i t u a t i o n are o ther a c t o r s , i e . , s o c i a l o b j e c t s . The ' s y s t e m ' wi th which 
we are d e a l i n g i s t h e r e f o r e the system of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a c t o r s and 
o b j e c t s w h i c h , when s o c i a l o b j e c t s are i n v o l v e d ijs a system of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n " . 
(12) In terms of a genera l t h e o r y , Parsons p o s t u l a t e s l e v e l s of c o n c e p t u a l i s a ~ 
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t i o n ; h i s b a s i c l e v e l , the ' g e n e r a l frame of r e f e r e n c e concerns the b a s i c 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a c t i o n as a ca tegory of phenomena, "without s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e 
to the n a t u r e and problems of the systems i n which the r e l a t i o n s of u n i t s of 
a c t i o n to each o ther a r e o r g a n i s e d " . (13) 
The task of s o c i o l o g y , a c c o r d i n g to P a r s o n s , i s s t r i c t l y s c i e n t i f i c - i t aims 
to a t t a i n s y s t e m a t i c t h e o r e t i c a l , unders tanding of e m p i r i c a l f a c t . For h i s 
t h e o r i s i n g , however incomplete or p r e l i m i n a r y , he sees a r o l e i n the cumulat ive 
development of such knowledge. For a l though the v a r i o u s l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t i o n 
do not c o n s t i t u t e e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y i t s e l f , nor are they d i r e c t or l i t e r a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of i t , any more than any theory can be. T h i s does not , however, 
imply u n r e a l i t y . . . . " i n the f i c t i o n a l sense . . . . they s tand r a t h e r , i n f u n c t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n to i s , such that f o r c e r t a i n s c i e n t i f i c p u r p o s e s , they are adequate 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of i t " . (14) T h i s i s ( a c c o r d i n g to P a r s o n s ) what H u s s e r l would 
have c a l l e d "phenomenological s t a t u s " , i t . . . . " i n v o l v e s no c o n c r e t e data t h a t 
can be thought away, t h 3 t are s u b j e c t to change. I t i s not phenomenon i n the 
e m p i r i c a l s ense . I t i s the i n d i s p e n s a b l e l o g i c a l framework i n which we d e s c r i b e 
and t h i n k about the phenomena of a c t i o n 1 ' . (15) T h i s f u n c t i o n s both as a frame-
work and a d e s c r i p t i o n ; whi l e i t c l a i m s phenomenological ( u n i v e r s a l ) s t a t u s , 
i t a l s o "Lakes on a d i f f e r e n t meaning" as an a n a l y t i c a l framework, i n t h a t the 
v a l u e s o f i t s e lements are c o n c r e t e d a t a , f a c t s of o b s e r v a t i o n or combinat ions 
of f a c t s ; they have c a u s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , r e c o n c i l i n g v i a the means and schema, 
"a r e a l process i n the mind of the a c t o r , as w e l l as e x t e r n a l to i t " . (16) 
P a r s o n s ' t h e o r i s i n g , read i n t h i s way, can be s a i d to say : 
i . F a c t s on ly have r e f e r e n c e i n terms of some a n a l y t i c a l scheme 
i i . The concepts employed i n a n a l y t i c a l schemes n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e a b s t r a c t i o n 
from any number of p o s s i b l e e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , because 
l i i . the apprehens ion of the most unique of events w i l l r e q u i r e the conceptua l 
use o f at l e a s t one l o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l of some s o r t , 
i v . I t i s the t a s k of genera l theory to s p e c i f y the e lements which c o n s t i t u t e 
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the framework of the s o c i a l , deve loping s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s from a 
b a s i c s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the g e n e r a l , l o g i c a l l y p r i o r , a n a l y t i c a l l y 
concre te p r o p e r t i e s of the u n i t a c t . 
v . These must be r a t i o n a l l y and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d i n terms of a 'means-
end' schema, because , a l though l o g i c a l l y , ends may be conce ived of as 
v a r y i n g randomely, the f a c t of s o c i a l o r d e r l i n e s s means that they must 
be o r g a n i s e d i n t o an a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s c o v e r a b l e sys tem. 
v i . T h i s does not mean t h a t concre te r e a l i t y may be understood complete ly or 
even predominant ly i n such terms. 
v i i . The s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p oetween u n i v e r s a l c a t e g o r i e s and r u l e s both 
a . c o n s t i t u t e the e v e n t , and 
b. make knowledge of the event p o s s i b l e . 
T h i s r e a d i n g of Parsons produces him f o r the purposes which I have i n mind, i f 
I were concerned to e v a l u a t e t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , then I would have to produce 
arguments about how t h i s a n a l y s i s attended to the t a s k which i t s e t i t s e l f , 
whether the t a s k was r i g h t l y conce ived or n o t , how i t succeeds or f a i l s i n 
account ing f o r the p r o p e r t i e s of r e a l i t y , how t r u e i t i s to the t h e o r e t i c a l 
r e s o u r c e s which i t i n v o k e s , and so on. Such accounts o f Parsons (17) have 
formed a great p a r t of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g f o r the pas t t h i r t y y e a r s . What 
I propose r a t h e r i s to examine how Parsons i s seen by one t h e o r i s t , G a r f i n k e l , 
who i s both sympathet ic to P a r s o n s , and a l s o , q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y not concerned 
w i t h doing the t h i n g s t h a t Parsons c o n s i d e r s h i m s e l f to be doing. I hope to 
show t h a t the r e l a t i o n of Parsons to G a r f i n k e l e x e m p l i f i e s what I c o n s i d e r the 
best r e l a t i o n between t e a c h e r and s t u d e n t , s o c i o l o g i s t and s o c i o l o g y , both as 
community and t r a d i t i o n . That i s to s a y , G a r f i n k e l has used Parsons to "make 
a d i f f e r e n c e " to the way i n which he s p e a k s , as a s o c i o l o g i s t ; he t a k e s what 
Parsons says s e r i o u s l y , which i s to say that he t r u s t s P a r s o n s . T h i s i s not to 
say t h a t he t a k e s over P a r s o n s ' v iew of the World , but t h a t , i n t r u s t i n g P a r s o n s , 
he seeks to f i n d , i n P a r s o n s ' work, a way of r e a d i n g i t which g ive s i t a reason 
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to be taken s e r i o u s l y . 
Some p a r a l l e l s ; W i t t g e n s t e i n once remarked t h a t there was no po int i n doing 
phi losophy i f i t d i d not change your l i f e ( 1 8 ) ; at the same t ime, when asked 
why he used A u g u s t i n e ' s account of language a c q u i s i t i o n as a r e s o u r c e when, on 
h i s own a c c o u n t , i t was so d e f i c i e n t , he r e p l i e d that i t must be impor tant , 
because i t was h e l d by such a grea t man. Now, how does G a r f i n k e l show us how 
to take Parsons (or any t h e o r i s t ) s e r i o u s l y ? I propose that t h i s i s by not 
s a y i n g what Parsons s a y s , but by us ing i t to say something d i f f e r e n t , but not 
j u s t a n y t h i n g . U s i n g Parsons to say something d i f f e r e n t from Parsons i s a 
demonstrat ion that we have unders tood, i n a way that makes us r e s p o n s i b l e to 
the community w i t h i n which our speech , and t h a t of P a r s o n s , i s s e n s i b l e ( S o c i o -
l o g i c a l T h e o r y ) , but a l s o t r a n s f o r m s , as i t f o r m u l a t e s , the r u l e - o r i e n t e d 
p r a c t i c e s o f chat community. Rather than s e e i n g the community as members 
u n i f i e d i n what they s a y , such a concept ion of community would see i t as a 
resource which enab le s members to speak so as to show t h a t they know, that i s , 
to a v o i d s a y i n g ( m e r e l y ) what o t h e r s say , but to show t h a t they unders tand what 
o t h e r s do. (19) 
Taking Parsons S e r i o u s l y ; G a r f i n k e l ' s Reading 
My account o f how G a r f i n k e l u s e s Parsons r e l i e s on m a t e r i a l , p u b l i s h e d and un-
p u b l i s h e d , i n which h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of P a r s o n s ' work i s e x p r e s s e d ; my purpose 
i s not to show t h a t G a r f i n k e l ' s work can be seen merely as r e f l e c t i n g the 
i n f l u e n c e of P a r s o n s , a l though such a t a s k cou ld be under taken , i n o r d e r to 
'point t o ' one p a r t i c u l a r way of making the work of e i t h e r u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . T h i s 
would be to t r i v i a l i s e the work of both, however. I propose , r a t h e r , t h a t t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n between the two s tands not as a judgment on 
the importance of one f o r the o ther (Parsons f o r G a r f i n k e l ) , except i n s o f a r as 
the work of the ' s t u d e n t ' t r a n s f o r m s the work of the ' t e a c h e r ' i n t o some o t h e r 
p r a c t i c e , but does not supplant i t . T h i s , I would a r g u e , makes G a r f i n k e l 
r e s p o n s i b l e to P a r s o n s , and the community of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y , but does not 
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c o n s t r a i n him i n t o only s a y i n g what they would a c c e p t , f o r such a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i s shown r a t h e r than needing to be a s s e r t e d . 
G a r f i n k e l acknowledges the importance of P a r s o n s i n h i s p u b l i s h e d work u n r e s e r -
v e d l y ; h i s concept of membership, he n o t e s , d e r i v e s d i r e c t l y from that of 
Parsons ( 2 0 ) . Both h i s and P a r s o n s ' work i s c e n t r a l l y concerned w i t h the 
problem of o r d e r ; (21) h i s concept of the r o l e of t h e o r y , l i k e w i s e , acknowledges 
the importance of P a r s o n s ' work. (22 ) 
Reading P a r s o n s i n t h i s way, we must conce ive h i s work i n two main ways; f i r s t , 
a s o l u t i o n to the problem of s o c i a l o r d e r , where in r e a l s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s 
c o n s i s t o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d p a t t e r n s of normative c u l t u r e , and the s t a b l e 
p r o p e r t i e s of r e a l s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s a r e guaranteed by mot ivated compliance to 
a l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r . T h i s proceeds from, and i s i t s e l f to be c o n s i d e r e d i n the 
l i g h t of P a r s o n s ' avowed c l a i m that every t h e o r y of s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n i s a 
s o l u t i o n to the problem of s o c i a l o r d e r ; the d i r e c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t , 
i n t h i s l i g h t , can be seen as t r e a t i n g the s o l u t i o n as the r u l e s o f t h e o r i s i n g 
and i n q u i r i n g procedures to which he a t t e n d s . The concept 'Adequate s t r u c t u r a l 
a n a l y s i s ' d e r i v e s , i n the work t h a t the t h e o r i s t produces , from a t t e n d i n g to 
these r u l e s . T h u s , i n P a r s o n s , that the r u l e s of t h e o r i s i n g and i n q u i r i n g a r e 
e q u i v a l e n t to the concept o f adequqte s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s r e s u l t s i n h i s t a k i n g 
e m p i r i c a l knowledge of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s a s both a n e c e s s a r y point of depar ture 
and a c o n t i n u a l and a c t u a l source of c o n t r o l on i t s development. 
I f we s e e , a n a l y t i c a l l y , t h e o r i s i n g as sense t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a c t i v i t y , then 
s o c i o l o g y i s to be seen as concerned to t r a n s f o r m a v a i l a b l e d e s c r i p t i o n s of 
l i f e - i n - s o c i e t y i n accordance w i t h the r u l e s of sense t r a n s f o r m i n g procedures 
found i n the met nods that s o c i o l o g i s t s a c t u a l l y employ, and to which they 
a c t u a l l y s u b s c i i b e as c o r r e c t ones . D e s c r i p t i o n s of l i f e - i n - s o c i e t y a r e t r e a t e d 
by s o c i e t a l members, as o b j e c t s of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l everyday c o n c e r n ; they a r e 
t r e a t e d as what i s r e a l , f o r i t i s to these d e p i c t i o n s w i t h which they must 
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come to terms. From t h i s p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , these and any such d e s c r i p t i o n s 
become trans formed i n t o ' r e a l s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e ' by the methods of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g and i n q u i r y . ( 2 3 ) 
As Parsons s a y s , s t r u c t u r i n g i n t h i s way depends on a d e f i n i t e s e t of p r o c e d u r e s ; 
that i s to s a y , che theory e x i s t s i n the r e l a t i o n s between the e lements o f 
which i t i s composed, s i n c e i t i s a c o n s t r u c t i o n from p o s s i b l e a c c o u n t s . 
For Parsons (24) and f o r G a r f i n k e l , t h e n , s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g c o n s i s t s of 
the i d e a l i s a t i o n s o f the ways i n which s o c i e t y i s known by i t s members m 
commonsense ways; t h i s i s the f a t e of any d e s c r i p t i o n of s o c i e t y whatsoever . 
While the w a r r a n t of commonsense knowledge d e r i v e s from the r u l e s which govern 
sense assembly i n the contex t s i n which i t i s a v a i l a b l e , the r u l e s governing 
the u s e , by s o c i o l o g i s t s , of any i d e a l i s a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i a l 
w o r l d , a s the b a s i s of warranted i n f e r e n c e i n accordance wi th the aims of 
i n q u i r y , make p o s s i b l e the e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e of such s t a t e m e n t s , i n accordance 
wi th the accepted r u l e s of sense t r a n s f o r m i n g p r o c e d u r e s . ' R e a l S o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e ' t h e n , comes down NOT to the conten t s of d e s c r i p t i o n s , but to d e s c r i p -
t i o n s c o n t r o l l e d by the r u l e s of procedure which are a t tended to by those who 
s u b s c r i b e to them. Thus , P a r s o n s ' ' g e n e r a l theory of a c t i o n ' , f o r G a r f i n k e l , 
i s not to be read as a s u b s t a n t i v e l i s t , but seen i n s t e a d as a set: of r u l e s f o r 
sense t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , such t h a t any account of the s t r u c t u r e s o f s o c i e t y (how i t 
i s o b s e r v a b l e ) can y i e l d a p o s s i b l e d e s c r i p t i o n , d e l i n e a t e d i n terms of the 
meaning of ' p o s i b b l e ' and ' e s s e n t i a l ' both i n terms of the method, and a l s o 
the programme, a t t i t u d e , s u b j e c t matter and accepted f i n d i n g s o f s o c i o l o g y (as 
a se t of r u l e governed p r a c t i c e s , a community of p r a c t i t i o n e r s ) . 
T h i s i s to say t h a t P a r s o n s ' approach s u b s t a n t i v e l y produces one r e a l s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e , but that a n a l y t i c a l l y i t p r o v i d e s f o r the p r o d u c t i o n o f o t h e r s ; 
d e c i s i o n s between these s u b s t a n t i v e accounts w i l l be i n terms of the p r a c t i c a l 
concerns of members as s o c i o l o g i s t s . Now, d e f i n i t i o n s do not c o n s i s t of a b s t r a c -
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t i o n s from ' r e a l i t y ' but are a se t of r u l e s o f r e l e v a n c e i n terms of which 
the s u b j e c t mat ter i s r e - c o n s t r u c t e d as another set of p o s s i b l e e v e n t s ; we 
could not s p e c i f y what i t i s t h a t any d e f i n i t i o n s e l e c t s from, s i n c e we cannot 
propose the e n t i r e se t of t h i n g s to which we could have a t t ended . The con-
c r e t e n e s s to which s u b s t a n t i v e accounts r e f e r does not j u s t i f y the s t a t u s 
accorded to the d e f i n i t i o n s of which i t c o n s i s t s ( t h i n k here of the argument 
i n the l a s t chapter on the n a t u r e of C e r t a i n t y ; see a l s o W i t t g e n s t e i n , "On 
C e r t a i n t y " ) . A l l warranted s ta tements are p o s s i b i l i t i e s which have been 
accepted as i n accordance w i t h our way of s e e i n g ( e m p i r i c a l i n t h a t s ense ) 
r a t h e r than ' e s t a b l i s h e d * m a t t e r s of f a c t ( i n the sense t h a t they make r e f e r e n c e 
to some ' u n q u e s t i o n a b l e ' e x t e r n a l i t y ) . 
For P a r s o n s , as G a r f i n k e l sees him, the problem of order i s to be approached by 
t a k i n g as the r e a l s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i e t y those f e a t u r e s which the s o c i o l o g i s t 
i d e a l i s e s i n accordance wi th s p e c i f i c r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , I t i s not that 
the s o c i o l o g i s t i s to be seen as p r o v i d i n g an e x t e r n a l view of the s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i e t y , but that 1f we a r e to account Cor the f a c t o f s o c i a l 
order at a l l , our account w i l l be of the environments of a c t o r s as they c o n s t -
i t u t e that o l d e r i n a way t h a t p r o v i d e s f o r these environments to be seen as 
assembl ing that o r d e r l i n e s s . I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r us to d i s t i n g u i s h , in s o c i o -
l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s , between the s o c i o l o g i s t s ' concept ion of the a c t o r t r e a t i n g h i s 
environment -,;hich c o n s i s t s of the r e a l s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s seen from w i t h i n , and 
the s o c i o l o g i s t s ' concept ion of the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s as assembled products of 
a c t o r s t r e a t i n g the s o c i o l o g i s t s ' s o c i e t y seen from w i t h i n ; that i s to s a y , w h i l e 
we can d i s t i n g u i s h between t h a t set of phenomena which we c a l l r e a l s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e which c o n s i s t of a s s e m b l i e s of c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n , and that set o f 
phenomena which we c a l l r e a l p e r c e i v e d s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the environment t h a t 
the s e t of r e a l concer ted a c t i o n s confront the members w i t h , there i s no sense 
i n which we can say that there cou ld p o s s i b l y be c o n f i r m i n g or d i s c o n f i r m i n g 
ev idence produced which would c o n s t i t u t e d i f f e r e n c e s between what i s p r e -
t h e o r e t i c a l l y ' t h e r e ' and what i s ' t h e r e ' i n the t h e o r y , f o r what i s r e a l l y 
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' t h e r e * i s an adequate d e s c r i p t i o n p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as i t corresponds to 
demonstrable f e a t u r e s of the a c t o r ' s environment , which i s p r e c i s e l y that 
f e a t u r e to which s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts a t t e n d i n t h e i r r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
S ince the s o c i o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i s the i d e a l i s a t i o n 
of s o c i e t y known i n the way that members know i t , and can be noth ing e l s e , the 
' r e a l i t y ' o f s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s o_f that s o c i o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n . 
T h i s i s a n e c e s s a r y consequence of G T r f i n k e l t a k i n g Parsons s e r i o u s l y ; i t i s to 
apply those r e l e v a n c i e s which P a r s o n s ' account p r o v i d e s to the account i t s e l f . 
Rather than see ing Parsons as the ( c o n v e n t i o n a l ) product of what h i s words 
would mean i f he were speaking the same as anyone e l s e (a s 1 f he were not 
t h i n k i n g ) , G a r f i n k e l t r e a t s h i s speech s e r i o u s l y ; he l ooks i n what Parsons says 
for h i s reasons f o r s a y i n g i t , r a t h e r than accuse him of say ing these merely 
because i t i s what i s a lways s a i d , or ( u n t h i n k i n g l y ) because i t i s what another 
has s a i d . Think here of c o n v e n t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m of P a r s o n s ; h i s concepts cannot 
be ' o p e r a t i o n a l i s e d ' , they 'do not e x p l a i n a n y t h i n g , because they can be 
a p p l i e d to e v e r y t h i n g , he i s the product of h i s ( i v o r y tower) environment , he 
i s 'too a b s t r a c t ' , he i s 'too d e t e r m i n i s t i c ' ( 2 5 ) . I am not s a y i n g t h a t Parsons 
cannot be c r i t i c i s e d , nor t h a t these a c c u s a t i o n s do not have w e i g h t ; what I am 
arguing i s that c r i t i c i s m i s u n j u s t i f i e d i f i t does not read the work of a 
be 
t h e o r i s t i n the way that i t p r o v i d e s f o r i t s e l f to be r e a d , and cannot j u s t i f i e d 
u n l e s s i t accounts f o r i t s charges i n terms of the c r i t e r i a which prov ide the 
sense of the theory i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Most c r i t i c s of Parsons p a l p a b l y f a i l 
to p r o v i d e any such grounds f o r t h e i r c h a r g e s , but proceed , very o f t e n , from a 
read ing of Parsons which shows t h a t they have not understood him i n terms which 
he would p r o v i d e f o r them to do so . (26) 
I s any read ing of 
Parsons as good as any o ther? What would a ' c o r r e c t ' r e a d i n g of P a r s o n s be 
l i k e ? We have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d the v a r i e t y of unders tand ings which we subsume 
90. 
under the one concept . In terms of the presen t q u e s t i o n , i t would seem t h a t 
we are f a c e d w i t h a number of p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . I f we accept that Parsons 
can be s a i d to make sense i n terms of the c r i t e r i a c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a v a i l a b l e to 
the community of s o c i o l o g i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s , then i t would seem t h a t t h e r e are 
a v a r i e t y of p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which might be g iven to h i s work, f o r the 
r u l e s to which p r a c t i t i o n e r s a t t e n d i n t h e i r sense a s sembl ing a r e by t h e i r 
n a t u r e , open ended and f l e x i b l e , being on ly a v a i l a b l e as an occas ioned corpus 
which must both f i t the e x i g e n c i e s o f the context and the p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 
of the members concerned . T h u s , no unders tanding of P a r s o n s has any n e c e s s a r y 
s u p e r i o r i t y over any o t h e r . 
I f on the o ther hand, we argue t h a t some u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f Parsons p a l p a b l y a r e 
b e t t e r than o t h e r s ( those acknowledged by h i s f r i e n d s or h i s enemies to be 
j u s t i f i e d as s u c h ) , then we must dec ide between the competing c r i t e r i a i n terms 
of which such u n d e r s t a n d i n g s make t h e i r c l a i m s . Here , we seem to be faced w i t h 
s imply a choice between compet i t i ve v e r s i o n s of what i s j u s t i f i e d i n the r e a l 
world and what i s no t . What G a r f i n k e l hal done i s to take Parsons as producing 
a v e r s i o n of t h e o r i s i n g which accords w i t h h i s b a s i c p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l assump-
t i o n s ; t h i s i s not s imply a mat ter of l i m i t i n g Parsons by s a y i n g because he 
a d d r e s s e s the q u e s t i o n i n t h i s way h i s work has t h i s form, but r a t h e r i t i s to 
seek the s e n s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s s ta tements i n the i s s u e s to which he 
a t t e n d s . 
As has a l r e a d y been argued, these proceed from an acceptance of the K a n t i a n 
framework to ep is temology; t h i s produces a theory of r e a l i t y which c l a i m s a 
correspondence , between the p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t o f the ' o u t e r ' world and the 
manner i n which i t i s apprehended, but a d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n c r e t e o b j e c t 
and the manner i n which i t i s apprehended. Thereby , f a c t u a l s tatements about 
r e a l i t y can only e v e r be p a r t i a l , a l though i t i s t h e i r f u n c t i o n to approximate 
r e a l i t y ; a c c o r d i n g to K a n t , t h i s i s p o s s i b l e because of the e x i s t e n c e of p r i m a l , 
i n v a r i a n t c a t e g o r i e s of apprehens ion ( P a r s o n s ' l o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l s ) , which g i v e 
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to the p r o p e r l y q u a l i f i e d o b s e r v e r , a view of the wor ld of r e a l o b j e c t s which 
i s independent of the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f the o b s e r v e r s ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
what cannot , t h e r e f o r e , be a d d r e s s e d , i s the ques t ion of why the o b j e c t s that 
are reproduced correspond i n t h e i r l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r to the l o g i c a l des ign of 
the reo \ w o r l d . 
T h i s mystery i s h e l d by P l a t o n i s t , or R e a l i s t , a s the n e c e s s a r y framework which 
must be accepted f o r knowledge t o be p o s s i b l e ; A ' l L t g e n s t e i n , however, showed i n 
h i s work on mathematics that the correspondence between l o g i c and the s t r u c t u r e 
of the r e a l world cannot be shown to proceed from the q u a l i t i e s of " e x t e r n a l 
r e a l i t y " , but i s r a t h e r a f e a t u r e of OUR " i n e x o r a b i l i t y " , mathemat ics , and 
l o g i c , are normative ( s o c i a l ) sys tems , convent ions or uses r e l a t e d to our 
p r a c t i c a l requirements and r e s p o n s i v e t o changes i n those requ irements . While 
the r u l e s which determine what i t i s to ( w a r r a n t e d l y ) accompl i sh something are 
a mat ter of c o n v e n t i o n , i t i s a l s o the case chat we can ques t ion the adequacy 
of those r u l e s , when the p r a c t i c e f a i l s to perform the t a s k which we s e t . T h i s 
i s how the problem can be seen at a l l ; r a t h e r than the s o c i a l l o c a t e d n e s s of 
p r a c t i c e s making i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r one to make a m i s t a k e , or to see a problem 
i n some o ther way, the very d i v e r s i t y of s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s makes i t p o s s i b l e to 
c r i t i c i s e and modify the p r a c t i c e s i n v o l v e d . Parsons may be c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g 
that t h e s e l o g i c a l frameworks cannot be "thought away", but on ly assuming t h a t 
we accept the framework w i t h i n which they come i n t o be ing . Thus , i t i s not a 
q u e s t i o n of s a y i n g t h a t Parsons i s 'wrong' because we can conce ive the problem 
i n another way, f o r he i s not s a y i n g that we cannot do so; r a t h e r , w i t h i n the 
a n a l y t i c a l framework which he proposes f o r c o n c e i v i n g of s o c i a l a c t i o n , we 
should have to d i s c o v e r elements of s o c i a l a c t i o n Lo which i t does not a t t e n d . 
Hence, w h i l e we can c r i t i c i s e Parsons i n terms of some o t h e r s e t of c r i t e r i a 
w i t h i n the language game of s o c i a l s c i e n c e , we must a lways do so w i t h the frame-
work whicn he proposed for h i m s e l f i n mind, i f we a r e to be r e s p o n s i b l e to h i s 
work, r a t h e r tnan a p a r t i a l p r o d u c t i o n . (28) 
9 2 . 
G a r f i n k e l proceeds from Parsons by l o c a t i n g another e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ques t ion 
for h i m s e l f ; r a t h e r than a s k i n g 'why does l o g i c have the i n e x o r a b l e f o r c e t h a t 
we s e e ? ' , he proposes that we see the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s k i n g 'how do we see the 
i n e x o r a b l e f o r c e t h a t l o g i c h a s ? ' I f we l eave a s i d e the t r u t h of the e p i s t -
emolog ica l theory which proposes correspondence between the p a r t i a l f o r m u l a t i o n s 
of the e x t e r n a l world and t h a t e x t e r n a l w o r l d , we are l e f t w i t h another p o s s i -
b i l i t y ; t h a t the p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t of the e x t e r n a l world _i_s the c o n c r e t e o b j e c t . 
T h i s congruence t h e o r y , d e r i v e d i n G a r f i n k e l ' s work from Schutz and K u s s e r l , 
proposes t h a t the problem of the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s t a t u s of the i n v a r i a n t c a t -
e g o r i e s o f unders tand ing i s not n e c e s s a r i l y to be accepted as a m y s t e r y . While 
the K a n t i a n q u e s t i o n i s i n t e r e s t e d i n e n q u i r i n g a f t e r the n e c e s s a r y framework 
w i t h i n which any sense can be made of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , t h i s ques t ion becomes 
i t s e l f the accompl i shed product of H u s s e r l ' s p r o j e c t . H u s s e r l argues t h a t 
r a t i o n a l i t y , i n the Kant ian framework, becomes a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y 
p r i n c i p l e ; what we can a l s o do, he argues i s to suspend judgment on these c a t -
d g o r i e s , what he c a l l s a phenomenological ' epoche ' ; r a t h e r than seek an a n a l y t -
i c a l framework, he argues that we should examine the uses which i n d i v i d u a l s do 
make of t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e of the w o r l d , i n making sense of the w o r l d , i n order 
to c o n s t r u c t a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ground f o r a l l such e x p e r i e n c e ; what Kolakowski 
has c a l l e d I l u s s e r l ' s ' s e a r c h f o r c e r t i t u d e ' . (29) Now, to accept t h i s p r o j e c t 
as l e g i t i m a t e i s no p a r t of G a r f i n k e l ' s t a s k ; I w i l l argue l a t e r that i t does , 
i n f a c t , have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the work t h a t he produces . At the moment, 
however, we are concerned w i t h how t h i s enab les him to proceed from P a r s o n s ' 
work. He could r e f o r m u l a t e Parsons i n terms of the concerns of t h i s q u e s t i o n 
by a r g u i n g that P a r s o n s ' work could be seen as producing an o r g a n i s a t i o n of the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the o b s e r v e r ' s e x p e r i e n c e to present him w i t h one out of a 
boundless c l a s s o f p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d s ; r a t h e r than an attempt to approx-
imate to r e a l i t y , P a r s o n s ' t h e o r i s i n g i s a r e c o n s l i t u t i o n of the world i n 
accordance wi th the r u l e s of s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g and the procedures of the 
' s c i e n t i f i c method*. 
To do s o , however, would i n v o l v e him i n q u e s t i o n i n g P a r s o n s ' assumption of the 
phenomenological s t a t u s o f h i s pr imal i n v a r i a n t c a t e g o r i e s , s i n c e P a r s o n s ' work 
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( i n G a r f i n k e l ' s t erms) proceeds from the acceptance of r a t i o n a l i t y as a 
methodo log i ca l l y n e c e s s a r y p r i n c i p l e . G a r f i n k e l chooseb, i n s t e a d , to suspend 
judgment on t h i s , as he must; P a r s o n s ' work i s not s u p p l a n t e d , but accepted 
w i t h i n the terms of the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions which form i t s base . Now, 
why must G a r f i n k e l do t h i s , f o r i t i s not s imply a mat ter of cho i ce or r e s p e c t ? 
To answer t h i s , we t u r n to c o n s i d e r the work t h a t G a r f i n k e l h i m s e l f has 
produced. 
t'e can suspend judgment on pr imal i n v a r i a n t c a t e g o r i e s , as G a r f i n k e l sees i t , 
because as w e l l as being an o r g a n i s i n g p r i n c i p l e i n s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e (as 
for P a r s o n s ) , t h e o r i s i n g , as the s o l u t i o n to the problem of the r a t i o n a l 
account ing of the w o r l d , i s what i s accompl i shed by everyday a c t o r s i n t h e i r 
cornmonsensej mundane a c t i v i t i e s , i t i s s eeab le by them accountab le by them, 
r e p o r t a b l e by them, i t i s a d i s c o v e r a b l e f a c u l t y , as i ' e l l as a c o l l e c t i o n of 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s methodolog ica l p r i n c i p l e s . N a t u r a l language, he notes : 
s e r v e s persons doing s o c i o l o g y - whether they a r e 
laymen or p r o f e s s i o n a l s as c i r c u m s t a n c e s , as t o p i c s , 
and as r e s o u r c e s of t h e i r e n q u i r i e s " . ( 3 0 ) 
and t h i s f u r n i s h i n g i t s e l f prov ides f o r the "technology" of these e n q u i r i e s 
and to t h e i r p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l r eason ing i t s c i r e s i s t a n c e s , i t s t o p i c s 
and i t s r e s o u r c e s . N a t u r a l language, he a r g u e s , i s encountered i n the i n v e s t -
i g a t i o n s of s o c i o l o g i s t s as an i r r e m e d i a b l y INDEXICAL phenomenon. That i s to 
s a y , a d e s c r i p t i o n : 
i n the ways that i t may be a c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t of 
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t d e s c r i b e s , in e n d l e s s ways and 
u n a v o i d a b l y , e l a b o r a t e s these c i r c u m s t a n c e s and i s 
e l a b o r a t e d by them". (31) 
Gi ven the f a c u l t y of r e f l e x i v i t y , we can see t h a t these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
n a t u r a l language a s s u r e to e x p r e s s i o n s the f o l l o w i n g p r o p e r t i e s ; d e f i n i t e n e s s 
of sense r e s i d e s i n the consequences of e x p r e s s i o n s (how they are u s e d ) ; d e f -
i n i t i o n s c o l l e c t d e f i n i t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y bounded; 
such bounds a r e prov ided i n the p o s s i b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
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i t s e l f a c o n d i t i o n p r e f i g u r e d by the i n d e f i n i t e n e s s of p o s s i b l e e l a b o r a t i o n . 
I n d e x i c a l i t y i s a n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e of a l l n a t u r a l language, i n c l u d i n g s o c i o l o g y ; 
f o r i n s t a n c e : 
"the n a t u r a l language formula 'the o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
o f s o c i a l f a c t s i s s o c i o l o g y ' s fundamental p r i n c i p l e ' 
i s heard by p r o f e s s i o n a l s a c c o r d i n g to o c c a s i o n as a 
d e f i n i t i o n of a s s o c i a t i o n members' a c t i v i t i e s , as t h e i r 
s l o g a n , t h e i r t a s k , aim, ach ievement , b r a g , s a l e s p i t c h , 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , d i s c o v e r y , s o c i a l phenomenon, or r e s e a r c h 
c o n s t r a i n t . L i k e any o ther i n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n , the 
t r a n s i e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s of i t s use a s s u r e i t a d e f i n i t e -
nes s o f sense as d e f i n i t i o n of t a s k or whatever , to someone 
who knows how to hear i t " . (32) 
D e f i n i t e n e s s cannot be a s s u r e d by anyth ing o t h e r than the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which 
members may b r i n g to i t on the o c c a s i o n of u s e . The a c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n s o f 
soc io logy cannot be a s sured a d e f i n i t e sense by a v a i l a b l e mathematica l or 
l o g i c a l methods. A l l t h a t s o c i o l o g i s t s can do i s to t r a n s f o r m these i n t o 
i d e a l i s e d e x p r e s s i o n s , and then: 
" s t r u c t u r e s are . . . . a n a l y s e d as p r o p e r t i e s of the i d e a l s , 
and the r e s u l t s a r e a s s i g n e d Lo a c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n s a s t h e i r 
p r o p e r t i e s , though w i t h d i s c l a i m e r s of a p p r o p r i a t e s c i e n t i f i c 
modesty". (33) 
I n consequence, any p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g , (whether l a y or p r o f e s s -
i o n a l ? ) seeks to remedy the i n d e x i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , i n 
the i n t e r e s t s o f demonstrat ing the r a t i o n a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of everyday a c t i v i t i e s , 
warranted by methodic o b s e r v a t i o n and report of s i t u a t e d , s o c i a l l y o r g a n i s e d 
p a r t i c u l a r s of everyday a c t i v i t i e s . 
"The remedia l p r a c t i c e s of p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l 
r eason ing are aimed at a c c o m p l i s h i n g a thoroughgoing 
d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t i v e and i n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s 
wi th which to make p o s s i b l e the s u b s t i t u t i o n of o b j e c t i v e 
f o r i n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s . At present that d i s t i n c t i o n 
and s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y p r o v i d e s p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i o l o g y i t s 
i n f i n i t e t a s k . " 
(Note; we mean by ' i n f i n i t e t a s k ' that the d i f f e r e n c e and 
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y mot ivate i n q u i r i e s whose r e s u l t s are 
recogni sed and t r e a t e d by members as grounds f o r f u r t h e r 
i n f e r e n c e s and i n q u i r i e s . I t i s w i t h r e s p e c t to the 
d i f f e r e n c e and s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y as aims of i n q u i r y that 
' i n f i n i t e t a s k ' i s understood by members to r e f e r to 
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the open c h a r a c t e r of s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t , to the 
" s e l f c l e a n s i n g " body of s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, 
to the present s t a t e of the problem, to cumulat ive 
r e s u l t s , to p r o g r e s s and the r e s t . " (34) 
T h i s i s taken by many of G a r f i n k e l ' s f o l l o w e r s to be an o b j e c t i o n to the 
p r a c t i c e s of convent iona l s o c i o l o g y ; I hope that i t i s c l e a r from what I have 
a l r e a d y argued that i t should not be read i n t h i s way at a l l . As he q u i t e 
e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s ( 35 ) he i s proposing an a l t e r n a t i v e to g e n e r a l theory 
b u i l d i n g but n o t , I would a r g u e , a iming to deny i t s l e g i t i m a c y . The key i s to 
be found i n the c a r e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n which he makes between p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g -
i c a l reason ing and the p r a c t i c e s of p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i o l o g i s t s . For G a r f i n k e l , 
t h e o r i s i n g i s a f e a t u r e of any a c c o u n t i n g , whether l a y or p r o f e s s i o n a l , and 
s u b j e c t to the same c o n s t r a i n t s . Thus , any p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l reason ing 
at tempts to remedy the i n d e x i c a l i t y of the e x p r e s s i o n s of n a t u r a l language; 
what he i s p o i n t i n g to i s the sense in which s o c i o l o g i s t s ( l i k e P a r s o n s ) a r e 
a c c e p t i n g the mystery of correspondence between the language wi th which we 
d e s c r i b e the wor ld and the r e a l i t y which i t i s used to d e s c r i b e . T h i s cannot 
be a p e r j o r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n , g iven the terms of G a r f i n k e l ' s own e n t e r p r i s e , 
f o r he_ must a l s o accept t h i s m y s t e r y , w h i l e r e s e r v i n g the r i g h t to a d d r e s s the 
p r o c e s s e s which for him make i t p o s s i b l e . 
Now, how does he propose to do t h i s ? By i n the f i r s t p l a c e , a d d r e s s i n g the 
p r a c t i c e s of commonsense knowledge of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s of everyday a c t i v i t i e s , 
p r a c t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , and p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g . G a r f i n k e l argues that the not ion of member, d e r i v e d from P a r s o n s , 
prov ides the key; t h i s r e f e r s not to a person , but a f a c u l t y - the mastery of 
a n a t u r a l language. (36) The i n v e s t i g a t i o n which he s e t s f o r h i m s e l f aims to 
exp lore the ways i n which the speaking of a n a t u r a l language i n v o l v e s a t one 
and the same t ime , the o b j e c t i v e p r o d u c t i o n and o b j e c t i v e d i s p l a y of commonsense 
knowledge of everyday a c t i v i t i e s as observab le and r e p o r t a b l e phenomena; t h a t 
i s to s a y , how i s i t that the mystery of correspondence i s ach ieved? T h i s i s 
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a l s o to draw a t t e n t i o n to the key r o l e p layed here by the attempt to t r a n s f o r m 
i n d e x i c a l p a r t i c u l a r s i n t o o b j e c t i v e l y s u b s t i t u t a b l e e x p r e s s i o n s , not j u s t i n 
p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n s t r u c t 1 v i s t s o c i o l o g y , but i n p r a c t i c a l , everyday a c c o u n t i n g 
of the r e a l w o r l d . For G a r f i n k e l , t h e o r i s i n g i s the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the 
i n d e x i c a l c h a r a c t e r of f o r m u l a t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e i n t o o b j e c t i v e f a c t u a l 
account ings of the r e a l w o r l d , whether t h i s i s p r o f e s s i o n a l or l a y s o c i o l o g y . 
acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e that the p r a c t i c e s o f s o c i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y and 
t h e o r i s i n g ( l a y or p r o f e s s i o n a l ) the t o p i c s and f i n d i n g s of those p r a c t i c e s , 
the methods proposed and so on are MEMBERS' methods, he conc ludes t h a t , f o r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i o l o g i s t and f o r everyday a c t o r , the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f : 
"members' methods f o r assembl ing s e t s of a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
menhers* methods for a s s e m b l i n g , t e s t i n g and v e r i f y i n g 
the f a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r of i n f o r m a t i o n , members' methods 
f o r g i v i n g an account of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of c h o i c e and 
c h o i c e s , members' methods f o r a s s e s s i n g , p rod u c i n g , 
r e c o g n i s i n g , i n s u r i n g , e n f o r c i n g , c o n s i s t e n c y , coherence , 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s , e f f i c i e n c y , p l a n f u l n e s s and o ther r a t i o n a l 
p r o p e r t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l and c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n s " . (37) 
i s an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of how the o b j e c t i v e ( l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t ) r e a l i t y which 
i s the s u b j e c t of such a c c o u n t i n g s , comes to be assembled i n the way i t i s . I t 
i s i n n a t u r a l language, he a r g u e s , that the o b j e c t i v e p a r t i c u l a r s of the r e a l 
world are somehow d i s p l a y e d . By a d d r e s s i n g the p r a c t i c e s of speaking a n a t u r a l 
language, t h e n , we should be ab le to d i s c o v e r , i n the p a r t i c u l a r s of s p e a k i n g , 
the e x h i b i t i o n of the phenomena which make t h i s p o s s i b l e ( i n i t s e l f e x h i b i t e d 
by the p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n e t c . ) Rather than accept the l i m i t -
a t i o n s of c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y , G a r f i n k e l proposes that e thnomethodological 
s t u d i e s w i l l ain> to i n v e s t i g a t e and prov ide i n d e t a i l e d a n a l y s e s , the p r a c t i c a l 
b a s i s f o r a c c o u n t a b l e phenomena; that i s to s a y , i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
uses of n a t u r a l language, the assemblage of the p r a c t i c e s of speakers of s i t u a t e d 
p a r t i c u l a r s w i l l prov ide a d i s p l a y of the work of the accomplishment of t h e i r 
speech meaning more than i t can say i n so many words . 
Thus G a r f i n k e l i s p o i n t i n g to the way i n which h i s own working hypothes i s l i m i t s 
what h i s a c c o u n t i n g can do; the work must be ongoing because h i s account i s 
s u b j e c t to the same c o n d i t i o n s - t h a t i t can a l s o , mean more than I t can say 
i n j u s t so many words. T h i s f e a t u r e of the use o f n a t u r a l language, what 
G a r f i n k e l c a l l s • G l o s s i n g ' , i s the e n d l e s s but p a r t i c u l a r and a n a l y s a b l e 
p r a c t i c e and method f o r producing observab le and r e p o r t a b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . (33) 
G a r f i n k e l ' s work aims to recommend i t s e l f as p r o v i d i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e to con-
s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g ; to do so , i t has proposed i t s t o p i c i n 
the way a l r e a d y o u t l i n e d . I t a l s o aims to d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t s e l f from c o n s t r u c -
t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y i n o ther ways. 
i . While s o c i o l o g y aims to i d e a l i s e i t s product ion of the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , 
ethnomethodological s t u d i e s w i l l aim to avo id t h i s by di s p l a y i n g 
s t r u c t u r e s r a t h e r than d e f i n i n g them. 
i i . 'while both ethnomethodology and c o n s t r u c t i v i s t soc io logy aim to focus on 
the formal s t r u c t u r e s of everyday a c t i v i t i e s , the l a t t e r r e q u i r e s the 
mastery of a n a t u r a l language as the s i n e qua non of adequate p r o f e s s i o n a l 
r e a d e r s h i p , and i s accompl i shed v i a the mastery of such a language. While 
c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y c l a i m s f o r i t s p r o d u c t i o n a d i f f e r e n t s t a t u s 
than any o t h e r , f o r ethnomethodology, t h i s product ion s t a n d s a l o n g s i d e 
any o t h e r p r o d u c t i o n , as a phenomenon to be d e s c r i b e d ; ethnomethodology 
i s i n d i f f e r e n t to the c l a i m s of such accounts f o r d i f f e r e n t s t a t u s , and 
a b s t a i n s from judgments of t h e i r adequacy, v a l u e , importance , n e c e s s i t y , 
p r a c t i c a l i t y , s u c c e s s or c o n s e q u e n t i a l i t y . 
l i i . Ethriomethodology does not aim to be a c o r r e c t i v e to c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y . 
i v . Ethnomethodological s t u d i e s are f r e e from the c o n s t r a i n t of r e c o g n i s i n g the 
meaning of a c t i o n and speech i n terms of the convent ions of p a r t i c u l a r 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l convent ions whereas c o n s t r u c t i v i s t soc io logy i s t i e d to 
such a c c o u n t s . (39) 
v . C o n s t r u c t i v e a n a l y s i s i s ab le to a c h i e v e i t s recommendation and under-
s t a n d i n g of i t s a c c o u n t s ' achievements and aims v i a t h e i r mastery of a 
n a t u r a l language; that i s to say c o n s t r u c t i v i s t a n a l y t i c a l accounts of 
the formal s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i a l world i s a p r a c t i c a l achievement , s i n c e 
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i t e x i s t s through the f o r m u l a t i o n s of n a t u r a l language. For ethno-
m e t h o d o l o g i s t s , i t i s the f o r m u l a t i o n of such a c c o u n t s , as a set of 
p r a c t i c e s which comprise the phenomena of p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g . 
T h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i t s e l f d i s p l a y s the read ing of Parsons ; P a r s o n s ' main 
concern i n deve lop ing the s t r a t e g y of a n a l y t i c a l r e a l i s m was to avoid what 
be, f o l l o w i n g A, N. Whitehead c a l l e d the ' f a l l a c y of m i s p l a c e d c o n c r e t e n e s s ; 
t h a t i s to s a y , he i s c a r e f u l to avoid r e i f y i n g the a n a l y t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s which 
he developed to d e s c r i b e the elements of s o c i a l a c t i o n . G a r f i n k e l has a l r e a d y 
noted that i n c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y , the on ly way i n which the i d e a l i s e d 
concepts which d e s c r i b e the phenomena of the s o c i a l world can be o p e r a t i o n a l i s e d 
i s to a n a l y s e s t r u c t u r e s as the p r o p e r t i e s of these i d e a l s , and the r e s u l t s 
a s s i g n e d to a c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n s as t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s - which i s p r e c i s e l y , i n 
P a r s o n s ' t erms , to commit the f a l l a c y of m i s p l a c e d c o n c r e t e n e s s . 
To avo id t h i s G a r f i n k e l i s r e l y i n g on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t he r e f e r s to as ' e t h n o -
methodological i n d i f f e r e n c e ' ; w h i l e s e e k i n g to d e s c r i b e (members' accounts of 
formal s t r u c t u r e s wherever and by whomever they a r e done) at the same t ime , 
such d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l a b s t a i n from a l l judgments ( o f t h e i r adequacy, v a l u e , 
importance , n e c e s s i t y , p r a c t i c a l i t y , s u c c e s s or c o n s e q u e n t i a l i t y ) . Here we 
have another echo of W i t t g e n s t e i n - th ink of h i s famous dictum "We must do away 
with a l l e x p l a n a t i o n , and d e s c r i p t i o n a lone must take i t s p l a c e " . (40) C l e a r l y , 
G a r f i n k e l has the background to t h i s i n h i s account of the s t r u c t u r e s of 
p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s ; but he a l s o a t t ends to the r o l e of such d e s c r i p t i o n s i n 
a c c o m p l i s h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For W i t t g e n s t e i n , d e s c r i p t i o n gets i t s l i g h t , i t s 
purpose , from p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems; we can see that G a r f i n k e l aims that h i s 
d e s c r i p t i o n s w i l l s i m i l a r l y be d i r e c t e d towards the problems o u t l i n e d by the 
p r o j e c t of p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g ; that i s to say , w h i l e W i t t g e n s t e i n 
aims to arrange what we a l r e a d y know, what we have a lways known, i n order to 
i l l u m i n a t e the problems consequent upon our bewitchment by language , G a r f i n k e l 
s i m i l a r l y seeks to d i r e c t our a t t e n t i o n to the commonsense mundane ways i n which 
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ue do manage the accomplishment of o r d e i i n our language games to i l l u m i n a t e 
the proces se s which c r e a t e such o r d e r . 
While W i t t g e n s t e i n , however, was concerned to i l l u m i n a t e the problems of one 
s p e c i a l language game ( p h i l o s o p h y ) by a p p l y i n g the c o r r e c t i v e o f o r d i n a r y 
language use , G a r f i n k e l has q u i t e s p e c i f i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d h i s p r o j e c t from 
that of c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y . Ethnomethodologica l s t u d i e s , u n l i k e W i t t -
g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s e s of o r d i n a r y language, do not aim to c o r r e c t the 'mother 
d i s c i p l i n e ' ; G a r f i n k e l ' s p r o j e c t i s r a t h e r , to recommend the r a t i o n a l a c c o u n t -
a b i l i t y of everyday a c t i v i t i e s as a d i s t i n c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e , marked o f f from 
c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y by ' i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i n t e r e s t s " . The f a c t that c o n s t r u c -
t i v i s t t h e o r i e s can only ( i n h i s t erms) be concerned w i t h the r e p a i r of i n d e x ! c a l 
e x p r e s s i o n s d i s t i n g u i s h e s , f o r etnnomethodological s t u d i e s , a d i s t i n c t i v e 
concern , i n the t a s k of a r a t i o n a l account of these ordered p r o p e r t i e s . What 
g i v e s ethnomethodological s t u d i e s that p o s s i b i l i t y i s p r e c i s e l y the p r i n c i p l e 
of i t s i n d i f f e r e n c e , or the not ion t h a t i t s " d e s c r i p t i o n ^ ' a r e to be read i n 
terms of the suspens ion of judgment on the n a t u r e of the phenomena which i t 
i n v e s t i g a t e s . 
Now, Husser l proposed a s i m i l a r suspens ion in h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t ; i n 
a t t a c k i n g the problems of s c e p t i c i s m and r e l a t i v i s m , he sought to d i s c o v e r the 
source of a b s o l u t e c e r t i t u d e . He proposed that t h i s c e r t i t u d e can be ga ined i f 
we no longer need to worry about the br idge between p e r c e p t i o n s and t h i n g s i n 
themse lves , where we cannot ask how we know that our a c t s reach the content as 
i t r e a l l y i s . To accompl i sh knowledge of t h i s l e v e l , he aimed at a ' t r a n s c e n -
denta l r e d u c t i o n ' , where the world i s meaning, t h i n g s and o t h e r people are 
c o n s t i t u t e d phenomena. The wor ld i s not what i s a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d , but i s an 
i n f i n i t e p o t e n t i a l i t y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; t h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s not a s u b s t a n c e , 
but i s a c t u a l on ly as d i r e c t e d toward something ( i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ) . R a t i o n a l i t y 
and c e r t i t u d e may be found only i f s u b j e c t i v i t y c o n s t i t u t e s the o b j e c t s of the 
w o r l d ; on ly as i t i s dependent on the c o g n i t i v e ac t i s the o b j e c t a c c e s s i b l e 
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i n a way which makes doubt i m p o s s i b l e . (41) 
I t i s no p a r t o f my task to c o n s i d e r the foundat ions of H u s s e r l ' s phenomenology; 
however, the i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s proposed r e d u c t i o n are important i n c o n s i d e r i n g 
G a r f i n k e l ' s work; H u s s e r l proposed the r e d u c t i o n p r e c i s e l y to a t t a i n knowledge 
of a l e v e l o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which was denied to s c i e n c e . The suspens ion of 
judgment i n G a r f i n k e l a i m s , s i m i l a r l y , a t accompl i sh ing knowledge of a l e v e l 
which i s denied to s o c i a l s c i e n c e . D e s c r i p t i o n t a k e s the p l a c e of e x p l a n a t i o n 
i n G a r f i n k e l because i n e x p l a i n i n g s o c i a l phenomena, we n e c e s s a r i l y i d e a l i s e ; 
our accounts s u b s t i t u t e o b j e c t i v e f o r i n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s , n e c e s s a r i l y . The 
p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i f f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n s to l o c a t e the knowledge of the p r o c e s s e s 
of p r a c t i c a l r eason ing at a l e v e l where i t i s not s u b j e c t to such a c c u s a t i o n s , 
s i n c e i t proposes a s i t s t o p i c the very p r o c e s s whereby the o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
which i n d i v i d u a l s c o n s t i t u t e i n t h e i r p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g i s accompl i shed . 
While K u s s e r l c l a i m s to have found a c o n s c i o u s n e s s which i s not i n the wor ld 
( i s not a p a r t of i t ) , but i s e n t i r e l y independent of e m p i r i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s 
the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d , human psychology , b io logy and h i s t o r y , v i a the r e d u c t i o n , 
i n G a r f i n k e l ' s no t ion of i n d e x i c a l and o b j e c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s we f i n d a s i m i l a r 
n e x u s . G a r f i n k e l must suspend judgment, or be i n d i f f e r e n t to the s t a t u s of h i s 
s u b j e c t s ' p r o d u c t i o n s , p r e c i s e l y because i n h i s t h e o r y , r e a l i t y as i t i s con-
s t i t u t e d can only e x i s t i n the a c t of knowing i t ; any r e f l e c t i o n on t h i s i s a 
media t ion o f the ac t of c o n s t i t u t i o n which attempts to remedy the e s s e n t i a l 
i n d e x i c a l i t y of the moment. For H u s s e r l , the suspens ion o f judgment a f f o r d e d 
him a c c e s s to u l t i m a t e c e r t i t u d e which could appear only i n immanence, and was, 
s i n c e communication i s a lways mediated by i t s symbols , incommunicable . 
Now, G a r f i n k e l i s prepared to accept the consequences o f h i s suspens ion o f 
judgment; the programme of e thnomethodological s t u d i e s i s , i n d e e d , founded upon 
the i r r e m e d i a b i l i t y of i n d e x i c a l i t y . But the consequence of t h i s acceptance i s 
t h a t the work that i t produces proceeds from an a b s o l u t e r e j e c t i o n of the p o s s -
i b i l i t y of doubting i t s p r o d u c t i o n s , s i n c e , i n terms of i t s own t h e o r y , what 
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cannot be doubted i s the very p o s s i b i l i t y of r e - w r i t i n g any p r o d u c t i o n . So 
t h a t , whi le G a r f i n k e l can p o s i t the i n e v i t a b l e i d e a l i s a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n any 
c o n s t r u c t i v i s t attempt to impute to i n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s the q u a l i t i e s of 
the s t r u c t u r e s a n a l y s e d , he can on ly a v o i d t h i s charge f o r h i s own f i n d i n g s 
by r e f u s i n g to doubt them. 
T h i s i s , of c o u r s e , i n keeping w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s arguments; s i n c e i t i s on ly 
p o s s i b l e to be c e r t a i n about something which we could s e n s i b l y doubt, then i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t that which we cannot doubt i s something about which we cannot have 
c e r t a i n t y . In G a r f i n k e l ' s c a s e , the argument i s r e v e r s e d ; s i n c e we cannot have 
c e r t a i n knowledge of the sense of ( i n d e x i c a l ) e x p r e s s i o n s , then we cannot doubt 
them, but on ly suspend judgment, s i n c e we can n e i t h e r c o n f i r m nor d i s c o n f i r m 
them. 
G a r f i n k e l ' s f i n d i n g s , t h e n , a r e not s u b j e c t to the same p r o c e s s e s of c o n f i r m a -
t i o n or di scon f i m a t ion as f i n d i n g s i n c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y . In W i t t g e n -
s t e i n ' s c a s e , what must be accepted was the form of l i f e - t h i s i s what c o u l d 
not be conf irmed or d i s c o n f i r m e d , but was embodied i n the grammar of the language 
The not ion of membership p o s i t s j u s t such grammatical f o r c e to the competences 
embodied i n the speaking of a n a t u r a l language. We noted e a r l i e r , however, 
t h a t , u n l i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n , G a r f i n k e l was not i n t e r e s t e d i n c o r r e c t i n g s o c i o l o g y ; 
f o r him, the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g s tands i n i t s 
own r i g h t , and, as I have a l r e a d y argued , G a r f i n k e l i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n 
c o r r e c t i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l ( c o n s t r u c t i v i s t ) theory . 
Now, for W i t t g e n s t e i n , the t a s k of the a n a l y s t o f o r d i n a r y language c o n s i s t e d 
i n j u s t such a c o r r e c t i v e ; he was concerned w i t h ' a s s e m b l i n g r e m i n d e r s ' , w i t h 
'showing the f l y how to get out of the b o t t l e ' w i t h " f r e e i n g the p h i l o s o p h e r 
from the bewitchment of language". O r d i n a r y language could be used i n that way 
because i t c o n s t r a i n e d the speaker to accept c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s ; i t cou ld not 
be c a l l e d upon to perform t a s k s to w h i c h , w h i l e we might be l e d by i t s i n d e t e r -
minacy and a m b i g u i t i e s to suppose i t could o f f e r us s o l u t i o n s , i n f a c t i t could 
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not , and t h i s cou ld be demonstrated by the p r o c e s s of examining i t to see 
what "e must a c c e p t . As C a v e l l n o t e s : 
There i s v i r t u a l l y noth ing i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
v h i c h we should o r d i n a r i l y c a l l r e a s o n i n g ; W i t t g e n s t e i n 
a s s e r t s nothing which could be proved , f o r what he 
a s s e r t s i s e i t h e r obvious - whether t r u e or f a l s e - or 
e l s e concerned w i t h what c o n v i c t i o n , whether by proof 
or ev idence or a u t h o r i t y , would c o n s i s t i n . . . . h i s 
w r i t i n g i s deeply n e g a t i v e and p r a c t i c a l , the way 
F r e u d ' s i s , and l i k e F r e u d ' s t h e r a p y , i t wishes to 
prevent u n d e r s t a n d i n g which i s unaccompanied by i n n e r 
change. Both of them are i n t e n t on unmasking the 
de fea t of our r e a l need i n the face of s e l f i m p o s i t i o n s 
which we have not a s s e s s e d ( P I 108) or f a n t a s i e s ( " p i c t u r e s " ) 
which we cannot escape ( P I 115) . . . . In a s k i n g f o r more 
than b e l i e f , such w r i t i n g i n v i t e s d i s c i p l e s h i p , which runs 
i t s own r i s k s of d i s h o n e s t y and h o s t i l i t y . But I do not 
see that the f a u l t s of e x p l i c i t d i s c i p l e s h i p are more 
dangerous than the f a u l t s which come from s u b j e c t i o n to 
modes of thought and s e n s i b i l i t y whose o r i g i n s a r e unseen 
or unremembered and which t h e r e f o r e c r e a t e a d i f f e r e n t 
b l i n d n e s s i n a c c e s s i b l e m other ways to c u r e . Between 
c o n t r o l by the dead and c o n t r o l by the l i v i n g t h e r e i s 
noth ing to choose ." (42) 
For G a r f i n k e l to produce , i n h i s f i n d i n g s , a s i m i l a r t h e r a p e u t i c change i n 
s o c i o l o g i s t s might be a c o n c e i v a b l e end for h i s work; q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y , however 
t h i s i s not the end he has m v iew. I n denying t h i s c o r r e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , 
however, what r o l e does G a r f i n k e l i n f a c t env i sage f o r e thnomethodolog ica l 
s t u d i e s ? 
H i s d i s t i n c t i o n between ethnomethodological s t u d i e s and c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g 
t u r n s upon the d i f f e r e n c e s between the s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y which i s the 
ha l lmark of the l a t t e r , and the r a t i o n a l i t i e s which may be employed i n the 
everyday management of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . In "The R a t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s of 
S c i e n t i f i c and Commonsense A c t i v i t i e s " (43) he d i s c u s s e s the v a r i o u s ways i n 
which r a t i o n a l i t y may be employed by persons doing s o c i o l o g y , and i n everyday 
l i f e . To begin w i t h , he notes t h a t commonly, s o c i o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h e r s decide 
a d e f i n i t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y by s e l e c t i n g one or more f e a t u i e s from among the 
p r o p e r t i e s of s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t y as i t i s i d e a l l y understood and p r a c t i s e d ; 
t h i s it, then used Lo a i d the r e s e a r c h e r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y : 
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"in d e c i d i n g the r e a l i s t i c , p a t h o l o g i c a l , p r e j u d i c e d , 
d e c i s i o n a l , m y t h i c a l , m a g i c a l , r i t u a l and s i m i l a r 
f e a t u r e s of everyday conduct , t h i n k i n g and b e l i e f s ' * . (44) 
T h i s t y p i c a l l y r e v e a l s , however, that t h e r e i s a gap between l a y and s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge and p r o c e d u r e s , but that n o n e t h e l e s s , e f f e c t i v e , s t a b l e and p e r s i s -
tent a c t i o n s and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s o c c u r . T h i s has l ed many s o c i o l o g i s t s to 
abandon the e m p i r i c a l l y u n i n t e r e s t i n g r a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s which such d e f i n i t i o n s 
d i s c r i m i n a t e d m favour of a s tudy of the f e a t u r e s and c o n d i t i o n s of non-
r a t i o n a l i t y i n human conduct . Thus , G a r f i n k e l seems to be s a y i n g that s o c i o l o g y 
has t y p i c a l l y r e f u s e d to accept the s t a b i l i t y e t c . , of the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s 
which i t s t u d i e s as ev idence for a r a t i o n a l i t y o ther than the i d e a l s c i e n t i f i c 
one which they attempt to impose on i t . 
R a t i o n d l i c y , he a r g u e s , i n f a c t d e s i g n a t e s many d i f f e r e n t ways of behaving; he 
produces S c h u t z ' s i n v e n t o r y of such uses as a po int of d e p a r t u r e . At the same 
t ime, he n o t e s , we need not e x e r c i s e the t h e o r i s t s ' r i ^ h t to choose between them. 
1. C a t e g o r i s i n g and comparing - r e f e r s to the a b i l i t y to s earch e x p e r i e n c e 
f o r a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n . 
2 . " T o l e r a b l e e r r o r " - where theory and o b s e r v a t i o n are f i t t e d t o g e t h e r , 
wi th g r e a t e r or l e s s e r correspondence , which may be r e l a t e d to the 
extent to which the cho ice of theory i s " r a t i o n a l " . 
3 . Search f o r Means - review of r u l e s of procedure i n pas t s i t u a t i o n s to 
produce e f f e c t . 
4. A n a l y s i s o f siternatives and consequences - weighing up the e f f e c t s of 
a c t i o n . 
5. i t r 3 t e g y - i r i t i c i p a t i o n of p o s s i b l e d i f f e r e n t courses o f a c t i o n p r i o r t o 
a n t i c i p a t e d o c c a s i o n . 
6. Concern f o r t i m i n g - r e f e r s to the a b i l i t y or cho ice e x e r c i s e d in t a k i n g 
up a p o s i t i o n i n e x p e c t a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c p o s s i b l e w.'ys i n which an t-vent 
can o c c u r . 
7 . P r e d i c t a b i l i t y - r e f e r s to the person pay ing a t t e n t i o n to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of a s i t u a t i o n i n order to be ab le to p r e d i c t p o s s i b l e outcomes or reduce 
s u r o r i s e . 
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1. Rules of procedure - the ways i n which a person d e c i d e s the c o r r e c t n e s s 
of i d s judgments , i n f e r e n c e s , p e r c e p t i o n s and c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s . 
here , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , G a r f i n k e l draws a t t e n t i o n to two c l a s s e s of r u l e s f o r 
d e c i d i n g the d i s t i n c t ways i n which a t h i n g may be decided to be known; 
C a r t e s i a n and t r i b a l r u l e s . 
" C a r t e s i a n r u l e s propose that a d e c i s i o n i s c o r r e c t 
because the person fo l lowed the r u l e s without re spec t 
f o r p e r s o n - i e , , tha t the d e c i d e r decided as any man 
"oulr! do when a l l m a t t e r s o f s o c i a l a f f i l i a t i o n were 
t r e a t e d as s p e c i f i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . By c o n t r a s t t r i b a l 
r u l e s prov ide that a d e c i s i o n i s c o r r e c t or not a c c o r d i n g 
to whether c e r t a i n i n t e r p e r s o n j l s o l i d a r i t i e s are re spec ted 
as c o n d i t i o n s of the d e c i s i o n . The person counts h i s 
d e c i s i o n r i g h t or wrong in accordance with whom i t i s 
r e f e r e n t i a l l y important that he be i n agreement." (45) 
He argues t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y i s f r e q u e n t l y used to r e f e r to the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
C a r t e s i a n r u l e s o f d e c i s i o n , r a t h e r than o t h e r s . Convent ions may impose 
r e s t r a i n t s on such d e c i s i o n making, the extent to which such c o n s t r a i n t s a r e 
suppressed or o t h e r w i s e made i n e f f e c t i v e may a l s o be termed r a t i o n a l i t y . 
9 . Choice - l>oth as an awareness of choosing as a p o s s i b i l i t y , and the f a c t 
of c h o o s i n g . 
10. Grounds of Choice - whether the ' a p p r o p r i a t e ' ones are c i t e d , or whether 
any a r e c i t e d at a l l - he d i s c u s s e s a number of d i f f e r e n t meanings o f 
grounds . 
11. C o m p a t i b i l i t y of means ends r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h p r i n c i p l e s of formal l o g i 
t r e a t i n g course of a c t i o n as problem s o l v i n g . 
12. Semantic c l a r i t y and d i s t i n c t n e s s ; - being c l e a r about what i s i n v o l v e d 
the s i t u a t i o n be fore a c c e p t i n g i t . 
13. C l a r i t y and d i s t i n c t n e s s f o r i t s own sake - being c l e a r about what i s 
i n v o l v e d i n the s i t u a t i o n as i t s own end. 
14. C o m p a t i b i l i t y of the d e f i n i t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n w i t h s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 
a l l o w i n g what we normal ly t r e a t as a "matter of f a c t " to be c r i t i c i s e d i 
terms o f i t s c o m p a t i b i l i t y wi th s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. 
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G a r f i n k e l a l s o notes that r a t i o n a l i t y may a l s o r e f e r to the p e r s o n ' s f e e l i n g s 
that accompany h i s conduct = e g . , " a f f e c t i v e n e u t r a l i t y " (a j o k e , I t h i n k , by 
a keen s tudent of P a r s o n s , ) "unemotional", "detached", " d i s i n t e r e s t e d " , and 
" impersona l"; whi l e these may be f e a t u r e s of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s exper i ence of 
h i s environment , what G a r f i n k e l i s i n t e r e s t e d i n i s the way i n which a person 
uses the f e e l i n g that he has about h i s environment to recommend the s e n s i b l e 
c h a r a c t e r of the t h i n g t h a t he i s t a l k i n g about or the warrant of a f i n d i n g . 
Only i n i d e a l l y d e s c r i b e d s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t i e s i s a person who t r e a t s h i s 
f e e l i n g s about a mat ter as i r r e l e v a n t to i t s sense or warrant s a i d to be a c t i n g 
more r a t i o n a l l y than one who does not . 
G a r f i n k e l goes on to d i s c u s s the ways i n which "these r a t i o n a l i t i e s may be used 
to c o n s t r u c t an image of a person as a type of behaviour"; t h i s may be done wi th 
a l l the r a t i o n a l i t i e s l i s t e d w i t h four e x c e p t i o n s . (10 -14 ) These four e x c e p t i o n s 
i l l u s t r a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n , f o r him, between the r a t i o n a l i t i e s of everyday l i f e , 
and those of the s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e . 
"Phrased as i d e a l maxims of conduct , these excepted 
r a t i o n a l i t i e s s t a t e t h a t the p r o j e c t e d s t e p s of i n 
the s o l u t i o n of a problem or the accomplishment o f a 
t a s k i e . , the means-ends r e l a t i o n s h i p s be c o n s t r u c t e d 
i n such a way ( 1 ) t h a t they remain i n f u l l c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
w i t h the r u l e s that d e f i n e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s 
of grammar and procedure ( 2 ) t h a t a l l the e lements be 
conce ived o f i n f u l l c l e a r n e s s and d i s t i n c t n e s s ( 3 ) t h a t 
the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of both the body of knowledge as w e l l 
as r u l e s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e procedure 
be t r e a t e d as a f i r s t p r i o r i t y p r o j e c t : and ( 4 ) t h a t the 
p r o j e c t e d s teps c o n t a i n on ly s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e 
assumptions that have to be i n f u l l c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h 
the whole of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge." (46) 
G a r f i n k e l argues t h a t s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t i e s occur as s t a b l e p r o p e r t i e s of 
a c t i o n and as " s a n c t i o n a b l e i d e a l s " o n l y i n the case of a c t i o n s governed by an 
a t t i t u d e o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g . "By c o n t r a s t , a c t i o n s governed by the 
a t t i t u d e of d a i l y l i f e are marked by the s p e c i f i c absence of these r a t i o n a l i t i e s 
e i t h e r as s t a b l e p r o p e r t i e s or as s a n c t i o n a b l e i d e a l s " . ( 4 7 ) 
Where any attempt i s made to impose the s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y onto s t r u c t u 
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s u b j e c t to the r a t i o n a l i t i e s of everyday l i f e , t h i s w i l l r e s u l t i n a m u l t i -
p l i c a t i o n of the anomic f e a t u r e s of i n t e r a c t i o n " . While the r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f 
everyday l i f e may apply i n the a c t i v i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g , the r e v e r s e 
i s not the c a s e . 
Now, t h i s i s , he s a y s , "an e m p i r i c a l r a t h e r than a d o c t r i n a l m a t t e r " , that i s 
to s a y , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the s c i e n t i f i c and everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s depends 
on the warrant t h a t can be found for t h i s s ta tement . For the s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s t , he a r g u e s , t h i s problem of r a t i o n a l i t y depends upon f i r s t c l a r i f y i n g 
the v a r i o u s meanings of r a t i o n a l i t y and a l l o c a t i n g them to b e h a v i o u r a l c o r r e l a t e s 
i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n s and the s y s t e m ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; which of the 
b e h a v i o u r a l d e s i g n a t i o n s go together must be decided on the b a s i s of e x p e r i e n c e 
r a t h e r than oy the e l e c t i o n of a theory . F u r t h e r , the d e c i d i n g o f these 
b e h a v i o u r a l d e s i g n a t i o n s must be a l l o c a t e d between d e f i n i t i o n a l and e m p i r i c a l l y 
p r o b l e m a t i c s t a t u s , and such d e c i s i o n s r e q u i r e grounds, and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of p u t a t i v e comparison w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e s e t s of d e c i s i o n s . T h i s i s a f u r t h e r 
restatement of h i s c o n v i c t i o n that s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i s t i e d , i n terms 
of i t s own ends , to n e c e s s a r y i d e a l i s a t i o n , s i n c e such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o u l d 
not succeed; the problem of everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s can only i n v o l v e a suspens ion 
of judgment on those mat ters which c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y would requi re such 
judgment. 
G a r f i n k e l then goes on to d i s c u s s the d i f f e r e n c e s between the p r e - s u p p o s i t i o n 
governing the a t t i t u d e of d a i l y l i f e and that of s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g , u s i n g 
as h i s r e s o u r c e S c h u t z ' s s t u d i e s of the c o n s t i t u t i v e phenomenology of commonsense 
s i t u a t i o n s . (48) These produce d i s t i n c t i o n s between the two i n the f o l l o w i n g way 
1. I n everyday s i t u a t i o n s , the o r d e r l i n e s s of the wor ld i s a c h i e v e d by the 
p r a c t i c a l t h e o r i s t , and he f u r t h e r attempts to s u s t a i n and j u s t i f y t h i s 
achievement . The wor ld i s taken to be what i t appears to be, and any 
p o s s i b i l i t y that i t might be o t h e r w i s e construed may be e n t e r t a i n e d , bur. 
i t i s not a c t e d upon. Such achievements a te expected of o t h e r s in more 
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or l e s s i d e n t i c a l f a s h i o n ; m a t t e r s of d i s p u t e are u s u a l l y s e t t l e d by 
mutual acceptance of c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n s t r u a l s . 
In s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s conducted on the b a s i s that the 
b e l i e f t h a t o b j e c t s of the wor ld are as they appear w i l l be h e l d i n abeyance; 
w h i l e commonsense r a t i o n a l i t y p e r m i t s coubt , the p r a c t i c a l i t i e s of everyday 
l i f e l i m i t the ex tent to which t h i s can be s u s t a i n e d . The s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e 
i s not l i m i t e d by such c o n s t r a i n t s , s i n c e h e r e , doubt i s i n p r i n c i p l e u n l i m i t e d . 
2. The p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of the everyday a c t o r ' s involvment i n the 
wor ld form the second assumption of the everyday a t t i t u d e . The a c c u r a c y 
of the a c t o r s ' o r d e r i n g s i s pre=supposed to be t e s t e d and t e s t a b l e without 
suspending the r e l e v a n c e of what he knows as " f a c t , s u p p o s i t i o n , c o n j e c t u r e , 
f a n t a s y and the l i k e , by v i r t u e of h i s b o d i l y and s o c i a l p o s i t i o n s i n the 
r e a l w o r l d . " 
" E v e n t s , t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e i r c a u s a l t e x t u r e , are 
not f o r him matters of t h e o r e t i c i n t e r e s t . He does not 
s a n c t i o n the not ion t h a t i n d e a l i n g w i t h them i t i s 
c o r r e c t to address them wi th the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e r u l e 
that he knows noth ing or that he can assume that he knows 
noth ing j u s t to see where i t l e a d s . In everyday 
s i t u a t i o n s , what he knows i s an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e of h i s 
s o c i a l competence. What he knows, i n the way he knows 
i t he assumes p e r s o n i f i e s h i m s e l f as a s o c i a l o b j e c t to 
h i m s e l f as we l l as to o t h e r s as a bona f i d e member of 
the group. (49) 
I n c o n t r a s t , s c i e n c e t a k e s the sense and a c c u r a c y of the model to be a matter 
to be t e s t e d and dec ided w h i l e the r e l e v a n c e of what the t h e o r i z e r knows by 
v i r t u e o f h i s " s o c i a l and bod i ly p o s i t i o n s i n the r e a l wor ld" i s a mat ter on 
which judgment must be suspended. 
3 . Time has a d i f f e r e n t p l a c e i n both a t t i t u d e s ; i n everyday l i f e , a system 
of temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p s (assumed to be h e l d in common with o t h e r s ) i s 
used to break e x p e r i e n c e down i n t o " s l i c e s " , so t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
c o n v e r s a t i o n becomes not J u s t what i s exper i enced as i t i s e x p e r i e n c e d , 
but what i t has j u s t been, and what i t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t i t w i l l come 
to be; sense i s only r e a l i s e d here as a p r o g r e s s i o n through a s e r i e s of 
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r e a l i s e d meaning, each w i t h r e t r o s p e c t i v e and p r o s p e c t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e s . 
He assumes t h a t the d u r a t i o n , p a c i n g , p h a s i n g and t e r m i n a t i o n o f conversa-
t i o n s i s s i m i l a r l y c o - o r d i n a t e d by h i m s e l f and o t h e r s . 
I n t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g , s t a n d a r d t i m e i s used as a d e v i c e 
f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g one out o f a l t e r n a t i v e e m p i r i c a l l y p o s s i b l e w o r l d s ; w h i l e i n 
the everyday w o r l d t i m e would gear h i s i n t e r e s t s t o the conduct o f o t h e r s , i n 
s c i e n c e i t becomes m e r e l y a d e v i c e f o r s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l em o f f o r m u l a t i n g , i n 
r e l a t i o n s o f cause and e f f e c t , o r something l i k e i t , t he c o - o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n s 
which are t h e s u b j e c t o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
4. The everyday a c t o r i s i n f o r m e d as t o the sense o f e v e n t s by a pre-supposed 
background o f t h e ' n a t u r a l f a c t s o f l i f e ' ; "anyone would t h i n k t h e same 
i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , " I n s c i e n c e , t h e "anyone who would t h i n k t h e same" 
i s n o t , as f o r t h e everyday a c t o r , s i m p l y a member o f t h e n a t u r a l language 
community, but i s a u n i v e r s a l i s e d anyone; r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g r o o t e d i n t h e 
p r a c t i c a l i t i e s o f a r e a l w o r l d , t h e anyone o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s e r i s 
"an i d e a l disembodied manual o f p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s f o r d e c i d i n g s e n s i b i l i t y , 
w a r r a n t , and o b j e c t i v i t y " . (50) The s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s e r i s n o t c o n s t r a i n e d 
by t h e o b l i g a t i o n s o f " s e e i n g t h e w o r l d i n t h e way i t i s seen by any o t h e r 
r e a l member" but i s o b l i g e d o n l y t o g i v e credence o n l y t o what he d e c i d e s ; 
i t i s h i s o p t i o n t o t r u s t t h e f i n d i n g s o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s , grounded i n t h e i r 
common membership of some ( s c i e n t i f i c ) community o r o t h e r , but i f ne w i t h -
h o l d s t h i s , he i s p e r m i t t e d t o j u s t i f y t h i s by i n v o k i n g as grounds h i s 
i m p e r s o n a l s u b s c r i p t i o n t o a community o f "competent i n v e s t i g a t o r s who are 
anonymous w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o l l e c t i v i t y membership and whose a c t i o n s conforr-. 
t o norms o f t h e manual o f p r o c e d u r e s . By such a c t i o n s he may r i s k c r i t i c i s m 
f o r unnecessary r i g o r . But such a c t i o n s i n d a i l y l i f e would r i s k a change 
i n s t a t u s t o c r i m i n a l i t y , s i c k n e s s o r incompetence." (51) 
5. For t h e everyday a c t o r , p r i v a t e l i f e forms the background t o h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l 
r e l a t i o n s t o o t h e r s a c c o r d i n g t o the c o n t e x t s i n which they o c c u r . Only 
whdt i t r e l e v a n t t o the i n t e r a c t i o n i n hand i s presumed by those i n v o l v e d 
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t o be grounds f o r behaviour i n q u e s t i o n ; t h e m a t t e r s t h a t a r e assumed t o 
be known i n common are i n f o r m e d i n t h e i r sense by those m a t t e r s w h i c h 
are h e l d i n r e s e r v e . 
For t h e s c i e n t i f i c t n e o r i s e r , no d i s p a r i t y e x i s t s between a p u b l i c and a p r i v a t e 
l i f e so f a r as m a t t e r s o f w a r r a n t and sense a re concerned; o n l y m a t t e r s t h a t 
are r e l e v a n t t o h i s d e p i c t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e w o r l d have any p l a c e , and these 
are both p u b l i c and p u b l i c i s a b l e . 
These two a t t i t u d e s . , he argues, produce " l o g i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e s e t s o f e v e n t s " ; 
i t i s not t h e case t h a t t h e y shade i n t o each o t h e r , o r a r e merely d i f f e r e n t i n 
degree; they do n o t ''describe d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f the same t h i n g " . R a t h e r , 
must see tha': no necessary p r i o r i t y can be assig n e d t o one p r o d u c t i o n r a t n e r 
than a n o t h e r on *>£ b ^ s i s £f r a t i o n a l i t y ; t h a t i s t o say, the i n s i s t e n c e o f 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s e r s on c o n c e i v i n g a c t i o n s i n terms o f s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y 
c r e a t e s f o r them t h e problems t h a t t h e y t h e n f i n d i n f i t t i n g t h i s r a t i o n a l i t y 
t o the c h o i c e s e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n t h e a f f a i r s governed i n t h e i r sense by t h e 
p r e - s u p p o s i t i o n s o f everyday l i f e . F o l l o w i n g Schut^, he argues t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y 
o n l y e x i s t s i n everyday l i f e i n s o f a r as i t i s necessary f o r t h e p r a c t i c a l 
purposes o f t h e a c t o i i n c o n c e i v i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e ends he has m mind, 
t h e i r consequences, and t h e means el h i s d i s p o s a l f o r r e a l i s i n g them; t h i s i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d by t h e p r a c t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f o p e r a t i n g i n t he r e a l w o r l d , 
^o t h a t , Sch'itz c o n c l u d e s , t h e e x h a u s t i v e system which would be necessary i f we 
were t o search f o r a n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e e x i s t s not at the everyday l e v e l , 
but i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l o f s c i e n c e ; i t i s n e i t h e r a p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e o f 
everyday t h o u g h t , n o r s h o u l d i t c o n s t i t u t e a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e o f s c i e n -
t i f i c s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g . 
Consequent upon t h i s , G a r f i n k e l recommends t h a t , r a t h e i t han t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r 
t r e a t i n g s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y as a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r u l e , he should ( i f he i s 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e a f f a i r s o f everyday l i f e ) choose, i n s t e a d o f an i d e a l i s e d mode 
110. 
(pace Parsons) t o t r e a t the p r o p e r t i e s o f l a t i o n a l i t y o n l y as e m p i r i c a l l y 
p r o b l e m a t i c a l d a t a ; "They would have t h e s t a t u b o n l y o f d a t a , and would have 
t o be accounted f o r i n t h e same way t h a t the more f a m i l i a r p r o p e r t i e s o f conduct 
are a ccounted f o r " ( 5 3 ) . T h i s i s the a t t e m p t t o remove t h e r a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s 
o f conduct from the domain o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l commentary and g i v e them over t o 
p m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h ; I n G a r f i n k e l ' s v i e w , t h i s i s p o s s i b l e because, u n l i k e 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f c r e d i b l e knowledge, t h e body o f c r e d i b l e 
knowledge w i t h i n a c t i v i t i e s o f d a i l y l i f e i s n o t s u b j e c t t o the r i g i d r e s t r i c t i o n 
o f w a r r a n t i n terms o f an i d e a l - f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e s a n c t i o n i n s c i e n c e o f not 
p e r m i t t i n g two i n c o m p a t i b l e 01 c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n s t o be used as l e g i t -
imate grounds f o r deducing t h e w a r r a n t o f a n o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n . I f t h e d e f i n i t i o n 
o f c r e d i b l e knowledge c o n s i s t s o f t h e r u l e * t h a t govern the use o f p r o p o s i t i o n s 
as grounds o f f u r t h e r i n f e r e n c e and a c t i o n , t h e n w h i l e f o r s c i e n c e t h e s e r u l e s 
mast be c l e a r l y e x p l i c a t e d (as the i d e a l t o w h i c h i t s u b s c r i b e s , i t s .nodel) f o r 
the coiimoasense w o r l d , as has been argued, t h i s i s c l e a r l y n o t t h e case. 
" W i t h i n t h e r u l e s o f r e l e v a n c e o f everyday l i f e , a 
c o r r e c t l y used p r o p o s i t i o n i s one f o r whose use the 
user s p e c i f i c a l l y e x p e c t s t o be s o c i a l l y s u p p o r t e d 
and by t h e use o f w h i c h he f u r n i s h e s o t h e r s evidence 
o f bona f i d e c o l l e c t i v i t y s t a t u s " , ( 5 4 ) 
G a r f i n k e l i s a r g u i n g t h a t t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e e m p i r i c a l s t a t e m e n t o f t h e 
r a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s o f everyday conduct c o n s i s t s i n t h e s e n s i b l e r e p o r t i n g o f 
the a c t i v i t i e s as t h e y are f o u n d , i n terms o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s i n t o which t h e y 
may be grouped; t h e g r o u p i n g i n t o forms o f r a t i o n a l i t y i s j u s t i f i e d i n t h e 
sense t h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r may c i t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e a c t o r s * make-up and 
t o h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r s , but " w i t h o u t i r o n i c comparison", 
T h i s has c l e a r l i n k s t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e form o f l i f e as t h e 
'bedrock' upon U i i c h i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s founded, but w h i c h i t cannot q u e s t i o n ; 
G a r f i n k e l i s s i m i l a r l y a r g u i n g t h a t here d e s c r i p t i o n can t a k e t h e p l a c e o f 
e x p l a n a t i o n , and must; t h a t i s t o say, the e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the 
r a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s o f everyday conduct cannot seek i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n a n y t h i n g 
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o t h e r t h a n i t s u n d o u b t a b l e n a t u r e . His r e p o r t i n g o f these r a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s 
does not aim t o e x p l a i n them, f o r t o do so would be t o make them a c c o u n t a b l e 
f o r i n terms o f canons o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h do not e x i s t i n t h e p r a c t i c a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h t h e y o c c u r . "Any f a c t o r t h a t we t a k e t o be c o n d i t i o n a l 
o f the p r o p e r t i e s o f a c t i v i t i e s i s a f a c t o r t h a t i s c o n d i t i o n a l o f t h e r a t i o n -
d l i t i e s " . ( 55) I n making t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o d a t a , he argues 
t h a t we must account f o r them " i n t h e same way t h a t the more f a m i l i a r p r o p e r t i e s 
o f conduct are accounted f o r " . How are t h e more f a m i l i a r p r o p e r t i e s o f conduct 
accounted f o r ? Here, he t u r n s i n a c i r c l e , f o r w h i l e h i s argument here has so 
f a r been d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s t h e a s p i r a t i o n s o f ( c o n s t r u c t i v i s t ) s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g , he now t u r n s back t o such t h e o r i s i n g ; f o r i t i s o n l y t h e r e q u i r e -
ments and c l a i m s o f t h e model o f " s c i e n t i f I C " t h e o r i s i n g which he aims t o r e s i s t s 
Given the c h o i c e between s c i e n t i f i c and everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s , he a r g u e s , no 
n e c e s s i t y d i c t a t e s t h a t we must o p t f o r t h e i d e a l i s i n g p r o c e d u r e s o f s c i e n c e . 
The i d e a l i s i n g p r o c e d u r e s o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g themselves are n o t demanded 
by any o n t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e e v e n t s t h e y seek t o d e s c r i b e . I t i s 
h i s argument t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n has t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a c c o u n t i n g conduct i f i t s 
s t a t e m e n t s are w a r r a n t e d by the c r i t e r i a w h i c h we do employ i n everyday l i f e , 
r a t h e r t h a n s i m p l y t h o s e c r i t e r i a w h i c h are employed i n t h e community o f 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g . Thereby, accounts o f everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s depend f o r 
t h e i r w a r r a n t n o t upon t h e c r i t e r i a o f s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y , but r a t h e r , upon 
t h e c r i t e r i a w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f everyday l i f e . 
Thus G a r f i n k e l i s t r a d i n g upon t h e d i v e r s i t y o f r a t i o n a l i t i e s i n the everyday 
w o r l d t o w a r r a n t d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f t h a t w o r l d ; t h e e m p i r i c a l 
n a t u r e o f h i s e n t e r p r i s e c o n s i s t s i n t h e f a c t t h a t the o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d does not depend upon a set o f master c r i t e r i a i n t e r m s o f which 
d e c i s i o n s about i t s r e a l i t y may be w a r r a n t e d , but i s r a t h e r a d i v e r s e set o f 
p r a c t i c e s , employed a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r r e l e v a n c e f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l s concerned. 
The e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s d i v e r s i t y assures members, among o t h e r t h i n g s , o f t h e 
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p o s s i b i l i t y o f comparing o r c o n t r a s t i n g one s e t o f p r a c t i c e s , o r one s i t u a t i o n , 
w i t h o t h e r s . S i m i l a r l y , G a r f i n k e l can t r a d e on t h i s f a c i l i t y i n h i s a c c o u n t i n g ; 
p r e c i s e l y those r e s o u r c e s which everyday a c t o r s employ t o r e f l e c t on t h e 
meaning o f t h e i r own and o t h e r s ' a c t i o n s and speech assure t o G a r f i n k e l t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e s c r i b i n g such a c t i o n s and speeches, f o r t h e s e are w a r r a n t e d 
by the same s e t o f i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e r e s o u r c e s . 
H i s ' p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i f f e r e n c e ' t h e n , can be seen t o be a necessary f e a t u r e o f 
h i s p r o j e c t ; ANY judgment would i n v o l v e a s t i D u l a t i o n w h i c h has no p l a c e i n a 
d e s c r i p t i o n , f o r i t would i n v o l v e a s s i g n i n g d e f i n i t e meaning t o t h e a c t i o n s t o 
which i t i s a p p l i e d . G a r f i n k e l cannot be concerned w i t h t h i s t a s k , f o r i n h i s 
c a k i n g r a t i o n a l i t y o n l y as d a t a , and not as a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e , he i s 
h i m s e l f l e f t w i t h o u t such a p r i n c i p l e , save f o r t h e " p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i f f e r e n c e " . 
P r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as h i s work depends upon b e i n g i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e "adequacy, 
v a l u e , i m p o r t a n c e , n e c e s s i t y , p r a c t i c a l i t y , success o r c o n s e q u e n t i a l 1 t y " o f i t s 
t o p i c as account o f t h e w o r l d , i n o r d e r t o make the r a t i o n a l i t y which w a r r a n t s 
i t i n t o h i s t o p i c , so G a r f i n k e l i s l e f t w i t h o u t a p r i n c i p l e i n terms o f whic h 
h i s a c c o u n t s can be seen as adequate, v a l u a o l e , i m p o r t a n t , n ecessary, p r a c t i c a l , 
s u c c e s s f u l o r c o n s e q u e n t i a l . Because they do n o t p r o v i d e any c r i t e r i a i n terms 
of w hich we can j u d g e t h e i r adequacy ( e t c . , ) a p a r t from those which t h e y d i s p l a y 
i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n which t h e y produce. They make no d i f f e r e n c e between t h e 
adequacy o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y and p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g 
because m r e j e c t i n g t h e s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e ( f o r t h e i r p u r p o s e s ) , h i s a c c ounts 
cease t o be w a r r a n t e d i n t h e same terms as tnose produced by t h e community o f 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s e r s . 
•vhile a i m i n g t o be w a r r a n t e d by t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f everyday l i f e w h i c h t h e y 
d e s c r i b e , i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s t r u e t h a t they a re d i f f e r e n t from the ac c o u n t s 
produced by everyday a c t o r s w i t h i n t h i s a t t i t u d e , f o r w h i l e such a c t o r s produce 
t h e o r e t i c a c c o u n t s , t h e y do so f o r , i n t h e overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f cases, 
p r a c t i c a l purposes. They do not suspend c e r t a i n t y i n t h e i r accounts o f t h e 
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everyday w o r l d , even though i n t h e i r p r a c t i c e s t h e y n e c e s s a r i l y r e t a i n t h e 
c a p a c i t y t o suspend doubt. That i s t o say, doubts about the r e a l i t y o f t h e 
r e a l i s e d w o r l d do have a p l a c e i n t h e r e f l e x i v e f a c u l t y , but o n l y w i t h i n v e r y 
s p e c i a l language games. G a r f m k e l may be i n d i f f e r e n t t o what the accounts 
a c c o m p l i s h , b u t t h o s e who produce and assess t h e R e c o u n t s cannot be, as he has 
h i m s e l f argued. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n j 
" L e t us say t h a t t h e meaning o f a p i e c e i s i t s r o l e i n a 
game.- Now l e t i t be d e c i d e d by l o t which o f t h e p l a y e r s 
g e t s w h i t e b e f o r e any game o f chess b e g i n s . To t h i s end, 
one p l a y e r h o l d s a k i n g i n each c l o s e d f i s t w h i l e t h e 
o t h e r chooses one o f t h e two hands a t random. W i l l i t be 
counted as p a r t o f t h e r o l e o f t h e k i n d i n chess t h a t i t 
i s used t o draw l o t s i n t h i s way? 
So I am i n c l i n e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e e s s e n t i a l and 
t h e m - e s s e n t i a l i n a game t o o . The game, one would l i k e 
t o say, has not o n l y r u l e s but a l s o a p o i n t . " 
But a f t e r a l l , a game i s supposed t o be d e f i n e d by t h e r u l e s ! 
So, i f a r u l e o f t h e game p r e s c r i b e s t h a t k i n g s a re t o be 
used f o r d r a w i n g l o t s b e f o r e a game o f chess, t h e n t h a t i s an 
e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f t h e game. What o b j e c t i o n m i g h t one make t o 
t h i s ? That one does n o t see t h e p o i n t o f t h i s p r e s c r i p t i o n . 
Perhaps as one wouldn't see t h e p o i n t e i t h e r o f a r u l e by which 
each p i e c e had t o be t u r n e d round t h r e e t i m e s b e f o r e one moved 
i t . I f we found t h i s r u l e i n a board game we s h o u l d be 
s u r p r i s e d and s p e c u l a t e perhaps about t h e purpose o f t h e r u l e . 
("Was t h i s p r e s c r i p t i o n meant t o p r e v e n t one from moving 
w i t h o u t due c o n s i d e r a t i o n ? " ) 
I f I u n d e r s t a n d t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e game a r i g h t - I might say -
t h e n t h i s i s n ' t an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f i t (Meaning i s a physiognomy). 
(56) 
G a r f i n k e l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n s aim t o d e r i v e t h e i r sense from t h e c r i t e r i a i n terms 
o f winch t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s which t h e y t a k e as t h e i r t o p i c bestow sense i n every 
day l i f e ; however, ^ h i l e these r a t i o n a l i t i e s may be i n v o k e d by everyday a c t o r s 
as the grounds f o r t h e i r p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s i n the everyday w o r l d , t h e r a t i o n a l * 
o f t h e i r i n v o c a t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y what i s o n l y a v a i l a b l e i n terms o f t h e p o i n t 
( p u r p o s e ) o f t h e i r c onduct. As G a r f i n k e l argued ( f o l l o w i n g Schutz) t h i s i s a 
p r a c t i c a l l y l i m i t e d r a t i o n a l i t y , and does n o t f i t a s y s t e m a t i c f o r m ; however, 
t h i s l i m i t a t i o n must a l s o a p p l y t o G a r f i n k e l , g i v e n t h a t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n c a l l s 
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i n t o p l a y t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s upon which i t f o c u s s e s , but a t the same t i m e , he 
must be i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e accomplishment o f t h e p o i n t t o w h i c h t h e conduct i s 
d i r e c t e d . That i s t o say, t h e p o i n t t o whi c h t h e b e h a v i o u r i s d i r e c t e d can 
have no s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r G a r f i n k e l , save as a c r i t e r i o n l e s s a s c r i p t i o n n o t 
p r o v i d e d f o r by t h e s e l f - i m p o s e d l i m i t s o f h i s d e s c r i p t i o n ; s i n c e t h e d e s c r i p t i o n 
i s d i r e c t e d towards t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s upon w h i c h everyday conduct depends f o r 
i t s sense, r a t h e r t h a n t h e accomplishments o f t h a t c o n d u c t , G a r f i n k e l i s n o t 
i n t e r e s t e d i n Lac p o i n t o f a language game, but o n l y what r u l e s t h e p l a y e r s 
a t t e n d t o as t h e y p l a y . 
G a r f i n k e l ' s game has a p o i n t , o f cour s e , which has a l r e a d y been l a i d o u t ; however, 
what i s n o t c l e a r about t h e p o i n t t o G a r f i n k e l ' s game i s e x a c t l y what t h e r u l e s 
o f h i s game a r e ; can we know when we break them? I n terms o f t h e o u t l i n e j u s t 
p r o v i d e d , i t v o u l d seem t h a t t h e s e r u l e s c o n s i s t i n making d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e 
o p e r a t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y as i t o c c u r s so t h a t t h e w a r r a n t f o r t h e se d e s c r i p t i o n s 
d e r i v e s from the r a t i o n a l i t i e s w h i c h t h e y d e s c r i b e , r a t h e r t h a n an i d e a l i s e d 
s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y . A l t h o u g h t h i s would be d e n i e d , much o f G a r f i n k e l ' s 
work comes do>'n t o " h a t i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d " n a t u r a l i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n " , but w i t h 
a s p e c i f i c ' ' d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t " . The N o v e l t y o f t h e work r e s i d e s i n t h e 
f a c t t h a t i t d e n i e s i t s s t a t u s AS a d e s c r i p t i o n as we u s u a l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
te r m , f o r w h i l e i t d e s c r i b e s courses o f e v e n t s , i t i s i n d i f f e r e n t t o t n e i r 
outcomes, so t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n proposed as an account i s i t s e l f -hat 
i s " d e s c r i b e d " , r a t h e r chan r e f e i n n g t o something ' b e h i n d ' i t s e l f . G a r f i n k e l 
sees t h i s as e m p i r i c a l p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as t h e p r o d u c t i o n d i s p l a y s t h e r a t i o n -
a l i t i e s upon which i t depends f o r i t s sense as an a n a l y t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t ] o n o f 
i t s c o n c r e t e n a t u r e . That i s t o say, i t i s t h e n a t u r a l n e s s o f n a t u r a l i s t i c 
d e s c r i p t i o n ^ h i c h i s t h e e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t o f n i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I n t h i s sense, 
G a r f i n k e l ' s c l a i m f o r t h e w a r r a n t o f h i s a n a l y s i s r e s t s on an e x t r e m e l y ambiva-
l e n t c l a i m ; w h i l e s t u d i e s aim t o d i s p l a y as t h e y make use o f t h e everyday 
r a t i o n a l i t i e s upon which t h e i r s t u d i e s depend f o r t h e i r sense, s i n c e t h e r e i s 
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no remedy f o r t h e i n d e x i c a l i t y o f such a c c o u n t s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e r i v i n g , 
say, a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f ways o f s p e a k i n g from such i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s s i m i l a r l y 
s u b j e c t t o t h i s c o n s t r a i n t . 
Think h e r e , once a g a i n , o f h u s t - e r l ' s p r o j e c t ; i n t a l k i n g about the meaning o f 
o t h e r ' s conduct i n t h i s way, t h i s t a l k i s e m p i r i c a l p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as i t i s 
my p r o d u c t i o n which i s o b j e c t i v e ( c o n c r e t e ) , t h a t i s t o say, i t s o b j e c t i v i t y 
r e s i d e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t d i s p l a y s t h e i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e r e s o u r c e s on w h i c h i t 
depends f o r i t s sense, r a t h e r t h a n s t i p u l a t i n g them as f e a t u r e s o f r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l 
t o the a c t o f e x p e r i e n c e . I n t h i s t a l k , t h e n , we have an avowedly u n c r i t i c a l 
view o f t h e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y w hich makes i t i m p o s s i b l e t o be c e r t a i n about any 
o f i t s p r o d u c t i o n s ; t h e s uspension o f c e r t a i n t y i s a n a t u r a l consequence o f t h i s 
a t t i t u d e . The q u e s t i o n t h e n becomes - what i s t h e p o i n t o f a game w h i c h suspends 
c e r t a i n t y i n t h i s way? I f i t aims t o recommend u n c r i t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n as a l l 
we can have o f t h e p r a c t i c e s o f s p e a k i n g , t h e n i t ^ oes no f u r t h e r t h a n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' 
p o i n t t h a t we must accept t h e form o f l i f e as t h e l i m i t o f our speech. I t has 
a l s o argued, however, f o r t h e d i v e r s i t y o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the w a r r a n t o f 
s e n s i b l e speech; now, i f sense making r e l i e s on such d i v e r s i t y , w h i l e i t i s 
s u r e l y t h e case t h a t we must n o t be r e s t r i c t e d by t h e s c i e n t i f i c model o f r a t i o n -
a l i t y i n o u r e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e speeches and a c t i o n s o f s o c i a l a c t o r s , i t i s 
s u r e l y a l s o t h e case t h a t we must n o t be r e s t r i c t e d by t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e 
mundane uses which a c t o r s employ; these a r e , as w e l l as b e i n g t h e background t o 
t h e f a c t i c i t y o f t h e everyday w o r l d , s u r e l y a l s o o f d i f f e r e n t degrees o f i m p o r t a n c e 
i n t h e p r a c t i c e s which a c t o r s f o l l o w i n d e c i d i n g upon t h e p o i n t o f such speeches 
and a c t i o n s . I n h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f chess, W i t t g e n s t e i n i s p o i n t i n g t o the 
way i n w h i c h d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f r u l e s may o p e r a t e i n t h e c o n t e x t o f p l a y i n g a 
language game, but t h a t n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a game a r i g h t , we d e c i d e 
t h a t some r u l e s are more e s s e n t i a l t han o t h e r s . The q u e s t i o n becomes, f o r 
G a r f i n k e l ' s p r o j e c t - how does i t c l a i m f o r i t s own p r o j e c t t h a t i t i s more 
i n t e r e s t i n g , o r more e s s e n t i a l i n an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f meaning 
i n everyday conduct? 
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O b v i o u s l y , one o f t h e ways i n which i t does t h i s i s t o c o n t r a s t i t s p r a c t i c e s 
w i t h t h o s e o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y , i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e regime 
o f s c i e n c e t o w h i c h i t sees such s o c i o l o g y as n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t ; w h i l e 'we' 
t a k e the a t t i t u d e i n terms o f w h i c h everyday a c t i o n s a r e s e n s i b l e s e r i o u s l y , 
' t h e y ' do n o t , and cannot. The c l a i m i s t h e r e f o r e advanced t h a t t h e o n l y way 
i n w h i c h t h e phenomena o f everyday conduct can be addressed w h i c h pays 
" s e r i o u s " a t t e n t i o n t o i t s a c t u a l grounds i s i n t e r m s o f a programme o f e t h n o -
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s . W h i l e 'we' cannot o f f e r t h e same k i n d s o f f i n d i n g s 
as c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y ( t h a t i s t o say, we cannot o f f e r c e r t a i n knowledge) 
t h e c e r t a i n t y t o w a r d w h i c h such s o c i o l o g y aims i s i l l u s o r y , i n t e r m s o f our 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e s s e s by w h i c h i t produces i t s a c c o u n t s ; what i s 
o f f e r e d i n s t e a d i s t h e u n d o u b t a b i l i t y o f everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s , p r e f i g u r e d 
by t h e d i s c l a i m e r o f any a t t e m p t t o d e c i d e t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e . I f , h e r e , 
meaning i s a physiognomy, t h e n i t becomes t h e t a s k o f t h e t h e o r i s t t o gr a s p 
t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e face t h a t i s produced f o r t h e everyday w o r l d ; ( W i t t -
g e n s t e i n was p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t we a r e l e d t o s e e i n g ; how does ethnomethodology 
" l e a d " u s?) G a r f i n k e l has moved, t h e n , f r o m an acceptance o f t h e n e c e s s i t y o f 
c a t e g o r i a l frameworks (and l o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l s ) i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f s o c i a l 
phenomena as o b j e c t s t o be a c c o u n t e d , pace Parsons, t o t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t i f 
we a r e p r e p a r e d t o accept i n d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a c t i o n s , we can 
t h e r e f o r e produce d e s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h e x h i b i t t h e p r o c e s s e s u n d e r l y i n g any 
a c c o u n t i n g . Parsons' account o f s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i s , t h e r e b y t h e ground 
o f G a r f i n k e l ' s p r o j e c t , i n t h a t sense; Parsons' account o f t h e ne c e s s a r y 
f e a t u r e s o f s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g p r o v i d e s f o r G a r f i n k e l ' s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
o f h i s p r o j e c t . 
That G a r f i n k e l can produce such a c c o u n t s i s p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
u n d e r - p i n n i n g o f h i s work; what remains t o be d e c i d e d i s e x a c t l y what we s h o u l d 
make o f t h e s e a c c o u n t s . I s h a l l argue t h a t G a r f i n k e l f a i l s t o p r o v i d e any 
c o m p e l l i n g reasons f o r us t o see t h e necessary d e m a r c a t i o n o f h i s p r o j e c t f r o m 
s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , and t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , 
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r e l y i n g as i t does on e r e c t i n g i r r e c o n c i l a b l e b a r r i e r s between t h e p r a c t i c e s 
o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g and t h e p r a c t i c e s o f everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s , c r e a t e s 
f o r i t s e l f no d i s t i n c t i v e p l a c e as a t h e o r e t i c a l p r o j e c t . What G a r f i n k e l i s 
a r g u i n g , e s s e n t i a l l y , i s t h a t u n l i k e c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y , ethnomethodo-
l o g i c a l s t u d i e s w i l l e x p l a i n n o t h i n g , but w i l l s i m p l y d e s c r i b e . The way i n 
w h i c h everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s o p e r a t e i s n o t something which r e q u i r e s us t o 
d i s c o v e r some new f a c t about i t , but i s r a t h e r a m a t t e r o f s e e i n g what we 
a l r e a d y know i n a d i f f e r e n t way; ( a g a i n , we a r e b e i n g l e d t o 'see* i n a c e r t a i n 
way); e x p l a n a t i o n here means I t h i n k d e d u c t i v e - n o m o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t i n g . 
I n a p e r f e c t l y good sense, however, e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s do e x p l a i n 
i n l e a d i n g us t o see how we make sense, i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , i n r e v e a l i n g how 
r a t i o n a l i t y i s connected t o the use o f speech t o a c c o m p l i s h meaning and o r d e r , 
we a r e g r a s p i n g c o n n e c t i o n s which i l l u m i n a t e p r o c e s s e s , and t h i s seems t o be 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n a p e r f e c t l y r e c o g n i s a b l e sense. Such e x p l a n a t i o n s are c o n c e p t u a l , 
r a t h e r t h a n e m p i r i c a l however, f o r w h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n 
produced i s e m p i r i c a l , t h e p r o b l e m which i t addresses i s not t h e adequacy ( e t c . , ) 
o f t h e a c c o u n t , but i t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e r a t i o n a l i t y upon wh i c h i t depends. The 
p r o b l e m b e i n g addressed i s t h a t o f how a c counts are s e n s i b l e f o r a c t o r s i n t h e 
way t h a t t h e y a r e s e n s i b l e . The d e s c r i p t i o n f u n c t i o n s so as t o i l l u m i n a t e an 
i n s t a n c e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f commonsense r a t i o n a l i t y and cannot aim, i n i t s own 
t e r m s , a t b e i n g an e m p i r i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e f e a t u r e s o f t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y ; 
such a d e s c r i p t i o n m i g h t o n l y emerge on t h e b a s i s o f a huge amount o f a n a l y s i s , 
and c o u l d t h e n o n l y be an i d e a l i s a t i o n , s i n c e i t depends i t s e l f on i t s t o p i c 
t o w a r r a n t i t s s e n s i b i l i t y . 
What, a f t e r a l l , i s G a r f i n k e l t r y i n g t o do? He has s a i d h i m s e l f t h a t h i s 
p r o j e c t i s t o " o p e r a t e upon language and r e c o v e r i t from t h e t a b l e " ( 5 7 ) . L i k e 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s method o f p h i l o s o p h y , t h e i ,ethnomethodology " l e a v e s e v e r y t h i n g 
as i t i s " (pr t r i e s t o ) ; i t i s n o t concerned w i t h c o r r e c t i v e s . But G a r f i n k e l 
i s a l s o committed t o t h e i n t e r e s t o f h i s p r o j e c t as a means o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; 
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he i s n o t , ( l i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n ) , c o n t e n t t o l e a v e , as h i s p r o j e c t , t h e c l e a r i n g 
up o f c o n f u s i o n s w h i c h a r i s e i n t h e p r a c t i c e s o f s o c i o l o g i c a l o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g , whether o r n o t t h i s i s how h i s work c o u l d be seen. The i n v e s t i g a -
t i v e s t a t u s o f h i s work proceeds from h i s s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e commonsense fr o m 
t h e s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e s , and t h e i r " i r r e c o n c i l a b l e " i n t e r e s t s ; t h a t i s t o say 
f o r G a r f i n k e l , t h e language games o f s c i e n c e and everyday l i f e a r e n o t o n l y 
d i s t i n c t from each o t h e r , but incommensurable; t h e c r i t e r i a o f one have no 
p l a c e i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e o t h e r . W h i l e W i t t g e n s t e i n saw o r d i n a r y l a n -
uage usage as a c o n s t r a i n t on t h e uses t o w h i c h i t c o u l d be put anywhere, s i n c e 
these o f t e n m i s l e a d , f o r G a r f i n k e l s c i e n c e i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f 
p r a c t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t i e s any more than p r a c t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t i e s o p e r a t e as a 
c o n s t r a i n t upon s c i e n c e , as an i d e a l p r a c t i c e . Thereby, t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f 
everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e s p r a c t i c e s w h i c h cannot bear upon s c i e n c e o r 
s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n except i n s o f a r as s c i e n c e i t s e l f can be seen as a 
s o c i a l phenomenon, and thus t a k e n as an o b j e c t o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and t h e s c i e n -
t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s o c i a l phenomena cannot produce a n y t h i n g but i d e a l i s a -
t i o n s o f those phenomena which are w a r r a n t e d by t h e c r i t e r i a which i t employs, 
and t h u s do n o t have a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a l i m i t e d sense i n terms o f t h e c r i t e r i a 
employed i n e veryday r a t i o n a l i t i e s . 
S c i e n t i f i c s o c i o l o g y and e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s can t h e r e b y be s a i d t o 
produce i r r e c o n c i l a b l y d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n s o f t h e "same" phenomena; i n terms o f 
h i s own l o g i c , G a r f i n k e l cannot s t i p u l a t e f o r one account o v e r a n o t h e r . Choice 
between them must be made i n terms o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e purposes o f t h e t h e o r i s t , 
but i t i s a c h o i c e w h i c h must be made, f o r i t i s n o t t h e case t h a t t h e y can be 
compared. 
But, we would want t o say, s u r e l y we do compare? I n t h e case o f s c i e n c e , we 
compare how t h e a c c o u n t s which i t produced o f , say, p h y s i c a l phenomena, f i t i n 
w i t h our everyday e x p e r i e n c e o f those phenomena. M e t e o r o l o g i s t s r e f e r t o h i g h 
o r low p r e s s u r e zones, and d e r i v e from t h i s p r e d i c t i o n s about the w e a t h e r , w h i l e 
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we do n o t s e a r c h t h e s k i e s f o r i s o b a r s , s u r e l y i t i s t h e case t h a t we can be 
brought t o see t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between t h e two a t t i t u d e s ? T h i s argument r e s -
embles t h a t , d i s c u s s e d i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , by Winch (see b e l o w ) . Now, w h i l e 
G a r f i n k e l may c l a i m t h a t t h e two e n t e r p r i s e s can be bro u g h t under t h e a u s p i c e s 
o f d i s t i n c t i v e s e t s o f r u l e s , t o make such a hard d i s t i n c t i o n between t h o s e 
r u l e s as t o make t h e i r p r o d u c t s incommensurable w i t h each o t h e r i s t o impose 
o n t o t h e p r a c t i c e s o f n a t u r a l language communities a r i g i d i t y w h i c h i s s u r e l y 
n o t borne o u t by e x p e r i e n c e . C l e a r l y , i t i s t h e case t h a t members o p e r a t e w i t h 
d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f r u l e s o f r e l e v a n c e i n t h e i r uses o f language, a c c o r d i n g t o the 
c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h e s e a re employed. For G a r f i n k e l t o c l a i m t h a t t h e 
s c i e n t i f i c and t h e commonsense r a t i o n a l i t i e s a r e incommensurable i s l i k e s a y i n g 
t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s which t h e y make " r e a l l y " mean o n l y what t h e r u l e s t o whi c h 
members a t t e n d under t h e a u s p i c e s o f t h e ( m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e ) d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s 
can p o s s i b l y i n t e n d them t o mean. Given t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m d e x i c a l i t y , t h e 
meaning o f s t a t e m e n t s does n o t r e s i d e i n p r e - e x i s t i n g r u l e s l a i d down f o r t h e 
a c t o r s b e f o r e t h e y e n t e r i n t o a s i t u a t i o n but r a t h e r , such p r e - e x i s t i n g conven-
t i o n s are t h e background a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e accomplishment o f such meaning g e t s 
done. 
Fundamentally, what we have here i s a s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem i n v o l v e d i n r e c o n -
c i l i n g c o n f l i c t i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s ; o p e r a t i n g w i t h t h e K a n t i a n r e q u i r e m e n t f o r c a t -
e g o r i a l frameworks t o any d e s c r i p t i o n i n mind, G a r f i n k e l r e f o r m u l a t e s t h e p r o b l e m 
o f d e s c r i p t i o n so t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n h o l d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s c i e n t i f i c frameworks, we a t t e m p t t o t a k e s e r i o u s l y t h e a c t u a l 
frameworks w h i c h members employ as t h e y c a t e g o r i s e . Thus, t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s produced r e s i d e s i n o u r s t a t u s as speakers o f a n a t u r a l language, 
o r a v a r i e t y o f n a t u r a l languages ( t h e games o f everyday l i f e ) . The i m p l i c i t 
a s s e r t i o n i s t h a t , when we produce a c c o u n t s o f how t h e s t r u c t u r e o f everyday 
conduct i s s e n s i b l e t o us, w h i l e we must l e a v e o u t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e adequacy 
o f i t s sense as a f o r m u l a t i o n , because t h i s sense I S t h e o b j e c t i v e o r d e r w h i c h 
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t h e conduct comes t o , i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n we have a d i s p l a y o f t h e g r a m m a t i c a l 
r e s o u r c e s upon which any sense depends, i n t h i s case. The c r i t e r i a l a s c r i p t i o n 
o f sense t o our e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e phenomena i n v o l v e d depends upon t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f o t h e r a s c r i p t i o n s b e i n g p o s s i b l e . Thus, G a r f i n k e l i s p o i n t i n g t o t h e f a c t 
t h a t our p r a c t i c e s o f making sense enable us t o have knowledge because i t i s 
c o n c e i v a b l e f o r us t o see t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h we produce h a v i n g sense o t h e r 
t h a n t h a t w h i c h we g i v e t o them, not because t h e y c o u l d o n l y make sense i n t h e 
way t h a t we propose. His c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n depends upon t h e c r i t e r i a w hich we 
employ t o j u s t i f y t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h we produce o f t h e conduct o f o t h e r s , 
n o t upon t h e s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o f o t h e r s ' conduct as a phenomenon o f h i s 
e x p e r i e n c e . Thus, h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s , and any o t h e r s , would be r e s p o n s i b l e t o the 
g r a m m a t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h govern the j u s t i f i a b l e a s c r i p t i o n o f meaning i n t h e 
c o n t e x t i n q u e s t i o n , r a t h e r than b e i n g j u s t i f i e d by t h e c e r t a i n t y o f G a r f i n k e l ' s 
( o r any t h e o r i s t ' s ) s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , s i n c e c e r t a i n t y (and knowledge) i s 
o n l y a v a i l a b l e o f phenomena i n terms o f grounds, w h i c h can o n l y be a v a i l a b l e 
i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e l y . The p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i f f e r e n c e , t h e n , l o c a t e s such grounds 
i n t h e grammatical s t r u c t u r e s o f n a t u r a l language games, so t h a t knowledge o f 
t h e o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s i s knowledge o f 
t h e grounds ( c r i t e r i a ) upon w h i c h t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f sense t o such a c t i o n s depends, 
and t h e c e r t a i n t y o f such s t r u c t u r e s depends upon t h e r e b e i n g o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
f o r sense a s c r i p t i o n i n t h o s e grounds w h i c h are n o t , i n f a c t , used, a l t h o u g h we 
c o u l d c o n c e i v e o f them b e i n g employed. C e r t a i n t y and knowledge here has, t h e n , 
t h e same k i n d o f w a r r a n t as t h a t o f any o t h e r a c c o u n t , no more o r no l e s s . That 
i s t o say, i t i s a s s e s s a b l e i n terms o f t h e c r i t e r i a w hich make i t s e n s i b l e , and 
o n l y t h i s s u p p l i e s i t w i t h i t s w a r r a n t , and n o t i t s i n v o c a t i o n o f some o t h e r 
g r o u n d i n g ( s a y , as an i n s t a n c e o f ' s c i e n c e ' ) . 
T h i s i n v o l v e s G a r f i n k e l , a t t h e same t i m e , i n p u t t i n g a s i d e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
comparison, f o r t h e purposes o f something l i k e a s c i e n t i f i c p r o j e c t , as I hope 
we have seen, w h i l e G a r f i n k e l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n s may be e m p i r i c a l (and hence 
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e x p l a n a t o r y ) , as c o n c e p t u a l i n v e s t 1 g a t i o n s , t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n r e s t s upon t h e 
r e s o u r c e s o f t h e everyday r a t i o n a l i t i e s i n terms o f w h i c h t h e ' e m p i r i c a l ' 
o b j e c t s o f t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n make sense. To de v e l o p c u m u l a t i v e knowledge o f 
such a c o r p u s , however, must i n v o l v e r e f e r e n c e t o a r a t i o n a l i t y w h i c h i s o t h e r 
t h a n t h a t w h i c h i s employed i n t h e language games o f everyday l i f e . T h i n k here 
o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l i t y 10-14 below. I n s h o r t , w h i l e G a r f i n k e l 
can propose knowledge which i s grounded i n t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f everyday l i f e , 
r a t h e r than t h e s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e , t o develop a corpus o f such knowledge 
depends upon grounds which a re a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e , and 
not i n terms o f h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e everyday a t t i t u d e . The d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f 
e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s from c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y r e s i d e s i n i t s i n d i -
f f e r e n c e t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e e t c . , o f t h e t a l k and a c t i o n which i t i n v e s t i g a t e s ; 
t h a t i t cannot be i n d i f f e r e n t t o the s i g n i f i c a n c e e t c . , o f i t s own t a l k i s a 
r e q u i r e m e n t on any body o f s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h aims t o e s t a b l i s h i t s c l a i m s t o 
t h e o r e t i c i t y . The c l a i m t o t h e o r e t i c i t y i n t h e case o f ethnomethodology does 
not depend upon a d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f p r a c t i c e from c o n v e n t i o n a l ( c o n s t r u c t i v i s t ) 
s o c i o l o g y , 
but depends upon such p r a c t i c e s . C r i t i c a l l y , 
G a r f i n k e l has prop o s e d , as h i s p r o j e c t , a d e s c r i p t i o n and e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
o f t h e s t r u c t u r e s upon w h i c h everyday conduct depends f o r i t s o r d e r l i n e s s ; now, 
w h i l e t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e as an o r d e r l i n e s s c e r t a i n l y f u n c t i o n s i n 
much t h e same way as t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f an o b j e c t , i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s n o t t h e 
same as t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f an o b j e c t ; r a t h e r , i t i s p a r a s i t i c upon t h e d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f t h e o b j e c t s o f w h i c h i t i s made up, l o g i c a l l y , f o r i t depends upon c o n c e p t s 
o f t h e o b j e c t s o f w h i c h i t i s t a k e n t o be a p e r c e p t i o n . G a r f i n k e l i s r i g h t t o 
t i e t h i s t o t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s upon wh i c h i t depends f o r i t s sense, f o r i t s j u s t -
i f i c a t i o n r e s i d e s i n t h e grammar o f t h e n a t u r a l Language o f t h e members concerned. 
A f u r t h e r consequence o f t h i s , however, i s t h a t w h i l e i t can ask "How i s t h e 
t a l k o r d e r l y ( s e n s i b l e ) f o r members i n t h e way t h a t t h e y t a k e i t t o be?" i t makes 
no sense f o r i t t o a t t e m p t t o go beyond a c c o u n t s w h i c h produce w a r r a n t s f r o m 
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m a n i f e s t e d d i s p l a y o f ( c o m p e t e n t ) mastery o f r e l e v a n t n a t u r a l language uses. 
As I hope I have shown, t h e s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h G a r f i n k e l i n t e n d s as t h e o b j e c t s 
o f h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s ( o r r a t h e r , which i t i s t h e o b j e c t i v e o f h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s 
t o d e s c r i b e o r show) are a v a i l a b l e o n l y i n t h e grammar o f o r d i n a r y language 
games, ( i n G a r f i n k e l ' s t e r m s , t h e r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f t h e everyday a t t i t u d e ) . 
Sense i s j u s t i f i e d by c r i t e r i a w hich a r e i t s w a r r a n t , i n t h e competent use o f 
n a t u r a l language. 
The terms " r u l e " and " r a t i o n a l i t y " seem t o do the same k i n d o f work f o r W i t t -
g e n s t e i n and G a r f i n k e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work, however, we f i n d 
( a l b e i t i n a piecemeal f o r m ) a more drawn o u t account o f e x a c t l y how r u l e 
f u n c t i o n s - how r u l e " r u l e s " . T h i s i n v o l v e s t h e n o t i o n o f c r i t e r i a , and o f 
" c r i t e r i a l " r e l a t i o n s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n between elements o f t h e i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e l y 
a v a i l a b l e r u l e s o f t h e language game ( c o r p u s o f knowledge) a v a i l a b l e t o a 
(co m p e t e n t ) n a t i v e language speaker (member). 
B e f o r e we i n t r o d u c e t h i s t e r m i n t o o u r account o f t h e r e l a t i o n between language 
and t h e w o r l d , I propose t o l o o k a t some o f t h e ways i n which W i t t g e n s t e i n 
d i s c u s s e d i t s r e l e v a n c e . 
Now, i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t e r m s , c r i t e r i a c o n s i s t i n a v a r i e t y o f p o s s i b l e phenomena. 
On t h e one hand, he d e s c r i b e s a phenomenon as t h e d e f i n i n g c r i t e r i o n o f a t h i n g 
( 5 8 ) . " A l l s o r t s o f phenomena a r e used as c r i t e r i a f o r h i s s e e i n g t h a t ( 5 9 ) " ; 
"What i s o u r c r i t e r i o n f o r b l i n d n e s s ? A c e r t a i n k i n d o f b e h a v i o u r ( 6 0 ) . "One 
must examine what s o r t o f f a c t s we c a l l c r i t e r i a f o r a p a i n " ( 6 1 ) Those t h i n g s 
w h i c h have c r i t e r i a i n c l u d e phrases ( 6 2 ) , words ( 6 3 ) , e x p r e s s i o n s ( 6 4 ) , 
c o n c e p t s ( 6 5 ) , s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s and p r o p o s i t i o n s ; f a c t s , as w e l l as b e i n g 
t hemselves c r i t e r i a are a l s o s a i d t o "have" them. ( 6 6 ) 
Hacker suggests t h a t we c o n c e i v e o f t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n , i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
t r e a t m e n t , as r e s u l t i n g i n e n t i t i e s s p e c i f i e d i n t h e m a t e r i a l mode as b e i n g 
d e r i v a t i v e l y so s p e c i f i e d , s i n c e t he c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n i s a g r a m m a t i c a l o r 
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l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n , and so i s t o be t h o u g h t o f as h o l d i n g between l i n g u i s t i c 
e n t i t i e s , as a m a t t e r o f l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n . However, w h i l e t h i s p e r m i t s one 
t o speak o f s t a t e s processes and e v e n t s as h a v i n g c r i t e r i a , and o f phenomena, 
k i n d s o f b e h a v i o u r , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as b e i n g c r i t e r i a i n the m a t e r i a l mode, 
t h i s i s m e r e l y e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e f o r m a l way o f sp e a k i n g o f words, phrases and 
e x p r e s s i o n s as h a v i n g c r i t e r i a , and o f sentences, p r o p o s i t i o n s e v i d e n c e s o r 
grounds as b e i n g c r i t e r i a . (67) He goes on t o argue t h a t t h i s k i n d o f r e l a t i o n , 
w h i l e i t i s e v i d e n t i a l , i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n ; t h u s , w h i l e t h e c r i t e r i a i n term s o f w h i c h t h e sense o f an account 
would be j u s t i f i e d may be s a t i s f i e d , i t must remain p o s s i b l e t h a t o t h e r con-
c e p t i o n s c o u l d be e n t e r t a i n e d . 
We can see t h e n , how G a r f i n k e l ' s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f h i s e n t e r p r i s e t r a d e s on 
t h i s d u a l i t y ; w h i l e t h e r e l a t i o n i s e v i d e n t i a l (between G a r f i n k e l ' s account and 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f i t i n terms o f everyday r a t i o n a l i t y ) , i t i s n o t t h e case 
t h a t we can h o l d up t h i s e v i d e n t i a l i t y as a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n , 
s i n c e i t i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e f o r s u b j e c t t o p r e t e n d , o r l i e , o r be d e c e i v e d . 
The c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n i s t h e n , a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n , i n a s t r o n g sense, t h e 
t r u t h o f a s s e r t i o n s couched i n terms o f c r i t e r i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , o r t h e sense 
o f a c c o u n t s , i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y s p e c i f i e d by t h i s r e l a t i o n . N o t h i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y 
o b j e c t i o n a b l e i n t h i s . 
However, W i t t g e n s t e i n a l s o goes on t o d i s t i n g u i s h c r i t e r i a from t h e n o t i o n o f a 
symptom; t h a t i s t o say, r a t h e r t h a n s e e i n g t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n as one o f 
i n d u c t i v e e v i d e n c e , W i t t g e n s t e i n argues t h a t when we c i t e , as e v i d e n c e f o r o u r 
s t a t e m e n t s , t h a t w h i c h i s " c o i n c i d e d , i n some way o r a n o t h e r w i t h t h e phenomenon 
which i s our d e f i n i n g c r i t e r i o n " (69) ( f o r i n s t a n c e , f a l l i n g b a r o m e t r i c p r e s s u r e 
and r a i n f a l l ) , t h i s i n v o l v e s adducing i n d u c t i v e e v i d e n c e , whereas t h e c r i t e r i a l 
r e l a t i o n i s a m a t t e r o f l i n g u i s t i c f o r c e o r c o n v e n t i o n . Thus, w h i l e " N o t h i n g 
i s commoner t h a n f o r t h e meaning o f an e x p r e s s i o n t o o s c i l l a t e , f o r a phenomenon 
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t o be regarded sometimes as a symptom, sometimes as a c r i t e r i o n of a s t a t e o f 
a f f a i r s " (Z para 438) ( f o r instance, i n science) the concommitant f l u c t u a t i o n 
i n the sense of an expression, and the r a d i c a l and n a t u r a l indeterminacy ot 
the sense of language do not prevent science from being p o s s i b l e , even though 
we might be l e d t o say t h a t science uses words which have no c l e a r demarcation 
between what i s symptom and what c r i t e r i o n . What i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n terms of 
Ga r f i n k e l ' s n o t i o n of science, however, i s t h a t , as he e x p l i c i t l y argues, while 
science involves c o n s t r u c t i n g an account so t h a t i t remains i n f u l l accord w i t h 
the rules governing s c i e n t i f i c a l l y c o r r e c t decisions, w i t h c l e a r and d i s t i n c t 
elements arranged so as t o c l a r i f y both the body of knowledge of which science 
consists and the methodological procedures which accomplish t h i s , so t h a t what 
i s produced i s i n f u l l accord w i t h the preceding body of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, 
i n terms of the assumptions on which i t s steps are based, f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
while the p r a c t i c e of t a k i n g measurable phenomena as the d e f i n i n g c r i t e r i a of 
an expression may o f t e n r e s u l t i n q u a l i t a t i v e c r i t e r i a becoming replaced by 
q u a n t i t a t i v e , where the s h i f t of meaning i s n o t i c e d , t h i s merely generates the 
i l l u s i o n of a discovery of the ' r e a l meaning' of the term, since what i s involved 
i s not the discovery of ' r e a l meaning', but a change i n the sense of the terms 
i n v o l v e d ; w i t h the replacement of non-measurable phenomena by measurable ones 
as the c r i t e r i a f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of a term, the non=measurable phenomena may 
become symptom, w i t h the consequence th a t the terms change t h e i r sense. While, 
fo r G a r f i n k e l , science operates w i t h a methodological self-consciousness which 
i s excluded from the a t t i t u d e of everyday l i f e , f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n what i s excluded 
from science i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s terms having the k i n d of s p e c i f i c i t y 
which i s much more r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e i n the language games of everyday l i f e , 
although t h i s makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o the p r a c t i c e of science, but i s r a t h e r 
merely a necessary feature of the c o n d i t i o n s under which i t i s conducted. 
That i s t o say, r a t h e r than i t being a problem f o r science to deal w i t h the 
phenomena of everyday l i f e , a problem which Garfinkel a t t r i b u t e s t o the 
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d i f f e r e n c e s between the r a t i o n a l i t i e s employed, f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , i t i s r a t h e r 
that science i s a problem f o r the language games of everyday l i f e to deal w i t h , 
since i t exemplifies i n an extreme form, the endemic s h i f t i n g of meaning embodied 
in the f l u c t u a t i o n between symptom and c r i t e r i o n which i s a feature of a l l n a t u r a l 
language p r a c t i c e s . C r i t e r i a l r u l e s are t a i l o r e d , W i t t g e n s t e i n argues, f o r 
n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s , but what those conditions are i s always a matter to be 
decided when they do or do not a r i s e ; w h i l e one may l e a r n how t o use an expression 
under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , the d e s c r i p t i o n of those c o n d i t i o n s i s not equivalent 
to a c r i t e r i o n of knowing what the expression means; i n t h i s sense, language i s 
n a t u r a l l y indeterminate. There i s no s i n g l e i d e a l of exactness or p r e c i s i o n . 
While we may make concepts more precise or r e f i n e d f o r t e c h n i c a l purposes, these 
standards are r e l a t i v e t o the purposes f o r which they are employed, so that 
p r e c i s i o n or imprecision may impair conceptual usages f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes. 
There i s never a f i n a l l i s t of c r i t e r i a , and the circumstances i n which they may 
be employed covers an indeterminate range. 
To recap, then; G a r f i n k e l argued f o r the d i s t i n c t i v e place of ethnomethodological 
studies on the basis of h i s for m u l a t i o n of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i n t e r e s t s of the 
s c i e n t i f i c and the everyday a t t i t u d e s , i n the r a t i o n a l i t i e s which j u s t i f y t h e i r 
p r a c t i c e s . The phenomena of everyday conduct as the products of actors operating 
w i t h i n a d i s t i n c t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e t o that of s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g 
could only become a v a i l a b l e as the product of systematic r e c o n s t i t u t ion of such 
conduct on the basis of r a t i o n a l i t i e s a c t u a l l y employed by members, i n c l u d i n g 
the i n v e s t i g a t o r , as speakers of n a t u r a l language. I n v e s t i g a t o r s accounts, then, 
d i s p l a y the features of n a t u r a l language which make the conduct a v a i l a b l e i n the 
way t h a t i t i s ordered (warranted) by the t a l k i n which speakers of the n a t u r a l 
language community concerned p a r t i c i p a t e as competent members. 
I have argued t h a t , while G a r f i n k e l can aim to produce such accounts, t h e i r s t a t u s 
as accounts i s warranted only i n terms of t h e i r place w i t h i n some language game 
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themself. I f t h e i r only warrant i s to be the language games which they take as 
t o p i c , then they can have sense only as a dis p l a y of r e f l e x i v i t y w i t h i n the 
language game concerned; as s t u d i e s , they can have sense only i f they abjure 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between c r i t e r i a and symptom, so tha t the order which they 
i n v e s t i g a t e becomes o b j e c t i v e (undoubtable) i n e x a c t l y the way i n which t h e i r 
i n i t i a l precepts deny. I have f u r t h e r argued th a t G a r f i n k e l ' s work depends upon 
sociology, although i t claims to d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t s e l f from sociology, and t h a t 
the key p r i n c i p l e i n terms of which i t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t s e l f i s the p r i n c i p l e 
of i n d i f f e r e n c e . Proceeding from the p r i n c i p l e t h a t there i s no necessary i d e a l 
embodied i n the p r a c t i c e s of science which would s u b s t a n t i a t e i t s claims to 
greater exactness or p r e c i s i o n except f o r s p e c i f i c t e c h n i c a l purposes, G a r f i n k e l 
thereby concludes t h a t i n d i f f e r e n c e t o such t e c h n i c a l ends i s a s u f f i c i e n t 
warrant f o r a p r a c t i c e which aims to i n v e s t i g a t e the conduct of everyday l i f e , 
since t h i s i s how everyday actors proceed, and we are a l l subject t o such 
c o n s t r a i n t s as are provided by n a t u r a l language. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n discusses games i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
* . such that whoever begins can always win by a 
p a r t i c u l a r simple t r i c k . But t h i s has not been 
r e a l i s e d - so i t i s a game. Now someone draws our 
a t t e n t i o n t o i t - and i t stops being a game. 
What t u r n can I give t h i s , t o make i t c l e a r t o myself? 
For I want t o say 'and i t stops being a game', not: 
'and now we see i t wasn't a game'. That means, I want 
t o say, i t can also be taken l i k e t h i s ; the other man 
di d not draw our a t t e n t i o n to anything; he taught us a 
d i f f e r e n t game i n place of our own. But how can the 
new game have made the o l d one obsolete? We now see 
something d i f f e r e n t , and can no longer n a i v e l y go on 
pl a y i n g . O E the one hand the game consisted i n our 
actions (our p l a y ) on the board; and these actions I 
could perform as w e l l now as before. But on the other 
hand i t was e s s e n t i a l t o the game that I b l i n d l y t r i e d 
t o win; and now I can no longer do t h a t . " (70) 
The essence of Garfinkel's claim f o r the d i s t i n c t i v e place of ethnomethodology 
resides i n h i s claim t h a t , i n showing us a new game, he 1s making the o l d 
p r a c t i c e s obsolete; t h a t i s t o say, we can no longer regard the phenomena of 
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everyday l i f e as 'taken f o r granted', or r a t h e r as to be simply taken f o r 
granted. I t i s a f u r t h e r consequence of Wittgenstein's argument, however, 
that w h i l e the game stops being a game f o r those who have been shown the new 
t r i c k , i t s t i l l remains as a game f o r those who have not. This i s t o say t h a t 
our ATTITUDE t o the game i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of i t s character. Now, while 
Garfinkel can claim t o remain f a i t h f u l to the r a t i o n a l i t i e s which ground every-
day conduct i n the d e s c r i p t i o n s which he produces of how tha t conduct i s o r d e r l y 
i t i s an e s s e n t i a l p o i n t of the new game t h a t i t can no longer remain naive 
about the purposes of such conduct. I t i s not a question of i n d i f f e r e n c e , but 
ra t h e r , what are the purposes t o which such an a t t i t u d e could be put? 
At the beginning of t h i s chapter, I included a sec t i o n on Parsons' concept of 
t h e o r i s i n g , where he argued f o r the necessity of conceptual schemes i n any 
ordering o f ( s o c i a l ) phenomena. I have concluded t h a t G a r f i n k e l ' s p r o j e c t 
involves attempting t o remain i n d i f f e r e n t to the purposes i n terms of which 
such schemes are employed i n order t o make t h e i r employment a v a i l a b l e as a 
phenomenon i n i t s own r i g h t . I t i s a consequence of Ga r f i n k e l ' s endorsement of 
Parsons' c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of t h e o r i s i n g t h a t such a p r a c t i c e i s po s s i b l e , but 
i t i s also consequential upon t h i s endorsement t h a t such p r a c t i c e s cannot form 
the data f o r any d i s t i n c t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t form of t h e o r i s i n g than sociology, f o r 
i t i s subject t o the same r e s t r a i n t s i n i t s attempts t o b u i l d up concepts, 
f i n d i n g s , models, t h e o r i e s etc. Science does not only aim to gen e r a l i s e , e x p l a i 
measure, e t c . , on the basis of a d i f f e r e n t language game than t h a t of everyday 
l i f e , but r a t h e r , i t s language game proceeds from the same grounds as the 
language games of everyday l i f e , and develops p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n those lang-
uage games f o r s p e c i f i c t e c h n i c a l purposes, but i t both acts upon and i s acted 
upon by, the language games of everyday l i f e . Ethnomethodological studies are 
p a r a s i t i c upon s o c i o l o g i c a l language games i n the same way; i t i s i t s e l f only 
conceivable as a p r a c t i c e i n the context of i t s place w i t h i n the fam i l y of 
games i n v o l v i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g . The not i o n o f a f i n d i n g , i n ethno-
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methodology could only have any a p p l i c a t i o n i n terms of a general r u l e about 
what such a f i n d i n g could be f o r ; f o r ethnomethodology t o produce accounts 
assumes t h a t these accounts would be produced f o r s p e c i f i c purposes. 
Where, i n Garfinkel's work, do we f i n d a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of such purposes? While 
the work i s concerned t o recommend i t s e l f , i t s task, as i n t e r e s t i n g f o r i t s own 
sake, and of no relevance f o r che p r a c t i c e s of c o n s t r u c t i v i s t sociology, we 
might ask - f o r whom could the accounts have relevance, as productions aimed at 
an audience? As competent members of the same n a t u r a l language community, i t 
might be expected t h a t the everyday a c t o r , whom the i n v e s t i g a t o r makes h i s t o p i c , 
would be i n t e r e s t e d ; however, what would be the purpose of d i r e c t i n g such 
accounts at t h i s audience? To make them self-conscious i s t o destroy the a t t -
i t u d e which i n v e s t i g a t o r s are committed t o preserve, i e . , methodically u n r e f l e x i v e 
a c t i o n . Conduct i s w i t h i n the everyday a t t i t u d e p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as i t opera-
tes w i t h o u t t h i s self-conscious methodological r e f l e c t i o n . Presumable the 
i n v e s t i g a t o r i s not producing the work simply f o r i t s own sake, f o r i n tha t 
case, why should i t be produced at a l l , since without an intended audience, i t 
i s a moving cog which does no work. 
Rather, I want to argue, the only audience f o r which ethnomethodological studies 
could have any s i g n i f i c a n c e i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t which i t proposes to be i n d i f f e r e n t 
to - that of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g . The cost of t h i s i s t h a t , f o r ethnometho-
d o l o g i c a l studies t o have any audience, i t must surrender i t s claim to d i s t i n c t i v e 
epistemological grounds. 
Parsons and Garfink e l both take as t h e i r avowed aim the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
s t r u c t u r e which i s a feature of s o c i a l o r d e r l i n e s s . For Parsons, t h i s s t r u c t u r e 
e x i s t s i n the r e l a t i o n s between the elements which form the framework of any 
a n a l y t i c account, produced on the basis of empiri c a l c r i t e r i a , which adequately 
describes the phenomena i n question. This i s taken, by both Parsons and G a r f i n k e l , 
as meaning that any s o c i o l o g i c a l account of such s t r u c t u r e s n e c e s s a r i l y i d e a l i s e s 
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what everyday members take t o be the f a c t s of the s o c i a l world. While Parsons, 
however, s t r i c t l y d e l i m i t s the r e l a t i o n between the a n a l y t i c a l elements of the 
s t r u c t u r e so t h a t they must be responsible t o the em p i r i c a l features of the 
world known i n common t o everyday actors ( i e . , warranted by the r a t i o n a l i t i e s 
t o which such actors a t t e n d ) , he also makes clear t h a t the theory e x i s t s i n the 
r e l a t i o n between the elements, so that the meaning of the terms i s not speci-
f i a b l e i n terms of the c r i t e r i a employed to warrant the everyday world which i t 
describes. 
For G a r f i n k e l , s t r u c t u r e i n everyday conduct i s the work manifested i n the 
employment of what he c a l l s , pace Mannheim, the documentary method of i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n ; while conventional sociology sees i t s e l f , o f t e n , as seeing through 
appearances, the subjects of s o c i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y are concerned w i t h : 
"coming t o terms w i t h a s i t u a t i o n i n which f a c t u a l 
knowledge of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s - f a c t u a l i n the sense 
of warranted grounds f o r f u r t h e r inference and actions -
must be assembled and made a v a i l a b l e f o r p o t e n t i a l use 
despite the f a c t that the s i t u a t i o n s i t purports to 
describe are, i n any c a l c u l a b l e sense, unknown; i n t h e i r 
actual and intended l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e s are e s s e n t i a l l y 
vague; and are modified, elaborated, extended, i f not 
indeed created, by the f a c t and manner of being addressed." (71) 
Prec i s e l y those problems are i n v o l v e d , Garfinkel argues, i n any s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s t deciding the reasonableness of his d e f i n i t i o n s and decisions about 
correspondences between observed appearances and intended events. There i s no 
decisive d i f f e r e n c e , he argues, between the use of "reasonableness" i n the 
warrant of s o c i o l o g i c a l f i n d i n g s and i t s employment i n the world of everyday 
acto r s ; both c a l l upon the use of t h e i r accounts t o provide a context o f i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n , w i t h i n which they are sensible. S o c i o l o g i c a l f i n d i n g s are f a c t s 
only i n the sense that they subscribe t o a set o f procedural r u l e s that a c t u a l l y 
govern the use of sociology's recommended methods and asserted f i n d i n g s as 
grounds of f u r t h e r inference and i n q u i r i e s ; f i n d i n g s r e f e r s t o : 
"the set of s o c i o l o g i c a l events that are possible when, 
under the assumption of the s o c i o l o g i c a l and mathematical 
domains corresponding i n t h e i r l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e s , socio-
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l o g i c a l events are i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of the r u l e s 
of s t a t i s t i c a l inference". (72) 
Garfinkel recommends t h a t the work of seeking the s t r u c t u r e of everyday s i t u a -
t i o n s of choice l i e s between the rigorous d e s c r i p t i o n of physical and b i o l o g i c a l 
p r o p e r t i e s of s o c i a l events (measurement) and using documentary work merely t o 
attempt to r e c o n s t i t u t e i n commonsense terms, what the a c t i o n has 'come t o * 
(the " s o f t p a r t " ) (73). Structure i s thereby the work t h a t subjects do t o 
make the context a v a i l a b l e as an order. As an i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s c o n s t r u c t , such 
a s t r u c t u r e i s a n a l y t i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o the t a l k which gives 
i t warrant. 
Whereas f o r Parsons the meaning of i t s terms are recoverable only i n terms of 
the e m p i r i c a l world (commonsense r a t i o n a l i t i e s ) since these are what the terms 
a n a l y t i c a l l y correspond t o , f o r G a r f i n k e l , the meaning of h i s terms i s d i r e c t l y 
recoverable from i t s corresponding reference i n the m a t e r i a l world. For Parsons 
s t r u c t u r e i s a feature of analysis which i s warranted by symptoms; f o r Garfin k e l 
s t r u c t u r e i s a feature of n a t u r a l language which i s warranted by c r i t e r i a . The 
d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of ethnomethodology can be reduced, then, t o the i n d i f f e r e n c e 
t o the a n a l y t i c a v a i l a b i l i t y of s t r u c t u r e , which could only be produced w i t h 
s p e c i f i c purposes (see Parsons, above) i n mind, and would hence be responsible 
t o sociology as a t h e o r i s i n g p r a c t i c e , i n favour of a r e a l i s t , n a t u r a l i s t i c 
acceptance of the a u t h o r i t y of the everyday world which i s i n i t s own terms, 
unable t o provide any account of the meaning o f i t s p r a c t i c e s outside o f an 
appeal t o competence - "anyone would know i t " or " I speak English". 
Parsons i s q u i t e c l e a r , however, th a t commonsense cannot provide any use f u l 
account of s o c i a l phenomena, f o r i t focusses on the p r a c t i c a l tasks which are 
the everyday concern of people f a c i n g mundane r e a l i t y ; science on the other 
hand, because i t operates on a l e v e l where meaning i s r a d i c a l l y indeterminate, 
struggles to locate i t s own grounds by being conscious of i t s methodological 
p r i n c i p l e s . The discovery of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge can be said t o proceed from 
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the r a d i c a l indeterminacy of the meaning of s c i e n t i f i c concepts, f o r the novel 
s u b s t i t u t i o n s which science makes between c r i t e r i a l and symptomatic evidences 
fo r sense extend and transform our understanding of the world. I t could be 
argued t h a t the r a d i c a l indeterminacy of the sense of s c i e n t i f i c concepts i s a 
necessary c o n d i t i o n , given the c r i t i c a l r o l e of indeterminacy i n the p r a c t i c e s 
of n a t u r a l language games, and the p e c u l i a r place of science as a ' s p e c i a l ' 
game. I cannot here explore the arguments f o r and against science as a means 
of accounting the s o c i a l world; the more modest purpose of t h i s work i s t o 
examine some of the issues raised by the p r a c t i c e s involved i n the speaking of 
na t u r a l languages f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , and i t seems t o me a task t h a t 
might r e q u i r e a searching examination of the extent to which science i s p e r i -
pheral t o n a t u r a l language. 
Indeed, we might see Garfinkel's p r o j e c t as proposing the un-naturalness of 
s c i e n t i f i c language as p r e c i s e l y t h a t which prevents i t from dealing w i t h every-
day conduct s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . I t h i n k that W i t t g e n s t e i n shows t h a t , w h i l e science 
i s d ealing w i t h the world i n ways which have an inherent tendency towards 
proposing themselves as transcendent, undoubtable, i n f a c t t h i s tendency proceeds 
from the p r a c t i c e s of na t u r a l language games, so that science i t s e l f i s t o be 
seen as an extension of the p r a c t i c e s of n a t u r a l language, ra t h e r than a t o t a l l y 
separate realm. 
Now, although we cannot f i n a l l y leave aside the place of science i n the explan-
a t i o n of s o c i a l phenomena, here the issue i s r a t h e r can we simply describe the 
pr a c t i c e s by which members make t h e i r conduct o r d e r l y and sensible i f we leave 
aside judgments about i t s purposes? This seems t o me t o c o n f l a t e a number of 
other questions; how i s a d e s c r i p t i o n not an explanation? And how can we avoid 
judgment? For G a r f i n k e l , a d e s c r i p t i o n does not involve any assumption about 
i t s f a i t h f u l n e s s t o presupposed p a t t e r n s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; thus, h i s descrip-
t i o n s only f u n c t i o n as d e s c r i p t i o n s i f we do not impose on them the demand t o 
to be taken l i t e r a l l y . The avoidance of judgment t h e r e f o r e r e f e r s not t o the 
p r a c t i c e s which have produced the account, but t o how i t i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d 
by i t s audience. 
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Ethnomethodological studies, i n terms of t h e i r own requirements, then, can 
only seek t o provide i n s i g h t i n t o the r e l a t i o n s between the (concrete) p r a c t i c e s 
which di s p l a y the use of members' competences as speakers of n a t u r a l language, 
and the ( a n a l y t i c ) order which i s the product of such p r a c t i c e s i n p a r t i c u l a r 
contexts. But t h i s i n s i g h t i s only a v a i l a b l e i n terms of a p r i o r commitment 
to a p a r t i c u l a r v i s i o n of i t s phenomena as a v a i l a b l e a n a l y t i c a l l y only i n the 
way i n which the t h e o r e t i c a l framework from which the d e s c r i p t i o n s proceed 
s t i p u l a t e s ; i n Garfinkel's case, t h i s framework i s thoroughly s o c i o l o g i c a l . 
E s s e n t i a l l y , the framework proceeds from a v i s i o n of subject as member. His 
requirement i s not t h a t we should refuse t o view the phenomena of s o c i a l l i f e 
s o c i o l o g i c a l l y , but that i n the case of p r e - c o n s t i t u t i v e phenomena, such a 
v i s i o n should not be t i e d t o the l o g i c of s c i e n t i f i c inference. The status of 
his f i n d i n g s t h e r e f o r e hangs on the p o s s i b i l i t y of the l o g i c of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g being d i f f e r e n t from that of science. 
For G a r f i n k e l , t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s provided f o r i n the ongoing nature of ethno-
methodological studies (74). Given the e s s e n t i a l l y s o c i o l o g i c a l nature of i t s 
primary c a t e g o r i s a t i o n devices, however, i t seems t o me consequential i n Gar-
f i n k e l ' s work t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f his f i n d i n g s w i l l not t u r n out t o be 
assessable except i n terms of i t s r e l a t i o n to a framework already a v a i l a b l e w i t h i 
s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g . Like Wittgenstein's n o t i o n of the f l u c t u a t i o n between 
symptom and c r i t e r i o n i n s c i e n t i f i c language games, Gar f i n k e l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n s 
cannot be s p e c i f i e d as meaning e x a c t l y t h i s or t h a t , but what t h e i r use w i l l be 
cannot wa i t upon some decisive c r i t e r i a i n terms of which such a meaning might 
be s p e c i f i e d , f o r such c r i t e r i a could never be a v a i l a b l e . I t i s not decisive 
one way or the other that we must r e l y on some c r i t e r i a other than those of 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i s i n g to make the phenomena of everyday conduct a v a i l a b l e as 
phenomena, f o r what the c r i t e r i a o f science might be i s not something which can 
be f i n a l l y decided, since these are subject t o change i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o other 
language games. 
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The re a l question i s rath e r what can the c r i t e r i a o f the s o c i o l o g i c a l language 
game be found t o be? Here, the promise of Parsons, and h i s gargantuan p r o j e c t 
displays the r i g h t s p i r i t , but founders on epistemological problems ( 7 5 ) . Now, 
the discovery of such c r i t e r i a has been taken by some t h e o r i s t s as the p r o j e c t 
of making s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge i n t o one kind of t h i n g - th a t i s , f i n d i n g the 
es s e n t i a l features of s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge (not knowledge of s o c i e t y , but what 
i t i s to seek such knowledge). This, i n a way, can be r e - w r i t t e n as a search 
f o r the r u l e s of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game. Parsons has proposed such r u l e s 
on the basis of a Kantian s o l u t i o n t o the problem of v a l i d i t y - the necessary 
existence of l o g i c a l categories - and the a n a l y t i c r e l a t i o n between explanatory 
schema and em p i r i c a l r e a l i t y . He i s s u b j e c t , however, t o the accusations o f 
c o n d i t i o n a l i t y t o which any theory p o s i t i n g the s o c i a l determination of knowledge 
leaves i t s e l f open. On a deep l e v e l , G a r f i n k e l ' s account of the i n d e x i c a l 
nature of t a l k r e f e r s t o the inherent process of convencionalisation which must 
be a co n d i t i o n f o r any communication t o be po s s i b l e , w i t h the concommitant 
c o n d i t i o n a l i t y of any statements produced under t h i s r u b r i c . This has been 
responded t o , t y p i c a l l y , w i t h the demand ( e i t h e r ) t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s be 
r e f l e x i v e , which i s to say conscious of i t s locatedness, or else ( i n G a r f i n k e l ' s 
case, f o r instance) abandon any claims to produce knowledge which i s other than 
th a t which i s grounded i n p a r t i c u l a r frameworks of value relevance, whether 
these are e x p l i c a t e d ( G a r f i n k e l ) or not ( c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s o c i o l o g y ) . Before 
t u r n i n g to consider the problems of r e f l e x i v i t y and value, I propose to t a l k a 
l i t t l e about the features of the Sociology o f Knowledge o b j e c t i o n s t o claim to 
t r u t h . I n the context of the present chapter, t h i s w i l l , I hope, i l l u m i n a t e my 
commitment to s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g as a p r a c t i c e i n which the p r i n c i p l e s 
which i t displays cannot be reduced to a set of methodological r u l e s , but com-
prises r a t h e r of a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a community of p r a c t i t i o n e r s faced, l i k e 
any other, w i t h the p r a c t i c a l problems of dealing w i t h the problem of a t r a n s -
communal wor l d , and the i d e a l s i n terms of which t h a t world i s to be considered. 
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The Sociology of Knowledge 
Much of the discussion so f a r has concerned the problems f a c i n g those who set 
themselves t o characterise sociology as n e c e s s a r i l y proceeding from c e r t a i n 
p r i n c i p l e d l i m i t a t i o n s ; Winch has argued f o r the power of convention, Welder f o r 
the i r r e m e d l a b i l i t y of i n d e x i c a l i t y i n language uses, G a r f i n k e l f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
uses of r a t i o n a l i t y i n sense assembly, Parsons f o r the necessary employment of 
a n a l y t i c frameworks employing l o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l s . This section i s concerned w i t h 
the task of drawing out what, i n a way, could be seen as an amalgamation of those 
issues, i n t o a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e o r i s i n g as always the product of p a r t i c u l a r 
purposes and s p e c i f i c value o r i e n t a t i o n s such t h a t any o f i t s c laimt t o knowledge 
must be remitted as p a r t i a l , biased, located, h i s t o r i c i s e d , d i s t o r t e d i d e o l o g i c a l 
and so on. This perspective, although i t has c l a s s i c a l antecedents, and has been 
a powerful influence throughout the h i s t o r y of western thought, i s associated 
p r i m a r i l y w i t h the work of Karl Mannheim i n sociology. (76) 
Mannheim proceeds from the p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s possible to ask s o c i o l o g i c a l questions 
about thought, i t i s a problem which confronts anyone de a l i n g w i t h h i s t o r y to 
account f o r the way i n which the concepts which are employed, while having s p e c i f i c 
uses w i t h i n the c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s of one p e r i o d , become redundant, or transformed, 
i n other times. I n the face of t h i s question, s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s must r e l i n q u i s h 
t h e i r concern w i t h epistemological problems to confront the problem of a: 
"maximally r a d i c a l s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s of the problems 
which may be raised i n a given epoch, and ana l y s i s which 
not only informs o u t s i d e r s about what i s going on i n 
research, but p o i n t s out the u l t i m a t e choices faced by 
the c u l t u r a l s c i e n t i s t i n the course of h i s work, the 
tensions i n which he l i v e s and which i n f l u e n c e h i s 
t h i n k i n g consciously or unconsciously. Such an ana l y s i s 
of the work going on i n the c u l t u r a l sciences w i l l give 
us the most fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f the i n t e l l -
e ctual s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g i n our time." (77) 
Thought i s at once, he argues, s e l f transcendent and s e l f r e l a t i v i s i n g . (78) 
"Self transcendence and s e l f r e l a t i v i s a t i o n of thought 
consist i n the f a c t that i n d i v i d u a l t h i n k e r s , and s t i l l 
more the dominant outlook of a given epoch, f a r from 
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according primacy to thought, conceive of thought 
as something subordinate t o other, more comprehensive 
f a c t o r s - whether as t h e i r emanation, t h e i r expression, 
t h e i r concommitance or i n general as something con-
d i t i o n e d by something els e . " 
"(Note)" What we mean by ' s e l f r e l a t i v i s a t i o n ' i s by 
no means epistemological r e l a t i v i s m , but merely the 
opposite of autonomy. One may very w e l l assert that 
thought i s ' r e l a t i v e t o being', non autonomous, 
'dependent on being' 'part of a whole reaching beyond 
i t ' without p r o f e s s i n g any r e l a t i v i s m concerning the 
t r u t h value of i t s f i n d i n g s . At t h i s p o i n t , i t i s , 
so t o speak, s t i l l open whether the e x i s t e n t i a l r e l -
a t i v i s a t i o n of thought i s t o be combined epistemological 
r e l a t i v i s m or not; We d e f i n i t e l y p r e f e r a r e l a t i v i s m 
which accentuates the d i f f i c u l t y of i t s task by c a l l i n g 
a t t e n t i o n t o a l l those moments which tend t o make the 
p r o p o s i t i o n s a c t u a l l y discoverable at any given time, 
p a r t i a l and s i t u a t i o n a l l y conditioned - we p r e f e r such 
a r e l a t i v i s m to an absolutism which l o u d l y proclaims as 
a matter of p r i n c i p l e , the absoluteness of i t s own p o s i t i o n 
or of t r u t h i n i t s e l f , but i s i n f a c t no less p a r t i a l than 
any r f i t s adversaries - and s t i l l worse, i s u t t e r l y incapable 
of t a c k l i n g w i t h i t s epistemological apparatus the problems 
of the temporal and s i t u a t i o n a l determination of any concrete 
process of thought completely overlooking the way i n which 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n i n g enters i n t o the s t r u c t u r e and 
e v o l u t i o n of knowledge." (79) 
The s e l f r e l a t i v i s a t i o n of thought escapes from the v i c i o u s c i r c l e of s e l f i n v a l -
i d a t i o n by conceiving thought as a mere p a r t i a l phenomenon belonging t o a more 
comprehensive f a c t o r w i t h i n the t o t a l i t y of the world process. On the one hand, 
one may maintain t h a t thought i s merely the medium of expression r a t h e r than the 
u l t i m a t e c o g n i t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n of o b j e c t s ; thus, beginning w i t h the c o n v i c t i o n 
t h a t thought n e i t h e r c o n s t i t u t e s o b j e c t s nor grasps u l t i m a t e l y r e a l matters of 
f a c t , i t can be seen as the expression of e x t r a t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d and 
warranted b e l i e f s ( t h e realm of the I d e a l , i n Platonism). These u l t i m a t e p h i l o -
sophical p r i n c i p l e s transcend changes i n the systems, since they are not subject 
t o t h e o r e t i c a l r e f u t a t i o n . 
From a s o c i o l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l standpoint, the r e l a t i v i s a t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l 
thought may involve r e l a t i o n s between s p e c i f i c e n t i t i e s and the thought on which 
they are said t o depend ( m y s t i c a l consciousness, r e l i g i o n , and e m p i r i c a l sphere 
such as the b i o l o g i c a l or s o c i a l system). 
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" I n a l l these cases, the f a c t o r on which thought i s said 
to depend i s contrasted w i t h i t as Being, and the contrast 
between Thought and Being i s worked out p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y 
f o l l o w i n g the model of Greek Philosophy. I n most such 
systems Being appears as a whole, i n contrast to thought 
as a mere p a r t ; and i t i s o f t e n assumed th a t i n order t o 
grasp Being one needs a su p r a - r a t i o n a l organ ( i e . , i n t u i t i o n ) 
or a higher form of c o g n i t i o n ( i e . , d i a l e c t i c a l as against 
r e f l e c t i v e knowledge)." (80) 
This i s , he notes, decidedly not a modern phenomenon; Mannheim locates , however, 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r u l y r e l a t i v i s i n g knowledge w i t h , r a t h e r than simply a theor-
e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , "what i s needed i s a whole c o n s t e l l a t i o n of mental and p r a c t i c a l 
tendencies" (81); w i t h the s h i f t from the dominance of the r e l i g i o u s systematisa-
t i o n of ideas t o the Enlightenment period, w i t h i t s preparations f o r the coming 
Bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n , the systematic as well as the s o c i o l o g i c a l core of t h i s 
o p p o s i t i o n a l science was formed around an o p p o s i t i o n t o theology and metaphysics. 
With the French r e v o l u t i o n , we see a new way of de p r e c i a t i n g ideas which was l a t e r 
t o be r e f l e c t i v e l y expressed i n the ideas of Marxism. This approach seeks t o 
" d i s i n t e g r a t e " ideas r a t h e r than simply r e f u t e , negate or c a l l them i n doubt. 
This i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between denying the t r u t h of an idea and determining the 
fu n c t i o n i t exercises; the denial of t r u t h s t i l l puts i t s e l f on the same f o o t i n g 
as the idea; the t h e o r e t i c a l basis f o r the idea i s the same f o r the r e f u t a t i o n . 
When the question of i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y i s not even r a i s e d , however, then the 
ex t r a t h e o r e t i c a l purposes of the idea, i t s p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s destroyed. 
This unmasking i s thereby not an att a c k on the moral existence of the persons 
concerned; while ' l i e ' r e f e r s t o the r e l a t i o n between re a l existence and mental 
o b j e c t s , ' e r r o r ' i s a t h e o r e t i c a l category i n t h i s instance, r e f e r r i n g r a t h e r to 
the r e l a t i o n between t h e o r e t i c a l systems and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y . This i s 
an attack r a t h e r on an impersonal s o c i o - i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r c e , to bring t o l i g h t an 
unconscious process, t o destroy the s o c i a l e f f i c a c y of ideas by unmasking the 
fu n c t i o n they serve. 
Mannheim's p o i n t here i s tha t t h i s i s a modern phenomenon, coming about f o r s p e c i f i c 
h i s t o r i c a l reasons, w i t h i t s roots i n the desire t o transcend immanent t h e o r e t i c a l 
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meaning i n p r a c t i c a l existence. Now, the absolute towards which such a trend 
aspires, i s he argues, an a s p i r a t i o n which requires to be understood against the 
background o f , on the one hand, i t s f o r m u l a t i o n by anti-metaphysical p o s i t i v i s m 
as a c e r t a i n complex l i f t e d out of the t o t a l i t y of the given and " l i k e any other 
metaphysic", hypostatised as an o n t o l o g i c a l absolute, and on the o t h e r , formulated 
by the i d e a l i s t - h i s t o r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , the need to grasp ideas as mutually i n t e r -
dependent p a r t s of a systemic t o t a l i t y , r a t h e r than i n i s o l a t i o n , so t h a t only now 
can the s p e c i f i c problematic of the sociology of knowledge, the c o n f r o n t a t i o n of 
worlds w i t h worlds, be developed. 
While the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of p o s i t i v i s m and a p r i o r i formalism (Kantianism) he takes 
t o be i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the problem, the c r i t i c a l ongoing concern w i t h t h i s 
problem may be found t o be between phenomenological and h i s t o r i c i s t approaches. 
The phenomenological approach (which he discusses v i a the work of Max Scheler) sees 
as i t s basic problem the r e l a t i o n between t h e o r e t i c a l and e x t r a - t h e o r e t i c a l f a c t o r s 
the need t o d i s t i n g u i s h between f a c t u a l and e s s e n t i a l , timeless and temporal, t o 
seek to a s c e r t a i n the timeless c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the mind of man. This r e j e c t s 
the epistemological d o c t r i n e s of p o s i t i v i s m , and sees instead i n metaphysical 
knowledge both "an e t e r n a l postulate of reason and a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y " . (82) 
This depends upon separation of sub-structure (composed of psychological d r i v e s ) 
from superstructure ( c u l t u r a l p r oducts), i n the r e l a t i o n of whole to p a r t , such 
t h a t i n t h e i r inseparable u n i t y , c e r t a i n i d e a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s can only occur i n 
c onjunction w i t h c e r t a i n r e a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s and v i c e versa. This approach cannot 
develop a h i s t o r i c a l theory because i t seeks t o e x p l a i n timeless c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
o f man, and as such, can only p o s i t the i n t e r a c t i o n of r e a l and c u l t u r a l f a c t o r s 
on the basis of the e x h i b i t i o n of general p r i n c i p l e s of succession, r a t h e r than 
the concrete unique temporal phases which such a theory would r e q u i r e . 
Here, we f i n d Mannheim discussing the d i f f e r e n c e s between the kinds of sociology 
which are p o s s i b l e ; the need to develop laws, he argues continues the t r a d i t i o n o f 
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n a t u r a l science, regarding the h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l as merely a complex of general, 
changelessly r e c u r r i n g p r o p e r t i e s , d i s r e g a r d i n g a l l t h a t i s not subsumed w i t h i n 
t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n . The opposite tendency, which he traces back t o the p h i l o -
sophy o f h i s t o r y proceeds i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n . I t considers h i s t o r i c a l 
i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s - both p e r s o n a l i t y and any " h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n " - as the 
necessary object of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Rather than seeing the i n d i v i d u a l as a com-
bi n a t i o n of a b s t r a c t l y d i s t i l l e d , unchanging c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , the i n d i v i d u a l i s t o 
be determined by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and p a r t i a l f a c t o r s which are apprehended 
with o u t mediation by general p r o p e r t i e s , i n much the same way as a face i s grasped 
by apprehending the "unique centre of an expression, and the eyes, mouth and other 
features characterised i n the l i g h t of t h i s c e n t r a l i n s i g h t . 
He notes; 
"The school i n question holds t h a t t h i s method, 
spontaneously employed i n everyday l i f e , has i t s 
a p p l i c a t i o n i n science a l s o , and has i n f a c t been 
unconsciously used by s c i e n t i s t s ; i t i s high time, 
then, t o f i x the methodological character of t h i s 
type of knowledge. For i t i s not the case th a t the 
'centre of expression', the p a r t i c u l a r physiognomy 
of a s i t u a t i o n , the unique e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e e x h i b i t e d 
by a sequence o f events can be grasped only by i n t u i t i o n 
and cannot be o b j e c t i f i e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y or communicated. 
A l l such i n s i g h t i n t o wholes can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o 
c o n t r o l l a b l e s c i e n t i f i c knowledge (83) 
In terms of general l i m i t s , then, the responses to the problem of c o n d i t i o n a l i t y 
can be seen as f a l l i n g i n t o 2 camps; l f we accept the framework w i t h i n which 
sociology comes i n t o being as an o p p o s i t i o n a l science, i t seems tha t the attempt 
to provide, i n the t r a d i t i o n o f n a t u r a l science, general laws about the r e l a t i o n s 
between concrete h i s t o r i c a l epochs founders upon the need t o r e l a t e these to 
e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s of the mind of man; on the other hand, the grasping of how such 
uniqueness comes i n t o being i n the concrete s i t u a t i o n s w i t h i n which meaning i s 
r e a l i s e d i s faced w i t h the problem of r e l a t i n g any proposed supra-temporal u n i t y 
of man i n terms o f on the one hand, the e s s e n t i a l i s t v i s i o n upon which t h i s must 
be based, to the concrete m u l t i p l i c i t y which the f a c t s o f human existence comprises. 
These are the very l i m i t s which Parsons and Gar f i n k e l exemplify i n t h e i r work* 
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Ga r f i n k e l can be seen as responding to the programme o u t l i n e d by Mannheim above, 
while Parsons struggles w i t h Scheler's problem i n r e c o n c i l i n g the need f o r formal 
frameworks w i t h which t o deal w i t h laws and general p r i n c i p l e s , w i t h the r e q u i r e -
ment t o grasp the concreteness of the s o c i a l worlds t o which these laws and 
systems might p u t a t i v e l y be applied. How, i n Mannheim's terms, are these r e q u i r e -
ments t o be reconciled? 
Mannheim p o s i t s a new conception of the c o r r e l a t i o n between idea and r e a l i t y ; ~ 
u n l i k e the P l a t o n i s t , who sees r e a l i t y or r e a l i s a t i o n as secondary t o the pre-
existence of models and ideas, Mannheim p o s i t s r e a l i t y as the c o n d i t i o n under 
which the meaning of any such ideas can only be a v a i l a b l e ; the separation of Being 
and Meaning which occurs as we seek t o analyse the r e l a t i o n between them i n the 
s o c i a l genesis of ideas i s only a " p r o v i s i o n a l device"; discomfort a r i s e s from 
the attempt t o t r e a t the products of such separation as f a i t h f u l t o the e s s e n t i a l 
u n i t y from which they proceed, e i t h e r from a p o s i t i v i s t or an i d e a l i s t standpoint. 
Rather, i f we abandon the search f o r phenomenological d i f f e r e n c e between r e a l and 
i d e a l f a c t o r s , and see t h i s nexus as instead subordinate t o the genetic u n i t y o f 
h i s t o r i c process, we begin t o t r e a t our existence as i n t e r p r e t i n g subjects s e r i o u s l y . 
That i s to say, as e x i s t i n g human beings, we have immediate experience of our 
existence and i t i s here t h a t r e a l f a c t o r s are converted i n t o mental data. However, 
i t i s our experience which makes of the ' n a t u r a l ' world t h a t which we t r e a t w i t h i n 
the mental realm; t h a t i s t o say, the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s between 2 spheres of the 
mental r a t h e r than a r a d i c a l d i s j u n c t i o n between the mental and the n a t u r a l (which 
we can only know through the mental); the s u b s t r u c t u r e - s u p e r s t r u c t u r e r e l a t i o n 
can be said t o e x i s t between the ' m i l l i e u ' , those categories of meaning i n which 
the human being l i v e s w i t h the greatest i n t e n s i t y , and h i s a c t i o n s . Mannheim 
conceives of the M i l l i e u as being p r i m a r i l y on the model of "the c o n d i t i o n s of 
production, together w i t h a l l concommitant s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s " . (84) Rather 
than accepting the immanent l o g i c of meaning i n the mental world, Mannheim proposes 
r a t h e r t h a t the a c t u a l l y p ossible i n the h i s t o r i c a l world be given precedence over 
the 'horizon of p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' inherent i n the t h e o r e t i c realm of ideas. Thus: 
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" I t seems t o be g e n e r a l l y o v e r l o o k e d t h a t the s u b j e c t 
s t u d y i n g and u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s t o r y can l o o k a t t h e l a t t e r 
f r o m v a r i o u s s t a n d p o i n t s , w h i c h make a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
e x i s t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e . Thus, i t makes a g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e 
w h e t h e r one s u r v e y s p r o d u c t s o f t h e mind r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y 
as f i n i s h e d p r o d u c t s o r r a t h e r t r i e s t o r e - e n a c t t h e p r o c e s s 
o f t h e i r c r e a t i o n . I n our o p i n i o n , however, i t i s a m i s t a k e 
t o adopt t h e r e t r o s p e c t i v e s t a n d p o i n t , and t o t r y t o account 
f o r t h e s t r u c t u r e o f g e n e s i s i n terms o f t h e a c t u a l as an 
a c c o m p l i s h e d f a c t , when d e a l i n g w i t h problems o f a m e t a p h y s i c 
o f t h e g e n e t i c p r o c e s s . (On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e p r o b l e m o f 
t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e s u b j e c t i n s t u d y i n g h i s t o r y i s n o t t h e 
same as t h e problem o f s t a n d p o i n t s i n t h e t h e o r y o f h i s t o r i c i s m . 
A l l h i s t o r i c i s m t eaches a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h i n k i n g by t h e 
s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e t h i n k e r , but such h i s t o r i c i s t t h e o r i e s may 
have a c o n s e r v a t i v e o r p r o g r e s s i v e s l a n t , depending on whether 
t h e y a r e c o n c e i v e d f r o m a r e t r o s p e c t i v e o r ' i n s t a t u n a s c e n d i ' 
s t a n d p o i n t . " (85) 
"Only t h o s e who f o c u s t h e i r a t t e n t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y upon t h e 
a c t u a l , upon t h e f i n i s h e d p r o d u c t c u t o f f from a l l f u n c t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n t h e g e n e t i c p r o c e s s , can have t h e 
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t what happened was t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f something 
p r e - e x i s t e n t , o f a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d , a b s o l u t e e n t i t y . " ( 8 6 ) 
While b o t h what i s a c c e s s i b l e t o us o f t h e e s s e n t i a l i n t u i t i o n s o f p a s t epochs, 
and how t h e y become a c c e s s i b l e t o us, depends upon o u r s t a n d p o i n t , Mannheim 
proposes t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s j u n c t i o n between s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t and p h i l o s o p h -
i c a l t h o u g h t , so t h a t s c i e n c e c o mpletes j u s t one and t h e same system d u r i n g 
s u c c e s s i v e p e r i o d s , but t h e l a t t e r s t a r t s from new c e n t r e s o f s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n 
i n every epoch i n t r y i n g t o master t h e i n c r e a s i n g m u l t i p l i c i t y o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
w o r l d . I n s c i e n c e , meanings do n o t change, w h i l e i n p h i l o s o p h y and t h e c u l t u r a l 
s c i e n c e s t h e y do. ( 8 7 ) Thus t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a dynamic approach i s p r o v i d e d 
f o r i n t h e n e c e s s i t y o f r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o d u c t s o f d i s t i n c t i v e h i s t o r i c a l epochs 
i n t h e r e a l m o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l and c u l t u r a l i d e a s , as o n l y a v a i l a b l e i n t h e i r r e a l 
b eing i n t h e epoch i n q u e s t i o n , and as b e i n g c o n t r o l s on succeeding p e r s p e c t i v a l 
views o f t h e i r meaning; a t the same t i m e , t h e f a c t t h a t we accept such c o n t r o l s 
i s t a k e n by Mannheim as i n d i c a t i v e o f our s u b s c r i p t i o n t o some core c o n c e p t i o n s 
o f what i t i s f o r p r o d u c t i o n s t o e x e r c i s e t h i s c o n t r o l . F a c t s , f o r p o s i t i v i s m 
came t o have a c a r e f r e e , u n q u a l i f i e d , c h a r a c t e r ; t h i s was based on a n a i v e 
m e t a p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . However, Mannheim argu e s , w h i l e 
c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l s c i e n c e s can be more s e l f c o n s c i o u s about t h e i r grounds, 
141. 
t h i s s h o u l d n o t l e a d them t o i g n o r e what was i m p o r t a n t i n p o s i t i v i s t t h o u g h t , 
and marked ' r e a l p r o g r e s s * . T h i s he t a k e s t o be the " m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e n t i o n " 
o f p o s i t i v i s m t h a t i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e o n t o l o g i c a l r e a l m as ' t h i s - w o r l d l y ' , 
immanent, r a t h e r t h a n t r a n s c e n d e n t . Thus, we cannot c o n c e i v e o f any metaphys-
i c a l e n t i t i e s which l i e o u t s i d e o f an e s s e n t i a l c o n t a c t w i t h t h a t r e a l m o f 
ex p e r i e n c e w h i c h f o r us r e p r e s e n t s t h e u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y o f t h e w o r l d . 
While m e t a p h y s i c s cannot be e l i m i n a t e d from our w o r l d c o n c e p t i o n , and metaphy-
s i c a l c a t e g o r i e s a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l and 
t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l w o r l d , i t i s n o t the case t h a t f a c t u a l knowledge and e s s e n t i a l 
knowledge r e p r e s e n t 2 s e p a r a t e d d i f f e r e n t forms o f knowledge. For Mannheim, 
e s s e n t i a l knowledge "goes f a r t h e r i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n t han f a c t u a l knowledge 
se t s o u t . " ( 8 8 ) . We move from f a c t u a l knowledge t h r o u g h t o i n t u i t i o n o f 
essences. The d u a l i t y o f f a c t and essence i s p a r a l l e l t o t h a t o f h i s t o r i c a l 
s c i e n c e and t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y . What Mannheim i s p r o p o s i n g i s t h a t t he 
p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y i s s u b j e c t t o t h e g u i d i n g i n f l u e n c e o f t h e c e n t r a l elements 
of e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e , such t h a t : 
"We are somehow g u i d e d by a ' p l a n ' , an ' i n t e l l i g i b l e 
framework' o f h i s t o r y whenever we p u t the see m i n g l y 
most i s o l a t e d p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i n t o a c o n t e x t . " ( 8 9 ) 
The assumption i s t h e r e b y made t h a t t h e o r d e r l i n e s s o f h i s t o r i c a l development 
i s r e l a t e d t o t h e s t a b i l i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c systems o f meaning. While these a re 
d i f f e r e n t , q u a l i t a t i v e l y and h i e r a r c h i c a l l y , t h e y cannot be s e p a r a t e d , f o r t h i s 
makes knowledge m e r e l y a m a t t e r o f r e v e l a t i o n . I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e r e l a t i o n 
between t h e e m p i r i c a l , s c i e n t i f i c t r e a t m e n t o f problems and t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l , 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t a n d p o i n t o f the i n v e s t i g a t o r which i s i n q u e s t i o n . For Mannheim, 
such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s o n l y p o s s i b l e i n t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l assumption o f the 
m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f the process o f development; t h e r e l a t i v i s a t i o n o f a l l accounts 
then becomes an a c c e p t a b l e c o n d i t i o n , s i n c e i t l o c a t e s i t s e l f w i t h i n t h e p o s s i -
b i l i t y o f a s p i r i n g towards t r u t h as p a r t o f t h e dynamic p r o c e s s o f " a t t e m p t s t o 
account f o r t h e whole o f r e a l i t y " which i s an i n h e r e n t tendency o f a l l human 
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t h o u g h t . R e l a t i v i s m i s n o t t o be overcome by a jump, by t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f 
s o l u t i o n , but by a c c e p t i n g b o t h t h e changes o f h i s t o r y and t h e dynamic n a t u r e 
o f our and a l l accounts w i t h i n t h a t h i s t o r y ; "one's own s t a n d p o i n t , though 
r e l a t i v e , c o n s t i t u t e s i t s e l f i n t h e element o f t r u t h " . ( 9 0 ) 
I n terms o f t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , Mannheim's f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e problem o f t h e 
s o c i o l o g y o f knowledge draws out t h e parameters w i t h i n which t h e work o f t h e 
t h e o r i s t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t o be viewed. So f a r , we have seen t h a t t h e 
t w i n r e q u i r e m e n t s o f c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l accounts o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r , and 
r e m a i n i n g f a i t h f u l t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f n a t u r a l language as i t i s used t o make 
th e s o c i a l w o r l d o r d e r l y and m e a n i n g f u l t o s u b j e c t and s o c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t o r 
produced responses w h i c h c o n f r o n t c o n t r a d i c t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s ; so f a r i t has 
seemed t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f the problems face d can o n l y l e a d t o r e l i a n c e , on t h e 
one hand, on t h e t e c h n i c a l e x a c t i t u d e but semantic i n d e f m i t e n e s s o f s c i e n c e , 
on t h e one hand, and on t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e competence b u t t e c h n i c a l u s e l e s s n e s s 
o f n a t u r a l language o r commonsense on t h e o t h e r . Mannheim i s r i g h t t o p o i n t t o 
th e t w i n demands o f f a i t h f u l n e s s t o " B e i n g " and " R e a l i t y " as u n r e a l i s a b l e , w i t h i n 
an e n t e r p r i s e w h i c h sees i t s e l f as p r o p o s i n g ' s o l u t i o n s * t o t h e p r o b l e m o f r e l -
a t i v i s m , as set o u t below, G a r f i n k e l ' s n a t u r a l i s m o r extreme e m p i r i c i s m i s t h e 
r e f u s a l t o acknowledge t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f " B e i n g " , w h i l e Parsons' f o r m a l i s m 
proceeds d i r e c t l y from h i s commitment t o t h e tra n s c e d e n c e o f a p r i o r i l o g i c . 
Mannheim w o u l d seem t o suggest t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f some o t h e r way o f m e e t i n g t h e 
problem; t h e "dynamic!'approach t r e a t s i t s e l f as an account l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s o f i t s h i s t o r i c a l epoch, and i t s commitment t o t r u t h as c o n d i t i o n a l 
upon t h e r e f l e c t i v e n e s s o r r e f l e x i v i t y w h i c h i t d i s p l a y s . Mannheim's f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f t h e pr o b l e m o f t h e s o c i o l o g y o f knowledge comes, f o r him, t o t h e problem o f 
what i t i s t o p r o v i d e a r e f l e c t i v e a c c o u n t . To t h i s p r o b l e m I now t u r n , but n o t 
yet t h r o u g h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Mannheim. I propose r a t h e r t o examine t h e work 
o f 2 contemporary t h e o r i s t s who have produced r e l a t e d , but d i s t i n c t , f o r m u l a t i o n s 
o f t h e problem o f r e f l e x i v i t y ; A l a n Blum and A l v i n Gouldner. I t w i l l be seen 
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t h a t t h e y c o n f r o n t t h e i s s u e s proposed by Mannheim and a r r i v e a t d i s t i n c t 
r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e problems i n v o l v e d i n j u s t t h e ways which he p r o v i d e d f o r 
i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o u t l i n e d . A g a i n s t the background o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o -
sophy, I w i l l t r y t o show, however, t h a t t h e s e r e s o l u t i o n s do not f a i l f o r t h e 
reasons o u t l i n e d by Mannheim, but r a t h e r , Mannheim's r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r success 
are themselves founded on p r i n c i p l e s which b e t r a y h i s a n a l y t i c a l p remises -
i e . , t h e pre-supposed u n i t y o f s c i e n c e , and i t s s e p a r a t i o n f r o m the processes 
o f s o c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
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CHAPTER 3 
REFLEXIVITY HISTORY AND NOESIS 
Blum 
Blum's work, and t h a t of h i s colleague Peter McHugh, i s mysterious f o r most 
s o c i o l o g i s t s because i t seems so d i f f e r e n t from what i s recognisable as socio-
logy i n the w r i t i n g s o f even the most diverse preceding t h e o r i s t s . What t o 
make of Blum i s the problem, and i t must be said that h i s work o f f e r s no easy 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; by i t s nature, i t i s s t i l l changing, and any attempt at 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n r i s k s v u l g a r i s a t i o n of what i s e s s e n t i a l l y an ongoing exercise. 
His 'allegiances* are f a i r l y easy t o d e t e c t , but are not s u f f i c i e n t t o enable 
us t o detect d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between h i s thought and t h a t of those 
t h e o r i s t s we may claim as 'in f l u e n c e s ' . For a time, he was a l l i g n e d w i t h 
ethnomethodologists, and we can e a s i l y t r a c e a concern w i t h the same problems 
as G a r f i n k e l ; even then, however, h i s work acknowledged the use o f Wittgen-
s t e i n ' s concepts and approaches more than any of the others w i t h i n t h i s approach, 
save McHugh. With work produced a f t e r the "Theorising" paper, he takes up some 
of the issues r a i s e d by Martin Heidegger i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n both of class-
i c a l Greek philosophy, and h i s c r i t i q u e of science and o f phenotnenological-
e x i s t e n t i a l l s t philosophy, w i t h a reference p a r t i c u l a r l y t o Neitzche and h i s 
work on e t h i c s ; h i s l a t e s t work revolves around the use o f Greek philosophy t o 
t r e a t a n a l y s i s of modern s o c i e t y . (1) 
Now, while there i s no easy way i n t o t h i s work, I t h i n k one or two clues about 
why i t takes the form t h a t i t does are o f f e r e d by l o o k i n g at the work o f 
Stanley Rosen. Before I o f f e r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Blum's t h e o r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , 
I w i l l t r y t o prepare the way by looking at Rosen ( 2 ) , since Rosen has been my 
key resource i n making sense o f Blum. Rosen's work i s concerned, broadly, 
w i t h the exegesis, on the one hand, of Greek philosophy and on the other, w i t h 
an examination of moral, e t h i c a l and e x i s t e n t i a l questions i n the modern wo r l d . 
We can d i s t i n g u i s h between h i s methodological s t r a t e g y or decisions i n the 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t e x t s , and the consequences which t h i s k i n d of scholarship 
has f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues which i t s analysis addresses. 
His methodological p r i n c i p l e s are o u t l i n e d i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s book on 
Plato's "Symposium" ( 3 ) . The work, he wants t o emphasise, i s i n dialogue 
form; while t h i s i s acknowledged by many contemporary s c h o l a r s , nevertheless 
amongst those i n the English speaking world: 
"The emphasis upon epistemology, l o g i c and l i n g u i s t i c 
a n a l y s i s has d i r e c t e d a t t e n t i o n away from standing dramatic 
form and towards the d i s s e c t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r themes or 
arguments i n r e l a t i v e independence from t h e i r context". (4) 
Thus Plato's work i s produced t o i l l u s t r a t e , i n the d i f f e r e n c e s between h i s 
dialogues, evidence f o r the h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n of h i s thought, so t h a t he 
appears e i t h e r as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y u n i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n k e r , or else concerned 
w i t h the same issues as n o m i n a l i s t or l i n g u i s t i c t h i n k e r s o f the t w e n t i e t h 
century. I r o n i c a l l y , d i s i n t e r e s t e d "conceptual a n a l y s i s " a l i g n s i t s e l f w i t h 
nineteenth century h i s t o r i c i s m . 
Now, Rosen argues, we cannot choose t o disregard the c e n t r a l i t y o f the dramatic 
context t o Plato's arguments, nor can we simply impose modern techniques and 
concerns onto a t h i n k e r of t h i s a n t i q u i t y . 
This i s based on a pure assumption of the s u p e r i o r i t y of our own techniques; 
Rosen cannot answer the question of t h e i r r e l a t i v e m e r i t s , but he aims t o 
cast doubt on the assumption of s u p e r i o r i t y . 
Now, the relevance of Rosen's approach t o the problem of reading Plato derives 
from the a t t e n t i o n which i t gives t o the problem of representing ideas i n 
words. The work which I have discussed so f a r has brought out the d i f f i c u l t y 
of r e c o n c i l i n g w i t h i n a statement, the tw i n requirements o f meaningfulness and 
exac t i t u d e . The problem seems t o come w i t h the seeming necessity t h a t language 
cannot meet both of these requirements at one and the same time i f we simply 
t r e a t the content of statements as being what they speak about. Rosen argues 
t h a t , i n the case o f Plato's dialogues, we should seek t o read them not simply 
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as statements, using the same set of resources which we would b r i n g t o bear 
on a statement made t o some end w i t h i n any of our modern language games, but 
r a t h e r , seek t o f i n d i n the work which the statements represent the r u l e s o f 
the language game w i t h i n which they have some place, and thus f i n d a way t o 
use t h i s work t o make out both the language game, and the place o f the s t a t e -
ments w i t h i n i t . The work of reading Plato i s thus always a r e - c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of Plato ( t h e a u t h o r ) , but also a r e - c o n s t r u c t i o n of the reader formulated by 
the author as the user of these rules t o make sense of h i s work. This con-
ception o f the c e n t r a l i t y o f a u t h o r - i t y and reader-ship a f f o r d us keys t o 
Blum's conceptions of the parameters o f t h e o r i s i n g . 
To begin w i t h , he argues, Plato wrote dialogues, so t h a t he says nothing, i n 
h i s w r i t i n g s ^ i n h i s own name. Whatever i s s a i d , f u r t h e r , i s r e l a t i v e t o a 
p a r t i c u l a r dramatic s i t u a t i o n . Even i f Plato i s taken as agreeing w i t h the 
statements o f h i s main p r o t a g o n i s t s , these say d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , at d i f f e r e n t 
times, t o d i f f e r e n t audiences. Even Plato's e x p l i c i t r e n u n c i a t i o n of a l l the 
views a t t r i b u t e d t o him cannot be viewed except i n the l i g h t o f the author's 
perennial p r a c t i c e of i r o n i c d i s s i m u l a t i o n ; how are we t o take h i s own s t a t e -
ments? I r o n y , Rosen argues, i s the c e n t r a l f e ature or problem i n the i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f Plate even i f we take the (obvious) step o f seeing the dialogues 
i n t h e i r own words, independently o f modern pre-suppositions ( d i f f i c u l t enough) 
we s t i l l face the problem of the i r o n i c element. 
With t h i s i n mind, however, the dialogues can be seen as supplementing each 
ot h e r , r a t h e r than as c o n t r a d i c t o r y ; a t the same time, while Plato argues t h a t 
h i s most important teachings cannot be state d l i k e any other form o f knowledge, 
t h i s i s not t o say t h a t i t cannot be s t a t e d i n some form. Thus, while we must 
recognise t h a t Plato's w r i t i n g s can be seen as an attempt to convey some 
e s o t e r i c teachings, we must remain committed t o seeing them also as concerned 
w i t h conveying an e x p l i c i t d o c t r i n e - th a t i s , we must remain t r u e t o both 
the e x p l i c i t statements of the work, and t h e i r i m p l i c i t meanings, or i n t e n t i o n s . 
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To do so i s t o seek t o f i n d i n the dialogues " e f f e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n s " both f o r 
the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Plato's o r a l teachings (supplementary t o h i s w r i t i n g ) 
and f u r t h e r , t o the i n t e n t i o n s behind t h i s , which i n Plato's teachings, argues 
t h a t the i n t e n t i o n o f the dialogues i s " t o force the reader t o engage i n the 
act of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t o f i l l i n missing l i n k s , t o revise accommodated argu-
ments, t o discern the import o f h i n t s , t o understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e of jokes". 
(5) 
Plato argues t h a t the philosopher must discover the complete or more adequate 
fo r m u l a t i o n of the highest themes f o r himself - e x p l i c i t l y , t h a t the teaching 
of the p r a c t i c e of Philosophy i s impossible. Thus, f o r Rosen, regardless of 
whether an o r a l teaching e x i s t s , the unspoken dimension o f the dialogues must 
be taken i n t o account, and i n methodological terms i t i s the most important 
dimension of the dialogues. 
The purposes of philosophy are seen by Plato ( v i a Rosen) as both medicinal and 
pedagogic; t h a t i s , philosophy must say d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s t o d i f f e r e n t readers 
so as to heal the disease o f ignorance or thoughtlessnesses a doctor t r e a t s 
d i f f e r e n t p a t i e n t s i n d i f f e r e n t ways) w h i l e at the same time, i t must lead the 
young towards philosophy f o r t h e i r own sake r a t h e r than as a means of persuad-
in g them t o one p o i n t of view, since t r u t h here i s the same as persuasion, and 
thus becomes a search f o r p o l i t i c a l power, rat h e r than p s y c h i a t r i c ( l i t e r a l l y ) 
purpose. Philosophy i s a way of l i f e r ather than a set of t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
I n the dramatic p r e s e n t a t i o n of men a c t i n g out the consequences o f the disease 
of ignorance, Plato presents the consequences o f the i n e v i t a b l e f a t e of a l l 
men, i n c l u d i n g the philosopher, i n gr a p p l i n g w i t h reason through opiniion. Only 
scrupulous awareness of t h i s c o n d i t i o n enables men t o escape from i t s dominion. 
An accurate r e f l e c t i o n o f the manner i n which thought emerges, i e . , i t s context, 
i s thus the f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of those seeking t o escape. The dialogue i s 
thus an e x i s t e n t i a l p o r t r a i t ; i t brings together, i n the form of a dramatic 
'mimesis' of human existence, a representation of the "synoptic nature of 
D i a l e c t i c " , so t h a t the 'measuring p r a c t i c e s ' o f mathematics and also poetry 
H8. 
are conjoined, but t h e i r product i s reducible t o n e i t h e r one one i n d i v i d u a l l y . 
The attempt i s thus to i m i t a t e the wholeness o f the form of l i f e i n which the 
production l i v e d . Each 'technique' thus a f f o r d s only a p a r t i a l view, since i t 
i s d i r e c t e d toward s p e c i f i c ends; but nonetheless, each i s a component. 
D i a l e c t i c s , combined w i t h the n o t i o n of medicinal r h e t o r i c , lead us t o see 
that every statement, as op i n i o n , occurs w i t h i n a dramatic context, so t h a t 
agreement reached about the ' t r u t h ' of statements, while i t does " c o l l e c t " 
t h i n g s , or " s o r t them out according t o k i n d " , i s t o be seen also as a methodic 
accommodation i n terms of the p r a c t i c e s and purposes of those concerned, 
i n c l u d i n g the 'teacher'. 
For Rosen, being f a i t h f u l t o Plato's purposes poses enormous problems f o r 
modern scholarship; 
"If» as i s the case w i t h P l a t o , one's aims include f o r c i n g 
men to t h i n k f o r themselves, t o submit t o the d i v i n e mania 
without p u b l i c l y r e p u d i a t i n g the d i v i n e nomos, t o undergo 
a t e s t i n g and purging of the psyche, and t o p r o t e c t p h i l o -
sophy from the rage o f non-philosophers, then the procedures 
of i r o n y make p e r f e c t sense .... The student of Plato should 
recognise f r a n k l y , w i t h o u t any naive r e p u d i a t i o n of the need 
f o r accurate t e c h n i c a l knowledge, t h a t the metier of h i s t o r i c a l 
scholarship i s by nature r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the exercise 
of d i v i n e madness .. (so t h a t ) .. obedience t o standards 
derived from another and l a t e r t r a d i t i o n , v i o l a t e P l a t o n i c 
accuracy". (7) 
Thus, while 'speculation' has come t o be a term of opprobrium i n terms o f such 
standards, f o r P l a t o n i c scholarship i t i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n ; each specul-
a t i o n i s a t e s t of the ef f e c t i v e n e s s o f Plato's medicinal r h e t o r i c i n c u r i n g 
the disease of thoughtless i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
The problem posed by Plato's work proceeds, i n Rosen's view, from a modern 
commitment t o the moral s u p e r i o r i t y of e x o t e r i c meaning i n the medium o f open 
and frank discussion over the p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n which leads to secrecy or 
modified utterances; t h i s commitment masks both the rea l r e s t r a i n t s which 
p o l i t i c s imposes on the p r a c t i c e s of philosophers, and also deprives i n t e r -
p r e t e r s of any p o s s i b i l i t y that work could be framed other than i n accordance 
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w i t h the very r i g i d p r i n c i p l e s - i e . , i r o n y i s rule d out. Rather, Rosen argues, 
should we not see t h a t our p u r s u i t of t r u t h must remain f a i t h f u l t o the p r i n -
c i p l e s g u i d i n g the thought we seek t o discuss? Plato i s thus t o be understood 
only i n terms of the p r i n c i p l e s which he e x h i b i t s - t h a t i s , how he provides 
f o r himself t o be understood. The issue then becomes - what i s an a t t e n t i v e 
reader (of Plato or any t e x t ) ? Rosen argues f o r the a t t e n t i o n t o the u n i t y of 
form and content, so t h a t i n seeing the form, we also see the content, r a t h e r 
than a l l o w i n g the content which i s v i s i b l e as form t o conceal I t s e l f as content. 
In other words, the way i n which an idea i s communicated i s ex t e r n a l t o the 
communication of the idea, but i s nonetheless the 'e s o t e r i c * content o f the 
form i n which the idea i s communicated. The a t t e n t i v e reader i s thus obliged 
to t h i n k f o r himself i n accordance w i t h the i n s t r u c t i o n s which he f i n d s w i t h i n 
the t e x t ; w h i l e he may c r i t i c i s e a f t e r he has done t h i s , any other p r i n c i p l e s 
he may employ here are bounded by t h i s previous requirement. I n the case o f 
'mathematical' or 'epistemological' themes o f modern philosophy, as applied t o 
Pl a t o n i c scholarship these must come a f t e r we have been f a i t h f u l t o Plato's 
concerns. 
Rosen i s thus arguing f o r a t t e n t i o n t o p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n dealing 
w i t h a t e x t ; he assumes p h i l o l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l competence precedes such 
issues. This i s t o say, i n the case of Pl a t o , t h a t h i s t o r i c a l studies should 
not be confused w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l ones; we should be wary of attempts t o 
impute, f o r instance, p h i l o s o p h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o chronological o r d e r i n g . 
we cannot reduce Plato t o the product of the h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n of which he 
i s a product, f o r : 
"The f a c t t h a t a philosopher i s a c i t i z e n o f h i s age does not 
prevent him from r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n upon the phenomena of 
h i s age ... but n e i t h e r does i t prevent him from engaging 
i n r e f l e c t i o n s common t o a l l ages". (8) 
While the con s i d e r a t i o n of Plato's ideas continues t o be dominated i n modern 
thought by the assumption of e v o l u t i o n , through stages o f thought (pace Comte), 
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Rosen argues against the metaphysic upon which t h i s i s based, that i t prevents 
us from asking genuine t h e o r e t i c questions i n t e r n a l t o the work. Primacy i s 
instead given t o the development of ideas, r a t h e r than t o t h e i r serious import. 
This, he argues, i s the course we should f o l l o w only when we have exhausted 
a l l other approaches. To accept the p r i n c i p l e on which i t i s based deprives 
us o f the a b i l i t y t o t h i n k about the work i n i t s own terms, since we are 
committed t o an i m p o s i t i o n of exte r n a l hypotheses to order the work. 
In terms o f the problems of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , the import of Rosen's 
analysis may not be immediately obvious; at the r i s k of o v e r s t a t i n g what may 
be nonetheless f a i r l y obvious, perhaps I could p o i n t t o some issues which 
seem germane. 
F i r s t , f o r Rosen, t h e o r e t i c questions have precedence over h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s , 
although responsible scholarship pre-supposes h i s t o r i c a l t a c t ; that i s t o say, 
i n dealing w i t h the work o f another scholar, t h e o r e t i c issues are t o be add-
ressed f i r s t i n terms of the p r i n c i p l e s provided f o r i n the work of the scholar 
concerned. 
Second, i f we are t o be a t t e n t i v e t o the import of the work, we cannot neglect 
the u n i t y of form and content; t h i s i s t o say t h a t form i s t o be regarded as 
the p r i n c i p l e from which we derive the e s o t e r i c content which i s e x o t e r i c a l l y 
expressed i n the content of form communicating ideas. 
T h i r d , e x o t e r i c a n a l y s i s alone i s based on accepting the metaphysics of h i s -
t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n of thought, and t h i s i s an unsubstantiated hypothesis (see 
the r e j e c t i o n of mathematical t h i n k i n g i n h i s " N i h i l i s m " ) . Rather we proceed 
from the assumption t h a t r a t i o n a l discussion i s possible both w i t h i n epochs 
about those epochs, and across epochs about t r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l issues. 
Fourth, work i s not t o be taken as necessarily committed t o the value o f the 
p u b l i c discussion of a l l issues; the moral s u p e r i o r i t y o f open discourse i s not 
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to be assumed, nor should we assume t h i s of the work of o t h e r s , so t h a t irony 
i s an ever present p o s s i b i l i t y , both i n our own work and i n the teachings o f 
others. 
F i f t h , any t h e o r e t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a p r i n c i p l e d s p e c u l a t i o n ; i f we accept 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of both e x o t e r i c and e s o t e r i c teaching, then the purposes o f 
the author are t o be derived from the i n s t r u c t i o n s which he gives f o r us t o 
i n t e r p r e t h i s work. Any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t o be weighed i n the l i g h t of 
those purposes, so t h a t work p r o d u c e r s t o be seen as the product o f a mind 
that t h i n k s f o r i t s e l f , rather than as simply a conventional re-statement of 
what has already been sa i d . 
S i x t h , escape from the realm of mere opinion i s only possible by scrupulous 
awareness of t h i s c o n d i t i o n , and then only p a r t i a l l y and momentarily. Truth 
(reason) appears only as an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of the manner i n which thought 
emerges. 
Seventh, the value of mathematical and epistemological themes i n modern thought 
i s not pre-supposed, but i n p r i n c i p l e defined i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the p o e t i c 
concerns w i t h i n which the purposes o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l work i s also t o be understood. 
While these p r i n c i p l e s may seem opaque, i n the work o f Blum we f i n d the attempt 
to r e a l i s e a programme o f t h e o r i s i n g on s o c i a l themes w i t h i n t h e i r terms. 
My exegesis i s open t o the complaint o f p a r t i a l i t y on two main counts; f i r s t , 
I want to examine h i s work i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t of W i t t g e n s t e i n , r a t h e r than 
t h i n k i n g through i t i n i t s own terras; and second, I concentrate on p a r t i c u l a r 
pieces t o serve my t h e o r e t i c a l purposes, r a t h e r than seeking t o preserve the 
i n t e g r i t y of the work as a whole. I hope to argue f o r t h i s as a p r i n c i p l e d 
r e c o n s t i t u t i o n provided f o r i n the purposes o f mv_ a n a l y s i s . 
Alan Blum's Theorising (9) 
As f o r Parsons and G a r f i n k e l , any t h e o r i s i n g f o r Blum i s the embodiment o f 
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one p r e f e r r e d method of seeing ( s o c i o l o g i c a l l y ) . I m p l i c i t i n t h i s view i s 
the idea t h a t t o use (any, s o c i o l o g i c a l ) language i s at once t o formulate 
sense, a n a l y t i c a l l y , t o formulate s e l f , i n t h a t i t i s a d i s p l a y of "what we 
know", and t o formulate the audience f o r our communication, since i t i s i n t e n -
ded t o be understood by those we d i r e c t i t toward, and as such, i t must attend 
to the r u l e s of competent usage w i t h i n the community of the t h e o r i s t and aud-
ience. To use t h i s language ( o r t h a t ) i s to p r a c t i s e , t o d i s p l a y one type o f 
(language) game among others; t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t i t stands i n a determinate 
r e l a t i o n t o a preceding body of p r a c t i c e s , n e c e s s a r i l y ; i t i s not a w i l l f u l 
e l e c t i o n , but i s constrained by the corpus ( o f p r a c t i c e s , which are r u l e 
governed) toward which i t d i r e c t s i t s speech. The n o t i o n o f language here 
r e f e r s t o n a t u r a l language i n the senses already o u t l i n e d . 
Sociology i s , i n the main, t i e d t o the hypothetico-deductive model o f explana-
t i o n and Blum ob j e c t s t o tha t model on the grounds which have already been 
developed, i m p l i c i t l y , w i t h i n G a r f i n k e l ' s work, such t h a t , when applied t o 
the p r a c t i c e s of actors i n a c t u a l l y using language t o make the world o r d e r l y 
and s e n s i b l e , i t glosses what should be e x p l i c a t e d ; i t cannot grasp the norm-
a t i v e character of language and a c t i o n , since i t i s j u s t i f i e d on the basis of 
an i d e a l r a t i o n a l i t y ; i t f a i l s t o grasp the c o n t e x t u a l i t y o f the su b j e c t ; and 
so on (see preceding chapters). While t h i s c r i t i q u e of the *H.D.' model 
might be developed, Blum does not see why we should develop i t , since such a 
c r i t i q u e would pre-suppose the problematic which t h a t model sees i t s e l f as 
addressing. How are we t o regard the H.D. model, then? 
Holding i t t o our requirements i s t o t r e a t i t c o n c r e t e l y ; to see i t s f a i l u r e s 
as the occasion f o r c o r r e c t i v e measures on our p a r t i s t o f a i l to b r i n g i n t o 
question i t s own occasion, i t i s t o f a i l to t r e a t i t as p r o v i d i n g a means f o r 
us t o make i t sensible. That i t does so describes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f an 
a n a l y t i c grasping of the method whereby the context w i t h i n which i t can t a l k , 
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becomes a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the terms of i t s language, r a t h e r than seeing i t as 
merely t a l k amongst other t a l k , so t h a t the occasion w i t h i n which i t occurs i s 
not addressed. 
An a n a l y t i c grasping of such a method would t r y t o see i t WITHIN the terms of 
i t s language; i t would ask; what kind of a n a t u r a l language i s i t ? and how i s 
t h i s a sensible language game t o employ? 
That he does r e j e c t the hypothetico-deductive model does not proceed from i t s 
f a i l u r e t o meet the requirements t h a t t h i s understanding of n a t u r a l languages 
would impose onto i t , but rather i t comes about because t h i s model "does not 
compel us". I t s speech does not compel us t o t a l k i n the same way; t h i s 
f a i l u r e means t h a t we are not silenced by i t s speech. 
In other terms, t h i s i s simply t o say t h a t t h e o r i s i n g i s an e l e c t i o n t o l i v e 
our l i f e ( i f you w i l l ) i n one way, i t i s an e l e c t i o n i n s o f a r as we can r e f l e c t 
on the claims the success or f a i l u r e , of one p a r t i c u l a r brand of t h e o r e t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y t o be a s a t i s f y i n g way o f l i v i n g ; we can r e j e c t i t s claims by v i r t u e 
of the f a c t t h a t i t claims that we cannot or should not, w h i l e i n f a c t we do; 
f o r i t claims t o be what t h e o r i s i n g CAN ONLY be, but i t does not address what 
makes i t possible t o make t h i s claim. "Deductive" t h e o r i s i n g attempts, f i r s t l 
t o be the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e kind o f t h e o r i s i n g ; i t attempts t o be a p r a c t i c e 
which claims greater (more secure) warrant f o r i t s statements, than f o r any 
others. 
Now, i n the " p r i m o r d i a l grammar" of " t h e o r i a " , the o r i g i n a r y uses to which i t 
was put i n c l a s s i c a l thought, science i s t o be seen as merely one kind of 
p r a c t i c e amongst others i n attempts t o escape from ignorance. 
"Theorising .. ( i s ) .. a more i n c l u s i v e and powerful 
n o t i o n than science, and ... i t encapsulates, as 
parameters, the ideas of spectator, search and s e l f . " (10) 
Blum wants us t o see t h e o r i s i n g as a performative ( 1 1 ) ; t h a t i s , as a d i s p l a y 
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of what someone knows. I t stands thus as an expression of s e l f , accomplished 
by the a c t o r . I t i s not thereby an account of s e l f knowledge, but i s r a t h e r 
to be seen as d i s p l a y i n g the knowledge which grounds i t . That i s , i t i s a 
p r a c t i c a l expression of s e l f - a commitment, an a c t i o n i n the world which 
stands as a concrete r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n of the t h e o r i s t s 1 attempt at f i n d i n g as 
hi s world ( h i m - s e l f ) THE world, which stands outside. 
This i s i n accord w i t h Cavell's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ; 
" I f i t i s accepted t h a t a language i s what n a t i v e speakers 
of a language speak, and t h a t speaking a language i s a matter 
of p r a c t i c a l mastery (my emphasis) then such questions as 
•what should we say i f ..' or 'In what circumstances would 
we c a l l asked of someone who has mastered the language 
( f o r example, oneself i s a request f o r the person t o say 
something about h i m s e l f , describe what he does. So the 
d i f f e r e n t methods are methods f o r a c q u i r i n g s e l f knowledge.") (12) 
Now, i t i s t o be noted t h a t the o b j e c t i o n t o science i s not on the grounds 
that i t f a i l s i n i t s own terms ( t h a t there could be a b e t t e r programme t o be 
the k i n d of t h e o r i s i n g t h a t science wants t o be), but r a t h e r t h a t science, i n 
f a i l i n g t o have the kin d o f mastery t h a t i t wants t o cla i m , asks t o t a l l y i n -
appropriate questions o f t h i s k i n d o f t h e o r i s i n g . To ask of a 'display of 
s e l f " i s i t c o r r e c t ? " or "does i t work?" i s , as Blum p o i n t s out, l i k e arguing 
against how someone l i v e s t h e i r l i f e ; degenerate t h e o r i s i n g (which i s t o become 
an important idea i n Blum's work) glosses the way i n which science (and other 
kinds of knowledge) are possible only as games w i t h i n a form of l i f e . Poss-
i b i l i t y i s the e s s e n t i a l f eature here - science (as a degenerate form of 
t h e o r i s i n g , which i t may be), wants t o r u l e out other p o s s i b i l i t i e s yet these 
are the very f e a t u r e s of language which make IT p o s s i b l e . 
Science (as a degenerate form of t h e o r i s i n g ) claims t o re-present the world. 
Nominalist and Re a l i s t arguments both proceed from an acceptance of the premise 
t h a t language i s a medium by means of which ' r e a l i t y ' (which i s not i n question) 
i s re-presented, or made present again, as i f there were a p r i o r sense i n which 
i t could be present before language d i d i t s work. I n c o n t r a s t , Blum wants t o 
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argue t h a t t h e o r i s i n g cannot be r e s t r i c t e d by science's attempts t o r u l e what 
counts as knowledge; r a t h e r , what counts as knowledge i s problematic because 
of the r u l e of science. I n the o r i g i n a r y grammar, t h e o r i s i n g as a p u r s u i t of 
knowledge was taken as a means t o escape from ignorance. In t r y i n g t o r u l e 
knowledge, science has t r i e d t o r u l e language; l i k e humpty dumpty, words w i l l 
mean j u s t what science says they mean. The st r u g g l e here i s p o l i t i c a l , and 
the r u l e o f science i s to proceed from i t s r u l e of grammar; j u s t what words 
mean, what they can do, how important they are, how they are t o be used. I f 
science i s t o be master, i t aims to be ' t h e o l o g i c a l ' , ( 1 3 ) . I t s l o g i c i s to 
be the d e i t y . 
Blum has pointed out, then t h a t science can deal only w i t h one aspect of the 
p u r s u i t of knowledge; th a t i t i s part of a form of l i f e , r ather than i t - s e l f 
a form o f l i f e , and i s thus one language game amongst others; and t h a t i t t r i e s , 
i n t r y i n g t o r u l e what we can see as v a l i d knowledge, t o gloss the very features 
which make IT p o s s i b l e , as a way of speaking. 
Now, one way of speaking would be t o take, as i t s p o i n t , what t h a t , as an 
occasion o f someone speaking, does NOT say, but p r e c i s e l y what makes i t poss-
i b l e ; i f i t e x i s t s because of i t s place amongst other language games, what i s 
i t s r e l a t i o n t o those other language games, what IS i t s place? I n Blum's 
terms, the question then becomes - what s o r t of things does t h i s t a l k 'gloss' 
(cover over)? His answer i s t h a t what i s covered over are p r e c i s e l y those 
aspects of the o r i g i n a r y grammar of t h e o r i s i n g which are present i n i t s class-
i c a l uses; i e . , ' s e l f , 'search' and 'wonder' (or audience/spectator). (14) 
Note, t h i s i s not a c r i t i q u e , save o f the degenerate tendencies which we can 
f i n d i n some of the usages of science. In p o i n t i n g to some of the features of 
t h e o r i s i n g which such degenerate usages would gloss, he would see himself as 
r e t u r n i n g t o t h a t which gives science i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , r a t h e r than denying i t s 
v a l i d i t y . Thus, while the concrete forms of science would lead us away from 
the a n a l y t i c concerns which ground them, he would lead us away from the r u l e 
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of form over the a n a l y t i c , and toward the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which ground such 
en t e r p r i s e s (as science, or mathematical t h i n k i n g ) . His reading of t h e o r i s i n g 
p r a c t i c e s i s thus t o be taken as supplying us w i t h a way t o read them. I f we 
are t o say o f t h e o r i s i n g t h a t i t expresses the "Weltanschauung" of the t h e o r i s t , 
then we must take t h i s s e r i o u s l y . We can, of course, operate w i t h t h i s p r i n -
c i p l e i n what i s , a n a l y t i c a l l y , a t r i v i a l way, so tha t when we read, we re-
i n t e r p r e t purely i n terms of ascribed m o t i v a t i o n s , or i n t e r e s t s ; "Oh yes, he 
said t h i s because he was a bourgeois i n t e l l e c t u a l / M a r x i s t / c a r salesman ecc." 
Bias i s not, Blum argues, t o serve merely as the determining feature of speech, 
f o r s u r e l y i f we can recognise t h a t a l l w r i t i n g expresses Bias, then there 
must be a way o f w r i t i n g which attends t o i t as a necessary feature of a l l 
discourse (see here, f o r instance, Rosen's discussion of i r o n y ) . Indeed, Blum 
argues t h a t since i t i s a necessary feature of a l l w r i t i n g , any claim that i t 
could be otherwise i s an absurd claim. 
A l l speaking i s the adoption of a perspective; to attempt t o speak the t r u t h 
about the w o r l d , t h e r e f o r e , must simultaneously be an attempt t o come t o terms 
w i t h the necessary f a i l u r e of any such e n t e r p r i s e . Speaking t h e r e f o r e becomes 
the attempt t o d i s p l a y what makes i t imperfect; that i s , the attempt to make 
the audience t h i n k through what animates the speech. Reading i s t h e r e f o r e a 
r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n which the t e x t i s the occasion f o r what the t h e o r i s t can 
make of the place of the speech w i t h i n the language games ( p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) which 
animate i t . 
Thus, there can be no ' d e f i n i t i v e ' meaning o f a t e x t , i n the sense t h a t any 
speech cannot ( f i n a l l y ) be taken as only ' r e a l l y ' meaning t h i s or t h a t . Rather, 
the problem o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r i s e s from the endemic features of language, f o r 
which there are no s o l u t i o n s , no r e p a i r s t o be made. I t s im p e r f e c t i o n i s i t s 
nature, and the search f o r p e r f e c t i o n i s f o o l i s h ( 15). Speech must remain t r u e 
t o i t s nature ( i n d e x i c a l , p e r s p e c t i v a l , flawed, i m p e r f e c t ) ; how then can we 
also accomplish knowledge, given these features? 
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Blum argues t h a t we accomplish t h i s by at t e n d i n g t o those features of speech 
which are not r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l , those features of speech which are not i n 
speeches, but stand as the reasons why speech can be; the p r a c t i c e s , methods, 
uses, which make up the foundation of being able t o use a word t o mean j u s t 
what i t does mean, o r , more p a r t i c u l a r l y , the background of p r a c t i c e s o f usage 
which make i t p ossible f o r a word, as used, t o have the p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t i t 
does have as a resource i n any a c t i v i t y of which i t could be a p a r t . While 
any speaking has a p o i n t i n a language game (see the discussion of G a r f i n k e l , 
l a s t chapter, on the purposes of speech, and i n d i f f e r e n c e ) , while seeing t h i s 
point i s one k i n d of a c t i v i t y i n terms of what might be done w i t h the speech, 
i t i s by no means a l l t h a t might be done. Think o f A u s t i n , and the notion of 
performative utterances again. 
I f t h e o r i s i n g about a t e x t i s a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of one-self, r e f o r m u l a t i o n i s 
expression i n another (an-other) form. Theorising i s thus making speech what 
the audience must make of i t , c o ncretely; w h ile what makes his speech possible 
( h i m - s e l f ) i s what animates the speech, t h i s becomes transformed i n t o what any-
one would have t o know i n order t o understand the speech. I n consequence, the 
speech as a dis p l a y of s e l f disappears i n a concrete reading of the speech, and 
the author disappears f o r the audience; h i s author-ship, h i s a u t h o r - l t y (the 
common norms t o which the speech attends) i s una v a i l a b l e t o the audience 
p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as his speech depends on i t not being possible f o r the aud-
ience to make what grounds h i s speech a t o p i c f o r t h e i r speech, s i n c e , i n a 
concrete reading, words mean what everyone knows t h a t they mean. Thus, argument 
proceeds from the attempt of t h i s view of t h e o r i s i n g t o r u l e the audience, t o 
be what 'anyone' would understand. I t s f r u i t l e s s n e s s proceeds from the i l l u s o r y 
nature of i t s f i n a l g o a l , which i s perf e c t speech. 
Rather than seeing argumentation surrounding the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f agreement as 
the necessary product of speech, Blum p r e f e r s to avoid t h i s by seeing the task 
of t h e o r i s i n g as r a t h e r t o celebrate the ways i n which each and every occasion 
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of t h e o r i s i n g i s also a display of the resources upon which the a b i l i t y t o 
t h e o r i s e i n f a c t depends. To t h i s end, t h e o r i s i n g then becomes the oppor-
t u n i t y t o celebrate bias, t o f i n d ways of reading which make reference t o 
p o s s i b i l i t y as the resource upon which 'concrete' or ' s t i p u l a t i v e • t h e o r i s i n g 
i n f a c t depends. 
Argumentation proceeding from the goal of p e r f e c t speech i s f u t i l e , f o r Blum, 
since i t does not address what should be the tru e aim of t h e o r i s i n g - i t 
aims at producing agreement, r a t h e r than r e l i e v i n g the sickness of ignorance. 
Truth i s equated w i t h agreement. I t does not recognise what i t s speech shows, 
but seeks t o impose what i t s speech says. Thus: 
" i n my version of t h e o r i s i n g , t h e o r i s i n g i s the methodic 
search f o r the c o l l e c t i v e t h a t i t presupposes (the form 
of l i f e ) . From my perspective, any other conception of 
t h e o r i s i n g i s degenerate, concrete, and p r a c t i c a l , since 
i t l o c a t e s i t s own j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n terms of the services 
i t renders, i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o other concrete selves, i t s 
e f f e c t s upon the audience; t o formulate one's s e l f as an 
achievement of t h e o r i s i n g i s t o render one's common-sense 
audience i r r e l e v a n t , i t i s to destroy the audience f o r 
one's theory". (16) 
I f we dispense w i t h the necessity of agreement, then the audience becomes 
( a n a l y t i c a l l y ) i r r e l e v a n t i n the production o f any theory, f o r the aim i s not 
to persuade t h i s audience t o see the speech i n terms of what i t says, but 
ra t h e r t o enable the audience t o t h i n k through what the speech means f o r them-
selves. Thus, he i s not saying t h a t we should, i n the concrete form of our 
speech, abdicate the i n e v i t a b l e f u n c t i o n of communication (and hence the poss-
i b l e occasion f o r the agreement of o t h e r ) but r a t h e r t h a t we see the p o i n t of 
w r i t i n g as an a n a l y t i c occasion t o e x p l i c a t e the grounds of our speech f o r 
ourselves, so t h a t i t stands, simultaneously, as both an occasion on which we 
can say something about ourselves, as we uncover the form of l i f e which enables 
us t o speak ( i n our understanding), and also an occasion on which we provide 
the means f o r others to f i n d i n the speech, more than i t says as a speech (17). 
I f the audience i s t o be i r r e l e v a n t , a n a l y t i c a l l y , then i t i s very much con-
c r e t e l y r e l e v a n t . A n a l y t i c ends f o r the t h e o r i s t are contained i n the n o t i o n 
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t h a t , i f the speech were t o be taken as an occasion f o r the agreement of the 
audience, then a concrete reading would betray the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the speech 
as an a n a l y t i c occasion f o r them. Refusing t o take the audience s e r i o u s l y 
( i n the sense th a t the speech does not aim f o r t h e i r agreement) recommends 
to the audience t h a t they f i n d i n the occasion of the speech as t h e o r i s i n g 
an o p p o r t u n i t y t o refuse t o take the speech as a concrete speech s e r i o u s l y , 
to refuse t o l e t i t r u l e them. Thus, making the audience a n a l y t i c a l l y i r r e l -
evant serves t o open up the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the speech as an occasion f o r 
undressing language, f o r showing the way i n which each and every occasion of 
speaking ( t h e o r i s i n g ) presents the op p o r t u n i t y f o r f i n d i n g i n the reading a 
way t o discover the conventions (grammar) which enables us t o read, and the 
work t h a t reading i s , as reading. As a dramatic device, we might say, the 
need t o make the audience i r r e l e v a n t i t i r o n i c i n t h a t i t focusses a t t e n t i o n 
upon the a c t i v e r o l e of the audience i n making of the t e x t what i t does i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways, make of i t , r a t h e r than, as i n persuasive speech, denying 
t h i s r o l e by not a l l o w i n g the audience t o be anything but a passive receptacle 
f o r the speech. 
The speech i s thus t o recommend t h a t the audience t h i n k through the p o s s i b i l i -
t i e s upon which sense making depends, r a t h e r than attempting t o overcome the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y by imposing the r u l e of one set of a u t h o r i t a t i v e s t i p u l a t i o n s as 
to those p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Rather than glossing the way i n which speech con-
c r e t e l y s t i p u l a t e s those p o s s i b i l i t i e s , Blum proposes t h a t we make one such 
attempt t o r u l e i n t o the t o p i c of our speech, r a t h e r than r e l y i n g on i t as an 
unexplicated resource. I n the e x p l i c a t i o n of the conventions upon which i t s 
sense making depends, we are provided w i t h , c o n c r e t e l y , a speaking of the 
commonsense knowledge of the author, but at the same time, t o address the 
usages which enable such a s t i p u l a t i o n t o make sense i s t o address simultan-
eously s e l f and community, f o r the community i s part o f the s e l f i n s o f a r as 
any user of language i s simultaneously a f o l l o w e r of the p u b l i c r u l e s under 
which language i s language ( i e . , how i t can mean what we want i t t o mean). 
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In terms of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , Blum argues th a t the deductive model of 
t h e o r i s i n g destroys, as i t imposes concrete l i t e r a l n e s s onto occasions of 
usage, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of sociology as a form of l i f e , since the " t h e o r e t i c 
impulse i n sociology i s an achievement i n e x p l i c a t i n g and showing a socio-
l o g i c a l conception o f the w o r l d " . I n t i e i n g sociology t o one ve r s i o n of 
t h e o r i s i n g as a p r a c t i c e , the deductive model denies the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g serving as a means t o pursue the o r i g i n a r y aims of 
t h e o r i s i n g , which are nonetheless p a t e n t l y relevant i n terms of i t s h i s t o r i c 
t h e o r e t i c a l discussion of i t s t h e o r e t i c a l grounds (18). While t h e o r i s i n g 
concretely produces methods f o r seeing the world i n a p a r t i c u l a r way (socio-
l o g i c a l l y ) , and "the possible s o c i e t y i s a method f o r ... r e c o n s t i t u t i n g a 
form o f l i f e as s e l f " , i t i s also the case t h a t doing so SHOWS a s o c i o l o g i c a l 
conception of the w o r l d . That i s t o say, i n f o r m u l a t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t o 
t h e o r i e s (as t h e o r i e s ) we express our-selves i n the medium which i s the form 
of l i f e (language); at the same time, the expression a f f o r d s the a n a l y t i c 
occasion f o r seeing what i t i s t o conceive of the world s o c i o l o g i c a l l y . The 
possible society formulated by t h e o r i s i n g i n t h i s case i s a method f o r prod-
ucing a t h e o r e t i c ACTOR, since i t i s the grammar of t h i s t h e o r e t i c a c t o r which 
imparts t o t h i s world i t s s o c i o l o g i c a l character. 
Each t h e o r e t i c f o r m u l a t i o n produces a possible s o c i e t y ; i t i s simultaneously, 
i n i t - s e l f an expression of the actor who produces i t (a dis p l a y of h i s •mind' 
or membership) and as such contains as i t s ground the grammar of s o c i o l o g i s i n g 
i n s o f a r as i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e as sociology to a community of p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
In t h i s way, p o t e n t i a l l y , the s t i p u l a t i o n s which i t makes a f f o r d a method i n 
that they are themselves possible t o p i c s f o r speech t o e x p l i c a t e the form o f 
l i f e i n which they make sense ( l i t e r a l l y ) and t h i s form of l i f e i s sociology. 
For Blum, then, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g t o be r e f l e x i v e 
consists i n the need t o r e f e r the reader o f i t s t h e o r i e s t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
which make i t sensible. I t must make reference t o i t - s e l f i n th a t the reader 
i s d i r e c t e d toward the conventions which ground i t as usage. 
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Blum i s not denying the aims of standard (deductive) t h e o r i s i n g , i t supplies 
c o n d i t i o n s under which i t makes sense t o read i t as an e x p l a n a t i o n / d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the a c t i o n t o which i t i s d i r e c t e d , i t i s a transforming i n the way that 
i t i s read of the obj e c t t o which i t i s d i r e c t e d so th a t i t i s seen by the 
reader i n t h i s way. Now, Blum argues, a l l language does t h i s , i n e v i t a b l y , i n 
des c r i b i n g the world, we produce an i m p l i c i t argument f o r our d e s c r i p t i o n as 
a way of seeing. However, t o see one special f o r m u l a t i o n as d i s t o r t i o n invo-
lves us i n claiming something about the p r a c t i c a l basis of common usage, r a t h e r 
than the v e r i d i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a l l usage. Such attempts are t o be 
r e s i s t e d , and t h e i r claims denied, f o r the reasons already o u t l i n e d , but we 
should recognise t h a t t h i s does not proceed from a d e n i a l of the p r a c t i c e , but 
rathe r from i t s i m p e r i a l i s t ( e m p i r - i c a l ) ambitions, t o r u l e a l l discourse. 
Rather, he wants t o say, t h i s kind of t h e o r i s i n g , or any o t h e r , i s an e l e c t i o n , 
i n t h a t we make i t as we c l a i m f o r any s t i p u l a t i o n or d e s c r i p t i o n , a u t h o r i t y 
(our warrant as competent members) grounds other than those which attend t o 
the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of the grammar which grounds the usage. This i s t o say, 
the deductive model denies the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the phenomena as an occasion 
f o r a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i s i n g ; i n s o f a r as any concrete t h e o r i s i n g r e l i e s on such 
a d e n i a l , i n the way th a t i t trades upon the conventions which enable i t t o 
make sense, argumentation proceeds from concrete reading. 
Rather than seeing a phenomenon as an occasion on which to formulate a way of 
seeing the context, events, r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the elements, e t c . , (as, f o r 
instance, i n the p u r s u i t of general law, deduction, or e x p l a n a t i o n ) , Blum 
argues f o r each phenomenon as an occasion of i n t e r e s t , as an o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
r e - c a l l from the corpus o f knowledge which we already possess the d i s t i n c t i v e -
ness of the grammar which makes i t possible f o r i t t o be t h a t phenomenon or 
occasion o f i n t e r e s t . Thus, s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i s to be"a r e t u r n t o 
t h e o r i s i n g apart from science", as the attempt t o heal the disease of u n t h i n k i n g 
speech, speech which speaks without re-cognising what makes i t possible f o r i t 
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t o speak. 
Again, t h i s i s taken t o be i n accord w i t h Wittgenstein's a t t a c k on r e d u c t i o n -
ism; each f o r m u l a t i o n o f a possible s o c i e t y ( a c t i o n of t h e o r i s i n g ) i s a b r i n g i n 
t o mind o f what i s already i n the corpus of knowledge of the t h e o r i s t . I t i s 
not something new, t o be e m p i r i c a l l y found t o be t h e r e ; r a t h e r , i t i s the task 
of t h e o r i s i n g , f o r Blum, to r e - c a l l the methods which the possible s o c i e t y 
( i n f a c t ) IS, i n order to see i t AS a d e s c r i p t i o n grounded i n the p a r t i c u l a r 
form of l i f e . We have already discussed Mannheim's account of the problematic 
of the sociology of knowledge; i n terms o f t h a t argument, we can see t h a t , f o r 
Blum, the m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n which t h e o r i s i n g takes place must be 
accepted, there i s no sense i n which he could be taken as arguing f o r possible 
transcendental concerns, or basic c o n s t i t u t i v e processes. (Again, i n terms o f 
Mannheim's account, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o locate Blum's account i n terms of 
what Mannheim discusses as possible responses t o the problem of c o n d i t i o n -
a l l y . ) (19) 
The e x p l i c a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the s t i p u l a t i o n s which make up the 
possible s o c i e t y ("state-ments") means a r e t u r n t o the communal resources 
which make up the a c t i v i t y ( o f f o r m u l a t i n g the possible s o c i e t y ) , possible. 
This does not require ' f a c t s ' of the kind most accounting does; the possible 
s o c i e t y as a method i s t o be seen as a r e d e s c r i p t i o n , r a t h e r than an explan-
a t i o n . That i s to. say, the features o f the method are t o be found i n the 
f o r m u l a t i o n . 
For conventional Sociology, then, t h i s has the consequence t h a t : 
"For our purposes, then, whether or not some d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f an event can be converted i n t o premises c o n t a i n i n g 
l a w l i k e statements, e t c . , i s i r r e l e v a n t , f o r i t c e r t a i n l y 
can be accomplished. The p o i n t i s , r a t h e r , why we as 
s o c i o l o g i s t s should e l e c t t o proceed i n such a way. What 
compelling reasons could p o s s i b l y be o f f e r e d t h a t could 
induce us t o abandon our worlds and our h i s t o r y ? " (20) 
For Blum, then, t h e o r i s i n g as a response to the problem of accounting the 
world involves a choice, since i t i n v o l v e s a question about the e x i s t e n t i a l 
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c o n d i t i o n o f the t h e o r i s t . As conceived by conventional sociology, i n h e r i t i n g 
the concerns o f mathematical and s c i e n t i f i c world views, t h i s i s not apparent, 
since these world views are i m p e r i a l i s t - they claim to r u l e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
f o r legitimate/competent accounting. Thus, accounting does not proceed from 
a r e c o g n i t i o n o f choice, but from appeals to arguments about which i s the best 
way t o l i v e , which ( c o n c r e t e l y ) i s the best form of possible s o c i e t y ( s t a t e -
ment). Here we f i n d the relevance of Rosen's comments on Plato's work as an 
' e x i s t e n t i a l p o r t r a i t ' . 
C l e a r l y , there are strong echoes o f W i t t g e n s t e i n here. The philosopher, f o r 
W i t t g e n s t e i n , pursues the questions of metaphysics, e t h i c s , and l o g i c without 
considering the way i n which h i s language contains i n i t s e l f the very s t r u c t u r e s 
he i s s t r u g g l i n g w i t h - he i s l i k e an a l i e n , confronted w i t h a strange tongue, 
when he f i n d s t h a t h i s language w i l l not produce what he wants i t co. I n 
d i r e c t i n g the philosopher back to the way i n which language i s used, Wittgen-
s t e i n aims t o fre e him from h i s "bewitchment". 
I t would seem t h a t , f o r Blum, the s o c i o l o g i s t shares i n t h i s bewitchment when 
he attempt t o see i n t h e o r i s i n g one way of making the language o f sociology 
capture the world. Theorising i n v o l v e s , r a t h e r , f o r Blum, the attempt t o show 
the methods by which a t h e o r i s t creates an idea. I f i t i s t o be r e f l e x i v e , i t 
must attend t o the ways i n which i t i s possible t o create an idea (as methods, 
how the form o f l i f e i n which i t operates). 
S o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , as a production of a possible s o c i e t y , shows what i t 
i s t o produce statements which make sense i n terms of sociology as a form of 
l i f e . This i s t o say t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g provides f o r i t s e l f as a 
p r a c t i c e the ways i n which the reader can competently warrant the account which 
i t produces as an instance o f the speech produced by members o f the possible 
community of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s e r s . A showing of the ways i n which i t i s 
possible t o be s o c i o l o g i c a l means an a t t e n t i o n t o the way i n which any formul-
a t i o n of a p o s s i b i l i t y ( i n conceiving o f a s o c i a l o b j e c t ) achieves the a n a l y t i c 
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meaning ( o f the o b j e c t ) only i n s o f a r as, as a method, i t describes the lang-
uage (as an instance of usage, of the r u l e s and auspices under which members 
of t h i s world can be seen to be making sense). 
That i s t o say, i n t h e o r i s i n g we formulate what kind of language must be 
spoken - what the language of the audience i s - i n order t h a t the speech be 
sensible. As an instance of r u l e - u s i n g a c t i v i t y , t h e o r i s i n g i s only able t o 
construct a sensible e d i f i c e i n terms of the r u l e s and grammar of the p r o j e c t e d 
audience, f o r , t o stand as an instance o f competent ( r e a l , s e r ious) author-
i t a t i v e speaking, i t r e l i e s on a d i s p l a y of recognised accomplishment i n the 
gaze of i t s p r o j e c t e d audience. 
This, f o r Blum, i s what r e f l e x i v i t y i s about; an expansion o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
o f seeing, a grasp of the way i n which concreteness l i m i t s the ways i n which 
i t i s possible t o be said to know. R e f l e x i v i t y i s an elected response of the 
t h e o r i s t i n the face of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f f e r e d by communities of language 
users - an a l t e r n a t i v e (freedom) to the imperialism of competing s i n g l e ways 
of accounting. 
While Blum i s c e r t a i n l y not o r i g i n a l i n posing the problem of r e f l e x i v i t y as 
an issue o f e x i s t e n t i a l choice, there do seem to be s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s 
between h i s v e r s i o n of the r e f l e x i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and those who have taken 
up the mantle o u t l i n e d by Mannheim (see below). Before attempting t o draw 
out some o f the d e t a i l s of his proposed method o f a n a l y s i s , I would l i k e t o 
o f f e r some t h i n g more recognisable as the standard s o c i o l o g i c a l response t o 
t h i s issue. I propose t o look at the version o f r e f l e x i v i t y produced by 
A l v i n Gouldner, and popularised i n h i s "The Coming C r i s i s of Western Sociology". 
A l v i n Gouldner and the Problem of R e f l e x i v i t y ; P o l i t i c s and Sociology 
"The Coming C r i s i s of Western Sociology" (21) had a great deal of i n f l u e n c e 
when i t f i r s t appeared. I t presented, among other t h i n g s , a strong and c l e a r 
a t t a c k on the bulk of what had been, f o r some years, the r u l i n g paradigm i n 
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sociology, Parsonian s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m . I n s o f a r as some of i t s 
c r i t i c i s m s were r e l e v a n t , and were eagerly seized upon by opponents of passive 
scientism, the use t o which they were put tended t o avoid the serious c r i t i c a l 
s c r u t i n y t o which they ought to have been subject. I w i l l not be concerned 
t o produce an exhaustive c r i t i q u e of Gouldner's work here, but w i l l concen-
t r a t e on h i s version of r e f l e x i v i t y . 
"To be e x p l i c i t , I believe t h a t having spent so much 
time baring the assumptions i n the work of oth e r s , 
I should now do the same i n my own work ... Presumably 
I should now be able t o dissect myself; i d e a l l y , and 
without defensiveness or s e l f f l a g e l l a t i o n I should be 
able t o o u t l i n e my own major assumptions i n some 
modestly coherent manner, i f not evaluate them. But 
I also believe t h a t such an e f f o r t i s doomed t o f a i l u r e . 
For no man can be h i s own c r i t i c and i n pretending t h a t 
he can, he promises t o d e l i v e r f a r more than he r e a l l y 
wants. S t i l l , some s e l f knowledge i s p o s s i b l e , and i f 
I make the e f f o r t t o d i s c l o s e my op e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s , 
while warning o f the d i s t o r t i o n and incompleteness t o 
which t h i s i s su b j e c t , I may render i t easier f o r my 
c r i t i c s t o perform t h e i r own task". (22) 
Gouldner c a r r i e s on t o say t h a t i t must be possible t h a t his theory (character 
i s i n g the convergence between f u n c t i o n a l i s m and Marxism) i s merely the pr o j e c -
t i o n of h i s own ambitions, 
"... a fantasy f u l f i l l m e n t o f my own wishes, a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
o f my own values, and indeed o f my own existence" (23) 
but i f we suppose t h i s t o be t r u e , i t does not f o l l o w t h a t what has been said 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y a d i s t o r t i o n of the t r u t h about sociology. There i s no way 
t h a t men can approach t r u t h or falsehood but by t h e i r s o c i a l l y shaped exper-
iences of the world; but 
"Whether or not any work presents us w i t h r e a l i t y or 
i l l u s i o n cannot be determined by knowing his l i f e 
t h a t the t h i n k e r has l e d . I n the end, t h i s can be 
appraised only by l o o k i n g at the work alone, and not 
the l i f e ; the work can be judged only i n terms of 
the standards appropriate t o i t , and by seeing how 
w e l l i t bears up under c r i t i c i s m " . (24) 
He goes on t o argue t h a t what understanding the r o o t i n g of the work i n the 
l i v e s and time of those who produced i t can do i s enable us t o see why i t 
takes the form t h a t i t does take, why i t i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h a t which i t speaks 
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about. Truth value, f o r Gouldner, i s thus not determined by s o c i a l experience 
(the c o n d i t i o n s of production) but i t i s teste d (assessed) by the way i n which 
the work stands up t o the canons o f c r i t i c i s m and argument embodied i n the 
corpus of knowledge t o which i t i s d i r e c t e d , the t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n which i t 
locates i t s e l f * 
Gouldner believes t h a t i t i s impossible t o understand how s o c i a l theory i s 
a c t u a l l y made i n terms of the assumptions which pre-judge what i s an e m p i r i c a l 
question. This empirical question i s (presumably) t o be addressed byj 
"... s t a r t i n g w i t h the very p r i m i t i v e assumption 
t h a t theory i s made by the pra x i s of men i n a l l 
t h e i r wholeness, and i s shaped by the l i v e s they 
lead and pursuing t h i s i n t o concrete e m p i r i c a l 
contexts". (25) 
To do t h i s i s t o grasp t h a t " t h e o r i s t s are entrenched i n t h e i r t h e o r i e s " ; t h i s 
'entrenchment' i s taken t o consist of c e r t a i n f a c t s , derived from t h e i r 
personal experience, which are so rooted i n t h e i r personal r e a l i t y , that they 
are un-doubtable t o those who hold them. He gives examples - the French 
Revolution, the r i s e of Socialism, the great Depression, a d v e r t i s i n g , sales-
manship; these are 'taken f o r granted* unproblematic f u r n i t u r e on the con-
sciousness of t h i s , t h a t o r the other s o c i a l t h e o r i s t . 
For Gouldner, what i s at issue i s not the determination of these ' f a c t s ' , but 
how we are t o order them; what i s t o be t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the accounts 
produced by those who subscribe t o , and t h e r e f o r e , presumably, act on the 
basis o f , t h e i r absolute r e l i a b i l i t y and unquestioned f a c t i c i t y . 
"Social t h e o r i s i n g ... i s o f t e n a search f o r the meaning 
of the pers o n a l l y r e a l , t h a t which i s already assumed t o 
be known through personal experience". (26) 
(Compare t h i s w i t h Cavell's comments on reminding ourselves of what we already 
know, or Rosen's comments on t h e o r i s i n g as an e x i s t e n t i a l p o r t r a i t , or Blum's 
n o t i o n of t h e o r i s i n g as " s e l f f o r m u l a t i o n " ) . 
Gouldner wants t o say tha t t h i s search f o r the meaning of the personally r e a l 
167o 
i s simultaneously an attempt t o incorporate w i t h i n t h a t r e a l i t y (as a normative 
order) s o c i a l events or processes which he takes t o be p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g 
to the values which i t embodies. This i s a ver s i o n of t h e o r i s i n g as sense 
tr a n s f o r m a t i o n ; t h e o r i s i n g here comes t o be how r e a l i t y must be seen i n order 
f o r i t t o make sense, how the world i s t o be produced so as t o correspond t o 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e s of the t h e o r i s t s l i f e - w o r l d . 
Theorising i s thus always a s e l e c t i v e o r d e r i n g of the ' f a c t s of experience', 
w i t h i n normative frameworks determined by the 'personally r e a l ' . T h e o r i s t s , 
since they cannot stand outside of t h i s process, must seek t o discover the 
conditions under which t h i s process takes place. For Gouldner, t h i s i s achieved 
by arguing f o r the values of one way of seeing against others. This has 
become, then, an argument about the moral worth of ways of l i v i n g . 
Gouldner's famous a r t i c l e , "Anti-Minotaur; the myth o f a value free s o c i o l o g y " , 
expresses the concerns behind t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n . What he obj e c t s to i n such 
an attempt: 
"... i s not t h a t the t h e o r i s t f a i l s t o s i t u a t e h i s 
s o c i a l o b j e c t s along a good-bad dimension, but only 
t h a t t h i s assignment, having been co n v e n t i o n a l l y 
defined as i r r e l e v a n t t o h i s task, i s now de-focalised 
and done c o v e r t l y rather than being openly accomplished". (27) 
Theorising i n v o l v e s , (he notes), i n the way t h a t i t c o v e r t l y manipulates i t s 
value basis the i n t r i n s i c p o s s i b i l i t y o f i d e o l o g i s i n g the r e l a t i o n s between 
the dimensions of any accounted s o c i a l o b j e c t ; t h a t i s to say, i n dealing w i t h 
s o c i a l events the "norm-alising process" c o v e r t l y superimposes an i d e o l o g i c a l 
defence/apology on t o r e a l i t y , as r e a l i t y e x i s t s over and above attempts at 
formulating t h e o r i e s t o account f o r i t . 
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s as an irremediable f e a t u r e of a l l t h e o r i s i n g i s 
proposed t o be the f a c t t h a t : 
"... i t i s extremely p a i n f u l and t h r e a t e n i n g f o r a man 
t o believe t h a t what i s powerful i n society i s not good. 
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This creates an unacceptable tension i n the basic 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of meaning i n the wor l d ; i t can be 
resolved e i t h e r by r e - a l i g n i n g goodness w i t h power 
or by concentrating on power while l e a v i n g aside 
the question of goodness". (28) 
Obviously, a l l s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s can become accountable f o r i n the way i n 
which they deal w i t h questions of goodness and potency, or i n the way i n which 
they leave them out of co n s i d e r a t i o n . The question i s framed so th a t theor-
i s i n g comes t o be seen as a way of accounting these dimensions. Theorising 
made by "man i n a l l h i s wholeness" i n c o n t r a s t , takes as i t s concern the way 
i n which these issues are dealt w i t h , and the consequences th a t t h i s has, w i t h 
the caveat: 
" I t i s intended only as an example of the p r o d u c t i v i t y 
of such a standpoint; i t was not intended to assign any 
exceptional s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the power-goodness dissonance 
i n comparison w i t h other f o i c e s , or to enumerate the 
v a r i e t y of theory shaping forces mentioned ( i n the course 
of the work); and i t was c e r t a i n l y not intended t o present 
a systematic s o c i a l theory about the e x t r a - s c i e n t i f i c 
forces at work i n s o c i a l theory. The pre s e n t a t i o n of 
th a t theory w i l l have to wait f o r a l a t e r work". (29) 
His work at t h i s p o i n t i s simply t o c o n s t i t u t e a 'case study', and the "theory 
of Social Theories" (which i s t o be c o n s t i t u t e d on the basis of such case 
studies) concerns i t s e l f w i t h what s o c i o l o g i s t s want t o do, and w i t h what they 
a c t u a l l y do. This i s not t o be simply an e m p i r i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of l i v e s and 
times, but: 
"... a transformation o f the s o c i o l o g i s t ... p e n e t r a t i n g 
deeply i n t o h i s d a i l y l i f e and work, e n r i c h i n g them w i t h 
new s e n s i b i l i t i e s and r a i s i n g the s o c i o l o g i s t s ' s e l f 
awareness to a new h i s t o r i c a l l e v e l " . (30) 
The s o c i o l o g i s t i s 'self-aware' ( r e f l e x i v e ) only i n s o f a r as he i s r a d i c a l . 
The question the s o c i o l o g i s t must confront i s how t o l i v e . We must develop: 
"... the ingrained h a b i t of viewing our own b e l i e f s as 
we now view those of others". (31) 
We must u n i t e w i t h our audience (whom we study as sub j e c t s , and w r i t e f o r ) and 
no longer i n s i s t on the s u p e r i o r i t y of our systems of l o g i c and b e l i e f . 
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This programme i s t o incorporate an emp i r i c a l research p r o j e c t accompanied by 
a campaign of moral s e l f awareness, the embodiment and advance of s p e c i f i c 
values, a p u r s u i t of knowledge which deepens the s e l f awareness of the t h e o r i s t 
o f who and what he i s i n a s p e c i f i c society at any given time, and how both 
h i s s o c i a l r o l e and h i s personal p r a x i s a f f e c t s h i s work as a s o c i o l o g i s t ; at 
the same time, t h i s w i l l be a search f o r both a t e c h n i c a l means to achieve 
v a l i d and r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n about the world and a commitment t o the value 
of openness i n r e l a t i o n t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f r e v i s i n g h i s way of seeing i n 
response t o new f a c t s , ideas and m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s . The s o c i o l o g i s t s ' s e l f 
i s t o be transformed so t h a t i t recognises the way that i t s way of seeing i s , 
or should be open t o using i n f o r m a t i o n ' h o s t i l e ' t o i t . 
In s h o r t , the question o f s o c i a l research, i s the question of Praxis. Gouldner 
c a l l s f o r the s o c i o l o g i s t t o recognise the r e l a t i o n between r o l e ( ' s o c i o l o g i s t ' ) 
and person ( h i s t o r y ) . He c a l l s f o r a r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of the moral standards of 
the man (the age) wi t h those of the r o l e . The s o c i o l o g i s t must change as the 
prax i s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l work transforms the s e l f of the h i s t o r i c a l man. 
I n Blumian terms, there i s c l e a r l y a key d i f f e r e n c e here; f o r Blum, the author-
i t y o f the deductive t h e o r i s t depends on h i s s e l f being interchangeable w i t h 
any-one o f h i s audience, h i s s e l f disappears from his w r i t i n g . Gouldner, i n 
c o n t r a s t , i s c a l l i n g f o r the s e l f of the t h e o r i s t t o r e t u r n t o the doing o f 
s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g ; u n l i k e Blum, however, he sees t h i s as desirable because 
of h i s b e l i e f i n the value of accounts as expressions o f s e l f . Blum sees such 
accounts, responsible as they are t o the canons of some community of t h e o r i s e r s , 
as a r e f u s a l on the p a r t of the t h e o r i s t to question the nature of a l l grounds, 
and hence, a f a i l u r e o f a n a l y t i c a l nerve. 
Gouldner's Reflexive Sociology 
"A r e f l e x i v e sociology, f o r i t s p a r t , recognises t h a t 
there i s an i n e v i t a b l e tendency f o r any s o c i a l system 
to c u r t a i l the s o c i o l o g i s t ' s autonomy i n at le a s t two 
ways; to transform him e i t h e r i n t o an ideologue of the 
status quo and an a p o l o g i s t f o r i t s p o l i c i e s , or i n t o 
a t e c h n i c i a n a c t i n g i n s t r u m e n t a l l y on behalf o f i t s 
i n t e r e s t s " . (32) 
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Sociology's quest f o r knowledge, he p o i n t s o u t , i s d i s t o r t e d i n the very act 
of s e t t i n g up any resources f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , since these must 
be c o n t r o l l e d and any use of them must be accountable. 
Sociology i s thus d i s t o r t e d by i . the nature of i t s subject matter 
i i . i t s methodologies 
i i i . i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g . 
"Every Social System i s bent upon c r i p p l i n g the very 
sociology t o which i t gives b i r t h " . (33) 
To be r e f l e x i v e , Sociology must i . recognise t h a t i t i s biased 
i i . commit i t s e l f to values, which i t makes 
e x p l i c i t 
i i i . recognise i t s l o c a t i o n i n h i s t o r i c a l 
processes which may in v o l v e i t s knowledge 
becoming redundant at any time. 
For Gouldner, a r e f l e x i v e sociology ( a t t h i s time) must be r a d i c a l sociology. 
R e f l e x i v i t y becomes a v a i l a b l e only i n the commitment to r a d i c a l values because 
of the concrete features o f the i n s t i t u t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s e t t i n g 
of sociology. To be other than r a d i c a l i s to become h e i r t o the i l l s of 
society w i t h i t s d i s t o r t i o n s and i d e o l o g i s a t i o n s . This ( r a d i c a l i s m ) i s not 
only t o be c r i t i c a l o f the ' r e a l ' world but fundamentally o f i t s e l f as a 
p r a c t i c e , i n the way t h a t i t i s done; i t i s a conception of how t o l i v e . 
Again, t h i s seems t o c o n f l i c t w i t h how Blum conceives of t h e o r i s i n g ; f o r 
Gouldner, r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g depends upon arguing about how t o l i v e one's 
l i f e , and t h i s proceeds from a c r i t i c a l awareness of the parameters o f s e l f , 
and the knowledge which the s e l f has. Blum sees such arguments as f u t i l e , 
attempts t o make our speech r u l e what can be made of i t by the audience; i f 
we avoid such unproductive argument and c o n f l i c t , we can t r y t o address what 
l i e s behind our impulse ( d e s i r e ) t o do t h i s . The good of argument l i e s only 
i n seeing what l i e s behind i t , what i s i t s beginning, what makes i t a p o s s i b i l i t 
Both conceptions of r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g t u r n , then, on the approach t o values, 
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as the source of bias. For Gouldner, t h i s i s t o be the subject of c r i t i c a l 
self-examination; f o r Blum, Bias i s t o be 'celebrated' ( 3 4 ) . The f i r s t question 
seems t o t u r n on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o r s e l f knowledge; Gouldner has s a i d , 
e f f e c t i v e l y , no-one can be t h e i r own c r i t i c - but they must t r y ; the good of 
s e l f c r i t i c i s m comes from the attempt t o know what we cannot, f i n a l l y , know -
to stand outside of o u r s e l f and see what i t i s t h a t forms our knowledge o f the 
world. The e x i s t e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n of the r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t , f o r Gouldner, then, 
i s of m i s t r u s t or doubt, even of our own c e r t a i n t y ; the r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t i s 
a sceptic. 
For Blum, the r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t seeks t o l i v e w i t h bias; he seeks t o accept 
the f a t e of human existence, while addressing what i s behind how t h a t f a t e works 
i t s e l f out i n the i n d i v i d u a l case, Since t h i s i s what i s behind the working of 
f a t e i n a l l cases. 
In the work of both t h e o r i s t s , we f i n d a usage o f the concept of grammar; I 
propose, through the examination of the work which they have both done on 
Marxist theory, t o look at the way i n which t h e i r respective approaches t o re-
f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g a c t u a l l y get done. 
Gouldner and Marxism 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g depends, i n Gouldner's work, on the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f c r i t i c i s m . One v e r s i o n of s e l f c r i t i c i s m involves seeing 
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n one's own v a l u e - r e l a t e d formulations. In a c r i t i q u e of 
Marxist theory (35) Gouldner t r i e s t o d i s p l a y t h i s k i n d o f a c t i v i t y . 
He formulates ideology as, i n an attempt to change the ( o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y o f 
the) world, a surmounting of the present i n the acceptance of a re-ordering of 
the world - and acceptance of the a u t h o r i t y of the f o r m u l a t i o n . Ideology's 
w r i t i n g must come to be read i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, i f i t i s t o be ideology. The 
a u t h o r i t y of the idea over what i t i s about derives, he believes, from a par-
t i c u l a r form o f s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n which separates theory ( i n the concrete 
form o f the i n t e l l e c t u a l s ) from p r a c t i c e ( i n the concrete form of the s o c i a l 
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world about which they t h e o r i s t ) . Gouldner wants to say that Marx did not 
recognise, i n t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s on which ideology operates. 
I n seeking t o r e - u n i f y theory and p r a c t i c e , Marx sought to reverse the objec-
t i f i c a t i o n of ideas; he sought t o formulate a theory which would t i e t h e o r i s i n g 
t o the p r a x i s of everyday l i f e . This was t o be achieved by j o i n i n g a c r i t i q u e 
of i d e a l i s t o b j e c t i v i s m at the l e v e l o f ideas. 
To be a c r i t i q u e , i t had i t s e l f t o be o b j e c t i v i s t i c ; i t c a l l e d , however, f o r a 
r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of theory and p r a c t i c e ( i n t e l l e c t u a l s and masses) which would 
not be o b j e c t i v i s t i c . 
In Marxist c r i t i q u e s of o b j e c t i v i s m , then, l i e s the c o n t r a d i c t i o n of f o r m u l a t i n g 
( i n an o b j e c t i v i s t i c t h e ory) a c r i t i q u e o f theory which does not , as a p r a x i s , 
I t s e l f involve r e - u n i f i c a t i o n f o r which i t c a l l s . The Marxist d o c t r i n e o f 
p r a x i s , then, conceals the c o n t r a d i c t o r y r o l e of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s who formulate 
i t . I t f a i l s t o d i s c u s s / c r i t i c i s e t h e i r dominance, and the way i n which they 
form an e l i t e stratum of the movement of s o c i a l i s m . 
The P r o l e t a r i a t i s thus created by a t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n of those outside o f 
i t ; s o c i a l i s m i s t o be created by those who do not f i g u r e i n i t . The theory 
formulates the world ( s o c i a l i s m ) but the world has no place f o r the t h e o r i s t s 
(the vanguard). I t needs, but cannot t r u s t , or produce, t h e o r i s t s . 
Marxism, as a theory, i s thus i t s own enemy; i t s r e v o l u t i o n must be perpetual 
since i t i s i t s e l f the i n c a r n a t i o n of a world without systematisation i n t o 
t h e o r i e s and p r a c t i c e s , ideas and o b j e c t s , e l i t e and mass. Lenin, according 
t o Gouldner, recognised t h i s i n his concept of the vanguard p a r t y , which i s t o 
b r i n g socialism i n t o being, but i s not i t s e l f p a r t of socialism. The vanguard 
pa r t y i s e v o l u t i o n a r y , r a t h e r than r e v o l u t i o n a r y ; i t brings s o c i a l i s m i n t o 
being by i n s t r u r a e n t a l i s i n g theory (focussing on i t s necessary r o l e ) and by 
transforming theory i n t o c u l t u r e , c r e a t i n g a b e l i e f system and a shared language 
i n a concrete "Weltanschauung" as a p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l necessity. 
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"Marsixm, then, l i v e s on two l e v e l s , which i s not i n 
the l e a s t t o suggest th a t i t i s two faced; nor again 
i s i t i n the l e a s t t o imply t h a t i t i s i n t h i s respect 
one whit d i f f e r e n t from normal academic sociology. There 
i s Marxism's manifest l e v e l as an e x t r a o r d i n a r y language, 
as a t e c h n i c a l theory and philosophy, as a m a t e r i a l i s m 
on behalf of working class emancipation. Marxism also 
l i v e s on a deeper l e v e l , an unconscious l e v e l not e a s i l y 
spoken i n i t s own community, i n which there i s an a b i d i n g 
commitment t o theory, t o ideas, t o generic ideology, and 
the dissonant a u t h o r i t y of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s . " (36) 
Theorising, then, creates marxism as a p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l form; but i t s theory 
c o n s t i t u t e s both a metaphorical ground (an o r i g i n a r y grammar) and a concrete 
ideology. This dual i d e n t i t y i s resolved, f o r Gouldner, i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r a d i c a l r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g , which i s c r i t i c a l i n s o f a r as i t aims to d i s p l a y 
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n inherent i n i t s productions. 
I t s primary c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t h a t i t i s both o b j e c t i v i s t and metaphorical. I t s 
m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y enables i t t o serve as a relevant theory t o diverse concrete 
s i t u a t i o n s • s o c i a l i s m ' and 'the p r o l e t a r i a t ' are not concrete s t i p u l a t i o n s , 
at t h i s l e v e l , and yet they p l a i n l y are at the l e v e l of ideology. Gouldner 
c a l l s these two l e v e l s "Technical" and "Grammatical" (or"Paleo-symbolic"). 
The former i s the l e v e l of ideology (the instrumental l e v e l at which theory 
becomes c u l t u r e ) , the l a t t e r i s the deep s t r u c t u r e which generates r u l e s or 
codes f o r t h e o r i s i n g . (His f o r m u l a t i o n consciously mimics Chomsky's n o t i o n of 
deep and surface s t r u c t u r e ) . 
Theorising i n v o l v e s , as a r e f l e x i v e e n t e r p r i s e , the re-discovery of the deep 
s t r u c t u r e , consciousness of the m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y of i t s concrete f o r m u l a t i o n s . 
Reflexive t h e o r i s i n g would imply, f o r s o c i a l i s t s , something l i k e a generative 
grammar, an attempt t o uncover the r u l e s o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n which competent 
s o c i a l i s t s employ when doing s o c i a l i s m , when t h e i r "knowledge" produces a 
surface s t r u c t u r e , a concrete instance of t h a t 'doing' ( s o c i a l i s m ) i n o p e r a t i o n . 
"The r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t s ' task i s t o help make the a c t o r s ' 
behaviour more f u l l y v i s i b l e t o him as an object of h i s 
own d e c i s i o n , choice and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , thus sharpening 
h i s r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s and c o n f r o n t i n g him as a s u b j e c t , 
w i t h h i s own dissonant o b j e c t i v i t y " . (37) 
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That i s t o say, Gouldner wants t o b r i n g about a r e - c o g n i t i o n of t h i s way of 
l i v i n g ( s o c i a l i s m ) as r u l e - d i r e c t e d , the e l e c t i o n of a conscious being ( r a t h e r 
than the o b j e c t i v i s t i c a l i e n a t i o n of the ideologue). His concern w i t h grammar 
i s as a means o f producing a "new rea l i s m " w i t h which to explore the r a t i o n a l -
i t y of so c i a l i s m - i e . , t o "understand Marxism's m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y , we must grasp 
the paleo-symbolism underpinning and a l l o w i n g c o n t i n u i t y amid the vagaries of 
Marxist p o l i t i c s ... (these being) ... the shared norms of the conretely 
d i v e r s i f i e d community of Marxist speakers". (38) 
Marx recognised, according t o Gouldner, t h a t philosophy ( t h e o r i s i n g ) i s i n the 
service o f h i s t o r y ; i t i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the philosopher ( t h e o r i s t ) t o 
be r e f l e x i v e as a means t o pre-serve both the c o n t i n u i t y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
thought (hegel and the movement toward the absolute and i t s m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y , 
and the abi d i n g l e i t m o t i f of emancipation, freedom from enslavement of m a t e r i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s , and ignorance) and the concrete h i s t o r i c a l processes (moving toward 
a m a t e r i a l base which can actual!se the re-union of theory and p r a c t i c e ) . The 
concrete basis of t h a t process (the p r o l e t a r i a t ) i s metaphorical as a p r a c t i c a l 
n e c e s s i t y , as the idea preceding the change i n c o n d i t i o n s . I t remains, i n i t s 
m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y , both a supremely adaptable concrete form, s u i t e d t o va r y i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s , and as an " a n a l y t i c of the l a s t r e s o r t " , the base of a general 
theory of r e v o l u t i o n . 
The general metaphor of Marxism i s one of emancipation from enslavement^ as a 
metaphor, t h i s i s wholly i n keeping w i t h i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l antecedents ( p r i m a r i l y 
Hegel and Feurbach), i n v o l v i n g as they do i n t h e i r m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y a recovery 
of the d i v i s i o n i n t o subject and object and the re-union o f these i n the 
absolute. To read them i n t h i s way i s to d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e i r concrete concerns 
(as courses of p r a c t i c a l reasoning) from t h e i r grammatical deep s t r u c t u r e . 
Philosophy comes t o be seen then as a continuous movement i n h i s t o r y , i n the 
service of h i s t o r y moving toward the end o f m y s t i f i c a t i o n i n a tr a n s f o r m a t i v e 
c r i t i q u e o f the s u b j e c t i v e impulses t o c o n t r o l / u n d e r s t a n d / o b j e c t i f y i t s o b j e c t s 
( o t h e r s ) . 
To achieve t h i s r e q u i r e s : 
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"... seeing s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s as on the order of 
speech processes, i n v o l v i n g a language and a grammar". (39) 
The problem of d e - m y s t i f i c a t i o n becomes, then, the problem of grammar l o g i c ; 
a formal ( t h e o r i s i n g ) r a t h e r than an e m p i r i c a l problem. I t becomes a question 
of f o r m u l a t i n g transformations c o r r e c t l y , i n c r i t i q u e ; concommitantly, i t 
becomes necessary t o perceive the world s t r i c t l y i n terms of the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t 
d i s t i n c t i o n ; t h i s l i e s at the very root of the need f o r r e v o l u t i o n - once the 
subject-object frame e x i s t s , then the movement from a c t u a l ( i s ) t o i d e a l (ought) 
becomes, as a general feature of the human c o n d i t i o n , an imperative. In Marxism, 
t h i s absolute becomes h i s t o r i c i s e d . 
Theorising as a r e f l e x i v e e n t e r p r i s e comes t o be a t r a n s f o r m a t i v e process, then, 
i n i t s e l f a means of emancipation, the r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t i s c o n s t a n t l y i n the 
process of re-forming the concrete features of the ( r e a l ) world as h i s e l e c t i o n 
i n the face of the (emancipatory) movement of h i s t o r y . For Gouldner, the 
t h e o r i s t " i n a l l h i s wholeness" cannot ignore the m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f the 
world; he must s t r u g g l e c o n s t a n t l y w i t h the determining power which they exer-
cise on h i s thought. Reflexive t h e o r i s i n g comes to be, f o r Gouldner, a constant 
process of s e l f c r i t i c i s m ; an e t e r n a l s t r u g g l e of consciousness against i t s e l f 
a perpetual process o f movement towards an u n a t t a i n a b l e u n i t y . For as con-
sciousness s t r u g g l e s t o incorporate both i t s own Weltanschauung and the m a t e r i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s which ground i t , the t h e o r i s t s t r u g g l e s t o f u l f i l l h i s r o l e i n the 
emancipatory movement of h i s t o r y , as a member of a caucus which i s apart from 
the metaphorical embodiment of the goal o f h i s t o r y . The audience which i s 
formulated by h i s t h e o r i s i n g must be brought t o a reading o f h i s w r i t i n g as 
p a r t of the emancipatory process; h i s r e f l e x i v i t y c o n s i s t s i n r e a l i s i n g the 
r e l a t i o n between the concreteness o f h i s r o l e ( i n the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f the 
world) and h i s m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y ( a n a l y t i c a l l y ) as an agent of the r e v o l u t i o n . 
This consciousness preserves the d i f f e r e n c e between h i s ( a u t h e n t i c ) s e l f and 
i t s o b j e c t i f i e d presence as actor on the stage of h i s t o r y . R e f l e x i v i t y i s t o 
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be the a u t h e n t i c r o l e of the t h e o r i s t i n the service o f h i s t o r y . 
Knowledge and C r i t i c i s m ; the Search f o r the Self 
What these t h e o r i s t s share i s a concern f o r the corpus of knowledge which i s 
the t h e o r i s t s ' s e l f . For Blum, t h i s knowledge shows i t s e l f i n what the t h e o r i s t 
does w i t h the a p p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e s which govern the conventional usage; 
the search f o r the c o l l e c t i v e which u n d e r l i e s these r u l e s and conventions which 
l i e behind the p r a c t i c e and make i t p o s s i b l e . Such an e x p l i c a t i o n would i n v o l v e 
reference t o the concrete e l e c t i o n o f the author ( t h a t h i s w r i t i n g w i l l mean 
j u s t t h i s ) but t h i s i s to say t h a t t h i s concrete e l e c t i o n proceeds i t s e l f from 
i t s l o c a t i o n as a p r a c t i c e i n the body of p r a c t i c e s which make up the n a t u r a l 
language ( c u l t u r e ) w i t h i n which i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e (as an instance of doing ... 
sociology, physics, crime and so on). Blum's r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g attempts 
t o grasp the ways i n which usage ( o f c u l t u r e , the conventions of language) 
c o n s t i t u t e s the normative dimensions of s e l f i n r e l a t i o n t o community; to grasp 
how t h i s comes about i s t o recognise the ways i n which community ( c u l t u r e ) I t s e l f 
provides an a n a l y t i c a l method, i n the achievement of the s e l f of the t h e o r i s t . 
Blum's p o i n t , then, i s t h a t the s e l f of the t h e o r i s t i s achieved i n the formul-
a t i o n , and t h a t a r e f l e x i v e grasp of t h i s recognises the v a r i e t y of ways i n 
which human l i v e s are l i v e d ( t h a t sense i s made i n a v a r i e t y of ways, t h a t the 
world i s simultaneously what i t i s formulated as, and how i t i s formulated). 
What i t i s formulated as i s a v a i l a b l e t o us i n convention, i n the f a c t t h a t 
'we' know what a f o r m u l a t i o n means (the everyday s o l u t i o n t o the problem of the 
i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d , i n Schutz's sense). How t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n comes t o mean 
what i t does mean i s the problem of r e f l e x i v i t y - i n other words, what are the 
sc making p r a c t i c e s which enable the 'what' t o be what i t is? Since sense I s made, 
there presumably are ways i n which i t i s made. Blum's r e f l e x i v i t y promises t o 
dis p l a y these p r a c t i c e s . To grasp these p r a c t i c e s as a method i s t o confront 
what anyone would have t o know (take t o be a convention) to make sense, w i t h 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of any t h e o r i s i n g ( f o r m u l a t i o n , accounting) as an occasion 
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i n which the resources of the community ( c u l t u r e ) and the s e l f simultaneously 
a f f o r d a method of seeing ( s o c i o l o g i c a l l y ) and a way of knowing (what i t i s 
to see i n t h i s way). Thus, s e l f knowledge i s grasping the communality of the 
common. I t i s not (cannot be) a question f o r argument f o r what i s common i s 
not what i s p r i v a t e (a p r i v a t e language). Yet i t i s also not concrete (not 
s t i p u l a b l e ) , f o r each saying (as a concrete act of r e f e r r i n g ) r e l i e s on what 
i s common t o be a saying. 
For Gouldner, the communality of t h e o r i s i n g resides i n the tra n s f o r m a t i o n of 
sense i n t o normative frameworks; the minimal f e a t u r e of t h e o r i s i n g i s o b j e c t -
i f i c a t i o n ( t h a t i s t o say, any t h e o r i s i n g formulates the w o r l d , s t i p u l a t e s or 
r e f e r s t o the world i n i t s speaking). Simultaneously, however, i t r e l i e s on 
a deeper grammar as the ground f o r t h i s ; the t e c h n i c a l l e v e l i s achieved by the 
rules of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (which speakers of the communal language use) from the 
paleosymbolic l e v e l ; t h i s l e v e l c o n s i s t s of the form of l i f e (way of l i v i n g ) 
of the t h e o r i s t as a normative frame u n i f y i n g concrete d i v e r s i t y . Thus the 
ess e n t i a l process i s subject c r e a t i n g object i n terras of the m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y 
of usage. 
Now, the sub j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n i s simultaneously the way i n which theory can 
e x i s t , and the source o f both the abiding existence of slavery (domination) and 
the h i s t o r i c a l imperative t o remove i t (ought i m p l i e s can). Theorising i s both 
generated by the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n , and i n the service of the h i s t o r i c a l 
process whereby the problem i s t o be resolved. The community of theory i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , i n the r e l a t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c normative frames which 
c o n s t i t u t e i t s r o l e i n h i s t o r y t o the a n a l y t i c grounds which enable t h a t t o be 
a sensible e x i s t e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n . Self knowledge, i n the r e f l e x i v i t y o f the 
t h e o r i s t , comes t o a grasping o f the c o n d i t i o n s under which t h a t i s a sensible 
way t o l i v e , and the c o n d i t i o n under which i t i s sensible ( t o be r e f l e x i v e ) i s 
c r i t i c i s m ; t h a t i s , t o r e a l i s e t h a t any accounting displays the m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y 
o f i t s formulations i s t o r e a l i s e the value bases which u n d e r l i e t h e o r e t i c a l 
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ways of l i v i n g ; as formulations of the world, these value bases c o n s t i t u t e an 
accounting of h i s t o r y . I t i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the t h e o r i s t to e l e c t t o 
a l i g n himself w i t h the movement of h i s t o r y (towards emancipation, t o r e a l i s e 
t h a t he i s i n the service of h i s t o r y ) by making out of h i s s u b j e c t i v e processes 
of t h e o r i s i n g an object f o r t h e o r i s i n g . Thus, at one and the same time, the 
t h e o r i s t i s pa r t of the process of emancipation from the subject-object dichotomy, 
and d i s p l a y i n g consciousness of the u n i t y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought i n the service 
of h i s t o r y . For Gouldner, then, s e l f c r i t i c i s m i s possible because the value 
system of the t h e o r i s t ( h i s system, h i s corpus of knowledge) IS the product of 
h i s speaking. Theorising, i n o b j e c t i f y i n g the worl d , d i s p l a y s i t s metaphoric-
a l i t y i n the face of the d i v e r s i t y of conventions; t h i s m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y i s 
a n a l y t i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e i n th a t the speech of the t h e o r i s t i s subject t o h is 
c o n t r o l i n s o f a r as he can d i s c r i m i n a t e between examples of co r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t 
speaking. Reflexive t h e o r i s i n g can confront the r u l e s of co r r e c t speaking w i t h 
them-selves as o b j e c t ! f i c a t i o n s , thereby making them the subject f o r a n a l y t i c 
e v a l u a t i o n s , by the actor who produces them, ( i n terms o f the deeper grounds 
o f h i s reason). Gouldner r e f e r s t o t h i s as a r e a l i s t approach t o r a t i o n a l i t y ; 
Skjervheim, ( f o l l o w i n g Husserl) has c a l l e d t h i s ' o b j e c t i v i s m ' (40). 
C l e a r l y , knowledge of s e l f means d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s f o r these two t h e o r i s t s . 
Blum sees i n the s e l f knowledge which t h e o r i s i n g i n v o l v e s , the search f o r a 
means t o recover the form of l i f e , to grasp the community of n a t u r a l language 
speakers as a method i n making sense. For Gouldner, the obj e c t s of c r i t i c i s m 
are the r u l e s t o which n a t u r a l language speakers o r i e n t (whether they could 
formulate them or not) i n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g instances of c o r r e c t speech. Now, the 
d i f f e r e n c e may not be c l e a r at t h i s p o i n t ; speaking i s produced by the act o r 
being able t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between competent and incompetent speech. Chomsky 
has shown t h a t we can ( i n p r i n c i p l e , at l e a s t ) generate r u l e s of tr a n s f o r m a t i o n 
t o account f o r t h i s process (41). Blum cannot but take as h i s point of 
departure, i n a sense, the same 'object'; the speaking, the speech. However, 
Blum wants t o b r i n g out t h a t speaking i s not j u s t an accounting of the world, 
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not j u s t a transformation of sense i n terms of the Weltanschauung. Speaking 
i s a matter of b r i n g i n g the world t o being, i t IS the world t h a t i t b rings 
i n t o being. The r u l e s of grammar, (of t h e o r i s i n g , of socialism) which Gouldner 
presents as the knowledge of the t h e o r i s t do not c o n s t i t u t e a d e s c r i p t i o n of 
the p r a c t i c e s by which t h e o r i s i n g i s done; they reveal the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
the t h e o r i s t . That i s t o say, they display the o r d e r l i n e s s of value judgments, 
they show the reasonableness of reason i n r e l a t i o n to the work t o v?hich i t i s 
put. 
S e l f knowledge i s t o be a v a i l a b l e , apparently, on two l e v e l s ; i t i s t o be what 
emerges from c r i t i c a l reading of speech as metaphor (Gouldner) and what shows 
i t s e l f i n the speculative r e f o r m u l a t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y (Blum). From a stand-
point of s o c i o l o g i c a l theory, both attempt t o provide f o r these versions of r e f -
l e x i v i t y as a necessary response t o an endemic c o n d i t i o n a l i t y . What i s not 
considered i s the locatedness of t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f , w i t h i n the frame-
work of a p a r t i c u l a r set of p r a c t i c e s which c o n s t i t u t e the language game o f 
s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g . I f we accept t h a t language games, although f u n c t i o n i n g 
i n t e r n a l l y i n very di s p a r a t e ways, share c e r t a i n features ('family resemblance'), 
i t would seem p r o f i t a b l e t o look at some of the basic features of sense making 
which are not examined i n these accounts. To t h i s end, I s h a l l explore some 
of Wittgenstein's work on the problem of P r i v a t e Language. 
R e f l e x i v i t y i n v o l v e s , f o r Blum and Gouldner, the attempt to grasp the r e l a t i o n 
between the act of knowing (the world) and the f o r m u l a t i o n of t h a t knowing. 
The problem has come t o be seen as - how are we t o have knowledge o f how we know? 
Both t h e o r i s t s have appealed t o the notion o f the language i n which f o r m u l a t i o n 
i s done being used i n r e l a t i o n t o a grammar which makes i t sensible t o a community 
of language users, and have r e f e r r e d t o the way i n which a grasp of the r u l e s 
of t h i s grammar w i l l c o n s t i t u t e the ground f o r any usage. Can we decide between 
the methods which they o f f e r f o r the search f o r these rules? 
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what has come t o be know as the sociology of knowledge p o s i t i o n (which Gouldner 
sees himself as c a r r y i n g on) has said that any language use i s e v a l u a t i v e , that 
any language used t o produce an account of the s o c i a l world i s r e l a t i v e t o the 
h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l l o c a t i o n of the speaker. That i s t o say, the products 
of t h e o r i s i n g transform sense, and formulate s e l f ; the transformation of sense 
i s concrete, and the formul a t i o n of s e l f i s a n a l y t i c . Gouldner wants t o confront 
t h i s problem by making t h e o r i s i n g i n t o transformation of s e l f i n the process of 
form u l a t i n g sense; that i s , since value i s the means to create ( o b j e c t i v i s e ) , 
value i t s e l f should be the object (the process of c r e a t i o n should be the object 
of t h e o r i s i n g ) . Thereby, i n the process of transforming the sense ( o f value) 
we transform the s e l f of the t h e o r i s t . 
Value, i n t h i s language game, i s the c e n t r a l term; that i s t o say, i n a s c r i b i n g 
values t o a t h e o r i s t , we make a claim about how he uses language, we assert 
something about how h i s language means what i t does mean. In terms of accounts 
of the s o c i a l world, we use value t o mean that an account f a i l s t o transcend 
the c o n d i t i o n s of i t s production. Value i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game 
r e f e r s t o one of the l i m i t s of discourse. I t means t h a t a l l thought i s s o c i a l l y 
determined; questions about value, then, become questions about the s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s of the production of thought. 
We could ask, at t h i s p o i n t , about the grammar of sociology's discourse on the 
r e l a t i o n of thought t o the world; t h i s i s to ask about the r e l a t i o n of subject 
to o b j e c t . The r e l a t i o n of s o c i o l o g i c a l object to s o c i o l o g i s t as t h i n k i n g 
subject becomes, then, an i n q u i r y i n t o the grammar of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language 
game. Expressed d i f f e r e n t l y , we might be seen t o be asking; what does value 
accomplish as a means of or d e r i n g the world f o r the s o c i o l o g i s t ? How i s value 
used t o describe the r e l a t i o n between theory and the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of i t s 
production? 
Now, t h i s i s t o confront the problem of dualism; that i s to say, i n asking f o r 
the way i n which value (thought) r e f l e c t s the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of i t s production 
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(the world) we are asking f o r an account of how value i s a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h a t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p - i n what sense, t h a t i s , does the not i o n of value e x p l a i n the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between thought and the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of i t s production. 
I n t u i t i v e l y , of course, we know what we mean by the n o t i o n of value judgment 
i n t h i s context; i t i s pa r t of the way i n which s o c i o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g i s done ( 4 3 ) . 
I s h a l l argue, however, t h a t the n o t i o n of value, i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l way of 
t h i n k i n g , s y s t e m a t i c a l l y misrepresents the r e l a t i o n between theory and i t s 
obj ects. 
My basic argument proceeds from Wittgenstein's a t t a c k on the notion of a p r i v a t e 
language. Wiggtenstein was concerned, i n discussing the ways i n which the 
d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o sense-data and consciousness f a i l e d t o account f o r 
the a r t i c u l a t i o n between representation and i t s o b j e c t s , to d i s p l a y the basic 
incoherence of dualism. I t i s a theme which occupied a great deal of his l a t e r 
work, and involved extensive discussion and argument. I s h a l l abstract some of 
h i s main p o i n t s i n order t o show how they are relevant t o my concerns. 
Private Languages (44) 
The d u a l i s t claims concepts t o be d i s t i n c t from the world which they describe. 
The external world i s experienced; t h i s experience i s the meaning of the world 
f o r the i n d i v i d u a l who experiences i t . Concepts enable us to communicate t h i s 
to others because of p r e - e x i s t i n g agreement on the reference of these concepts. 
Now, while language does r e l y on agreement and r e g u l a r i t y i n reference t h i s 
does not mean t h a t language i s based on p r i o r agreement i n judgments. The 
Du a l i s t makes agreement i n concepts independent of agreement i n judgment and 
thereby, t r u t h i s decided by human agreement - i t i s subject to the c o n d i t i o n s 
of the s o c i a l world i n which i t i s formulated. 
This i s what Hacker (45) has c a l l e d the ' s e p a r a b i l i t y t h e s i s ' and i t i s , he 
contends, both t r u e and f a l s e at the same time. While our agreement i n 
concepts enables us t o measure the world (describe a s t a t e of a f f a i r s ) i n s o f a r 
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as we can separate the judgment (using the language) from the world t h a t i t i s 
used t o describe; i t must, i t seems, e i t h e r f i t or i t must not. 
However, we i d e n t i f y our agreement i n d e f i n i t i o n by means of our agreement i n 
judgment. This i s t o say t h a t unless our uses of concepts accomplish t h e i r 
task (measuring r e a l i t y ) r e g u l a r l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y , we could not be using a 
language. Agreement over the uses of concepts i m p l i c i t l y r e l i e s on reference 
to agreement as t o what "everyone" knows (what anyone would have to judge t o be 
the case). 
Logic i s not thrown out here, however; our sentences do not determine the 
world, but only the p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t the world must s a t i s f y . This i s not t o 
say that any language must be the r e s u l t of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , which would 
seem a p r e - r e q u i s i t e t o agreement, t h a t we could not produce a language which 
i s unshared, but r a t h e r t h a t language, by i t s very nature, could not be some-
t h i n g which i s unsharable. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f o r dualism are: 
a) t h a t we cannot account f o r the way i n which we have 
knowledge of other minds, and yet we act as i f we do, and 
b) only the sensations of our consciousness can have meaning, 
yet we cannot have knowledge of them. 
To develop t h i s devastating c r i t i q u e , W i t t g e n s t e i n argues from the c h a r a c t e r i -
s a t i o n o f language teaching, a c q u i s i t i o n and purpose which i s produced i f we 
assume the dualism of language and the world. F i r s t , words "stand as ideas" 
i n the mind of the user (developed, of course from Locke's famous d i s c u s s i o n ) ; 
t h a t i s to say, they r e f e r to what i s experienced. Experience describes i t s e l f 
i n the concept which accounts i t . Meaning comes from a s s o c i a t i n g a term w i t h 
a stored r e p l i c a of one's own experience, w i t h the 'exemplar' serving as the 
paradigm f o r the meaning of the term. 
Thus, by 'ostension', word i s f i x e d t o experience and stored i n memory l i k e an 
almost i n f i n i t e f i l i n g system. To communicate, then, i t i s necessary t h a t the 
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same concepts be used f o r the same experiences. Now, the e s s e n t i a l connections 
are i n d e f i n a b l e ; nevertheless, speaker and hearer manage t o share the same 
subjects f o r ideas presented t o t h e i r senses. Thus, i n the d u a l i s t v e r s i o n 
of communicating, words can serve the primary f u n c t i o n of enabling what are 
pr i v a t e experiences (or ideas) t o be conveyed from one mind to another, 
because o f the a s s o c i a t i o n between sound and r e f e r e n t , on which there i s 
agreement between the minds concerned. 
Now, t h i s means t h a t knowledge i s acquired i n d i r e c t l y , since the associations 
which we are taught between idea and word, and word w i t h r e f e r e n t must be 
assumed by us to be ours, and not those of the person teaching us. 
"One man's mind cannot pass i n t o another man's body .... 
(using a word i s l i k e ) ... s t r i k i n g a note on the 
Keyboard of the imagination". (46) 
Now, i f we go from t h i s separation of 'the world* and 'our experience o f i t ' , 
we come t o three l e v e l s of skepticism. The f i r s t l e v e l leads us t o assert that 
i n t h i s version of the world, only I can have knowledge of my inner s t a t e s ; 
others can only speculate on my inner states on the basis of my behaviour. Thus, 
here, c e r t a i n t y belongs only to me; outs i d e r s can never experience my c e r t a i n t y . 
Thus, of course, we are l e d to the idea t h a t I can only believe i n the e x i s t -
ence o f anything outside o f my experience; a l l t h a t I can know are those things 
which are objects which 1 experience. 
We thus have two d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n s , formed on a common basis of conceptual 
r e l a t i o n s . The second i s merely less i n c l i n e d to apply the term 'knowledge' 
t o a l l but the i n c o r r i g i b l e i n t u i t i o n s o f p r i v a t e experience. 
There i s an even more extreme p o s i t i o n , however; i n so l i p s i s m , the pr i v a c y of 
knowledge and ownership o f i t i s extended t o language. I f we accept t h a t 
experience i s p r i v a t e and non-transferable, and thereby t h a t knowledge i s 
p r i v a t e l y ( i n d i r e c t l y ) a r r i v e d a t , the meaning of language which i s used t o 
describe such knowledge i s also p r i v a t e . When I r e f e r t o something, I mean by 
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th a t my experience of i t , which i s by d e f i n i t i o n , not anyone else's; so t h a t 
words as used by d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s mean something d i f f e r e n t t o each one. 
"The assumption would be possible - though u n v e n f i a b l e -
tha t one section of humanity had one sensation of red, 
and another section another". (47) 
Thus, we cannot, given t h i s v e r s i o n of epistemology, understand what we are 
saying t o each other; f u r t h e r , we cannot suppose that others are capable of 
having experiences, f o r the i n d i v i d u a l (the s o l i p s i s t ) i s the locus, the centre 
of a l l experience. He i s the mono-centre of the world and h i s language. We 
could never know t h a t others have experience, f o r t h i s i s beyond a l l possible 
knowledge. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s t h i s on the basis of two o b j e c t i o n s t o the idea of a 
p r i v a t e language. How, given the tenets of t h i s viewpoint, can we account f o r 
the formation or the possession of a concept? P r i v a t e language, as. w e l l as 
being unteachable, i s also u n i n t e l l i g i b l e t o those who speak i t . Furthermore, 
i n terms o f t h i s theory, we cannot explain how sentences are constructed. Now, 
on both these counts, we p l a i n l y c o n t r a d i c t what i s a c t u a l l y done w i t h language 
i n the p r a c t i c e s of every speech s i t u a t i o n of everyday l i f e . 
He s t a r t s by loo k i n g at the way i n which language i s acquired. I f we are t o 
construct a concept, the a s s o c i a t i o n o f word and sensation a f f o r d s us no basis 
on which t o do so, since t h i s gives us no standard of l e x i c a l d e f i n i t i o n w i t h 
which t o evaluate f u t u r e usage. P r i v a t e ostension i s a p o s s i b i l i t y only on 
the basis o f e x i s t i n g language usages, which provide us w i t h a concept of the 
object i n question. I t i s the possession of a language which makes i t possible 
to p o s i t the process of ostensive d e f i n i t i o n . Ostensive d e f i n i t i o n can only 
be used t o account f o r secondary language a c q u i s i t i o n . I t cannot account f o r 
le a r n i n g t h a t which i t r e l i e s upon t o give i t sense as a process - i e . , poss-
ession o f s y n t a c t i c a l categories. For a word t o mean an object i t must already 
'mean1 i t , f o r an object cannot give a sign i t s meaning. 
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I n the p r i v a t e l i n g u i s t s ' concept of mind, concepts are cards i n a f i l i n g 
system, to be searched out as the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r using words t o r e f e r to 
something not present. I n the presence of o b j e c t s or p r o p e r t i e s , we may use 
the s u b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n a f f o r d e d by t h i s system to deny th a t these are 
r i g h t l y c a l l e d , or conjecture about presence, or remember a previous occasion 
on which the o b j e c t / p r o p e r t y was present. We cannot, however, j u s t i f y r e f e r r i n g 
t o an object before us i n t h i s way. Wi t t g e n s t e i n sees t h i s notion of j u s t i f i -
c a t i o n as b a s i c a l l y wrong. J u s t i f i c a t i o n must, he p o i n t s o u t , appeal t o some-
th i n g apart from t h a t which needs j u s t i f y i n g ; one memory may c e r t a i n l y be 
checked against another, but there i s no way t h a t I can check whether the 
memory produces the c o r r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n . 
Also, given the pri v a c y of the exemplar, there i s , i n p r i n c i p l e , no way i n 
which a co r r e c t exemplar may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an i n c o r r e c t . I f , as the 
p r i v a t e l i n g u i s t wants to say, i t i s only from t h e i r experiences t h a t people 
can know what pain means, (and thus, each has h i s own exemplar, which i s un-
a v a i l a b l e t o anyone e l s e ) , when communication does take place, the exemplar i s 
i r r e l e v a n t , i t i s a piece of ' i d l e machinery', i n the process o f communication, 
since reference t o i t only i n v o l v e s using the word i n the appropriate s i t u a t i o n , 
the naming r e l a t i o n s h i p (as i t i s conceived i n the p r i v a t e language account) 
has no part i n the knowing of the meaning of a word or i n meaning something by 
a word or knowing what someone means. I f i t d i d , communication would be 
impossible. (48) This i s not t o be taken t o imply t h a t p r i v a t e experience i s 
nothing; i t i s n o t , he says, a 'something 1, but not a 'nothing' e i t h e r ( 4 9 ) . 
\"ihat the emphasis on p r i v a t e experience seems t o do i s t o make possible the 
claim that i n t u i t i o n can y i e l d knowledge wit h o u t the i n t e r v e n t i o n of concepts 
(and thereby, understanding). Objects can only be known i n a way i n which they 
make sense v i a the mediation of a concept; without understanding, there can 
be no knowledge which deserves to be so c a l l e d . Appearance might be i n t u i t i o n 
w i t h o u t thought, but we cannot know i t i n t h i s way. I f we take the precepts of 
t h i s account s e r i o u s l y , then, there can be no knowledge of the extern a l world 
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which makes sense t o the subject. 
S i m i l a r l y , given the a r b i t r a r i n e s s of language, the fa c t t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n 
of sound and obje c t i s subject t o the change and innovation o f i n d i v i d u a l s or 
groups, the p r i v a t e language advocate would want t o say t h a t the e s s e n t i a l 
r e l a t i o n of mind t o world i s i n terms o f images - that i s , the e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n 
of the world i s i n the form of a p i c t u r i n g of what the world i s l i k e , and any 
sign could be used t o r e f e r t o t h i s ; however, while i t i s t r u e that languages 
a r b i t r a r i l y assign r e l a t i o n s between sound and r e f e r e n t we cannot assume t h a t 
t h i s a r b i t r a r i n e s s has no bearing on the way i n which a sign becomes a symbol. 
I t i s only p o s s i b l e t o mean something by making a sound i n a language because 
of the complex s t r u c t u r e o f syntax i n the language and t h i s complex s t r u c t u r e 
s t r i c t l y defines the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i t s employment. Given the ' p i c t u r e 
theory' of language we cannot Account f o r the use of words to convey meaning, 
since the not i o n of a p i c t u r e or an image cannot account f o r the semantic and 
s y n t a c t i c p r i n c i p l e s which govern the possible r o l e s of a word i n d i f f e r e n t 
sentences. 
To conceive of the r o l e of language as b r i n g i n g about a mental event i n the 
mind of the hearer t o achieve communication i s r a d i c a l l y mistaken. W i t t g e n s t e i n 
says t h a t ... "speaking a language i s part of an a c t i v i t y , or a form of l i f e " (50) 
The purely s i g n i f i c a t o r y c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f language proposed by the p r i v a t e 
language account leaves out the v a r i e t y of ways i n which language f u n c t i o n s i n 
our everyday l i f e (eg., the word pain i n pleading, begging f o r mercy, asking 
fo r help, t h r e a t e n i n g , sympathising, p i t y i n g , p r a y i ng, exclaiming, even j o k i n g ) . 
Seeking t o f i n d the c o n s t i t u t i v e f e a t u r e s of mental states as the essences or 
sources of meaning i s fundamentally misguided. Wittgenstein p o i n t s t o the 
behavioural i n d i c a t o r s of t h i n k i n g and understanding t o deny the necessity or 
s u f f i c i e n c y of proposed i n t e r n a l s t a t e s as c r i t e r i a f o r a s s e r t i n g t h a t these 
processes are t a k i n g place. Thinking (knowing, understanding) are not t h i n g s 
that go on as the accompaniment t o speaking, e i t h e r i n t e r n a l l y or e x t e r n a l l y , 
r a t h e r : 
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"Language i s the ve h i c l e of thought". (51) 
Note, he i s not concerned t o deny the possible existence of i n t e r n a l s t a t e s ; 
r a t h e r , he wishes t o deny t h e i r e f f i c a c y i n e x p l a i n i n g t h a t o f which they are 
said to be the foundation. The spistemic privacy of experience would seem t o 
deny the p o s s i b i l i t y o f communication, knowledge and meaning; we can have no 
knowledge of any inner worlds, i n c l u d i n g our own. 
Wi t t g e n s t e i n , w i t h h i s reminders of the ways i n which such knowledge i s used 
i n everyday l i f e , claims t h a t when we do ascribe such psychological terms t o 
ourselves, ve do so as o f n a t u r a l r i g h t , but witho u t j u s t i f i c a t o r y evidence; 
th a t t h i s i s a sensible t h i n g to do derives from the s e l f evidence which we 
f i n d i n the n a t u r a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of such inner s t a t e s . This i s to say, while 
we have no c r i t e r i a f o r a s c r i b i n g these states t o ourselves, we can nevertheless 
do so because of the existence of the n a t u r a l expressions which c o n s t i t u t e p a r t 
of the evidence ( c r i t e r i a , j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) on the grounds of which others ascribe 
psychological p r e d i c t a t e s t o us. 
Doubt about the c e r t a i n t y o f our knowledge of other minds ( f o r instance, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f others pretending) only makes sense i n the context of possessing 
behavioural c r i t e r i a t o d i s t i n g u i s h t r u t h from pretence; i t i s not possible t o 
imagine a s i t u a t i o n i n which pretending d i d not r e s t upon f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h forms 
of a c t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e the pretended a c t i o n . Thus, we can know w i t h c e r t a i n t y 
( o f d i f f e r i n g degrees) the contents of other minds; t h i s c e r t a i n t y , he p o i n t s 
out, does not depend on being s u b j e c t i v e or o b j e c t i v e f o r i t s r e p u t a b i l i t y . 
C e r t a i n t y does not d i f f e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i f i t i s s u b j e c t i v e or o b j e c t i v e ; the 
di f f e r e n c e i s l o g i c a l , and the kind of c e r t a i n t y possible i s given i n the grammar 
of the kind of language game involved. 
The c r i t e r i o n o f c e r t a i n t y i s l a i d down i n the grammar which makes a sentence 
i n a language game sensible. That i s t o say, what a sentence comes t o , i t s 
sense, derives from the grammar, the r u l e s f o r i t s use, the grounds o f the 
sentence. 
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"These a r e , i n t e r a l i a , t h e ( n o n - i n d u c t i v e ) e v i d e n c e 
f o r t h e t r u t h o f t h e sentence i n t h e absence o f 
c o u n t e r v a i l i n g e v i d e n c e " . ( 5 2 ) 
The grounds o f a sentence, t h e n , c o n s t i t u t e t h e b a s i s o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c e r t a i n t y . 
Doubt can o n l y r e s t on a background o f such r u l e s o f evidence as we use i n 
f i x i n g t h e m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f what i s t o be doubted. 
I n t h e case o f f i r s t p e r s o n p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s (say, avowals o f p a i n ) i t 
i s n o t t h e immediacy o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e which e x c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f doubt ( a s t h e s c e p t i c would have i t ) , but r a t h e r t h e grammar o f knowing does 
n o t a l l o w us t o doubt t h a t we are i n p a i n , w h i l e a t the same t i m e , t h i s e x c l u d e s 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g ' c e r t a i n ' , i n a sense, s i n c e i t i s o n l y p o s s i b l e t o 
use 'knowing' about one s e l f i f t h e grammar o f what one c l a i m s t o know a l s o 
p e r m i t s one t o ' b e l i e v e ' , 'doubt* o r ' s u s p e c t ' , which about p e r s o n a l s u b j e c t i v e 
s t a t e s , i t does n o t a l l o w . I t i s , W i t t g e n s t e i n b e l i e v e s , nonsense t o ' c l a i m * 
t o know t h a t one i s i n p a i n ; i f one t h e r e b y c l a i m s g r e a t e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l c e r t -
a i n t y t h a n o t h e r s can have, one i s c o n f u s i n g t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f b e i n g i n p a i n 
w i t h t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h j u s t i f y t h e c l a i m t o know ( f o r i n s t a n c e , 
i n d u c t i v e p r o o f o r p a i n b e h a v i o u r ) . 
The way i n w h i c h t h e p r i v a t e ownership t h e s i s i s f o r m u l a t e d m i s l e a d s us i n t o 
t h e wrong c o n c e p t i o n o f what ' e x p e r i e n c e ' i s ; i n t h e case o f p a i n , t o say t h a t 
a n o t h e r p e r s o n cannot have my p a i n makes p a i n o u t t o be some t h i n g w h i c h , 
because i t s l o c a t i o n i n a person p e r m i t s us t o i n d i v i d u a t e i t , seems t o be 
s p a t i a l l y l o c a t e d i n t h e same way as a m a t e r i a l o b j e c t . W i t t g e n s t e i n wants t o 
say t h a t t h i s i s m i s l e a d i n g , and t h a t w h i l e t h e phenomenal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and 
l o c a t i o n o f a p a i n p r o v i d e us w i t h c r i t e r i a o f q u a l i t a t i v e i d e n t y , t h e n u m e r i c a l 
i d e n t i t y o f a p a i n i s g i v e n by t h e p a i n b e h a v i o u r o f t h e s u f f e r e r . E x p e r i e n c e s 
a r e ' i d e n t i f i a b i l i t y 1 dependent on t h e i r owners, b u t c r i t e r i a o f i d e n t i t y i n 
the case o f e x p e r i e n c e s do n o t ( e x c e p t i n a t r i v i a l sense) c o n s t i t u t e u n i q u e l y 
p r i v a t e o b j e c t s . A c l a i m f o r t h e p r i v a c y o f i d e n t i f i a b i 1 i t y - d e p e n d e n t o b j e c t s 
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n e g l e c t s t h e f a c t t h a t we can w i t h g r e a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n c l a i m t h a t such ' o b j e c t s ' 
a r e t h e same, on t h e b a s i s o f p r e c i s e l y t h e grounds which e n a b l e us t o i d e n t i f y 
them a t a l l ; i n a p e r f e c t l y good sense, people can be s a i d t o have t h e same 
e x p e r i e n c e s , t h e same p a i n s , t h e same knowledge. At the same t i m e , W i t t g e n s t e i n 
c l a i m s , t o say t h a t a n o t h e r person cannot have my p a i n i s nonsense. The s o l -
i p s i s t would be drawn i n t o s a y i n g , g i v e n t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e p r i v a c y o f kno w l -
edge, t h a t ".. o n l y he can p l a y chess". ( 53) 
Th i s i s a c o n f u s i o n about t h e grammar o f such usage e q u i v a l e n t t o what such 
people do i n f a c t say; ' o n l y I can know my s e n s a t i o n s - I cannot e x h i b i t my 
e x p e r i e n c e s . ' W i t t g e n s t e i n p o i n t s o u t t h a t what l o o k s l i k e a m e t a p h y s i c a l c l a i m 
has, i n f a c t , a good g r a m m a t i c a l sense. To say t h a t o n l y I can know t h a t I 
am i n p a i n i s t o ( q u i t e c o r r e c t l y ) c l a i m t h a t i t makes no sense, i n my own 
case, f o r me t o doubt whether I am i n p a i n , and t h u s says something about t h e 
meaning o f ' p a i n ' i n t h i s usage. What cannot be i n f e r r e d from t h i s knowledge 
i s t h a t doubt i s l o g i c a l l y e x c l u d e d from such knowledge i t i s an a p r i o r i c l a i m , 
and n o t an e m p i r i c a l one. F i r s t p e r s o n p s y c h o l o g i c a l u t t e r a n c e s i n t h e p r e s e n t 
t e n s e do n o t ' d e s c r i b e ' t h e cons c i o u s n e s s o f t h e speaker, but a r e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s 
o f i n n e r s t a t e s ( a v o w a l s ) . I n a l i m i t e d sense, t h e y can be t a k e n as d e s c r i p t i o n s 
o f my i n n e r s t a t e , but they a re c r i t e r i o n l e s s ; t h e y do not depend on my: 
'•Observing my s o u l out o f t h e c o r n e r o f my eye". ( 5 4 ) 
The i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f doubt i m p l i e s t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f knowledge - a t l e a s t 
c e r t a i n knowledge as t h i s i s g i v e n i n t h e g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s i n v o l v e d . 
I n t he case o f f i r s t p e r son p r e s e n t t e n s e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s e ntences t h e use o f 
I as s u b j e c t l e a d s one t o t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s a p e c u l i a r s o r t o f knowledge 
which i s e m p i r i c a l , n o n - e v i d e n t i a l and immediate. Yet t h e r e a r e no c r i t e r i a 
w h i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e use o f I as s u b j e c t , no i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f one o b j e c t among 
o t h e r s , no r e c o g n i t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n t o whom t h e p r e d i c a t e i s a t t r i b -
u t e d . Thus t h e r e i s no room f o r m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o r m i s r e c o g n i t i o n . T h i s , 
he c l a i m s , means t h a t T ' i s n e i t h e r a d e m o n s t r a t i v e pronoun n o r does i t denote 
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a possessor when used t o make avowals. Rather t h a n c o n s t i t u t i n g t he b a s i s 
from w h i c h appearances come t o be d i s c u s s e d , t h e i d e a o f s u b j e c t i v e appearance 
i s a r e l a t i v e l y l a t e s t a g e i n the a c q u i s i t i o n o f language ( 5 5 ) . Language 
appears a t f i r s t as a d i s c o u r s e o f t h e o b j e c t i v e - l e a r n i n g t o c a l l some t h i n g 
by name ( a c q u i r i n g a c o n c e p t ) i s t h e p r e v i o u s b a s i s o f t h e n o t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e 
appearance. To l e a r n how t o d e s c r i b e how t h i n g s seem t o me (as i f d e s c r i b i n g 
an o b j e c t ) i s l o g i c a l l y p a r a s i t i c upon b e i n g a b l e t o d e s c r i b e an o b j e c t . The 
concept o f a s c r i b i n g p e r c e p t i o n s c r i t e r i o n l e s s l y t o t h e s e l f depends on t h e 
concepts o f t h e o b j e c t s t h e y a r e t a k e n t o d e s c r i b e ; and i t makes no sense t o 
ask f o r t h e c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h we can j u s t i f i a b l y d e s c r i b e t h e o b j e c t i v e 
w o r l d as t h i s o r t h a t . The use o f language m a n i f e s t s t h e r e l e v a n t m a s t e r y , 
b u t i t i s d e r i v e d from n o t h i n g s i n c e , as language, i t pre-supposes knowledge 
o f i t s c r i t e r i a t o be s e n s i b l e ( 5 6 ) . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n says t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n must come t o an end, and t h a t end, ( i n a 
c a r e f u l l y l i m i t e d sense) i s w i t h how t h i n g s seem t o be w i t h t h e s u b j e c t ; however, 
t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f how t h i n g s seem t o be w i t h t h e s u b j e c t does n o t r e s t upon 
s e l f e v i d e n c e b u t upon c o n v e n t i o n s w h i c h g i v e s t a t e m e n t s about t h e o b j e c t i v e 
w o r l d t h e i r sense. The c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n which e x i s t s between s t a t e m e n t s and 
t h e i r sense s u p p l i e s meaning t o d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d , makes them j u s t i f i e d 
as s t a t e m e n t s , b u t t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s , a l t h o u g h s t r o n g e r t h a n i n d u c t i v e 
e v i d e n c e , much weaker t h a n e n t a i l m e n t . For a t h i n g t o seem t o be does n o t i m p l y 
t h a t i t IS so. (57) 
I f we f o l l o w W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e n , we c o u l d argue t h a t when we l o o k f o r t h e j u s t i -
f i c a t i o n f o r a c c o u n t s , we s h o u l d l o o k f o r t h e c r i t e r i a which make them s e n s i b l e . 
Such c r i t e r i a would c o n s i s t o f t h e grounds from w h i c h t h e y d e r i v e o r t h e grammar 
o f t h e language game o f w h i c h t h e y a r e a p a r t . How does t h i s r e l a t e t o t h e 
s o c i o l o g i c a l concern w i t h t h e v a l u e b a s i s o f accounts? Both C o u l d n e r and Blum 
see themselves as concerned w i t h a c c o u n t i n g as an e x p r e s s i o n ( m a n i f e s t a t i o n , 
p r o d u c t e t c . , ) o f e x i s t e n t i a l b a s i s ; t h e corpus o f knowledge o f t h e t h e o r i s t , 
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i n some way, i s h e l d t o ' c o n t a i n ' , i n some m y s t e r i o u s way, h i s v a l u e s , w h i c h 
r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g would make a v a i l a b l e t o us. How does t h e i r work set 
about a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s t a s k ? 
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Some I m p l i c a t i o n s : ( i ) Gouldner and S e l f - C r i t i c i s m 
"The o l d e r n o t i o n o f ' o b j e c t i v i t y • i n t h e s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e s , as c r y s t a l i s e d i n Max Weber's c l a s s i c a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e v a l u e - f r e e d o c t r i n e , s t r e s s e d 
an e p i s t e m o l o g y t h a t prenussed a r a d i c a l s e p a r a t i o n 
between t h e f o r m a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a s s e r t i o n s , on 
t h e one s i d e and t h e o r i g i n genesis o r 'mode o f 
p r o d u c t i o n * o f these a s s e r t i o n s , on t h e o t h e r . For 
my p a r t , I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t a r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between g e n e s i s and j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t e n a b l e . A t 
t h e same t i m e , I r e j e c t a r e l a t i v i s t i c and n i h i l i s t i c 
s o l u t i o n . I n o r d e r f o r us t o have r a t i o n a l grounds 
f o r b e l i e v i n g i n t h e t r u t h o f s p e c i f i c a s s e r t i o n s about 
t h e s o c i a l w o r l d , we must suppose them t o have been 
produced by c e r t a i n k i n d s o f p e o p l e , 'normal' p e o p l e , 
p eople h a v i n g c e r t a i n t a l e n t s and t r a i n i n g , w o r k i n g 
w i t h a genuine commitment t o c e r t a i n j u s t i f i e d c r i t e r i a 
and c e r t a i n methods, who accept t h e s e C and M, and who 
a l s o , a p p l y them w i t h t e c h n i c a l competence and m o r a l 
s i n c e r i t y " . ( 5 8 ) 
Gouldner t a k e s t h i s t o mean t h a t , i n o r d e r t o be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n 
b e l i e v i n g i n t h e t r u t h o f any a c c o u n t , we must have knowledge o f t h e s o c i a l 
system o f s c h o l a r s h i p from w h i c h i t comes, and grounds f o r c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h i s 
s o c i a l system i s e n f o r c i n g c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e methods which aim a t t h e f u l -
f i l l m e n t o f i t s c r i t e r i a . I n t h e modern w o r l d , however, t h e r e a r e no grounds 
f o r c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e s c h o l a r s ' c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e r i g h t method, s i n c e t h e 
w o r l d o f s c h o l a r s h i p i s a s o c i a l w o r l d i n which membership depends upon i n i t i a l 
and c o n t i n u i n g d i s p l a y s o f w a r r a n t a b l e competence (agreed as such by o t h e r 
members o f t h e community) which e f f e c t i v e l y d i s t o r t judgment because o f t h a t 
w o r l d ' s own dependence upon a s p e c i f i c form o f s o c i a l and economic p a t r o n a g e 
f o r i t s own e x i s t e n c e . To f i n d t h e c r i t e r i a o f r e l i a b l e s p e a k i n g , i n t h i s 
a c c o u n t , would i n v o l v e l o o k i n g o u t s i d e t h e s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h speech 
i s produced ( t h e community o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s ) i n o r d e r t o " r e - c o g n i s e " t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d e t a i l s o f sp e a k i n g and t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f i t s 
speech t o e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s and d e s i r e s . To seek t o produce " o b j e c t i v e " 
speech i s t o seek t o i s o l a t e common v i r t u e s i n t h e f a c e o f t h e d i v e r s i t y o f 
i n t e r e s t s . I t i s n o t , Gouldner n o t e s , t o be n e u t r a l , but t o be ( " l i t e r a l l y " ) 
' r e a l i s t i c ' , i n s o f a r as r e a l i s m i n v o l v e s r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t reason i s c o n t i n u a l l y 
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v u l n e r a b l e t o i n t e r e s t and d e s i r e . A c l a i m t o r e c o g n i s e , and be a b l e t o 
produce, o b j e c t i v e speech, amounts t o an e x h i b i t i o n o f a l a c k o f o b j e c t i v i t y , 
i n w h i c h case o b j e c t i v i t y becomes i d e o l o g y . 
The r e f l e x i v e s o c i a l t h e o r i s t , f o r Gouldner, 
"... s t r e s s e s t h e connectedness o f news and mens' i n t e r e s t s " ^ ( 5 9 ) 
h e l p s people t o m a i n t a i n access t o what t h e i r s o c i e t y i s s i l e n t a b o u t , s t r e s s e s 
i n s i s t e n t l y and o n e - s i d e d l y t h e r e p r e s s e d and s i l e n t s i d e o f t h i n g s . T h i s i s 
at once t h e t a s k o f knowing what i s t o be known, and p e r s u a d i n g o t h e r s o f i t s 
v a l u e , i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f e m a n c i p a t i o n . 
I t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Gouldner, t o b r i n g about a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between t h e 
t e c h n i c a l language games o f t h e o r i s t s , and t h e everyday language games o f whi c h 
t h e y are t r a n s f o r m s , i n s o f a r as we must r e c o g n i s e t h a t t e c h n i c a l language games, 
i n h i s vie w , a r e n o t s e l f grounded, but have t h e i r grounds i n t h e mundane 
concerns o f everyday l i f e . 
What i s t o be found i n t h e everyday language game i s v a l u e , as a system o f 
p r i o r i t i e s w h i c h s t r u c t u r e p r o d u c t i o n , whether o f t h i n g s o r i d e a s . Value i s 
t h u s t h e ground o f b o t h everyday and L e c h n i c a l language games, by d e r i v a t i o n . 
To speak r e l i a b l y , i n t h i s e v e n t , t h e n , i s t o i n v o k e t h e e m a n c i p a t o r y , t h a t 
w h i c h q u e s t i o n s , e x t e n d s , opens up the v a l u e grounds o f speech. C r i t i c a l 
speech i s r a d i c a l , o r i t i s n o t r e f l e x i v e ; t h a t i s t o say, r e f l e x i v e speech 
denies i t s own a b i l i t y t o produce, i n i t s s p e a k i n g , what grounds i t , b u t i s 
produced as a d i a l e c t i c a l moment i n an ongoing p r o c e s s . I f i t seeks t o speak 
th e good, r a t h e r than a p p l y i n g i t s own s t a n d a r d s t o i t - s e l f , t h e n i t becomes 
i d e o l o g i c a l , a p o l o g e t i c . R e f l e x i v e speech i s d i a l e c t i c a l , i n Gouldner's v i e w , 
i n t h a t i t seeks t o t r a n s f o r m i t s e l f i n t o what i t i s n o t (what i t does n o t say, 
what grounds i t ) . What grounds i t s speech i s shown i n t h e d e s i r e t o a p p l y 
c r i t i c a l s t a n d a r d s t o i t - s e l f , t o t a k e i t s p l a c e (as ' o t h e r ' r a t h e r t h a n ' f i r s t ' ) 
as s u b j e c t ( r a t h e r t h a n r u l e r ) i n t h e community o f s p e a k i n g , w h i l e s e e k i n g t o 
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r e p l a c e t h e ( i m p e r i a l i s t ) d e s i r e f o r p e r f e c t speech w i t h t h e ( e m a n c i p a t o r y ) 
acceptance o f t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f h i s t o r y , and h i s t o r i c i t y . 
I f v a l u e i s t h e ground o f t h e everyday language game, Gouldner argues, o b j e c t -
i v i t y has, and can o n l y have, a p e c u l i a r sense, i n r e l a t i o n t o s o c i a l a c c o u n t s . 
C o r r e c t n e s s does n o t , t h e n , i m p l y t r u t h , because o f t h e r u l e o f c o n v e n t i o n ; f o r 
the same re a s o n , p a r t i a l i t y does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y b i a s , s i n c e , g i v e n t h e 
p r i o r i t y o f v a l u e , what does an a c c u s a t i o n o f b i a s now come t o ? N e i t h e r i s 
'reason', i f i t i s t o be c o n v e n t i o n a l n e c e s s a r i l y p r o d u c t i v e o f 'Good', f o r 
who i s t o say what i s good. To e l e c t t o be r e f l e x i v e i n terms o f t h i s argument, 
i s t o make an argument f o r a way t o l i v e , s i n c e i t i s t o commit o n e s e l f t o 
openness about what grounds one's i n q u i r i n g . Thus, o b j e c t i v i t y comes here t o 
be t h e a t t e m p t t o t r a n s f o r m l o c a t e d n e s s f r o m t h e source t o t h e t o p i c o f i n q u i r y . 
To make v a l u e (as s o u r c e ) i n t o t o p i c , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y employs i t as r e - s o u r c e . 
Gouldner i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t when he f o r m u l a t e s t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e grammar o f 
t h e t e c h n i c a l ( s o c i o l o g i c a l ) language game as depending on t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
o f everyday language games. For him, t o be r e f l e x i v e must be t o t a k e emancip-
a t i o n as t h e p r i m a r y v a l u e , t o show t h i s as the ground o f your speaking as you 
a n a l y s e t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game. The p r o b l e m f o r r e f l e x i v e s o c i a l a n a l -
y s i s , t h e n , comes down t o making t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e m a n c i p a t i o n , as t h e good, 
what i s t o be shown by t h e a n a l y s i s . 
I f v a l u e g i v e s t o s o c i a l a c c o u n t s the sense t h a t Gouldner's c r i t i c a l r e f l e x i v i t y 
makes o f them, t h e n , f o r Gouldner, v a l u e - g r o u n d s a r e t h e c r i t e r i a f o r s o c i o l o g -
i c a l a c c o u n t s . The grammar o f the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game, f o r Gouldner, 
c o n s i s t s i n t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s between i t s a c c o u n t s and t h e i r v a l u e grounds. 
C r i t i c i s m , t h e n , o f t h i s g r a m m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n , i n v o l v e s , he a r g u e s , a r e - v a l -
u a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n between norms o f i n q u i r y ( i n s o c i o l o g y ) , m e t h o d o l o g i e s 
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g s , and t h e s o c i a l system which game them b i r t h , i n 
terms o f t h e p o l i t i c a l commitment t o r a d i c a l r e a l i s m . The T h e o r i s i n g o f whi c h 
such a c r i t i q u e c o n s i s t s i s a t once i d e o l o g i c a l and m e t a p h o r i c a l . As a c o n c r e t e 
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s t a t e m e n t o f v a l u e , i t i s i d e o l o g i c a l , but i t s m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y aims a t t r a n s -
c e n d i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y o f i t s l o c a t i o n t o r e l a t e t o a d i v e r s i t y o f c o n c r e t e 
s i t u a t i o n s . A t t h e a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l , t h e n , i t s m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y p r o v i d e s a 
deeper grammar whi c h t r a n s f o r m s i t s s t a t u s , p r o v i d i n g a d i a l e c t i c a l moment i n 
t h e p r o c e s s o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . M e t a p h o r i c a l i t y t h u s r e f e r s t o t h e r u l e s o f 
usage (among r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t s ) w h i c h enable v a l u e commitments t o j u s t i f i a b l y 
c o n s t i t u t e a c c o u n t s o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d . 
The r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t , t h e n , t o make these r u l e s o f usage ( t h i s grammar) t h e 
t o p i c o f h i s i n q u i r y i s t o make t h e way i n which v a l u e i s b o t h c o n v e n t i o n a l 
(and thus a v a i l a b l e ) and m e t a p h o r i c a l (and t h u s h i d d e n ) a p r o b l e m . As a c r i t -
i c a l e n t e r p r i s e , t h i s i s t o c o n f r o n t t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e community ( c u l t u r e ) 
w i t h the agency o f h i s t o r y ( t h e s e l f ) ; speech and ground, ought and i s , s u b j e c t 
and o b j e c t - each i s animated by t h e d i a l e c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e , t h e supreme con-
f r o n t a t i o n between p o s s i b i l i t y and r e a l i t y . I n t h e grammar o f r e f l e x i v e t h e o r -
i s i n g , as a m e t a p h o r i c a l o r ' p a l e o s y m b o l i c ' ground, we f i n d , as a 'form' o f 
( t h e o r e t i c ) l i f e , b o t h t h e ' n o r m a t i v e ' frame o f t h e t h e o r i s t ( c o n v e n t i o n ) and 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r r e a l i t y w h i c h t h e way o f l i f e a f f o r d s ( i t s meaning-
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s as m e t a p h o r ) . 
Grammar, i t s h o u l d be n o t e d , i s n o t a t h e o r y 'produced' ( o r w i l l e d ) by members 
o f a c u l t u r a l group about t h e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y ; i t i s the r e a l i t y w h i c h t h e y 
i n h a b i t , f o r t h e y a r e s u b j e c t t o i t s f a c t i c i t y ; t h e laws o f n a t u r e , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
may seem i n e x o r a b l e but t h i s i s o u r i n e x o r a b i l i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t I S i n e x o r -
a b i l i t y , and we cannot 'choose' t o have them o t h e r w i s e , ( 6 0 ) 
To p o s i t t h e grammar o f t h e language game as t h e ground o f an account i s t o p o i n t 
t o c o n v e n t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , i n t h e sense t h a t t h e r e a l i t y w h i c h i s accorded 
w i t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e language game, as p a r t o f t h e complex o f such games 
which c o n s t i t u t e t h e c u l t u r e o f a s o c i e t y . W h i l e Gouldner i s ( q u i t e c o r r e c t l y ) 
p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t e c h n i c a l language games (such as s o c i o l o g y ) cannot be s e l f 
grounded, i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y s u p p l y t h e i r own c r i t e r i a o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
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i t i s q u i t e a n o t h e r t o s e p a r a t e language games o u t i n t o ' t e c h n i c a l ' and 'every-
day' i n a way which g i v e s p r i o r i t y t o one o v e r t h e o t h e r , f o r t h i s i s a 
s e p a r a t i o n o f grounds. Gouldner i s a r g u i n g t h a t t e c h n i c a l language games, 
s i n c e t h e y have t h e i r g e n e s i s i n t h e mode o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n ( t h e s o c i a l 
c o n t e x t w i t h i n which t h e y a r e c r e a t e d ) , are t h e r e b y p a r a s i t i c on the everyday 
language games whi c h ( p r e s u m a b l y ) f o r m t h i s c o n t e x t o f p r o d u c t i o n . 
Now, t h i s argument i s p a r a l l e l t o the p r i v a t e l i n g u i s t s ' c l a i m f o r ' s u b j e c t i v e ' 
speech; h e r e , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , we come u l t i m a t e l y t o "how t h i n g s seem t o 
me" as t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r speech; 'sense-data' form t h e l i m i t s o f our w o r l d . 
Gouldner's argument i s p a r a l l e l t o t h i s c l a i m i n t h e sense t h a t i t a s s i g n s 
f a c t i c i t y o f j u s t t h e same o r d e r (as sense-data) t o the w o r l d o f everyday 
language games i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e 'second-order' p r o d u c t i o n s o f t e c h n i c a l 
language games. How t h i n g s seem t o the everyday a c t o r p r o v i d e t h e y a r d s t i c k 
a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e p r o d u c t s o f t e c h n i c a l language games a r e t o be measured. 
Now, w h i l e W i t t g e n s t e i n h o l d s t h a t t h e language game o f t a k i n g s u b j e c t i v e 
appearances as t h e o b j e c t o f speech i s c e r t a i n l y a p o s s i b l e move, i t i s n o t 
the b a s i s on which l e a r n i n g t o d e s c r i b e t h e w o r l d i s based, f o r i t i s p a r a s i t i c 
on t h e p r a c t i c e o f o s t e n s i o n - i e . , l e a r n i n g t o c a l l t h i s o b j e c t by t h i s name. 
The n o t i o n o f something a p p e a r i n g t o me t o be so depends on my h a v i n g l e a r n e d 
t o say when i t i s so, s p o n t a n e o u s l y ; t h a t i s , l e a r n i n g 'how t o go on' i n t h i s 
o r t h a t language game by g r a s p i n g t h e meaning o f what i t i s t o go on i n t h i s 
way o r t h a t way. 
Language i s 'given a new j o i n t ' when we l e a r n t o t a k e how t h i n g s seem t o be t o 
us as an o b j e c t f o r d i s c u s s i o n and a p p r a i s a l ; t h e s u b j e c t here appears as t h e 
o b j e c t . That t h i s i s p o s s i b l e n e i t h e r i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s always done ( o f 
c o u r s e ) , n o r t h a t t h e o b j e c t t h a t i s addressed i s t h e b a s i s o f a c t u a l i n f e r e n c e s , 
s i n c e t h e ' o b j e c t ' i n q u e s t i o n i s n o t an o b j e c t a t a l l . The k i n d o f knowledge 
which we c r i t e r i o n l e s s l y a s c r i b e t o o u r s e l v e s depends upon t h e concepts which 
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we use t o d e s c r i b e ' i n t h e normal case'. W h i l e i n t h i s ease ( i n a s s e r t i o n s about 
t h e ' o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ' ) our accounts a r e s u b j e c t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n by r e - d e s c r i b i n g 
t h e r e l e v a n t p e r c e p t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n ( s i n c e t o make an a s s e r t i o n means t o l e a r n 
t o r e c o g n i s e t h e c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h one i s j u s t i f i e d i n making i t ) , a 
statement about how t h i n g s seem t o appear t o me s i m p l y d e s c r i b e s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n 
o f the c o n d i t i o n s under which one i s so j u s t i f i e d , and i s n o t s u b j e c t t o eny 
f u r t h e r p r o c e s s . We cannot r e c o g n i s e t h e r e c o g n i t i o n . 
As Hacker p u t s i t : 
" I t i s t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f our mastery o f t h e r e l e v a n t .. 
co n c e p t , t h u s p r e - s u p p o s i n g o u r knowledge o f i t s c r i t e r i a 
and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f our mastery o f t h e 
component concepts o f t h e o b j e c t i v e ( w o r l d ) .. c o n t a i n e d 
w i t h i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n . " ( 6 1 ) 
The n o t i o n o f v a l u e i n Gouldner's account o f t h e r e l a t i o n between everyday and 
t e c h n i c a l language games ( s o c i o l o g y , Marxism) i s used t o r e l a t e t h e a c c o m p l i s h -
ment o f an account t o i t s b a s i s i n everyday l i f e ( t h e mode o f p r o d u c t i o n , t h e 
mundane). Value, f o r Gouldner, grounds t h e ac c o u n t s o f t h e everyday language 
game, and t h u s , t h r o u g h them t e c h n i c a l language games. Our ac c o u n t s a r e s e n s i b l e 
i f how t h i n g s seem t o be i n t h e account i s i n accord w i t h how t h i n g s m i g h t 
c o n c e i v a b l y be, g i v e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r j u s t i f i a b l e a s s e r t i o n w i t h i n t h e 
everyday language game. The eve r y d a y language game, a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s l i n e , 
s u p p l i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h t h e t e c h n i c a l language game may make j u s t -
i f i a b l e a s s e r t i o n s . A fundamental p r e c e p t o f Gouldner's r e f l e x i v e s o c i o l o g y 
i n v o l v e s t h e f o r m u l a t o r o f t h e account i n the t e c h n i c a l language game making t h e 
v a l u e s o f t h e t e c h n i c a l language game r e c o g n i s a b l e i n terms o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r j u s t i f i a b l e a s s e r t i o n o f t h e everyday language game. As i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
d i s c u s s i o n above, i t would seem t h a t we can t a k e how we f o r m u l a t e t h e s o c i a l 
w o r l d ( t h e 'way o f s e e i n g ' o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game) as an o b j e c t f o r 
i n q u i r y i n terms o f t h e way i n which t h e w o r l d i s f o r m u l a t e d i n everyday l a n g -
uage games. We 'see' t h e d i f f e r e n c e s ; f o r i n s t a n c e , deviance may appear t o be 
bad, d i s g u s t i n g , i r r e s p o n s i b l e ( e t c . , ) i n t h e language games o f t h e everyday 
w o r l d , whereas i n s o c i o l o g y ( o r p s y c h o l o g y , o r p o l i t i c s ) i t may be ' r e - w r i t t e n ' 
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as r a t i o n a l , d e t e r m i n e d , e x p r e s s i v e , c r e a t i v e , and so on. I t would seem, t h e n , 
t h a t we s h o u l d be a b l e t o make t h e ' v a l u e s ' w h i c h produce t h i s v i s i o n r e s p o n s i v e 
t o t h e 'commonsense' v i e w , f r o m w h i c h , s u r e l y , i t must d e r i v e s i n c e d e v i a n c e 
as a phenomenon i s a p r o d u c t o f t h e everyday w o r l d i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e . 
Gouldner argues t h a t r e f l e x i v e s o c i o l o g y must be an argument f o r a t r a n s c e n d e n t 
v a l u e b a s i s , some common good w h i c h w i l l t r a n s f o r m t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e 
grounds o f t h e everyday language game and i t s e l f i n a r e - u n i f i c a t i o n o f 'pure' 
and ' p r a c t i c a l * reason. 
Now, t h i s r e - u n i f i c a t i o n i s t o come a b o u t , a c c o r d i n g t o Gouldner, w i t h t h e 
r e f l e x i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l u e grounds o f s o c i o l o g y i n t h e everyday w o r l d . 
T h i s i s t o say t h a t Value, as t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n on w h i c h w o r l d - r e f e r r i n g a s s e r -
t i o n s a r e u l t i m a t e l y grounded, i s t o be grasped i n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e 
c r i t e r i a on w h i c h mastery o f t h e r e l e v a n t c o n c e p t u a l usage ( i n s o c i o l o g y ) 
depends. However, w h i l e f o r Gouldner, t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r usage i n t h e 
t e c h n i c a l language game can be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e everyday language game, W i t t -
g e n s t e i n argues t h a t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i a b l e a s s e r t i o n 
comes t o an end w i t h t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e mastery o f t h e r e l e v a n t c o n c e p t , 
w i t h t h e pre-supposed knowledge o f i t s c r i t e r i a . 
For Gouldner t o ground t h e concepts o f s o c i o l o g y u l t i m a t e l y i n t h e everyday 
language game i n v o l v e s a s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e two l e v e l s and an assumption o f t h e 
p r i o r i t y o f everyday language games, so t h a t t h e grounds o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l 
language game a r e a v a i l a b l e i n everyday language. " T a k i n g how t h i n g s seem t o 
us as s o c i o l o g i s t s " as an o b j e c t o f i n q u i r y , i n t h i s a c c o u n t , depends on t h e 
everyday language game o f " t a k i n g how t h i n g s seem t o us as everyday a c t o r s " . 
I f we accept t h i s as a p o s s i b l e move, t h e n t h e grammar o f t h e everyday language 
game, s i n c e i t s u p p l i e s us w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r w o r l d - r e f e r r i n g 
a s s e r t i o n s , a l s o s u p p l i e s t h e c r i t e r i a f o r the s e n s i b l e a t t r i b u t i o n o f v a l u e 
t o s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s , s i n c e these a r e r e s p o n s i b l e u l t i m a t e l y t o t h e grammar 
o f everyday language games. 
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However, t o d e s c r i b e s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c ounts i n terms o f t h e v a l u e s w h i c h ground 
them i n t h e s o c i a l c o n t e x t o f p r o d u c t i o n depends on o u r b e i n g a b l e t o j u s t i f y 
t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f a c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n , t h a t i s t o say, upon our making 
s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s an o b j e c t f o r t h e r e f l e x i v e a n a l y s i s . I f t h e y a re t o be 
tak e n as such an o b j e c t ( i e . , i f t h e y are t o be grounded i n v a l u e s ) t h e n t h e y 
must be t a k e n as h a v i n g one meaning, t h e y must have a c l e a r sense. We c o u l d 
n o t j u s t i f i a b l y a s s e r t the r e l a t i o n between v a l u e and account u n l e s s we had 
n o t a l r e a d y i n t e r p r e t e d what t h e account means. 
Thus, f o r us t o a s s e r t a r e l a t i o n s h i p between v a l u e and account depends upon 
our a l r e a d y u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e account t o whi c h we a t t r i b u t e t h i s d e t e r m i n i n g 
e f f e c t . Tnat i s t o say, o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e account i s presumed t o be 
a n a l y t i c a l l y s e p a r a b l e from our i m p u t a t i o n o f v a l u e . 
To be c r i t i c a l o f s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c ounts r e q u i r e s t h a t we see s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s 
as h a v i n g a c l e a r l y d e l i m i t a b l e meaning which we can t r e a t as the one p o s s i b l e 
d e s c r i p t i o n ; i e . , t h a t we see i n s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s an i n s t a n c e o f language 
o p e r a t i n g as s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ( i n Gordon Baker's p h r a s e ) : 
"a c o n j u n c t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s and a p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n j u n c t i o n " ( 6 2 ) 
P r o c e e d i n g f r o m t h i s s e p a r a t i o n o f f o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f o r 
th e moment, we see t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e sentences o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l 
account comes about w i t h t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f sense i n terms o f t h e c r i t e r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e more b a s i c sentences o f t h e everyday language game. The c l a i m 
t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s o f the s o c i o l o g i c a l account were based on c r i t e r i a which 
d i d n o t make them c e r t a i n ( i e . , t h a t t h e y a re r e m i t t e d , b i a s e d , v a l u e l a d e n ) 
would depend, i n i t s t u r n , on t h e c l a i m t h a t these c r i t e r i a , as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , 
i n f a c t o f f e r e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r b e l i e v i n g i n something e l s e , w i t h a presum-
p t i v e a b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e t r u t h o f c o u n t e r v a i l i n g a c c o u n t s , and a s i g n i f -
i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g a c c ounts and the c r i t e r i a l j u s t i -
f i c a t i o n appealed t o i n t h e everyday language game which a f f o r d e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
t o b o t h c o u n t e r v a i l i n g and o r i g i n a l a c c o u n t s . 
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The p o s s i b i l i t y o£ c r i t i c i s i n g t h e c r i t e r i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n a ppealed t o t h e 
o r i g i n a l account i s t h e r e f o r e p a r a s i t i c on t h e h o l d i n g o f o t h e r c r i t e r i a l r e l a -
t i o n s between sentences i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game and t h e appeal t o 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s p u t a t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d by t h e same sentences o f the 
everyday language game. Thus, an a c c u s a t i o n o f v a l u e groundedness o n l y has 
sense 1 f we c o n j o i n , on t h e one hand, t h e meaning o f an account as h i g h l y d e t e r -
m i n a t e (a j u n c t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y ) and a l s o h i g h l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e (a c o n j u n c t i o n 
o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) . The n o t i o n o f i n d e x i c a l i t y c a p t u r e s t h e paradox v e r y w e l l . 
On t h e one hand, t h e meaning o f an u t t e r a n c e i n c o n t e x t i s h i g h l y s p e c i f i c , 
whereas i f we remove i t from c o n t e x t i t o f f e r s an e x t r e m e l y wide v a r i e t y o f 
p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
C o n t i n u i n g t o m a i n t a i n Gouldner's proposed r e l a t i o n between t h e sentences o f 
the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game and t h e language games o f everyday l i f e , we now 
f i n d , however, t h a t i f we w i s h t o c l a i m t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d i s c o v e r i n s t a n c e s 
of a breakdown between sentences o f t h e t e c h n i c a l language game and i t s e v e r y -
day grounds, t h i s can o n l y f o l l o w 1 f we m a i n t a i n t h e g e n e r a l c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
between sentences o f the two k i n d s . Mannheim's argument f i n d s s u p p o r t h e r e , 
f o r , we c o u l d n o t propose a g e n e r a l breakdown w i t h o u t d e p r i v i n g o u r s e l v e s o f 
any means t o d i s c o v e r i t . However, any c r i t i c i s m o f t h e v a l u e bases o f s o c i o -
l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s r e q u i r e s grounds; i n t h e p r e s e n t case, s i n c e we must m a i n t a i n 
t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o f r e l a t i o n s between s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c ounts and everyday 
language, these grounds must i n v o l v e a d d i t i o n a l evidence which s u b v e r t s t h e 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s a p p ealed t o g i v e t h e o r i g i n a l account sense. That i s t o say, 
the sense o f s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s can o n l y be s u b v e r t e d by a p p e a l i n g t o evidence 
which i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m the c r i t e r i a a ppealed t o i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e t o g i v e 
those accounts t h e i r sense. 
Since t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f sense t o an account depends on t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o j u s t i f y such an a t t r i b u t i o n as s e n s i b l e , and t h e 
c r i t i c i s m o f t h e v a l u e bases o f s o c i o l o g y depends c r u c i a l l y on t h e sense 
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a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e o b j e c t o f c r i t i c i s m , i t would seem t o f o l l o w t h a t t o c r i t i c -
i s e an account must i n v o l v e r e - f o r m u l a t i n g t h e o b j e c t which t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l 
c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s would produce i n terms o f doubts grounded i n a d d i t i o n a l 
e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t . 
However, Gouldner's a t t r i b u t i o n o f v a l u e does n o t , and cannot produce a d d i t i o n a l 
e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t f r o m t h a t a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e , t h a t which a l r e a d y j u s t i f i e s 
the usage. To c r i t i c i s e a c c o unts t h e n , i n terms o f t h e v a l u e s w h i c h produce 
them, i t would seem t h a t we must ( a ) make t h e c o n v e n t i o n s which ground the 
a t t r i b u t i o n o f sense i n t o t h e ' o b j e c t s ' o f c r i t i c i s m , and ( b ) o f f e r a d d i t i o n a l 
e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t , o u t s i d e o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n s which, f o r t h i s ' o b j e c t ' ground 
i t s s e n s i b l e employment, i n o r d e r t o o f f e r a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g 'sense'. 
what would t h i s mean f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts? To b e g i n w i t h , i t would mean 
t h a t what s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts come t o , what t h e sense o f i t s sentences i s co 
be, can be p r e c i s e l y demarcated by e x a m i n i n g t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l 
language game. I f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game i s t o be, as a t e c h n i c a l 
language game, i t s e l f grounded i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e everyday language 
game, t h e n t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e everyday language game would seem t o a f f o r d 
an ' e x t e r n a l v i e w ' o f the sense o f i t s ' s o c i o l o g i c a l ' sentences. However, 
these a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s view o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f sense, 
' s o c i o l o g i c a l ' p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r as they d e r i v e t h e i r sense from t h e i r r e l a t i o n s 
t o each o t h e r , as sentences i n a s p e c i a l i s e d language game; t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f t h e c r i t e r i a l account o f sense making i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t no ' e x t e r n a l ' v i e w 
o f t h e sense o f sentences i s a v a i l a b l e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f t h e sense o f t h e 
sentences o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game depends on t h e c r i t e r i a l s u p p o r t 
o f t h e sentences o f t h e everyday language game depends on t h e c r i t e r i a l s u p p o r t 
o f t h e sentences o f t h e everyday language game, t h e n t h e sentences o f t h e 
everyday language game cannot be more b a s i c t h a n t h e sentences o f t h e s o c i o -
l o g i c a l language game; t h e c r i t e r i a w h i c h j u s t i f y t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language 
game would themselves r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and so on t o an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s 
o f m e t a - s t a t e m e n t s , i f t h a t were t h e case. 
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R a t h e r , what W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work suggests i s t h a t sentences w h i c h a f f o r d 
c r i t e r i a l s u p p o r t depend themselves f o r t h e i r sense on t h e sentences t o which 
t h e y are t h e r e b y c r i t e r i a l l y r e l a t e d i n t h i s a c t i o n . T h i s i s t o say, t h e 
sentences o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game themselves form t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
o£ t h e sense o f the sentences o f the 'everyday* language game which a r e c r i -
t e r i a l l y r e l a t e d t o them; a statement o f t h e v a l u e groundedness o f s o c i o l o g i c a l 
a ccounts depends f o r i t s sense on t h e c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n between i t s e l f and 
the account f o r w h i c h i t c l a i m s t o be t h e ground. The sense o f t h e 'statement 
of v a l u e ' depends on t h e sense o f the account f o r which i t c l a i m s t o be t h e 
ground. I t i s a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n . ( 6 3 ) 
To c l a i m t h a t t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game i s grounded i n t h e everyday language 
game, t h e n , does n o t enable one t o demarcate t h e meanings o f t h e sentences o f 
th e s o c i o l o g i c a l language game e x t e r n a l l y , f o r t h e sense o f accounts i n t h e 
s o c i o l o g i c a l language game are i n v o l v e d i n r e e l p r o c a l c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
w i t h t h e sentences w h i c h f o r m t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i r sense. I f v a l u e i s 
t o form t h e ground o f an ac c o u n t , i t cannot be f o r m u l a t e d i n terms o f t h e sen-
tences o f t h e everyday language game, as i f t h e s e were p r i o r and unconnected, 
whatever sentences a re used c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e p r a c t i c e s 
i n v o l v e d i n f o r m u l a t i n g a s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t , f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r 
t h e sentences produced i n the p r a c t i c e o f s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g t hemselves 
form t h e 'meaning' o f t h e sentences produced i n t h e p r a c t i c e . There i s no 
• c a l c u l u s ' i n language games; we cannot ' s u b t r a c t ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n o r d e r t o 
i s o l a t e meaning; t h e meaning o f t h e o r i s i n g p r a c t i c e s e x i s t s i n t h e r e l a t i o n 
between sentences i n an account and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which make them s e n s i b l e . 
I n sum, t h e n , t h e r e i s no e x t e r n a l view o f t h e meaning o f s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s 
o u t s i d e o f t h e c r i t e r i a l s u p p o r t a f f o r d e d by t h e sentences which j u s t i f y t h e 
usages which a r e embodied i n i t , and t h e sense o f t h e sentences w h i c h a f f o r d 
such c r i t e r i a l s u p p o r t depends on what t h e y are b e i n g used t o a t t r i b u t e sense 
t o , f o r t h e i r own sense. 
Gouldner's f o r m u l a t i o n o f v a l u e as a r e l a t i o n w h i c h a s s i g n s p r i o r i t y t o the 
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sentences o f t h e everyday language game i s t h u s based on a ' c l a s s i c a l * e p i s -
t e m o l o g i c a l t h e o r y w h i c h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s . I t makes no 
sense t o f o r m u l a t e v a l u e as t h i s k i n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r t h i s e s t a b l i s h e s a 
p r i n c i p l e o f doubt which would o v e r t u r n any c l a i m t o c e r t a i n t y , s i n c e i t r e s t s 
i t s e l f on a view o f c e r t a i n t y which i s an ' i l l u s i o n o f grammar*. 
We do, o f c o u r s e , speak o f i n t e r e s t d i c t a t i n g t h e c o n t e n t and arguments o f 
accounts ( f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e s o c i a l t h e o r i e s o f Nazism), and i n t u i t i v e l y , t h i s 
seems a r e a s o n a b l e t h i n g t o do. T h i s r e s t s , however, on our a b i l i t y t o j u s t i f y 
such c r i t i q u e s on t h e grounds o f some o v e r r i d i n g and u n q u e s t i o n a b l e s et o f 
v a l u e s ( t h e s a n c t i t y o f human l i f e , t he d i g n i t y o f man, o u r v e r s i o n o f t h e 
e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s o f a j u s t s o c i e t y , and so o n ) . Gouldner's c l a i m f o r t h e 
v a l u e o f e m a n c i p a t i o n i s j u s t such a c l a i m ; what he a l s o does, however, i s t o 
t i e t h i s moral c r i t i q u e t o an argument t h a t , s i n c e t h e accounts o f s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e e x i s t as t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n an i n t e r e s t - d i r e c t e d 
s e l e c t i o n from t h e 'g i v e n and f i x e d realm* ( t h e ' r e a l i t y ' o f s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s ) 
i t i s t h e r e f o r e always p o s s i b l e t o doubt t h e i r t r u t h . He t h u s ' b u i l d s i n * a 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f s c e p t i c i s m which can be p r o j e c t e d t o any l e v e l . T h i s e n a b l e s 
him t o j u s t i f y t h e appeal t o t h e mo r a l r e a l m (and t h e v a l u e o f e m a n c i p a t i o n ) 
by a r g u i n g from a p o s s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r breakdown (as i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s , 
o r Nazi Germany) t o a g e n e r a l breakdown, w i t h no c e r t a i n t y ( i n t h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y ) 
a v a i l a b l e , w i t h t h e concommitant n e c e s s i t y o f an appeal t o m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y . 
The n o t i o n o f v a l u e , used i n t h i s way, n e c e s s a r i l y becomes a c a u s a l f a c t o r i n 
the g e n e s i s o f s o c i a l t h e o r i e s ; t h e r e i s no way o u t o f t h e r e s u l t i n g i n f i n i t e 
r e g r e s s i f we accept t h e t h e s i s t h a t , s i n c e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s d e f e a s i b l e a l l 
s o c i a l a c c o u n t s are r e l a t i v e t o t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n . 
What W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work suggests i s t h a t , w h i l e any c l a i m t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s 
s u b j e c t t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u b v e r s i o n , t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a g e n e r a l breakdown o f c r i l e r i a l r e l a t i o n s . As a g e n e r a l t h e o r y , 
t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Gouldner's s c e p t i c i s m would t r a n s f o r m t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
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value-groundedness i n t o a brute f a c t ; what i s to be remembered i s t h a t whether 
or not accounts are to be grounded i n value i s not t o be decided p r i o r to the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a general theory i n which doubt and c e r t a i n t y have a r o l e t o 
play, f o r i t i s only i n terms of such a theory t h a t we could conceive of the 
proper r o l e of value i n r e l a t i o n t o other p o s s i b i l i t i e s (such as c e r t a i n t y , 
and doubt, and t r u t h ) . 
In terras of a theory which would see sense as being accomplished by the r e c i p -
rocal c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s between sentences of a v a r i e t y of language games, 
value has q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t r o l e t o play than t h a t which i t takes i n the r e l a -
t i o n between the fundamental sentences of the 'everyday' language game and the 
' t h e o r e t i c a l ' sentences of t e c h n i c a l language games such as sociology. I n terms 
of the former, what i s being doubted about the r o l e of value i s not the e m p i r i c a l 
f a c t of value d i r e c t i n g theory, but the general premises which are adduced from 
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . 
According t o Wi t t g e n s t e i n , the p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt does not undermine a claim 
to c e r t a i n t y based on c r i t e r i a l support. In s o c i o l o g i c a l terms, only s u b s t a n t i a l 
grounds f o r doubt can undermine an account; t h a t i s to say, the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
doubting s o c i o l o g i c a l statements does not undermine t h e i r claim to c e r t a i n t y i n 
general, r a t h e r the claim to c e r t a i n t y which such accounts make i s part o f a 
language game i n which (as i n any language game) i t only has sense t o t a l k of 
c e r t a i n t y which does include the p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt. 
In the language of sociology, i t does not make sense to search f o r c e r t a i n t y 
which i s unquestionable, any more than i t does i n any language game. I t i s 
p r e c i s e l y the q u e s t i o n a b i 1 i t y of s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c accounts which makes i t 
sensible to t a l k of them i n terms of c e r t a i n t y at a l l . 
Now, as Baker's argument has shown t h i s i s not simply the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a 
new, weak sense of ' c e r t a i n ' ; the point i s t h a t the kind of c e r t a i n t y involved 
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i n the n o t i o n of value freedom ( i n the case of sociology) i s based on a n o t i o n 
of knowledge which i s , by v i r t u e of how i t i s defined, both una t t a i n a b l e and 
unnecessary. 
Gouldner's Account of Value; a Summation 
For Gouldner, then, the consequence of the value etnbededness of any account of 
t h r s o c i a l world i s that o b j e c t i v i t y only becomes possible w i t h the analysis 
of what values i n f a c t ground s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts i n the mundane concerns of 
everyday l i f e . This r e s t s on the separation of the grounds of everyday and 
te c h n i c a l language games; the l a t t e r are transforms of the former. To be re-
f l e x i v e i s t o search f o r value-grounds which display the i n t e r e s t of emancipa-
t i o n - i e . , the common good - i n the o b j e c t i v e t r ansformation of the process 
of r e - u n i f i c a t i o n ( o f everyday language games and s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g ) 
brought about by s e l f c r i t i c i s m . Making the t e c h n i c a l l e v e l metaphorical enables 
Gouldner t o claim t h a t the con d i t i o n s f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s statements 
can be a matter of convention, or grammar. «Jhat i s brought together i n t h i s 
f o r m u l a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n of value (convention) and account (metaphor) i s the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f statements, given t h a t t h e i r sense i s 
accomplished i n the r e c i p r o c a l c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n of themselves and t h e i r rules 
of usage, provides only and can only provide an irremediable indeterminacy to 
the sense of i t s sentences. The m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y of the statements of the socio-
l o g i c a l language game provides f o r the p r i n c i p l e of the indeterminacy of the 
sense of i t s sentences. However, t h i s view r e s t s , as has been argued, on the 
n o t i o n t h a t some other possible view of the sense of i t s sentences i s a v a i l a b l e 
to us. Taking Wittgenstein's view of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of sense s e r i o u s l y , we 
can see t h a t the sense of the sentences of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game IS 
what i s accomplished i n the r e l a t i o n t o i t s c r i t e r i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n - there i s 
no other access t o i t . The claim t o m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y r e s t s also on the a b i l i t y 
to b r i n g together c o n c r e t e l y diverse phenomena as instances of 'the same t h i n g 1 ; 
t h i s , i t i s held, demonstrates the existence of formulable 'rules of t r a n s -
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formation' which the t h e o r i s t could, i n p r i n c i p l e , recognise, i f not neces s a r i l y 
formulate. The paleo-symbolic l e v e l from which these rules transform, would 
presumably c o n s t i t u t e a realm i n which basic sentences (which are unformulable 
i n p r i n c i p l e ) supply the sense of the sentences of the surface s t r u c t u r e . 
While t h i s claim cannot, by i t s nature, be r e f u t e d , the a b i l i t y of sentences 
to j u s t i f y concretely diverse phenomena as instances can be subsumed under a 
c r i t e r i o l o g i c a l account of sense making because of the r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n of 
sentences and t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n s - i e . , the sense of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s 
at l e a s t p a r t l y determined by the sentence which i t j u s t i f i e s . 
The n o t i o n o f being c r i t i c a l of the grammar of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game 
rests on a fundamental misconception of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r knowledge and 
c e r t a i n t y . I t depends on reducing the sense of accounts i n t h i s context t o 
grounds on a more basic l e v e l i n the mundane language game. To spe c i f y socio-
l o g i c a l accounts as transforms of t h i s more mundane l e v e l i s t o claim that the 
meaning of the concepts employed i n s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts i s p r i o r t o the usage 
of those concepts i n the assertions/statements of the account (eg., Role, 
Str u c t u r e , A c t i o n and so on). Under t h i s account, we go wrong i n sociology 
when we mis-apply the concept according to the grammar of the s o c i o l o g i c a l 
language game as i t i s formulable i n terms of the everyday language game. The 
ru l e s of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game c o n s t i t u t e what i s t o count as a corre c t 
or an i n c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of a concept i n s o f a r as sociology i s recognisable 
as having a s p e c i f i c end, which then stands as the a r b i t e r of what w i l l be 
i n t e l l i g i b l e w i t h i n the a c t i v i t y . I n a sense, then, the grammar of sociology 
i s a r b i t r a r y ; however, t h i s end i s i t s e l f only a v a i l a b l e i n the corre c t a p p l i -
c a t i o n of i t s r u l e s . The grammar of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game determines 
what i s t o c o n s t i t u t e doing sociology i n terms of what i s t o c o n s t i t u t e good/ 
true/accurate accounting of s o c i o l o g i c a l phenomena but, what i s to c o n s t i t u t e 
the accounting of s o c i a l phenomena i s not defined by the r u l e s of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
grammar. Gouldner wants to claim t h a t the language game of sociology i s a 
transform of the language game of everyday l i f e , and that t h e r e f o r e , i t s ends 
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(whdt gives i t sense) are formulable i n the mundane language game. But the 
grammar of the everyday language game i s an a l t e r n a t e form of representation 
to the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game. To account the ends of sociology i n terms 
of the everyday language game i s t o change the sense. The language game of 
everyday l i f e does not form the ground of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game. The 
statements of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language game do not depend f o r t h e i r sense on 
a more basic set of sentences. Rather, the grammar of the s o c i o l o g i c a l language 
game c o n s t i t u t e s r e a l i t y as the s o c i o l o g i s t knows i t . To argue f o r a more 
basic view i s to move outside of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of knowledge. 
To argue then f o r the r e l a t i v i t y of s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge depends on the 
assumption of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a general breakdown of c r i t e r i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r i t s statements; such a breakdown i s e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d by 'W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
c o n s t r u c t i v i s t account of sense making. The subversion of p a r t i c u l a r accounts 
necessarily remains as a p o s s i b i l i t y because the d e f e a s i b i l i t y of c r i t e r i a l 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s what makes possible the c e r t a i n t y t h a t we can have. Thus, 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the subversion of s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts on the basis of 
t h e i r value ground i s what supplies sociology w i t h the form of c e r t a i n t y that 
i s possible i n any language game, but such a move involves grounds which are 
not themselves open t o doubt, and t h e r e f o r e , cannot be known. The accusation 
of value groundedness i s p a r a s i t i c on the o b j e c t i v e accounting which the socio-
l o g i c a l language game a f f o r d s . The claim which r e f l e x i v i t y makes f o r a cog-
n i t i o n of value grounds through s e l f c r i t i c i s m i s r a d i c a l l y incoherent; the 
claim f o r a tr a n s f o r m a t i o n of value grounds through s e l f c r i t i c i s m may have 
some weight, but i t cannot involve the kind o f s e l f knowledge which i t claims, 
c r u c i a l l y , i t does not involve the a c t i o n of w i l l . I t i s i t s e l f subject to 
the grounds possible i n any community of language, which are i n p r i n c i p l e , 
open n e i t h e r t o doubt, nor knowledge, nor c e r t a i n t y ; the transformation of a 
way of seeing can only occur w i t h i n the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the e v i d e n t i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the sentences of what has already t o be accepted, and the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h a t which i s the product of such a process, and the 
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process whereby i t comes i n t o being i s not i t s e l f subject to doubt, knowledge 
or c e r t a i n t y . 
The problem i s e s s e n t i a l l y the s t a t u s of the s e l f as the object of s u b j e c t i v e 
knowledge, the sense i n which we know our own thoughts as o b j e c t s i n a f i e l d 
of c o g n i t i o n . Such knowledge only has sense i n terns of the s e n t e n t i a l c r i t e r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s between the objects of which i t i s taken to be a d e s c r i p t i o n - i e . , 
knowing our knowledge as a uay of knowing the world depends f o r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y 
on the r e l a t i o n s between the sentences w i t h which we describe the wo r l d , and 
how we j u s t i f y them. The s e l f which appears as subject i n t h i s move i s irrem-
ediably conventional; the knowing of that s e l f i s the achievement of grammar, 
as i t s t r u c t u r e s the r e l a t i o n between the s e l f as subject and o b j e c t . 
R e f l e x i v i t y i n sociology cannot take as i t s goal a c r i t i c a l speech on i t s own 
grounds; the object towards which such speech would be d i r e c t e d i s not a poss-
i b l e object of knowledge. C r i t i q u e i s p a r a s i t i c on the p o s s i b i l i t y of_ theor-
i s i n g . Any c r i t i q u e of the conventions of sociology pre-supposes a meta-
sociology i n which i t i s i t s e l f i n t e l l i g i b l e ; the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a c r i t i q u e 
does not imply the r e l a t i v i s a t i o n of s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts, but should r a t h e r 
i t s e l f form the ground under which such speech could be i n t e l l i g i b l e . The 
way of l i f e under which c r i t i q u e i s a possible move i t s e l f has a grammar, but 
t h i s grammar must be accepted, i t i s not a matter f o r argument. This i s not 
to say t h a t i t does not change, but ra t h e r t h a t i t only has l i f e i n each occasion 
of c r i t i q u e as the sense of c r i t i q u e and i t s o bject i s accomplished i n t h e i r 
r e c i p r o c a l c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . C r i t i q u e then comes t o an argument f o r a 
way to l i v e , but i t i s not r e f l e x i v e , i n the way that i t claims to be, but 
rests on the acceptance of p r e v i o u s l y decided conventions of grammatical usage; 
the " o b j e c t s " of the language game o f c r i t i q u e are c o n s t i t u t e d i n the grammar 
on which i t r e s t s . 
The goal of r e f l e x i v e sociology, then, i s to be the grammar of the occasions 
i n which s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts accomplish sense. 
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Some I m p l i c a t i o n s ( i i ) Blum and Self Knowledge 
Self i s the achievement of Grammar i n the r e l a t i o n t o the grounds which make 
i t p o s s i ble. That i s to say, the s e l f i s accomplished by the r e l a t i o n between 
the communal resources upon which sensible speech (the speech of members) i s 
founded and the occasions of speech which celebrate those resources i n concrete 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Speech r e - c o l l e c t s the r e l a t i o n between i t s e l f and the world 
on the occasion o f producing the world. Reflexive t h e o r i s i n g , then, would be 
speech which attends not t o t h i s possible s o c i o l o g i c a l world as a product, not 
to what i s what i s produced i n i t s s t i p u l a t i o n s , a s s e r t i o n s , p r e d i c a t i o n s , but 
rather how t h i s product i s a display of what makes i t p o s s i b l e , how the s e l f 
i s a method f o r the production of speech. (64) 
"Theorising i s the attempt to bring the experience of 
t h i n g i n g t o speech. I f t h i n k i n g i s a conversation 
w i t h i n the s o u l " ( c f . , W i t t g e n s t e i n , below), "what one 
speaks about ought to be exemplified as a moment i n 
t h i s conversation. One's predecessors re-present the 
unthought o r i g i n s of one's own thought which t h i s 
very thought seeks t o surpass. Theorising begins w i t h 
what men have i n common, and since author reader and 
predecessor are men, i n q u i r y begins w i t h what they 
have i n common as men. What they have i n common i s 
t h a t they are a l l moved caused and summoned by t h a t 
which moves causes and summons a l l t h i n g s . Beneath 
the s u p e r f i c i a l commonality of t h e i r 'mutual o r i e n -
t a t i o n s ' t o one another i s a deeper u n i t y - the one-
ness of Being i n which a l l men p a r t i c i p a t e .... The 
d i f f e r e n c e between the author, predecessor and reader 
i s t h a t he has l i s t e n e d t o what they share. The Author 
knows t h a t what they share needs r e - t h i n k i n g , and t h e i r 
deep u n i t y c o n s i s t s not i n the what of what they share 
but i n the f a c t t h a t what they share can be rethought. 
The most important matter t o r e - t h i n k i s that what they 
share has not been thought ... The problem of the author 
i s t o induce the reader t o j o i n w i t h him to hear what 
they share by c o n s t r u c t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
predecessor as the icon o f the t h i n k i n g experience as 
i t - s e l f an instance of the r e - t h i n k i n g t o which author 
and reader are d i r e c t e d . Author and reader share t h e i r 
humanness - the capacity t o r e - t h i n k that which needs 
thought. The author'.s problem i s t o re-create an 
exemplary t h i n k i n g experience f o r a reader whose horizons 
are c o n t r o l l e d by the s e c u r i t y of the unthought, the 
pleasurable and the common; t o have the reader r e -
experience t h e i r human s o l i d a r i t y which the d i s p e r s i v e 
forces o f the high sounding and impressive cover over. 
To c i t e the f a l s i t y of predecessors, and t h e i r omissions, 
gaps and s t u p i d i t i e s as f a i l u r e s i s t o compare t h e i r 
performances (performances which the author has himself 
created) w i t h the standard of true speaking i n terms of 
which they f a l l short. To use the standard r e s o u r c e f u l l y 
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f o r such c i t a t i o n while not exposing i t s committed 
and r a t i o n a l character as a standard t h a t i s achieved 
masks the p o s s i b i l i t y of re-experiencing the standard 
i t s e l f as t h a t which emerges out of the Desire t o 
surpass t h i s s e l f same arena of f a l s i t y and otherness. 
Because such usage concretizes the standard as a 
n e u t r a l object - present and apparent t o the onlooker -
i t d i v e s t s the standard of any moral weight as a good 
on the grounds t h a t what i s merely present i s not 
worth saying". The Book (65) 
For Blum, then, the self-centredness which t r e a t s speech as simply the d i f f e r -
ence between author and predecessor cannot re-present the u n i t y which grounds 
the author's t h e o r i s i n g as t h e o r i s i n g ; the a s s e r t i o n of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n 
the assumed agreement from which u n t h i n k i n g speaking begins masks the problem 
of how, i n f a c t , necessary l o y a l t y to t h i s agreement (the moral grounds of 
speaking as a saying) i s a f f i r m e d i n the s e l f . A saying of what ought to be 
shown i t s e l f shows what 'ought' i t aspires t o , shows how i t re-members i t s - s e l f 
as a c e l e b r a t i o n of t h i s agreement. Reflexive speech, then, recognises i n the 
d i f f e r e n c e o f what i s shown to what i s said the c e l e b r a t i o n of the moral grounds 
of speaking .vhich u n i f y author and predecessor, s e l f and other, member and 
community. The knowir. 0 r>L t h i s u n i t y i s the recovery of the s e l f as a method 
f o r the accomplishment ( i n f a i t h f u l n e s s to moral grounds of speaking) o f 
membership which re-members the underlying community of language and t h a t of 
which i t speaks. To speak of sociology i n t h i s way i s to mark o f f the subjects 
of which i t speaks from the a u t h o r i t a t i v e e l e c t i o n which i t makes concerning 
how the phenomena which i t c o n s t i t u t e s ought t o be understood; i t i s to mark 
o f f the concrete subject ( t h a t of which i t speaks) from the r u l e to which 
sociology subjects i t s e l f the r u l e shich provides the auspices f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l 
d e s c r i p t i o n . This r u l e i s the A n a l y t i c subject of sociology; i t i s what 
enables sociology t o produce a t o p i c . The a n a l y t i c subject of sociology, then, 
i s the moral l i f e of which, as i t s e l f an i n q u i r y , i t i s an instance. Put i n 
another way, s o c i o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n displays i t s moral commitment not i n 
conceptions of the m a t e r i a l upon which i t operates (as Gouldner and other 
' r e f l e x i v e ' s o c i o l o g i s t s would c l a i m ) , but i n the way i n which any study 
dis p l a y s i n i t s e l f a normative commitment to how i n q u i r y ought t o be accomplished. 
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That i s to say, i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only i n terms of grounds which j u s t i f y i t 
as a display of competent membership (exemplifying the moral and r a t i o n a l code 
of the community of s o c i o l o g i c a l language). To make the grounds of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
accounting a t o p i c , then, i s t o make the r e l a t i o n between the speech (what 
i t c o n s t i t u t e s ) and i t s standard (how t h i s i s i n t e l l i g i b l e ) the goal o f speech. 
To speak t r u l y would be to speak i d e a l r a t i o n a l i t y , but such p e r f e c t speech 
i s impossible, f o r any reference t o i t s own standard makes use of such a standard 
to c o n s t i t u t e i t s e l f . The desire t o make reference t o the r a t i o n a l and moral 
grounds of speaking a r i s e s w i t h the accomplishment of any p r a c t i c e of i n q u i r y , 
f o r such accomplishment rounded on r a t i o n a l and moral standards which i t must 
meet; i n the accomplishment of i n q u i r y there i s immediately rais e d the poss-
i b i l i t y o f 'that which the i n q u i r y i s f o r ' ( i t s m o r a l / r a t i o n a l grounds) being 
che r a t i o n a l t o p i c f o r the p r a c t i c e i t s e l f . The desire t o address the grounds 
of s o c i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y , then, amounts to a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the inaccess-
i b i l i t y of the standards according t o which s o c i o l o g i c a l speech i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y of the standard of i n t e l l i g i b l e s o c i o l o g i c a l speech i s not 
taken, thereby, as a recommendation f o r sil e n c e s . Rather, d e f i n i t i o n , which 
stands as the accomplishment of i n t e l l i g i b l e speech, i s t o be seen as a metaphor 
i n which the grounds are brought to speech; t o make any such metaphorical apppear-
ance the occasion f o r i n q u i r y i n t o how i t i s a r r i v e d at i s to d i s p l a y , i n the 
workings of the reasons f o r the d e f i n i t i o n (the r a t i o n a l i t y ) the moral grounds 
of the speech which the d e f i n i t i o n i s - i e . , a n o t i o n of what j u s t i f i e s the 
sense of the d e f i n i t i o n (note here the c r i t e r i o l o g i c a l account of sense making). 
To take a s o c i o l o g i c a l account as a metaphor f o r i t s moral and r a t i o n a l grounds 
i s t o t r e a t i t as an i c o n , t o take i t s occasion as the o p p o r t u n i t y t o show the 
desire the a s p i r a t i o n f o r a speech which grounds i t s e l f ; the a s p i r a t i o n t o the 
perfect speech shows i n i t s f a i l u r e ( p r a c t i c a l i t y , p a r t i a l i t y ) the l i m i t s on 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of speech. The l i m i t s of p o s s i b i l i t y of speech which seeks 
to speak what j u s t i f i e s i t s speaking describes (shows) the conditions under 
which the Self achieves the r a t i o n a l and moral version which members recognise 
as the competent accounting of soci a l r e a l i t y . 
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Insof a r as s o c i o l o g i c a l 9peech i s r e f l e x i v e , then, i t i s speech which i s 
responsible f o r the product which the speech i s ; that i s , as the possible 
t o p i c of r a t i o n a l speech, the product of r e f l e x i v e speech must be i t s e l f 
subject to the r a t i o n a l methods whereby t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y can become cl e a r 
and i n t e l l i g i b l e . This i s not t o make the speech subject to an i d e a l i s e d 
( p l a n f u l , i n t e l l i g i b l e ) standard constructed from j u s t how ( s o c i o l o g y , science, 
everyday t h i n k i n g , e t c . ) gets done, but r a t h e r , i t seeks to address the 
question behind the method - i e . , why i t i s worth doing, why i t ought t o be 
done. To understand the p r a c t i c e of sociology, then, does not imply t h a t we 
accept the standards accepted as secure i n order that sociology 'gets done'; 
sociology cannot achieve a p r a c t i c a l understanding of i t s e l f , i t cannot under-
stand i t s p r a c t i c e i n terms of the standards by which the p r a c t i c e i s i n t e l l -
i g i b l e , i t cannot make i t s e l f the t o p i c f o r i t s standard. Yet, the a s p i r a t i o n 
t o r e f l e x i v i t y displays the ground which i s the reason f o r speaking, di s p l a y s 
i t s r a t i o n a l i t y - the f a i l u r e to speak the p e r f e c t speech d i s p l a y s the d e s i r e , 
the reason f o r a s p i r i n g t o per f e c t speech. 
Pa r a d o x i c a l l y , r e f l e x i v e speech cannot achieve i t s aim ( a s p i r a t i o n ) , f o r as a 
saying i t cannot achieve p r a c t i c a l understanding of why i t speaks; t o t a l k i n 
such a way as to show tha t the f a i l u r e i s recognised, speaking i n a way that 
shows t h a t i t remembers that the t o p i c of r e f l e x i v i t y i s what i t does not say; 
that i s , i t understands i t s e l f as that reason f o r speaking ( r a t i o n a l i t y ) of 
which i t cannot speak. I t shows i t s r a t i o n a l i t y by not accepting the inade-
quazy of i t s own standard applied to i t s e l f ( p r a c t i c a l understanding as the 
ground), of what i t can say of i t s e l f as a p r a c t i c e , as the l i m i t s of the s e l f 
knowledge i t can have. Rather, r e f l e x i v e speech aims t o recover what i s shown, 
i t aspires t o recognise i n the f a i l u r e of speech to say i t s ground how t h i s 
saying shows i t s moral and r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . 
Reflexive speech i s not, then, an accounting of that which enables i t t o be 
an account, but an account which shows t h a t i t s product i s j u s t i f i e d by the 
i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between the standard i n terms of which, as the product of a 
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p r a c t i c e , i t i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e , and the moral and r a t i o n a l grounds which 
t h i s standard e x e m p l i f i e s (of which i t i s an i c o n ) . Now, t h i s i s to make r e f -
l e x i v e speech the attempt to provide, i n the reading of i t s e l f which i t recom-
mends (how i t s saying raises the question of i t s e l f as a t o p i c ) , a way of 
undermining the r u l e i n terms of which i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . The recommendation 
t o t r e a t the product of speech a n a l y t i c a l l y i s the recommendation to refuse t o 
allow the subject of the speech t o only be i n t e l l i g i b l e i n terms of the stand-
ard which the p r a c t i c e provides; t h e r e f o r e , the only way of seeing vhich can 
r e s i s t the standard i n t e r n a l t o the p r a c t i c e i s metaphoric reading. Theorising 
which raises the question of i t s e l f as a p r a c t i c e recommends t h a t i t s speech 
be read as a metaphor f o r that which i s external t o the p r a c t i c e ( t h a t which 
i t cannot formulate, i t s moral and r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y ) , so that any reading 
i t s e l f i n volves grasping through the r u l e of & pracLice the s e l f which achieves 
the sense of tne reading. 
Reflexive speech, then, i s speech which t r e a t s i t s e l f as i f i t were not pro-
v i d i n g an a u t h o r i t a t i v e version of how i t ought to be read; i t i s i r o n i c , i t 
t r e a t s words i c o n i c a l l y , and refuses t o take what they formulate ( t h e i r cone-
reteness, t h e i r meaning i n terms of the standard of the p r a c t i c e which the 
speech i s r e f l e x i v e on) s e r i o u s l y (as the s e l f evident j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the 
moral and r a t i o n a l ground on which the p r a c t i c e stands). 
For Blum, then, r e f l e x i v i t y i s a way t o s e l f knowledge, but i t i s knowledge 
of the deepest grounds of s e l f , the community of that s e l f w i t h the a u t h o r i t y 
which ( s i l e n t l y ) sanctions a l l speaking. This a u t h o r i t y i s t o be displayed, 
rather than described, f o r i t i s the a u t h o r i t y which enables d e s c r i b i n g t o 
describe. C r u c i a l l y r e f l e x i v e s o c i o l o g i c a l speech would be speech which d i s -
plays the a u t h o r i t y of which i t s standard i s (but) a metaphor. Reflexive 
s o c i o l o g i c a l speech would be speech which recognises the i r o n y of i t s formul-
a t i o n s ; f o r r e f l e x i v i t y (according to Blum) requires the denial o f the standard 
of e m p i r i c a l adequacy, f o r t h i s i s i t s e l f a c o n c r e t i s a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n 
between d e s c r i p t i o n and i t s o b j e c t s . A l l e m p i r i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n proceeds from 
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the s u b j e c t i o n of the world t o the r u l e of t h a t which i s the ground of the 
community of language users - that which i s already a v a i l a b l e ( c f . , W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
the sense o f an object i s not given by the object i t s e l f ) . 
R e f l e x i v i t y i n sociology would be a t h e o r i s i n g which r e j e c t s the ends of socio-
logy as a form of l i f e . I t can only have as i t s ends (given Blum's account) 
the denial o f the concerns of s o c i o l o g i c a l accounting as serious concerns -
i t would seek t o make the t o p i c s of sociology a n a l y t i c , whereby they would 
lose t h e i r place as t o p i c s i n the face of the greater t o p i c (what grounds t h e i r 
existence as t o p i c s what i s the moral and r a t i o n a l ground f o r t h e i r place as 
to p i c s i n so c i o l o g y ) . S o c i o l o g i c a l accounts as d e s c r i p t i o n s become subverted, 
on t h i s account of r e f l e x i v i t y , by t h e i r i r o n i c r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the (unaddre-
ssed) moral and r a t i o n a l grounds of the way of l i f e which they seek to preserve. 
Sociology e x i s t s only, then, as the decadent instrument of a way of l i f e which 
refuses to take the Reason f o r i t s own being s e r i o u s l y . The a s p i r a t i o n to 
r e f l e x i v e speaking would d i r e c t i t s e l f not at the adequacy o f accounts (the 
c r i t e r i a which give them sense i n the language game) but at the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of the language game i n which they are sensibly employed. Reflexive speaking 
would seek t o display the questions which ought t o be the t o p i c s of i n q u i r y 
which s e r i o u s l y raises the question of what grounds i t (what i s the reason 
f o r i t s speaking). 
Sociology then i s incapable of r e f l e x i v e speaking, f o r r e f l e x i v e speaking must 
take as i t s t o p i c the way i n which sociology, as a way of seeing, f a i l s t o 
address what authorises i t . What, then, i s r e f l e x i v e speaking t o consist of? 
Cl e a r l y , i t has a view of what i t s p r a c t i c e s should be, what e l e c t i o n we 
ought t o make i f we are t o confront the problem of what the grounds of our 
speaking ought t o be. Many o f these should be apparent from the discussion 
which has gone before. (66) 
F i r s t l y , i t recommends t h a t we t r e a t any speech as an occasion, ra t h e r than a 
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s t i p u l a t i o n . That i s , what the speech i s t o mean should not be taken as s e l f 
evident, r a t h e r , we should recognise t h a t what i t i s to mean i s accomplished 
i n OUR reading; each reading i s a new recovery, f o r the r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t , 
r a t h e r than a re-view of what has already been viewed. Of course, what the 
speech which i s the reading w i l l i t s e l f then be i n t e l l i g i b l e as must l i k e w i s e , 
f o r the audience f o r which i_t i s an occasion, be a matter f o r recovery. Reading 
i s thus t o be the d i s p l a y of the resources i n terms of which the speech i s 
i n t e l l i g i b l e , rather than the r e - c i t a t i o n of the a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s concrete 
meaning (what i t means i n terms of the standard o f the p r a c t i c e w i t h i n which 
i t locates i t s e l f ) . 
Speaking i s t h e r e f o r e i c o n i c and i r o n i c ; i t i s i c o n i c i n t h a t i t s statement 
exemplifies the standard i n terms of which i t formulates the world ( i t i s an 
instance o f the r u l e which i t i s subject t o ) ; i t i s i r o n i c i n that i t ( i n e v i t -
a b l y ) concretises t h a t which ought to be i t s a n a l y t i c t o p i c ( i t - s e l f , the moral 
and r a t i o n a l grounds which enable i t t o be what i t i s ) . Secondly, then, reading 
i s t o be metaphorlc, r a t h e r than l i t e r a l . 
This makes t h e o r i s i n g , as a p r a c t i c e , e s s e n t i a l l y non-cumulative; Blum i s not 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the idea of progress. Rather than moving towards more and more 
( e s s e n t i a l , r e f i n e d , profound, complex ... e t c . , ) knowledge, t h e o r i s i n g i s the 
r e - c o g n i t i o n t h a t what makes our knowing possible i s the r e a l l y serious t o p i c 
and t h i s i s the f i r s t and most important question f o r any i n q u i r y . Progress 
i s ( n e c e s s a r i l y ) founded on t a k i n g t h i s question f o r granted, and t a k i n g i t 
f o r granted means tha t i t has not been asked. 
Asking the question, then, i s the business of r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g , but i t 
i s because o f the a c c r e t i o n of the products of t h e o r i s i n g which assume the 
answer t o the f i r s t question t h a t i t i s p ossible t o ask i t . For t o ask the 
question i s t o involve one-self i n a dialogue w i t h the speech of which i t i s 
asked. What i s made the t o p i c f o r the speech upon another speech i s the 
a u t h o r i t y on which they both r e s t . Reflexive speech, t h i r d l y , i s Dialogue-ic, 
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and D i a l e c t i c ; i t i s speech which takes what i t can make of another speech as 
i t s t o p i c , but what i t makes i s i t s e l f recommended as merely a possible occasion 
f o r what another can make of i t . Underlying what i t makes of tha t which i s i t s 
t o p i c , and t h a t which i s made of i t as a t o p i c i s the concern w i t h how t o p i c 
i s sensibly made of any speech. D i a l e c t i c a l l y , i t transforms i t s e l f from 
what i t i s as a saying t o what i t shows, from what i t concretely i s to what 
i t a n a l y t i c a l l y stands f o r , from an e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n of a standard to the meta-
phor of the ground of which the standard i s an icon. 
A concern w i t h r e f l e x i v i t y , then i s a concern w i t h the moral grounds which are 
covered over when the meaning of a speech i s made t o be t h a t which must f o l l o w 
from the h i s t o r i c i s c d instrumental purposes of i t s author, when h i s a u t h o r i t y 
i s derived from a concrete reading of the reason ( r a t i o n a l i s t i c relevances) 
f o r his speaking. Thereby r e f l e x i v i t y becomes the concern w i t h h i s t o r y as 
the process whereby speech, thought, a c t i o n d i s p l a y how they are u n i t e d w i t h 
the ideal of r a t i o n a l i t y as they describe t h a t which i t i l l u m i n a t e s (the good 
which makes i t possible f o r us t o recognise i t s e l f i n what i t does not des c r i b e ) . 
Theorising i s e s s e n t i a l l y S o c r a t i c ; i t does not a i n at a r r i v i n g at (producing) 
statements, but i s ra t h e r concerned w i t h what i t i s to thi n k i n the r i g h t way 
so as to produce statements; the product i s s t r i c t l y subordinate to showing the 
t h i n k i n g which produced i t . 
This conception of t h e o r i s i n g depends c r u c i a l l y on a r e j e c t i o n of any attempt 
to s pecify the agreed meaning of a concept. The theory of the meaning of 
speech being i n the usage i s i n t e r p r e t e d as leading to the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
for m u l a t i n g the l i m i t s o f i t s meaning, since i t only has that meaning i n the 
context i n which i t i s employed. 
" I n t h e o r i z i n g under the auspices of mathematical 
i n t e r e s t s , men introduce standards of exactitude 
and parsimony i n t o t h e i r discourse which are 
designed to s t a b i l i z e the discourse as a common 
object of o r i e n t a t i o n f o r co-speakers. Yet, 
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exactitude can only be achieved when the d i v e r s i t y 
o f actual employments i s suppressed and f o r g o t t e n ; 
remembering such d i v e r s i t y makes the formulation 
of exact concepts impossible, because what i s rem-
embered are the inexh a u s t i b l e c o n d i t i o n s under 
which the formula i s denied through the pr a x i s of 
s o c i a l i t y " . (67) 
To read concretely i s t o accept the a u t h o r i t y of what the speech can be read 
as saying on the basis of the unquestioned agreement (what anyone knows) as 
to what i t must mean (harx the economist, Marx the p o s i t i v i s t ) . The only 
a l t e r n a t i v e an a n a l y t i c reading, t r e a t s such agreement (the conventions of 
ordinary usage) as only the occasion f o r knowing through destroying the agree-
ment, through i n t e r r o g a t i o n of the conventions without stopping, without 
s o l v i n g the problem. Any s o l u t i o n t o the problem assumes an a u t h o r i t y which 
i s , by the nature of the problem, i t s e l f always open to question (any concret-
i z a t i o n i s subject t o a n a l y t i c reading). The irremediable Indeterminacy of 
the sense of speech, then, generates the problem of r e f l e x i v i t y ; the gap 
between the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n of a corpus of work, and the a c t i o n of i n t e r -
p r e t i n g creates the i n s o l u b l e problem of encompassing the i n e x h a u s t i b l e poss-
i b i l i t i e s of i t s usage. R e f l e x i v i t y can only a f f o r d p a r t i a l and incomplete 
glimpses, through the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of such p o s s i b i l i t i e s , of the encounter 
between S e l f , Convention and the transcendent u n i t y of discourse which, as 
merely a catalogue of events, H i s t o r y i s the concrete mask. 
According t o t h i s account of t h e o r i s i n g , meaning j u s t i f i e d by reference t o 
what c r i t e r i a are a v a i l a b l e i n the conventions of the community of language 
users merely hides the moral and r a t i o n a l grounds on which such a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n f a c t r e s t s . To search f o r such moral and r a t i o n a l grounds i s the i d e a l of 
a Socratic conception of i n q u i r y . Further, such a search depends c r u c i a l l y 
on being i n the form of a Dialogue. I t i s the attempt t o educate, to show, 
to display what i s going on when i n t e r p r e t a t i o n gets done. What other response 
i s possible i n the face of both the concreteness and the m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y endemic 
to speech? We e i t h e r submit ourselves to the a u t h o r i t y of a standard, or refuse 
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t o do so. The r e f u s a l t o do so attempts to subvert the a u t h o r i t y of the 
standard by focussing the ac t i o n of i n q u i r y onto i t s e l f , by making the process 
whereby the standard c o l l e c t s speech (which makes a t h i n g out of the world) 
with the world (the t h i n g which the world i s ) , t h a t i s , i t takes as i t s i d e a l 
that which i s not a t h i n g upon which t h a t which i s a t h i n g depends (st a n d s ) . 
This i s the f i n a l i r o n y , f o r the ground upon which the thingness of speech 
stands i s no- t h i n g . The no-thing ( t h a t which cannot be said) i s not nothing, 
but n e i t h e r i s i t some-thing. The goal of r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g cannot be 
said, but only shown. I t consists i n the concerted r e l a t i o n between speaker 
(speech) and hearer ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) i n an underlying p r i n c i p l e which u n i f i e s 
them, the p r i n c i p l e t h a t the speech shows that which i t does not say, t h a t 
the word and the world are u n i f i e d by what i s other than them-selves. The aim 
of r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g i s to f i n d ways f o r t h i s t o a f f e c t the t h i n k i n g which 
i n q u i r y i s , t o f i n d ways f o r i t to be i n t h i n k i n g . Reflexive i n q u i r y then, 
addresses the inner processes which are other than the p u b l i c processes which 
speech, as the v e h i c l e o f thought, allows. 
This account o f the consequences of the i n d e x i c a l i t y of speech f o r t h e o r i s i n g 
c l e a r l y attempts t o transcend the l i m i t s of speech; i n t e r e s t i n g l y , however, i t 
depends i t s e l f upon a c l e a r n o t i o n of what those l i m i t s are. This n o t i o n i s 
contained i n the ve r s i o n which i t embraces of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of meaning i n 
speech. Fundamentally, i t depends on embracing a d o c t r i n e of the irremediable 
indeterminacy of the sense of concepts. The argument i s b a s i c a l l y t h a t : 
"Such elementary human concern as the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between r i g h t and wrong assumes t h a t man i s able 
t o rais e himself above h i s h i s t o r i c a l conditioned-
ness. When c l a s s i c a l philosophy i n q u i r e s i n t o 
j u s t i c e , and puts i n the foreground the unconditional 
nature of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , i t i s c l e a r l y r i g h t , and 
a r a d i c a l h i s t o r i c i s m , which h i s t o r i c a l l y r e l a t i v i s e s 
a l l u nconditional values, cannot be r i g h t . Thus one's 
arguments have to be tested i n the l i g h t of c l a s s i c a l 
philosophy." (68) 
This does not re s t on the fundamental c o n t r a d i c t i o n implied i n h i s t o r i c i s m , 
but upon the c e r t a i n t y t h a t i t can never be s e t t l e d as t o which perspective 
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on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of speeches i s the corr e c t one. From t h i s i s derived 
the necessity of a r e t r e a t from progress and the necessity of i n q u i r i n g i n t o 
the r e l a t i o n between ( h i s t o r i c a l ) speeches and the o r i g i n a r y concerns of the 
c l a s s i c a l philosophy from which they have come. 
Theorising which accepts the r a d i c a l h i s t o r i c i s a t i o n of value, the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of t a l k i n g about t r u t h i s N i h i l i s t i c ; the consequence of accepting the con-
d i t i o n a l i t y of speech ( i t s irremediable indeterminacy) i s t h a t "everything i s 
permitted". The only a t t r i b u t i o n of value which i s possible i s by an act of 
a r b i t r a r y r e s o l u t i o n , given the c o n d i t i o n a l i t y o f speech, and such j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
as we can produce f o r such an a t t r i b u t i o n i s ( o f course) i t s e l f subject to the 
r e s t r a i n t of c o n d i t i o n a l i t y . According to the h i s t o r i c i s e d concept of theor-
i s i n g t h a t which i s good i s separate from that which i s reasoned; given the 
Cartesian version o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , ego e i t h e r independently perceives the 
order of the ^ o r l d as i t presents i t s e l f to him, or else p r o j e c t s h i s creaced 
order onto the world as he masters and creates i t . The question of the good-
ness of the order i n e i t h e r case becomes a problem in a c c e s s i b l e to metaphysics 
mathematised by the philosophy of h i s t o r y , while reason i t s e l f becomes h i s t o r -
i c i s e d by the d o c t r i n e of the autonomous ego. What must be addressed are the 
consequences of t h i s divorce between goodness and reason f o r the philosophies 
which i t has produced. E s s e n t i a l l y , such a conception of i n q u i r y seeks t o 
r e s i s t enslavement to h i s t o r y , wishing n e i t h e r t o re v e r t t o the past, nor 
plunge i n t o the f u t u r e , but rat h e r t o recognise t h a t i t i s only possible t o 
l i v e (the good l i f e ) i n the present. A Resistance of h i s t o r y comes down t o a 
concern w i t h the s e l f ( t r u t h , being) which f i n d s i t s e l f between past and f u t u r e . 
(69) 
Now, any account of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of sense, which attempts to replace the 
act i o n of knowing ( n o e s i s ) , the 'conversation w i t h i n the s o u l ' , w i t h a " p u b l i c , 
mediated, d i s c u r s i v e " account o f the s e t t i n g w i t h i n which t h i s must take place 
i s denying the p r i o r i n t e l l i g e n c e of doing from which speech i s derived; from 
t h i s perspective, such an e n t e r p r i s e (as t h a t of the l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n ) would 
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f i n d i t s e l f arguing f o r the a r b i t r a r i n e s s of reason, Since i t would have to 
deny t h a t , as i t s e l f a human c o n s t r u c t i o n , there i s any way t o provide f o r 
the meaning or value of i t . ' I t i s merely a contingent f a c t . The p r i v a t e 
language argument i s taken t o be implying t h a t , since we must exclude the 
i n t u i t i o n o f form n o e t i c a l l y since there are no c r i t e r i a by means of which 
one may decide whether or not the name given to the i n t u i t i o n i s c o r r e c t , we 
are thereby condemned to merely speaking without t h i n k i n g , f o r a p u b l i c speech 
i t s e l f depends on i n t u i t i o n and memory, and the a b i l i t y t o compare what i s 
said against what i t i s t h a t i t i s said about. Inner experience (noesis) i s 
l o g i c a l l y r e q u ired i f p u b l i c speech i s not t o be e i t h e r nonsense or s i l e n c e . 
The argument that reason i s d i s c u r s i v e i s n i h i l i s t i c because i t attempts t o 
replace speech about the transcendent forms on which such i n t u i t i o n i s based 
with speech about how ordinary language i s used, and w i t h t h i s move, replace 
consideration of the value of usages w i t h a denial of the v a l i d i t y of s e l f 
p r e d i c a t i o n on l o g i c a l grounds, and a r e f l e x i v e a s s e r t i o n of the correctness 
of t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n by v i r t u e of the s i l e n c e which the t h e o r i s i n g demands 
about anything which i s not conventional. To be reasonable on thss account, 
means t o speak i n the usual way. Any attempt t o speak about why we should 
l i v e the way of l i f e w i t h i n which such speech i s the usual, cannot give any 
reasons, f o r to s p e c i f y the way of l i f e i s to provide what such argument would 
come t o ; i n the end, the deci s i o n t o l i v e such a l i f e i s a decision of p r i n -
c i p l e , not subject t o r a t i o n a l choice outside the way of l i f e w i t h i n which 
reason i s po s s i b l e . The inference of the value of the f a c t s of the universe 
cannot, on the basis of a d i s c u r s i v e account of reason, be a r a t i o n a l choice. 
Wittgenstein's l a t e philosophy, then, i s absurdiste on t h i s account. Such 
an account can have nothing t o say, i t cannot be t h e o r i s i n g which i s respon-
s i b l e f o r the moral and r a t i o n a l nature of the world of which i t speaks. To 
read i t i n t h i s way, however, c l e a r l y takes i t as producing, from ordinary 
language, the only possible account of the nature of reason, being an account 
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which can say nothing o£ the reason f o r i t s nature. That i s , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
f o r meaning which the reason of ordinary language provides are taken t o be the 
l i m i t s o f any speech, i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s , as conventions, c o n f l a t e what the 
world can (o n l y ) be seen as with what the world i s , w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t , at 
any time what the world can be seen as i s subject to challenge on the grounds 
that i t s p o s s i b i l i t y i_s i t s e l f only a convention which i s open t o doubt. 
Now, Wit t g e n s t e i n was concerned to replace the privacy of inner experience i n 
sense making w i t h a p u b l i c account of the shared nature of the r u l e s by which 
language, as the v e h i c l e of thought, operates i n t h i s process. He denied not 
the existence of inner experience, but only i t s use t o account f o r t h i s process. 
As has already been argued ( 7 0 ) , Wittgenstein did not deny the inner experience 
which forms the object of s u b j e c t i v e appearance; what he did deny was i t s 
independence from language. He argued t h a t the very p o s s i b i l i t y of t a k i n g 
s u b j e c t i v e appearance as an object was p a r a s i t i c on e s s e n t i a l l y sharable 
( r a t h e r than e m p i r i c a l l y shared) semantic and s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s which form 
the grammar of the ' lebensform'. The very essence of Wittgenstein's attack 
on Cartesianistn r e s t s on the argument t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y the c o n d i t i o n of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f knowledge which permits the speaker of the language 
t o claim knowledge of other minds, f o r , unless the assertions o f utterances 
about s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s make reference to what i s experienced ( i e . , have t r u t h -
value) then no knowledge whatsoever i s possible. The p r i v a t e l i n g u i s t cannot 
claim t h a t while he can know t h a t he experiences ' x f , he cannot know that 
others do f o r the a b i l i t y t o recognise t h a t he experiences 'x' depends on h i s 
a b i l i t y to recognise that others do. The argument against the privacy of 
experience i s not an argument against n o e t i c i n t u i t i o n per se; r a t h e r , i t 
argues against the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i o n without the mediation of under-
standi ng. 
Making sense, according t o Wi t t g e n s t e i n , i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p u b l i c process; 
any a t t r i b u t i o n of meaning i s made i n terms of what i t i s possible f o r a s t a t e -
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merit to mean i n the language from which i t comes; that i s t o say, i t i s 
j u s t i f i a b l e . The c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n (between sentence and j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) i s 
determinate, d e f e a s i b l e , and d i s t i n c t from both ind u c t i o n and entailment (71 ) , 
while at the Game time, i t i s the basis of what c e r t a i n t y i s possible. To 
argue for a programme which proceeds from the f a c t of the accomplishment of 
sense i s t o argue t h a t t h i s fact i s the fundamental resource i n terms of which 
theories a b c i t hov i t comes about must be dealt w i t h . Thus, an argument f o r 
the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l 1 t y of accounts (as an argument f o r a transcendent 
world of t r u t h ) f a i l s t o deal w i t h the facts of everyday experience. W i t t -
genstein's response t o scepticism i s not merely t o make 'what the world i s ' 
a matter f o r n e g o t i a t i o n and agreement; r a t h e r , he i s concerned to make doubt 
about t h i s something which must provide j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t s e l f m terms o f 
the ways i n which we do make sense, that i s , i n terms of the kinds of evidence 
which i s acceptable f o r t h i s k i n d of claim to make sense. That i s to say, 
the c o n d i t i o n a l i t y o f statements i s not something which i s t o be assumed on 
the basis of t h e i r p o ssible subversion, but r a t h e r , t h e i r subversion i s only 
possible i n p a r t i c u l a r instances because of t h e acceptance of general p r i n c i p -
les i n terms of which i t can be recognised as such. Blum's r e j e c t i o n of the 
ends of sociology, h i s denial of empiri c a l adequacy as a c r i t e r i o n of c e r t a i n t y , 
h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y of accounts and h i s con-
ception of dialogue and d i a l e c t i c as the primary methods o f r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g 
proceed from ( i ) the t h e s i s of the irremediable indeterminacy of the sense of 
speech, and ( i i ) the not i o n of the transcendent u n i t y masked by the f a i l u r e 
of h i s t o r i c a l l y located accounts ( I s ) , which underlies the reason (Ought) of 
a l l discourse. E s s e n t i a l l y , h i s argument i s f o r t r u t h (Being) as the u l t i m a t e 
which speech cannot r e a l - i s e , but on which i t depends. C e r t a i n t y , f o r Blum, 
belongs only i n the realm of metaphysics; we must proceed from a r a d i c a l r e j e c -
t i o n o f the standards of convention, w i t h a t r u s t only i n the fact t h a t we 
can speak, towards the o r i g i n a r y reason why we do speak. Reflexive t h e o r i s i n g 
must t u r n i t s back on what we can know, and t u r n towards how we can know. 
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In the 'Tractatus', t h i s was, of course, p r e c i s e l y the problem that Wittgen-
s t e i n confronted. He came t o the conclusion t h a t a p e r f e c t speech i s impos-
s i b l e , t h a t the ends of reason cannot themselves be c e r t i f i e d as reasonable, 
that speech i s merely a ladder which leads only to sil e n c e . The l i m i t of 
speech ( d i a n o i s ) i s i n t u i t i o n ( n o e s i s ) , of which i t must be s i l e n t . Blum 
would see t h i s as n i h i l i s t i c p r e c i s e l y because the good of speech, which 
W i t t g e n s t e i n would (here) deny th a t i t can speak, i s p r e c i s e l y the t h i n g which 
must be the goal of speech. He would accept the l i m i t that W i t t g e n s t e i n 
proposes f o r speech as a saying, but assert t h a t t h i s i s merely a concrete 
mask, and t h a t the m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y of speech shows th a t of which i t cannot 
speak. The i m p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n of Wittgenstein's l a t e r philosophy proceeds 
from what i s seen as Wittgenstein's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of what i s shown i n speech 
as the merely conventional; f o r Blum, what i s shown i n speech transcends 
convention. The only c e r t a i n t y i s the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l l t y of the 
standards of convention. 
For the l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h i s was not the case. His l a t e r work was concerned 
to p o i n t out not only t h a t the accomplishment o f sense depends on the grammar 
of the conventions of language use, but that t h i s grammar i s i t s e l f the ground 
of c e r t a i n t y . This i s not , as Blum's r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s t would argue, t o make 
reason only what i s u s u a l l y s a i d , but i t i s ra t h e r to show us what i t i s to 
be c e r t a i n of anything. Wittgenstein's achievement i s p r e c i s e l y to demonstrate 
that c e r t a i n t y i s the product, not of a conversation i n the s o u l , but of the 
grammar i n terms o f which i t i s possible to make sense at a l l . That i s t o say, 
to be c e r t a i n of anything r e s t s not on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of doubting i t t o be 
the case (since a l l speech i s h i s t o r i c a l l y l ocated, can we doubt t h e r e f o r e 
t h a t i t i s the product of the circumstances i n which i t was produced?) but on 
the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t things could be otherwise. Doubt, f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
cannot be based on the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i n g s could be otherwise than they are 
( t h i n k o f i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s t o r i c a l accounts - of course, t h l s i s why the account 
i s inadequate); Doubt must proceed from actual grounds, we must accept the 
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general p r i n c i p l e t h a t statements obtain t h e i r warrant from the c r i t e r i a l 
support that j u s t i f i e s them. Without t h i s general p r i n c i p l e , we could not 
have statements t o doubt, f o r what gives them sense at a l l are the conventions 
w i t h i n which i t i s possible t o recognise them as statements. This i s t o say 
that c e r t a i n t y i s not t o be con f l a t e d w i t h necessity; necessity f o l l o w s from 
the production of i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e evidence. To allow the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
improving the evidence ( j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) f o r a statement i s to allow the possi-
b i l i t y t h a t i t i s not necessarily t r u e . The very i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of statement, 
however, requires t h a t we have a conception of i t not being the case - i e . , 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t evidence f o r i t could be improved or overturned. C e r t a i n t y , 
i n c o n t r a s t , derives from j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t cannot be improved upon. That i s 
to say, c e r t a i n t y derives from j u s t i f i c a t i o n which i s actual r a t h e r than merely 
possible; t o i d e n t i f y a statement as c e r t a i n i t s e l f r e s t s on the a b i l i t y t o 
recognise the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t might not necessarily be the case. 
Being c e r t a i n means being able t o produce actual j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and the recog-
n i t i o n of what i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n depends on the p o s s i b i l i t y of doubting. 
C e r t a i n t y i s thus not something which cannot be doubted, but something which 
we do ( a c t u a l l y ) not doubt, but which we po s s i b l y could. 
C r u c i a l l y , then, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r knowledge are given r e l a t i v e to language, 
and are not independent of them. The noesis to which the dianoia of the 
Tractatus leads depends, a f t e r a l l , on language f o r i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . Truth 
i s a q u a l i t y which we recognise as being achieved by a statement which i s 
supported by evidence which i s i n accord w i t h the rules i n terms of which we 
j u s t i f y i t . We can have no other access to knowledge; the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
doubting such evidence, f a r from undermining c e r t a i n t y , i s p r e c i s e l y what makes 
i t possible at a l l . The programme which Blum proposes f o r Reflexive Theorising 
can lead only t o s o l i p s i s t i c incoherence. I t arises from a misconception of 
what i s involved i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of sense, and what the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r 
knowledge are. To provide ( I hope) c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s charge, I propose to 
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examine a p a r t i c u l a r piece of h i s work to show how the a p p l i c a t i o n of his 
conception of t h e o r i s i n g leads him, not towards t r u t h and s e l f knowledge but 
to the •Ab-grun'-l' of solipsism, 
Blum's paper "Reading Marx" (72) defines i t s reason at the o u t s e t , by r e j e c t i n g 
the idea of review as i t i s c o n v e n t i o n a l l y understood. I t does not define i t -
s e l f as clairping t o say what Marx meant, but to display the s p i r i t of which 
i t intends to depict Marx as the metaphorical embodiment. From the oucset, 
i t r e j e c t s the n o t i o n of producing an a u t h o r i t a t i v e reading of Marx, and 
proposes instead that the reading which i t produces i s t o serve simply as the 
occasion f o r inducing i t s reader to enter Marx's corpus ' p l a y f u l l y and exper-
i m e n t a l l y ' i n order to " t r u l y hear the resonances which h i s concrete speech 
covers over" (73). Marx's work, then, i s t o serve merely as an example f o r 
what l i e s beneath i t ; the problem of what Marx meant i s thereby i r r e l e v a n t f o r 
the purposes of t h i s reading. Blum contends t h a t the serious problem i s to 
be why t h a t should be a problem f o r the reader - t h a t i s , how does harx's 
work serve as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r so many possible readings? To respond t o t h i s , 
he argues, we must r e j e c t the conventions which allow Marx to mean something, 
and ask instead the question - How does Marx's speech NOT say what i t means? 
That i s , i f we accept that Marx's speech as a concrete t h i n g provides us w i t h 
a reason f o r r e j e c t i n g what i t says (the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l i t y of speech), 
that which i t leaves unsaid must be the reason why i t speaks at a l l . 
"(Marx's speech)... speaks of men and machines, or 
organisations and machines, and what i t leaves 
unsaid i s everything; what i t leaves unsaid i s how 
i t can i n t e l l i g i b l y and f o r c e f u l l y speak of men 
and machines, organisations and a c t i v i t i e s , how i t 
can speak of what i s Good and Real and Rational 
through t h i s t a l k " . (74) 
How does t h i s speaking show us what i t does not say? Blum proposes t h a t Marx's 
speaking depends on an Ideal R a t i o n a l i t y ; the way i n which h i s w r i t i n g system-
a t i c a l l y undermines i t s e l f as a concrete f o r m u l a t i o n p o i n t s to the metaphoric-
a l i t y of h i s speech; h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s of concrete states of a f f a i r s become 
metaphors as he undermines them w i t h the caveat of h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l i t y . 
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Thereby, Marx formulates the Rational reader, f o r his speech becomes not what 
i t i s about, but ra i s e s the question of why i t i s spoken at a l l . The subjects 
of h i s speech then become not what he formulates them ajs, but the shadows of 
the i d e a l i n terms of which they are cognisable at a l l . 
The version of sense-making which Blum subscribes t o holds t h a t speech i s 
incapable of making reference t o what i s r e a l , i n th a t what i s r e a l i s p r e c i s e l y 
how speech can speak at a l l . I f what i t makes reference t o i s a r r i v e d at i n 
accordance w i t h the r u l e s which determine how speech i s sensible, then, as a 
p i c t u r e of the world, i t depends on the p r i o r capacity to see reason as reason-
able. I t s form, then, i s the i l l u s i o n , and i t s mode of apprehension i s what 
i s r e a l . 
Analysis proceeds, then, from the decision t o t r e a t speech as i f what i t r e a l l y 
comes t o i s not what i t says. I t excludes the question of what the speech 
' r e a l l y ' means (whether i t i s r i g h t or wrong) i n favour of a concern w i t h how 
we make of i t what we might make. Thus: 
"Revisionism .... emerges through the understanding t h a t 
Marx's speech has l o s t i t s power and t h i s understanding 
i s always grounded i n the mathematical paradigm of the 
r e l a t i o n between speech and s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s . The speech 
has become obsolete ( i n need of r e p a i r ) because i t i s no 
longer accurate, u s e f u l , or s o p h i s t i c a t e d ; and y e t , such 
a r e c o g n i t i o n only occurs when accuracy, u t i l i t y and 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n are seen as concrete features of the author's 
speech which are 'there f o r the look i n g * r a t h e r than as an 
a s p i r a t i o n which the speech evokes". (75) 
Analysis thus turns us from the evaluation of speeches i n terms of our version 
of what the r e a l i s towards the problem of how we can formulate the r e a l i t y 
w i t h which to compare the speech. The method t o be applied to speeches, then, 
i s - how i s i t metaphoric? How does i t propose i t s e l f as a topic? Analysis 
has provided reasons f o r t h i s d e c i s i o n , and has excluded i t s e l f from c r i t i c i s m s 
which might be l e v e l l e d against i t by c l e a r l y demarcating i t s province of 
concern; i t i s immune from c r i t i c i s m because i t does not propose i t s e l f as 
being concerned w i t h producing d e f i n i t i o n s , but only w i t h i n i t i a t i n g / r e s p o n d i n g 
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t o ongoing dialogue. More c o r r e c t l y , • c r i t i c i s m * i s i r r e l e v a n t , since, by 
i t s own account, the speech of an a l y s i s must be ( c o n c r e t e l y ) p a r t i a l , biased, 
t r a n s i e n t (and so on), since i t i s t o serve only as the occasion f o r metaphoric 
response. Analysis i s immunised by i t s e s s e n t i a l l y inward, non-public nature. 
C r u c i a l l y , i t i s not possible t o doubt the process of education which an a l y s i s 
takes as i t s aim. because there are no s p e c i f i c grounds which could be prod-
uced t o make t h i s doubt sensible. Analysis j u s t i f i e s i t s decision t o r e j e c t / 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y subvert the standards according t o which speech i s sensibly 
i n t e r p r e t e d on the basis of ... "the despair r e s u l t i n g from the tension between 
the mathematical standard of c e r t a i n t y = the i d e a l of methodic knowledge - and 
the i n s t a b i l i t y of the senses". (76) I t thereby proposes t h a t which cannot 
be doubted as the capacity to doubt i t s e l f . The a b i l i t y t o produce a metaph-
o r i c reading (a reading which subverts i t s e l f ) i s thereby t o be the transcen-
dent feature which u n i f i e s discourse. I t i s the un-doubtable capacity of a l l 
language speakers t o hear, i n t h e i r speech, more than they mean by i t . The 
transcendent u n i t y of discourse t h e r e f o r e , i s located i n the p r i n c i p l e that 
speech i s both concrete ( r e - i f i c a t o r y ) and a n a l y t i c (metaphorical). In contrast 
to a t r a d i t i o n of reading which would take the concrete work as the source of 
the p r i n c i p l e s upon which c e r t a i n t y of i t s meaning must r e s t , a n a l y s i s proposes 
a d i a l e c t i c a l conception of reading, whereby that meaning i s seen as emerging 
from the conversation of the speech i n a m a t r i x of convention, which i s i t s e l f 
n e i t h e r i n c o r r i g i b l e nor i n d u b i t a b l e . Thereby, >Aat i s to be addressed i s the 
nature of the r e l a t i o n of the speech to convention, t h a t i s , to ask the question 
of the good of the instrumental purposes v» hich are the auspices (norms, conven-
t i o n s ) under which i t i s i n t e l l i g i b i l e . A concern w i t h t h i s question, i n 
a t t a c k i n g the conventions which would make the speech concretely meaningful, 
seeks t o d i r e c t us to what i d e a l the degeneracy of concrete speech makes 
apparent. HerA no longer speaks ' f a c t s * but shows us i n his speaking what 
seeing so as t o speak these f a c t s must be. To take Marx s e r i o u s l y we must 
therefore not say what he says, but show t h a t we have understood, that we are 
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not r u l e d by what he says, but can l i s t e n to what our response to Marx shows 
of how h i s work provides an occasion w i t h i n which our method of making sense 
operates ( t h a t i s , h i s work on the occasion of our making sense of i t , i s the 
method by which we make sense of i t ) . In Wittgenstein's terms, language i s 
the v e h i c l e of thought; i n t h i n k i n g Marx's work, i t i s Marx's language which 
i s the method f o r our assembling sense. Marx's work i s only a v a i l a b l e f o r us 
i n the sense which we can make of i t - i t j u s t i f i e s our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Anal-
ys i s would show us that the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the mask 
of the underlying u n i t y (of Marx and the reader). The Ground of t h i s r e l a t i o n 
i s the r e a l i t y of the moral and r a t i o n a l s p i r i t (the Good) which i s the true 
community of i n q u i r y . 
Now, Blum would have us aspire to knowledge of t h i s transcendent Good. The 
desire t o know i s an icon, a p a r t i a l and metaphorical glimpse of t h a t which 
i s un-knowable. Doubt i s thereby the icon of that which cannot be doubted -
what we can know merely metaphoricises what we cannot know. 
Again, expressed i n Wittgenstein's language, t h i s i s to po i n t out t h a t , " i n 
the absence of metaphysical simples, c o r r e l a t e d with l i n g u i s t i c simples by 
means of some mechanism c o n s t i t u t i n g a connection between language and r e a l i t y , 
the theory of the l i m i t s of thought and the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the world 
becomes r a d i c a l l y c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t , and metaphysical t r u t h s become not simply 
i n e x p r e s s i b l e , but i l l u s o r y r e f l e c t i o n s o f grammatical conventions" (77). 
This q u a l i t y of i n - e x p r e s s i b i 1 i t y becomes, i n Blum the p r i n c i p l e of metaphor-
i c a l i t y , the i c o n i c nature of desire as the Good of reason. Reading Marx, 
then, i s f i n d i n g i n Marx the source f o r our imagination; h i s work becomes 
a l l e g o r i c a l , or p o e t i c , a way of saying what cannot be said. The t o p i c of 
our response t o Marx i s other than i t s e l f ; i t i s t h a t otherness which being 
i t s e l f nre-supposes. 
The temptation here i s to r e t r e a t from t h i s p o s i t i o n purely because of i t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l work as i t conceives of i t s e l f ; i t p l a i n l y i s 
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not i n t e r e s t e d i n accounting f o r the s o c i a l world i n terms of a c r i t e r i o n of 
adequacy, empir i c a l or i n t e r p r e t i v e . In f a c t , q u i t e p l a i n l y i t i s p a r a s i t i c 
on such attempts f o r i t s own existence; knowledge a r i s e s from ignorance, the 
mistake (the problem) i s the occasion on ^hich education depends f o r i t s 
beginning. Analysis provides f o r i t s own existence, and i n s u l a t e s i t s e l f 
from a t t a c k , by d e l i m i t i n g i t s concern from the concerns of sociology, and 
at the same time, proposes the degeneracy of those concerns as the reason f o r 
i t s being. Analysis proposes the r a t i o n a l i t y of p r e - r e f l e c t i v e n e s s (conscious-
ness of the standard) as i t s t o p i c . 
C r u c i a l l y , however, r e f l e x i v i t y i s a problem f o r sociology; Blum's programme 
proposes t h a t we separate the two. Sociology can never, f o r Blum, achieve 
understanding of i t s e l f as (a p r a c t i c e ; such understanding (as may be possible) 
comes only when we r e j e c t the standards of the d i s c i p l i n e . Understanding 
(standing under) i s thus outside of the usages w i t h i n which i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y 
accomplished ( i t i s processual, inward, n o e t i c ) . Why n o t , then, get on w i t h 
the work, and leave t h i s concern t o i t s e l f ? 
I f we accept the n o t i o n of understanding embodied i n the p r a c t i c e s of a n a l y s i s 
(even though we do not e l e c t t o do t h i s kind of work) we endorse a conception 
of the p r a c t i c e of sociology which i s r a d i c a l l y n i h i l i s t i c - we do sociology 
even though we admit t h a t i t cannot understand i t s e l f . The seriousness of 
analysis i s thereby the claim t h a t i t makes t h a t sociology cannot understand 
i t s e l f , and t h i s i s the claim t h a t must be answered. 
How would s o c i o l o g i s t s propose to understand Marx? The charge of degeneracy 
ar i s e s from the claim that i n producing a reading of Marx, s o c i o l o g i s t s endorse 
a concrete version o f readership; that i s , they propose t h a t Marx's work means 
what we can make o f i t i n terms of convention, that the reader i s bound ( r u l e d ) 
by the conventions w i t h i n which i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . This form of understanding 
i s degenerate f o r A n a l y s i s , however, because i t assumes Marx to be saying 
nothing - i f the standard i s conventional, i t i s always subject t o r e v i s i o n , 
2 30. 
and t h e r e f o r e , Marx i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e i n many d i f f e r e n t ways, a l l of which 
are j u s t i f i a b l e i n terms of some set of conventions. The r e a l question then 
becomes - how does Marx's work provide i n - s i g h t i n t o the p r i n c i p l e which l i e s 
beneath the d i v e r s i t y (how i s i t an occasion f o r c o n f r o n t i n g the grounds which 
l i e beneath the sense-making?) 
Understanding, then, becomes a p r i v a t e rather than a p u b l i c process ( w h i l e , 
at the same time, the methodic accounting of understanding necessarily remains 
p u b l i c and concrete, also metaphorical r a t h e r than l i t e r a l ) . Concreteness and 
Analysis r e f e r us t o the consequences of w r i t i n g ; concrete w r i t i n g accepts the 
r u l e o f convention, a n a l y t i c w r i t i n g r e f e r s us t o the methods of i t s accomp-
lishment. Concrete w r i t i n g accepts the s i l e n c e which i s outside of speech, 
a n a l y t i c w r i t i n g demands tha t we t h i n k the l i m i t s of speech. 
Analysis depends, then, on the d i f f e r e n c e that i t proposes between these forms 
of understanding - e s s e n t i a l l y , the d i f f e r e n c e i s between l i t e r a l and meta-
phoric conceptions of meaning. I f reference i s conventional, we cannot say 
what we mean, f o r words are not the things which they r e f e r t o , so t h a t meaning 
invokes words as metaphors of things-in-themselves. We are a n a l y t i c (we Truly 
understand) .hen we grasp t h i s m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y , see the reason which i t shows 
but cannot say. 
Now, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , I would argue, r e s u r r e c t s the problem of s o l i p s i s m . I t 
argues t h a t t r u t h i s a n a l y t i c ; i t ... "does not r e q u i r e a system, but the 
l i v e d experience of wresting unconcealment from i t s hiddenness under the impetus 
of other-ness" (78). The consequences of t h i s c o n v i c t i o n have been set out 
below, '.'hat i s <?o f a r unexamined are the p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n v o lved i n 
the v e r s i o n of d u a l i t y proposed here. 
Concrete reading i 3 Analysis' v e r s i o n of mathematical t h i n k i n g , or l i t e r a l i s m . 
To read concretely i s t o accept the a u t h o r i t y of speech as a p i c t u r e of the 
world. Analysis Lakes as a fundamental p r i n c i p l e the degeneracy of such a move. 
What does r e j e c t i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the p i c t u r e involve houever? F i r s t , i t 
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proposes t h a t each reading i s an occasion of making sense; i n other words, i t 
makes the meaning of the speech an accomplishment of reading on each occasion. 
That i s , what i s the meaning of the speech i s r a d i c a l l y indeterminate, since 
each occasion i s a new view r a t h e r than a re-view. What i s rea l then, on each 
occasion o f reading i s the grasping of meaning on each occasion; the p u b l i c 
accounting o f t h i s grasping remains concrete and i n f l e x i b l e , p r o v i d i n g no 
account of how i t i s possible. The contrast invoked i s th e r e f o r e between 
speech as speaking, and speech as t h i n k i n g ; t h i n k i n g i s what speaking cannot say. 
Now, W i t t g e n s t e i n was concerned t o deny p r e c i s e l y t h i s kind o f d u a l i t y . Where 
he i s misunderstood i s i n e x a c t l y what sense t h i s would make thought conventional 
or conservative. The r e j e c t i o n of the atomic model (the p i c t u r e theory) of 
meaning does not have the kind o f e x c l u s i v i t y generally imputed t o i t ; the 
th e s i s o f the determinacy of meaning i s not t o be replaced by a l o g i c o f 
vagueness. To speak b l u n t l y , the contrast between concreteness and a n a l y t i c i t y 
i s i l l i c i t , i n terms of Wittgenstein's account of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of sense. 
Understanding, i n Wittgenstein's terms, does not involve an independent object 
with or without o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s . He argues that the meaning of a word i s 
not independent of the ru l e s of i t s usage, and that when asked f o r the meaning 
of a word, we o f t e n r e f e r t o the context In which i t can be used, p o i n t t o how 
i t i s used or what i t o s t e n s i v e l y r e f e r s t o . He does not, however, l d e n t i f y 
meaning w i t h the r u l e s of usage. A vvord c a r r i e s i t s meaning w i t h i t , but t h i s 
i s not accountable i n the form of a l i s t of r u l e s . Meaning i s de f i n e d , deter-
mined or c o n s t i t u t e d by the rules o f usage, but i t i s not separable from them. 
Asked f o r the meaning of a word on t h i s account, then, the (concrete) reader 
would produce j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the usages conventional i n h i s l i n g u i s t i c comm-
u n i t y .. Now, t h i s would be degenerate, i n Blum's terms, because i t would l i m i t 
the meaning of the word t o those conventions - i e . , i t would i d e n t i f y meaning 
with r u l e s of use. Thereby, t o gain understanding of the convention which 
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would warrant such a reading, he advocates a reading (response) which, although 
i t incorporates an immanent r e f l e c t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c usage, r e j e c t s the con-
sequences of i t s c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y f o r the purposes of understanding, and aims 
instead t o f i n d i n the work the desire t o go beyond the l i m i t s which these 
conventions set. An a n a l y t i c reading, i n Wittgenstein's terms then, proposes 
t o make the r u l e s of usage ( a v a i l a b l e through immanent r e f l e c t i o n ) p o i n t to 
what makes them sensible. The meaning a v a i l a b l e i n the r u l e s of usage becomes 
the problem f o r the a n a l y t i c reader. Given the indeterminacy of the meaning 
a r r i v e d at through r e f l e c t i o n on the r u l e s of usage, the a n a l y t i c reader must, 
of course, refuse t o take i t as an o b j e c t , however; each concrete reading 
(accomplishment of meaning) serves only an i r o n i c purpose; t o take i t s object 
as given merely i n i t i a t e s a regress, i n terms of t h i s b i f u r c a t i o n . An anal-
y t i c reading requires t h a t i t s h a l l have no status as an account of meaning 
other than as the analysts' metaphor f o r the i n t e r n a l grasping of the r e l a t i o n 
between the speech, as an occasion, and the i d e a l which appears i n the formul-
a t i o n of the l i m i t s of the speech, i n the a n a l y t i c reading, on the basis of 
how the speech as a metaphor can be re-constructed. Informed by the concept 
of l i t e r a l n e s s speech comes to be seen not as a way of accounting f o r 'the 
world' as a t o p i c , but as a way of p o i n t i n g t o i t s e l f doing such an accounting; 
speech ( e t e r n a l l y ) poses the question - how i s i t possible f o r speech t o be 
meaningful; 
Analysis thus proposes meaning as merely the shadow cast by the sun o f the 
i d e a l ( t h e r e a l ) . Concrete reading i d e n t i f i e s the shadow (meaning) w i t h the 
re a l (proposes the world as that which convention permits i t t o be). Under-
standing t h i s shows the desire f o r knowledge which i s the icon of the i d e a l 
(Being, T r u t h ) . 
To make t h i s c o n t r a s t , however, necessitates t a k i n g the r e f l e c t i o n on the r u l e s 
of usage a v a i l a b l e t o every competent member of the language community t o have 
a p a r t i c u l a r kind of ( e m p i r i c a l , e v i d e n t i a l ) s t a t u s ; as Hare (79) has remarked, 
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the p r o p o s i t i o n s about the r u l e s of an a c t i v i t y which are a v a i l a b l e on r e f l e c -
t i o n seem t o have a p e c u l i a r s i m i l a r i t y t o s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i knowledge, and 
are i n a sense analogous to Pla t o n i c 'anamnesis 1 (80). Indeed, i f we take 
the notion o f concrete reading s e r i o u s l y , we must be drawn i n t o g i v i n g what 
i s a v a i l a b l e on r e f l e c t i o n the property of determining what i s t o count f o r 
us as the r e a l world. The problem which, of course, seems t o a r i s e here, 
however, i s why should we p r e f e r any one set of rules of usage to any other 
set? I f what i s t o be c o n v e n t i o n a l l y agreeable i s what i s t o count as "the 
r e a l " , then we would, indeed seem t o be bound by what everyone can be brought 
to agree t o as an empi r i c a l f a c t . Concrete reading would then have a l l the 
disagreeable features which Blum brings out; i t would indeed s e t t l e the meaning 
of the wprld by f i a t . 
However, i t i s p r e c i s e l y t o undermine the n o t i o n t h a t grammar determines 
meaning as a separate ( s p e c i a l ) object t o which Wittgenstein's e f f o r t s are 
d i r e c t e d . The appeal t o the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of convention does not give the 
convention a special k i n d of e v i d e n t i a l s t a t u s ; i t i s not an empirical matter 
at a l l , i n the way i n which W i t t g e n s t e i n proposes t h a t i t be used. An appeal 
t o use instead of meaning proposes t h a t meaning as a special o b j e c t , t o be 
searched f o r , i s an i l l u s i o n generated by grammar. I t i s not the case t h a t 
we can " f i n d " meaning i n the use, but that i n the usages a v a i l a b l e to us, i t 
i s something t h a t i s achieved. The appeal t o convention, t h e r e f o r e , serves 
only as the means to generate i n p a r t i c u l a r cases, the study of the confusions 
r e s u l t i n g from the search f o r meaning as a special o b j e c t ; i t i s not i n i t s e l f 
a programme of empirical research, but a r i s e s from the problems and confusions 
which beset those kinds of e n t e r p r i s e . (81) 
The appeal t o convention, then, aims t o c l a r i f y confusion, t o show how we do 
i n f a c t achieve understanding on the basis of commonly a v a i l a b l e l i n g u i s t i c 
resources. The grammar of our language games warrants our use of language 
to mean uhat we can mean. To see t h i s as a c o n c r e t i z a t i o n , i t i s necessary 
to a t t r i b u t e t o grammar an e m p i r i c a l q u a l i t y which c e r t a i n l y W i t t g e n s t e i n did 
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see i t possessing. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n afforded by grammar derives not from 
the unshakeable c e r t a i n t y o f correspondence between language and the world, 
but from our determination t o employ a form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; the hardness 
of l o g i c derives from our commitment to a form of expression, and our r e f u s a l , 
or i n a b i l i t y t o depart from i t . Thus essences, r a t h e r than being 'de r e ' 
n e c e s s i t i e s , are r e f l e c t i o n s of forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , made by man ra t h e r 
chan found. 
To t a l k of the appeal to convention as a c o n c r e t i z a t i o n of meaning i s t o 
appeal f o r knowledge of essences which i s other than conventional; t h a t i s , 
we are d i r e c t e d to a form of knowledge which i s other than l i n g u i s t i c a l l y 
a v a i l a b l e . For analysis t o propose that the capacity t o intmanently r e f l e c t 
on r u l e s of usage should serve as a special o b j e c t , to be transcended as i t s 
c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y i s subverted, i s to propose t h a t we should renounce our comm-
itment t o the t r u t h a v a i l a b l e i n the l o g i c of our form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t 
i s a c a l l f o r a scepticism of the most r a d i c a l k i n d . For, i f t r u t h , or cer-
t a i n t y , i s only a n a l y t i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e , then the meaning of p r o p o s i t i o n s about 
r e a l i t y becomes i r r e l e v a n t i n the face of the question - what gives meaning 
i t s meaningfulness? By d e f i n i t i o n , t h i s question i s unanswerable. Knowledge 
becomes, then, a conversation i n the soul. 
A n a l y t i c reading, as the method f o r achieving t h i s s t a t e , recommends the meta-
p h o r i c a l , imaginative capacity of consciousness, as i t s icon. What i s being 
pointed t o i s the self-grounding capacity of language as symbol, the capacity 
of language to say more than i t w i l l s of i t s place i n a t h e o r e t i c t r a d i t i o n . 
Blum speaks from a p o s i t i o n uhich sees speech i n i t s l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n , 
a p o s i t i o n which sees the meaning of speech as not that permitted by convention, 
but by the i d e a l of which convention i s but a metaphor. Truth indeed becomes 
the l i v f i d experience of otherness, f o r i t r e q u i r e s scepticism even of the 
experience which we account to ourselves, as the product of convention. I n 
the face of t h i s r a d i c a l doubt, our experience of knowing becomes i t s e l f the 
means t o glimpse the transcendent u n i t y of consciousness. 
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Grammatical p r o p o s i t i o n s , according t o W i t t g e n s t e i n , however, are not themselves 
l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s ; w h i l e the l a t t e r cannot pr o p e r l y be said to be t r u e , or 
necessary, the former can. While a grammatical p r o p o s i t i o n i s t o be understood 
as a p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t makes an a s s e r t i o n about an o b j e c t , t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n 
depends e x c l u s i v e l y f o r i t s t r u t h value on the r u l e s of usage of the l i n g u i s t i c 
sign which s i g n i f i e s the o b j e c t . The rules of usage thus serve to express 
the a p r i o r i l o g i c a l form un d e r l y i n g an a s s e r t i o n about o b j e c t s , but as a 
grammatical p r o p o s i t i o n , t h i s cannot be an a s s e r t i o n about a l i n g u i s t i c r u l e , 
nor can i t take the form of a r u l e formulated i n words. 
Now, f o r Blumian a n a l y s i s , the l e v e l s of concreteness and a n a l y t i c i t y r e f e r 
to correspondences between speech and the world; the degeneracy of concrete 
( l i t e r a l ) reading derives from our u n c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards our way o f 
seeing - our acceptance of a conventional standard i n terms of which we i n t e r -
pret meaning. A (concrete) reading of Marx would thus take his speech t o be 
,%a l a t e n t set of c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r possible o b j e c t s " ( 8 2 ) , " r e l a t i o n s of prod-
u c t i o n " , "mode of p r o d u c t i o n " , "foundation and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " , " s o c i a l c l a s s " 
are i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of o b j e c t s of reference. In t h i s reading, such i d e n t i f i -
c a t ions are taken t o be i n c o r r i g i b l e . Blum proposes t h a t an a n a l y t i c reading 
would make problematic t h i s assumed correspondence. 
I f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between speech and object i s i n c o r r i g i b l e i n a concrete 
reading, then i t t e l l s you nothing about the world (83). I t 
could not be f a l s e ; any speech, concretely read, i s as good as any other. An 
a n a l y t i c reading recommends, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t any speech be t r e a t e d as c o r r i g i b l e , 
c o n d i t i o n a l . However, t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l i t y has the consequence that the i n f o r -
mation which i t g i v e s y o u about the world becomes i r r e l e v a n t ; the contrast 
invoked i s between the c o n d i t i o n a l i t y and c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of meaningful speech, 
and the u n s p e c i f l a b l e form of l i f e w i t h i n which the speech has meaning. Given 
the c o n d i t i o n a l i t y of the meaning con v e n t i o n a l l y a v a i l a b l e , p r o p o s i t i o n s about 
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how th a t meaning i s a v a i l a b l e become i n c o r r i g i b l e , however. Talk of convention 
t e l l s you nothing about the world, i t simply i s the case that t h i s i s how t a l k 
i s meaningful. Blum takes t h i s as a recommendation f o r a speculative response; 
t h a t i s , since conventions are i n c o r r i g i b l e , they can only t e l l you something 
about t h e i r meaning i f they themselves are taken to admit t o the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of f a l s i f i c a t i o n ( i f we can doubt them), and the consequence of t h i s doubt i s 
the abandonment of f a i t h i n the l o g i c of speech, and a commitment t o the t r a n s -
cendent q u a l i t y of imagination as the u n i f y i n g ground of speeches. 
Thus, Blum takes the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of speculative ( a n a l y t i c a l ) response t o 
be the showing of the c o n d i t i o n a l ! t y of convention; the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of 
grammar i s t o serve as the object (occasion) f o r a d i s p l a y of imagination, 
resonnance, m e t a p h o r i c a l i t y , a way of grasping the transcendent good of the 
human imagination. 
To summarise, the c o n d i t i o n a l i t y of speech has the consequence that i t s meaning 
i n terms of a standard (grammatical convention) makes the meaning r a d i c a l l y 
indeterminate, t o read concretely i s t o impose one ver s i o n of a u t h o r i t y onto 
the speech; an a n a l y t i c reading makes the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n which t h i s 
indeterminacy might be resolved i n t o the t o p i c of speech, but t h i s requires 
t h a t 1ts speech s h a l l have purpose only i n the way i n which i t r e j e c t s i t s e l f 
as an instance o f an a u t h o r i t a t i v e v e r s i o n . Hou are we then t o read Marx? 
A concrete reading, whereby the conventions of sense making are accepted, i s 
degenerate, since i n making sense-rnaking a p u b l i c l y accountable process, i t 
cannot then examine the 'good' (the reason) of the conventions which make i t 
possible. An a n a l y t i c reading, r e f u s i n g t o take these conventions s e r i o u s l y , 
seeks to f i n d , i n the metaphoric p o s s i b i l i t i e s of speech the deeper moral and 
r a t i o n a l grounds masked by the concreteness of convention. Here, however, the 
concrete (conventional) meaning of the speech must be i r r e l e v a n t ; the question 
a r i s e s , however, - what i s the process involved m making sense of an a n a l y t i c 
reading? 
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3lum wants t o argue th a t ' t h i n k i n g ' here i s d i f f e r e n t from 'making sense'; 
that we can have access to thought which i s other than conventional. Analysis 
only has any p o i n t i f we accept the n o t i o n t h a t inner experience (noesis) car 
be separated, or occurs separately from the d i s c u r s i v e processes of sense 
making. The degeneracy of concrete reading rests thereby i n the fact that i t 
sees no d i f f e r e n c e between thought and sense makin 0. I t i s a d i s c u r s i v e , 
p u b l i c , i u t e r s u b j e c c i v e phenomenon. Only i f we make a d i f f e r e n c e between 
t h i n k i n g and sense making can we have access to the universal r a t i o n a l and 
moral grounds of a l l discourse. Seeing t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s a 'conversation i n 
the soul' - a r a d i c a l l y p r i v a t e experience. 
Think of r e f u s i n g t o take the standard s e r i o u s l y ; t o do so i s to propose the 
metaphoric grammar of a speech as the standard w i t h i n which i t should be 
i n t e r p r e t e d , A reading i s produced which must, to be sensible be d i s c u r s i v e l y 
formulated around the r u l e s of the language game of "not-taking-the-conventions-
s e r i o u s l y " of f i n d i n g i n the w r i t i n g a s t r u c t u r e other than t h a t t o which we 
conventionally attend. These rules are of course concrete and conventional 
j u s t as much as any other sense making p r a c t i c e s . 31um's claim i s t h a t , the 
s e l f subversion - n t t e n i n t o such a reading, by the negation of convention i n 
metaphor thereby produces, f o r the gaze of the inner ( n o e t i c ) eye, the r e l a t i o n 
between sense making and the grounds on which i t r e s t s . Concrete reading, or 
the appeal t o a "mathematical standard of c e r t a i n t y " r e s t s , then, on the notion 
that s tates of a f f a i r s must be completely determinate; analysis responds to the 
l i m i t a t i o n s imposed on our knowledge of t h i s determinacy by proposing the 
inherent i n s t a b i l i t y of conventional forms of representation. Language f a i l s 
us because i t i s the product of human a c t i o n ; Being ( t r u t h ) i t s e l f i s only 
a v a i l a b l e as that which i s other than language. This i s wholly i n accord w i t h 
the g e n e r a l l y accepted laws of epistemology and semantics. Knowledge i s 
independent of t r u t h , what can be known t o be true i s separate from what i s 
t r u e ; the t h e s i s of the indeterminacy of sense proceeds from a g e n e r a l l y 
accepted n o t i o n of transcendent, o b j e c t i v e t r u t h . 
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I t was p r e c i s e l y t o undermine such a n o t i o n t h a t Wittgenstein's l a t e r p h i l o -
sophy was d i r e c t e d ; taken s e r i o u s l y , h i s work woulc undermine the fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s on which Blum's account of t h e o r i s i n g r e s t s , since they exemplify 
a standard epistetnological p o s i t i o n (the n o t i o n of a transcendent r e a l i t y ) . 
The separation between concrete and a n a l y t i c reading r e s t s on the n o t i o n t h a t 
p r o p o s i t i o n s about the world cannot capture the t r u t h about the world; that 
i s t o say/"the r e l a t i o n of statement l o the worl d , t o hypothesise i s a 
r e l a t i o n of i n d u c t i v e support, l i n k e d t o a p r i o r i p r o b a b i l i f i c a t i o n . Thus, 
any statement, r e s t i n g on the conventions of the standard a v a i l a b l e i s subject 
t o doubt which undermines the claim to c e r t a i n t y as the standard i t s e l f i s 
always open t o r e v i s i o n . Metaphor can t h e r e f o r e j u s t i f i a b l y claim that i t s 
s e l f r e f l e c t i o n on the capacity t o doubt, i n subverting conventional sense 
making, opens the underlying grounds of discourse t o view. The separation of 
thought and speech i s i m p l i c i t . W i t t g e n s t e i n e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s t h i s n o t i o n 
as incoherent; as has already been pointed o u t , the existence o f p r i v a t e exper-
iences i s not , i n h i s view, a contentious issue. The point made i n h i s w r i t i n g 
on p r i v a t e experience i s t h a t i t has no place i n our attempts t o deal with the 
question of c e r t a i n t y and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of accounts. 
We may, i n reading Marx, or any t e x t , derive meaning which we can j u s t i f y on 
the basis of convention or some set of r u l e s . Now, as Blum says, these reading 
o f t e n c o n f l i c t and given the p r o j e c t , t o author-ize a reading of Marx, necess-
a r i l y so. I t i s one t h i n g t o argue t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , such a p r o j e c t produces 
only c h a t t e r and dispute, and i s thereby unmindful of the deeper grounds (the 
reasons) f o r Marx's speaking - which a n a l y s i s would take as i t s subject - but 
i t i s q u i t e another t o claim t h a t what i s produced, because i t depends on the 
conventions o f discourse f o r i t s meaning, thereby involves a r a d i c a l and 
irremediable d i v i s i o n between i t s r e a l meaning ( t r u t h ) and i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
( o p i n i o n ) . W i t t g e n s t e i n , i n h i s w r i t i n g s on t h i s issue, i s p o i n t i n g out tha t 
our c e r t a i n t y about anything i s a product of the grammatical s t r u c t u r e s which 
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determine the f i r m (but not always immutable) r e l a t i o n s between our form of 
representation and that which i s represented, and th a t these are a communal, 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y a v a i l a b l e resource; i t i s not the case that c e r t a i n t y 
proceeds from i r r e f u t a b l e evidence, but t h a t i t proceeds, i n a given case 
from evidence which we cannot, sen s i b l y , dispute. C e r t a i n t y i s thus c o n d i t i o n a l 
upon the p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt. 
Blum's recourse t o the "conversation i n the sou l " as the act of knowing t r u t h 
may, indeed, @.f we ignore i t s i m p l i c i t c r i t i q u e and misconceptions about the 
nature of sense making) provide a metaphor f o r the i n t e r n a l processes which go 
on i n the act of grasping an idea, or seeing a r e l a t i o n s h i p . This does not 
help us, however, t o account f o r the way i n which, marvellously, our form of 
representation does work, and not only forms the way i n which we do see the 
world, but provides an enduring basis, o v e r l a i d w i t h subtle yet inexorable 
transformations, f o r speech t o be sensible. 
I n the case of sociology then what are we t o make of the demand f o r r e f l e x i v i t y ? 
As I have t r i e d t o show, Wittgenstein's work provides us w i t h the means to 
explore what I believe t o be fundamental misconceptions as t o what i s both 
d e s i r a b l e and possible f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts. We must, i n the attempt to 
i n t e r p r e t and e x p l a i n the s o c i a l , accept the c o n d i t i o n under which t h i s i s a 
p o s s i b i l i t y , which i s to say th a t our employment of language i s subject to the 
grammatical s t r u c t u r e s which such employment involves, vie must not be misled 
by the problems "which such a s t r u c t u r e seems to pose i n t o r e j e c t i n g the l i m i t -
a t i o n s of language i n favour of a search f o r e x t r a - t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, or 
undermining the products of theory i n favour of an a l l embracing skepticism. 
R e f l e x i v i t y has n e i t h e r , i n my o p i n i o n , of those features. Rather, a r e f l e x i v e 
e n t e r p r i s e consists of working w i t h i n the l i m i t a t i o n s of the grammar of the 
s o c i o l o g i c a l language game while d i s p l a y i n g the commitment t o show those 
l i m i t a t i o n s , w h i l e at the same time (since the work of showing those l i m i t s 
i s the work o f producing v a l i d knowledge) p r o v i d i n g f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l warrant 
of accounts i n terms of recognisable d i s p l a y of t h e o r e t i c a l awareness of the 
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i n t e r s u b j e c l i v e l y a v a i l a b l e standards i n terms of which s o c i o l o g i c a l work i s 
recognisable as such. This means tha t v a l i d s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge w i l l be 
a v a i l a b l e i n terms of diverse standards of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , r a t h e r than being 
simply one standard, but that knowledge nevertheless can be said t o be a v a i l a b l e . 
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Conclusion 
I have t r i e d t o show tha t Wittgenstein's ideas can be used t o p o i n t out the 
l i m i t a t i o n s and i l l u s i o n s t o which s o c i o l o g i c a l theory i s prone when i t attempts 
t o deal w i t h the features of n a t u r a l language. In large p a r t , then, the enter-
p r i s e i s negative, i n that what p r o p o s i t i o n s do emerge are t e n t a t i v e and un-
e x p l i c a t e d , and derive from the l i m i t s which I have set f o r the p r o j e c t s of 
the t h e o r i s t s I have discussed. The work of producing a p o s i t i v e programme 
f a l l s , s t r i c t l y speaking, outside the province of t h i s present p r o j e c t . Hope-
f u l l y , however, some suggestions about the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l 
analysis w i l l have emerged. With the aim o f drawing out some possible i m p l i -
c a t i o n s , I s h a l l review the areas which I have covered. That t h i s i s a socio-
l o g i s t s p o s t s c r i p t i s , I hope, c l e a r . As I believe I have maintained throughout, 
Wittgenstein was not concerned t o produce, w i t h i n philosophy any such programme; 
n e i t h e r do I believe h i s work can serve such a purpose w i t h i n s ociology, since, 
f i n a l l y , sociology i s a programme o f p r a c t i c a l work, and i s concerned w i t h the 
problem o f accounting f o r the world as i t i s found by men i n s o c i e t y . This 
f i n d i n g draws together the p r a c t i c e s of science, philosophy, poetry and the 
m u l t i t u d e of diverse language games of which i t c o n s i s t s so t h a t understanding 
and e x p l a i n i n g i t becomes mul t i d i m e n s i o n a l , and cannot be f i n a l l y l i m i t e d t o 
the p r a c t i c e s o f any one game, except i n s o f a r as that game i t s e l f acknowledges 
such m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y . V a l i d s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge, then, i s subject to 
the same l i m i t a t i o n s as v a l i d knowledge i n any other language game, no more or 
l e s s ; which i s t o say that knowledge depends on the p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt, but 
t h a t doubt comes t o an end. Where i t comes t o an end i s p r e c i s e l y the c o n d i t i o n 
which the ongoing p r a c t i c e of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g i s c o n s t a n t l y i n the 
process o f f o r m u l a t i n g and r e f o r m u l a t i n g . 
What w i l l have emerged from the preceding chapters, I hope, i s the c o n v i c t i o n 
that much of sociology's t h e o r i s i n g s u f f e r s from a p e r s i s t e n t f a i l u r e t o deal 
w i t h the complex of problems thrown up by the d i s j u n c t i o n between the world 
as i t i s understood and l i v e d i n by the everyday man, and t h a t i n h a b i t e d by 
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s p e c i a l i s t s studying how t h a t everyday man l i v e s h i s l i f e . Further, these 
problems are found by such s p e c i a l i s t s t o be simply one kind of m a n i f e s t a t i o n 
of a general epistemological problem ( 1 ) , which i s c a l l e d the problem of 
'other minds' or Cartesian dualism, among other t h i n g s . The work discussed 
I take t o exemplify the r e s u l t s of f a i l i n g t o solve what Kant r e f e r r e d t o as 
'a scandal of philosophy 0. Now, a c r u c i a l p a r t of my argument has been t h a t 
' t e c h n i c a l ' language games, such as sociology and philosophy, do not depend 
on j u s t i f i c a t i o n from more primary sentences i n the everyday language games 
from which they undoubtedly develop. I have used the c r i t e r i a l account of 
sense c o n s t i t u t i o n t o argue t h a t , i f we accept Wittgenstein's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between 'symptom' and ' c r i t e r i a ' , and the d i f f e r e n t r o l e s they play i n the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the sense of sentences, then t e c h n i c a l language games them-
selves stand i n a c r i c e r i a l r e l a t i o n t o the sentences of the everyday language 
game which o f f e r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r sense. This i s t o argue t h a t the 
sense o f the sentences o f t e c h n i c a l language games i s not reducible t o the 
sentences of ordinary language, but achieves a symptomatic semi-autonomy, so 
that the understanding which competent ( t e c h n i c a l ) language users (members o f 
the s o c i o l o g i c a l community) a r r i v e at i s warranted because o f t h e i r membership 
of t h a t community. I t i s a v a i l a b l e i n the r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
( t e c h n i c a l ) usage and (everyday) grounds, w i t h n e i t h e r having p r i o r i t y . 
I am thus arguing t h a t speakers of d i f f e r e n t t e c h n i c a l language games ( v i z . 
s o c i o l o g i s t s and philosophers) r e t a i n , u l t i m a t e l y , t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t i v e 
domains; however, i t i s also my argument t h a t these domains are not s e l f 
grounded, and t h a t making sense i n sociology or philosophy i s only possible 
at a l l because o f t h e i r common relatedness t o the language p r a c t i c e s of the 
mundane world from which they s p r i n g , and t o each other as members o f the 
fami l y of language games which form the c u l t u r a l community which t h e i r t r a d -
i t i o n s acknowledge. Insofar as Descartes i s the common ancestor o f (western) 
s o c i o l o g i s t and philosopher a l i k e , I take i t t h a t attempts i n e i t h e r camp t o 
deal w i t h h i s legacy w i l l have profound i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the other. 
243. 
The attempts which I deal w i t h here generate some severe problems f o r them-
selves. Peter Winch, attempting t o remake sociology i n a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n 
mould argues t h a t since the uses of language i n c o n s t i t u t i n g meaning are r u l e 
d i r e c t e d , then the search by S o c i o l o g i s t s f o r general laws to account s o c i a l 
phenomena i s p o i n t l e s s , since the nature o f s o c i a l phenomena req u i r e s under-
standing r a t h e r than explanation f o r any accounting. Consequently, sociology 
i s a conceptual undertaking, r a t h e r than an e m p i r i c a l one, and as such, must 
assign p r i o r i t y t o the conceptual understandings which men, i n t h e i r s o c i a l 
world, a c t u a l l y subscribe t o and act upon. For Winch, then, the d i s j u n c t i o n 
between the everyday world and the world of s o c i o l o g i c a l theory i s t o be 
responded t o by g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o the former. " F a i t h f u l n e s s t o the phenomenon" 
i s , i t seems, the philosopher's response t o the v i o l a t i o n , by science, of the 
s o c i a l world. 
However, Winch's 'naturalism' also marks a r e t r e a t from progress. How, i f the 
conventions or r u l e s of everyday usage are t o be assigned p r i o r i t y i n the 
understanding o f the s o c i a l world, do we account f o r change? What are the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between d i f f e r e n t language games, both w i t h i n n a t u r a l language 
communities and without? Winch f i n d s h i s s o c i a l men t o be, i n terms of h i s 
concept o f understanding, h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed i n t o c o l l e c t i v e l y exclusive 
enclaves, w i t h communication depending upon, w i t h i n the community, c o l l e c t i v e 
s u b s c r i p t i o n t o the conventions w i t h which we f i n d ourselves saddled at b i r t h , 
and between communities, upon the p r i m i t i v e 'brute' c e r t a i n t i e s o f the univ-
er s a l features o f human s o c i e t i e s - b i r t h , c o p u l a t i o n , and death. 
In c o n t r a s t , Wieder f i n d s the world of the everyday a c t o r i n f i n i t e l y s u b t l e , 
and f a r more t r a n s i e n t . The conventions of c u l t u r e become, f o r Wieder, 
merely the t o o l s o f i n t e r a c t i o n ; while Winch would see t e n n i s as reducible t o 
the conventions which govern how i t i s t o be played, f o r Wieder, i t i s a 
s t r a t e g i c , emotional, p l a y f u l , event. For Wieder, the s o c i a l world i s the 
achievement o f actors engaged i n c o n s t r u c t i n g i t out of the corpus o f knowledge 
which t h e i r place i n i t a f f o r d s them. To reduce the understandings which men 
have o f t h e i r world t o the conventions of i t merely glosses the richness o f 
t h e i r i n f i n i t e inventiveness. I f Winch seeks ' r e a l i t y ' i n the concepts 
which men employ, Wieder seeks r e a l i t y i n the employment o f the concepts. As 
such, i t i s always u n a v a i l a b l e , f o r each moment i s unique, each usage and 
meaning incarnate i n the event. Yet we do "understand r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y " . This 
i s p o s s i b l e , Wieder, argues, by our a b i l i t y t o r e - c a l l the experience as a 
'document' which e x h i b i t s the competences and relevancies i n terms of which 
i t c o n s t i t u t e d the meaning of the event of which i t formed a p a r t . The seeing 
of t h i s r e c a l l as an e x h i b i t i o n o f the everyday competencies which enable a 
corpus of c u l t u r a l knowledge (such as a 'convict code') t o c o n s t i t u t e the 
(c o n t e x t u a l ) meaning of a c t i o n both provides the for m u l a t i o n o f a r e f l e x i v e 
approach t o the problem of r e l a t i v i s m , and defines the consequences o f t h i s 
issue f o r sociology. Wieder ( f o l l o w i n g Garfinkel and Mannheim, or so he f e e l s ) 
proposes ethnomethodological studies as p r o v i d i n g a d i s t i n c t i v e approach ( t o 
standard s o c i o l o g i e s ) which seeks t o i n v e s t i g a t e phenomenologically the ongoing 
course of a p a r t i c i p a n t ' s use of c u l t u r a l competencies i n s t r u c t u r i n g the 
meaning of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . This i s t o involve the e x p l i c a t i o n of the 
researchers use o f his understandings as documents which e x h i b i t such c u l t u r a l 
competencies. 
Wieder's p o s i t i o n , i n terms o f the c e n t r a l problematic which I p r e v i o u s l y 
formulated can thus be seen as a despair of re p r e s e n t a t i o n , and i m p l i c i t l y , 
an acceptance o f the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f i d e a l i s a t i o n and hence v i o l a t i o n of 
incarnate meaning, and a r e t r e a t t o the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y o f p r i v a t e experience. 
The meaningfulness of the world i s t o be accounted f o r , r a t h e r than accounted 
as t h i s or t h a t ; the epoche of t h i s s o c i a l phenomenology leaves aside the 
problem of competing accounts t o t u r n inward toward how these accounts come 
to be possible at a l l . 
While Mannheim saw the documentary method as a hermeneutic a i d t o the e x p l i c ~ 
a t i o n of the s o c i a l context of pro d u c t i o n , and acknowledged the separateness 
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and equal v a l i d i t y o f psychological accounts of meaning c o n s t i t u t i o n , f o r 
Wieder t h i s method serves only t o provide the r a t i o n a l e u n d e r l y i n g what comes 
t o , f i n a l l y , an account of meaning c o n s t i t u t i o n as a p r i v a t e , i n t e n t i o n a l event. 
The documentary method provides, f o r Wieder, the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e reference 
of sense making; i t i s h i s theory of meaning, t h a t which j u s t i f i e s h i s exper-
iences having relevance f o r others. I f r u l e s or conventions o f language use 
are not omniscient (as Winch would have i t ) then Wieder's endorsement o f 
i n d e x i c a l i t y must provide some means o f g i v i n g concepts i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e comp-
a r a b i l i t y , and t h i s i s the r o l e played by the documentary method. While 
Mannheim placed i n d i v i d u a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i n phenomenological brackets, however, 
Wieder attempts t o r e c o n c i l e , w i t h i n the n o t i o n o f t h e o r i s i n g as an "accounting-
o f - t h e - s o c i a l - w o r l d " , both the i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v e l y i n t e n d i n g meaning and 
the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e , o b j e c t i v e context o f meaning production, w i t h i t s r u l e s 
and conventions. While Mannheim recognised the problem as being how we can 
compare and c o n t r a s t the productions o f competing accounts, however, f o r Wieder, 
as f o r Husserl, the mystery of the accomplishment of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y precludes 
any r e f l e c t i o n on the d i f f e r e n c e s between accounts, and, i n i t s p r o j e c t of 
fundamentalist n a t u r a l i s t empiricism, i s thereby l e f t w i t h o u t c r i t i c a l standards, 
e i t h e r f o r the world o f i t s s u b j e c t s , or f o r i t s own products - u n s u r p r i s i n g l y , 
since these are u l t i m a t e l y r e ducible t o the same t h i n g , w i t h o u t c r i t e r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s t o the world o f others. 
The problem o f other minds, then, has lead us t o the question o f the place of 
theory. The v a r i e t i e s o f n a t u r a l i s m espoused by Winch and Wieder have been 
found t o lead t o unidimensional concepts of understanding which deny the basic 
p r o j e c t of making the world more i n t e l l i g i b l e , since they r e s t r i c t the ways 
i n which i t i s conceived o f as p o s s i b l e t o understand. For T a l c o t t Parsons, 
the work o f Sociology i s the work o f f o r m u l a t i n g a means t o r e c o n c i l e the 
o b j e c t i v e realm o f s c i e n t i f i c thought w i t h the s u b j e c t i v e and i n t e n t i o n a l 
elements of human behaviour. Like Mannheim, he recognised i n the p o s i t i v i s t 
p r o j e c t o f mastering the m a t e r i a l realm o f existence the t r u e dynamic o f 
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human a s p i r a t i o n , and i t s c o n f l i c t w i t h the i r r a t i o n a l , emotional f a t e o f 
'imperfect' humankind. For Parsons, the c e n t r a l concern o f any study o f 
human a c t i o n must be the r e s o l u t i o n of the c o n f l i c t between Reason and E x i s t -
ence, between science and emotion, between l o g i c and i r r a t i o n a l i s m . The 
c e n t r a l problem i s thus the problem o f Order. 
For Parsons, i t appears, t h i s was both the achievement of man, and the con= 
d i t i o n of men i n s o c i e t y . The problem o f order thus becomes - how are we t o 
describe the o r d e r l i n e s s which we f i n d , and what order are we t o a t t r i b u t e t o 
the possible orders which we may choose t o d i s c e r n , i n the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e 
f a c t ! c i t y which we a l l experience f o r ourselves? These choices Parsons f i n d s 
t o be l i m i t e d by the nature of our so c i e t y and the nature of our i n t e l l e c t u a l 
h i s t o r y ; given the problem as he has defined i t , i n order t o produce an account 
of the s o c i a l realm, we must, f i r s t of a l l , f i n d i n the s o c i a l world which we 
i n v e s t i g a t e those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which make i t t h a t world f o r those who 
i n h a b i t i t , both s c i e n t i s t s and laymen. The p r o j e c t must, then, c h a r a c t e r i s e 
t h a t world i n terms of categories which, phenomenologically, order the w o r l d 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y - t h a t i s to say, w i t h Kant, the c a t e g o r i a l imperatives. 
That these are t o be the fundamentals o f our account i s thereby t o l o c a t e 
t h i s account as a r a t i o n a l , and ( p u t a t i v e l y ) a s c i e n t i f i c o r d e r i n g , since i t 
i s an e l e c t i o n produced as a r e s u l t o f one p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t . 
Parsons' s o l u t i o n t o dualism, then, gives p r i o r i t y t o the world o f the spec-
i a l i s t ; a l l t h a t i s p o s s i b l e f o r Parsons, given h i s epistemological pre-suppo-
s i t i o n s , i s t o produce an a n a l y t i c o r d e r i n g , l i n k e d t o the e m p i r i c a l realm by, 
he claims, the phenomenological s t a t u s o f i t s c e n t r a l concepts. Thus, the 
s p e c i a l i s t s a n a l y t i c a l schema, as w e l l as being a s e l e c t i v e s t r u c t u r i n g of 
the e m p i r i c a l realm (and thus p a r t i a l , and a b s t r a c t ) r e f e r s t o the e m p i r i c a l 
w o r l d i n the sense t h a t i t derives from and i s the e s s e n t i a l means by which 
r a t i o n a l sense can be made o f , the concrete system which i s the t o p i c and 
product o f a c t o r s ' speech and ac t i o n s . 
For Parsons, then, the w o r l d o f the everyday ac t o r and t h a t of the s p e c i a l i s t 
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are the products o f language games which are i n d i v i s i b l e from each other; 
while he i s committed t o the development of rigorous science as the best 
way of accounting f o r the s o c i a l w o r l d , he knows t h a t science which ignores 
i t s grounding i n the world o f commonsense cannot hope t o produce accounts 
which do j u s t i c e t o t h a t world as a phenomenon, any more than ' n a t u r a l i s t i c ' 
avoidance o f general c a t e g o r i a l grounds could hope t o produce an account which 
had a p p l i c a t i o n outside o f the a r t f u l , i n t u i t i v e , imaginative ( e t c . , ) uses 
which might be found f o r i t by whatever audience i t might f i n d . 
What Parsons himself f a i l e d t o provide was the means whereby t h i s phenomeno-
l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s could f i n d i t s way back i n t o the e m p i r i c a l realm; he f a i l e d 
t o recognise t h a t by g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o the experts' w o r l d , he cuts the analyst 
o f f from h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r e c i s e l y those ' i r r a t i o n a l , ' commonsense, 
i n t u i t i v e , p l a y f u l , and a r t i s t i c dimensions which form the v i t a l d i f f e r e n c e 
between the p e r f e c t i o n o f science and the brute f a c t i c i t y of the e m p i r i c a l . 
The reference t o the e m p i r i c a l realm i n Parsons always s t r u g g l e s t o penetrate 
the brackets i n t o which h i s a n a l y s i s , r e g r e t f u l l y but i n e v i t a b l y , must consign 
i t . As a masterful s p e c i a l i s t , Parsons himself elected t o develop h i s theory 
before the brackets could be taken o f f ; t h a t they never have been does not 
point t o the f u t i l i t y of Parsons' endeavour, but provides a challenge f o r 
those who recognise h i s great achievement. Harold G a r f i n k e l c e r t a i n l y saw t h i s . 
Herminio Martins has said (2) t h a t , i n some ways, Ga r f i n k e l ' s work i s 
"... Parsons' p r o j e c t w r i t small", while Parsons addressed the r o l e o f the 
s p e c i a l i s t i n f o r m u l a t i n g accounts o f the s o c i a l world, G a r f i n k e l addresses 
the r o l e o f the layman. For G a r f i n k e l , ' l a y ' s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts, although 
i m p l i c i t and 'taken-for-granted' are recognisably s o c i o l o g i c a l and have the 
same s t a t u s towards the order which they address as those o f conventional 
• c o n s t r u c t i v i s t ' sociology. The achievement of such c o n s t r u c t i v i s t accounts 
i s t o produce, i n terms o f s c i e n t i f i c canons of enquiry, rigorous and sophis-
t i c a t e d re-orderings o f the s o c i a l realm which p o i n t t o the systematic and 
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l o g i c a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 'social f a c t s ' as Durkheim conceived o f 
them. Recall t h a t , f o r Parsons, order was a two dimensional problem; where 
h i s e n t e r p r i s e founders i s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the anal y s t s ' construc-
t i o n of order, i n terms o f phenomenologically given cat e g o r i e s , and the order 
which i s accomplished by the phenomenology o f the everyday actor ' t o u t c o u r t ' . 
Parsons could not deal w i t h commonsense i n the consciousness of the sub j e c t . 
To t h i s task G a r f i n k e l sees himself devoted. While Parsons emulates Kants' 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f the f a c t o f ( s o c i a l ) knowledge, G a r f i n k e l pursues Husserl's 
a l t e r n a t i v e - he seeks t o address the means by which t h i s pre-supposed knowl-
edge i s a r r i v e d a t . For G a r f i n k e l , then, the language games of the everyday 
a c t o r , since these e x h i b i t the processes by means of which such order i s 
accomplished, become the data and form the background against which h i s 
analyses are t o be understandable. Parsons' commitment t o science i s what 
leads him i n t o the b l i n d a l l e y of abstract a n a l y t i c i t y , and Garfink e l seeks 
t o avoid t h i s by p o i n t i n g t o the necessary p r i o r i t y o f commonsense r a t i o n a l i t y 
i n making sense o f the world of commonsense ac t o r s . Given Parsons' formula-
t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l tension between reason (and w i l l ) and existence (and 
f a t e ) , G a r f i n k e l can be seen as accepting h i s f a t e ; u n l i k e Socrates, however, 
Garfinkel does not choose t o make t h i s acceptance an example. The p r i n c i p l e 
of ethnomethodological i n d i f f e r e n c e makes of Ga r f i n k e l ' s e n t e r p r i s e a detached, 
n e u t r a l , q u i e t i s t formalism. The earnest e m p i r i c a l enquiry i n t o How the 
'whatness' o f the world can be apprehended has no room f o r any a t t i t u d e toward 
th a t whatness apart from i t s s t a t u s as an o b j e c t . That the products of 
Garf i n k e l ' s e n t e r p r i s e provide no c r i t e r i a i n terms of which they can be 
evaluated f o r ' t r u t h ' value i s no s u r p r i s e , given the i n i t i a l bracketing of 
both the c r i t e r i a o f s c i e n t i f i c language games and the c r i t e r i a i n terms of 
which the e f f e c t i v e n e s s , import, s i g n i f i c a n c e ( e t c . , ) - t h a t i s t o say, the 
concrete meaning of a c t i o n s i n terms of the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t i o n s o f the 
subjects - i s to be evaluated. I n c u t t i n g i t s e l f o f f from sociology, ethno-
methodology becomes, ne c e s s a r i l y a - h i s t o r i c a l . I n d i f f e r e n c e places the problem 
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of c o n t e x t u a l i t y i n brackets; w i t h the p r o v i s i o n o f u n d o u b t a b i l i t y , by t h i s 
move, however, Garfinkel also gives up the p o s s i b i l i t y of relevant or t r u t h f u l 
knowledge, and a l l h i s f i n d i n g s , l a c k i n g c r i t e r i a by means of which t h e i r 
sense can be decided apart from the morally n i h i l i s t i c l a b o r a t o r i e s o f i t s 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s , become i r r e l e v a n c i e s f o r the h i s t o r i c a l l y engaged s c i e n t i s t 
and layman* 
That sense which ethnomethodological studies can have derives from the precise 
separation o f s p e c i a l i s t and laymen which was the ground f o r ethnomethodology's 
attack on f o r m a l i s t sociology; the c r i t e r i a f o r ethnomethodological statements 
t o make sense has i t s communal grounding, not i n the everyday wo r l d , but i n 
the community of ethnomethodologists. G a r f i n k e l ' s a l t e r n a t i v e p r o j e c t can 
have no relevance t o the world, apart from those who f i n d i t s p r i s t i n e detach-
ment congenial, so long as these i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i n t e r e s t s which mark i t o f f 
from sociology remain i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . The lack of values i s as b i g a problem 
f o r ethnomethodology as the grounding i n value i s f o r Sociology. 
That t h i s i s a problem i s t e s t i f i e d i n the work o f Gouldner and Blum examined 
below. For Parsons and G a r f i n k e l , the s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e o r e t i c ! t y has l e d , or 
so i t seems, t o phenomenological a b s t r a c t i o n at the a n a l y t i c a l and the concrete 
l e v e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . The s t r u g g l e t o r e c o n c i l e these two w i t h a t h e o r i s i n g 
r e l e v a n t t o the world o f t h e o r i s t and everyday ac t o r i s Gouldner's task. Like 
Mannheim, he recognises the problem of r e f l e x i v i t y as the c e n t r a l one; u n l i k e 
Mannheim, he believes t h a t the only possible response t o t h i s i s a grounding 
i n the revealed fundamental value of the h i s t o r y of thought, emancipation. 
In h i s argument, the d i v i s i o n between s p e c i a l i s t and layman can only be 
resolved by making the value-groundings o f the s p e c i a l i s e d domain responsible 
t o the r e a l i t y o f the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s from which i t derives - the c o n d i t i o n s 
of production which determine i n t e l l e c t u a l and any other k i n d o f work. This 
i s t o make r e f l e x i v i t y e s s e n t i a l l y a c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( 3 ) . 
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For Mannheim, t h i s was not so; h i s f a i t h i n the u n i t y o f science and scien-
t i f i c method r e s u l t e d i n a commitment t o the pre-requirement of communication, 
comparison and ap p r a i s a l of opposing contexts of meaning. To demand commitment 
to one set of values i s t o abrogate t h i s p r i n c i p l e ; t h a t Gouldner does so i s 
p e r f e c t l y compatible w i t h e x p l i c i t endorsement of the p r i o r i t y of everyday 
language games as the foundations which enable t e c h n i c a l discourse t o come 
i n t o being. Indeed, f o r Gouldner, the malaise of modern sociology can only 
be repaired by r e i n s t a t i n g the place o f the values o f the everyday world i n 
the productions of i t s t e c h n i c a l language games. Reflexive sociology, f o r 
Gouldner, can only be t h a t which i s mindful o f , and c r i t i c a l o f i t s genesis 
i n the concrete value frameworks of the everyday world. 
Gouldner thus argues t h a t , i n the s t r u g g l e between competing accounts, the 
only v i a b l e response i s t o seek transcendental grounding i n h i s t o r i c a l evolu~ 
t i o n ; he discerns, i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of preceding t h i n k e r s such as Hegel 
and Marx, a ' l e i t m o t i f of emancipation, a desire f o r ought t o become i s which 
s u b t l y modifies the thought of men i n h i s t o r y and thus i s transformed i n t o 
s o c i a l a c t i o n . I f speech i s h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n a l , t h i s argument seems to 
say, then a l l t h a t can be done i s t o seek t o a l i g n speech w i t h h i s t o r y ; t h i s 
i s t o apply the standards which reveal themselves i n h i s t o r y t o the speech 
which i s i n h i s t o r y , to transcend the conrete c o n d i t i o n s which would d i s t o r t 
speech by d i s p l a y i n g the emancipatory desire t o reveal t h e i r power, and so, 
h o p e f u l l y , t u r n i t i n t o a d i a l e c t i c a l moment i n the emancipatory movement 
towards the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of speech w i t h i t s grounds, as the r e f l e x i v e 
c r i t i c i s m of the concrete c o n d i t i o n s which d i s t o r t accounts t u r n s t h e i r power 
i n upon themselves. 
Gouldner's c r i t i c a l r e f l e x i v i t y , however, presumes t o i d e n t i f y the process 
of h i s t o r i c a l development; t h i s , of course, i s a judgment which goes against 
the very core o f Mannheim's teaching, and e f f e c t i v e l y pre-empts vhat would 
be the goal o f h i s comparative, d i s c u r s i v e p r o j e c t . Gouldner goes wrong when 
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he presumes t o be able t o c r i t i c i s e the value basis o f s p e c i f i c accounts, i n 
Mannheim's terms, f o r Mannheim i n s i s t e d t h a t h i s p r o j e c t was concerned t o 
synthesise not opposing ideas but conceptual contexts. Given h i s discussion 
of the development of the sociology of knowledge and the key p a r t s played i n 
t h i s development by p o s i t i v i s t science and a n a l y t i c a l and i d e a l i s t philosophy, 
we can r e a d i l y d i s c e r n the d i f f e r e n c e , f o r Mannheim i n s i s t e d t h a t although 
ideas can c o n f l i c t , they can also be compared, because they can be encompassed 
w i t h i n the system of communication (th e f a m i l y of language games) which makes 
i t p ossible f o r them to be understood at a l l . His concept of the ' t o t a l view' 
has been c r i t i c i s e d as conservative pragmatist and Utopian, but i t can be 
seen t o r e s t on c a r e f u l l y considered grounds v i z . , the patent a b i l i t y of 
competing t h i n k e r s t o e x p l a i n themselves t o others. 
To seek h i s t o r i c a l grounds f o r the value of speech i s t o accept the sovereignty 
of h i s t o r y , i n Gouldner's case. For Blum, h i s t o r y may be of class s t r u g g l e , 
but, more i m p o r t a n t l y , i t i s the h i s t o r y of triumph f o r science and mathemat-
i c a l t h i n k i n g , and, l i k e Heidegger, he sees t h i s triumph as being at the expense 
of thought. For Blum, the dominance o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g i n our age 
merely masks the f a i l u r e t o consider what the reason of t h i s t h i n k i n g comes t o . 
For Blum, the problem o f h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l i t y appears as a problem because 
of the desire o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l speech t o capture the thingness o f the world 
which l i e s behind i t ; t h i s resistance t o the u n i v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n o f man masks 
the r e f u s a l t o accept the u l t i m a t e groundlessness o f any speaking which takes 
f o r granted the f i r s t question - what i s the good of speaking? I f , f o r 
Gouldner, h i s t o r y betrays the l e i t m o t i f of emancipation, f o r Blum h i s t o r y 
d isplays i t s f u t i l e p u r s u i t o f the i l l u s i o n o f progress. The only v i a b l e 
response t o such f u t i l i t y i s t o respond t o i t s images as i r o n i c icons o f the 
Good o f which they are merely the shadows. The t r u e r o l e of the r e f l e x i v e 
t h e o r i s t , i n h i s terms, i s t o d i s p l a y the commitment to t h e o r i s i n g as m e d i c i n a l , 
t h e r a p e u t i c and concerned not w i t h r u l e i n society but w i t h change i n man. 
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Blum's epistemology proceeds from the f a i l u r e of language; he i s concerned t o 
re-make the r o l e which language plays i n thought. While Gouldner sees the 
c o n d i t i o n s of the s o c i a l world determining the products of t h e o r i s i n g , Blum 
sees the very attempt by language t o account the thingness o f the world as a 
c o n d i t i o n f o r i t s f a i l u r e , f o r f o l l o w i n g Heidegger, Blum sees the grounds o f 
language as n o t h i n g , or r a t h e r , t h a t which i s outside o f language which i s 
n o t - a - t h i n g . The very attempt t o capture t h a t which grounds language shows 
the desire t o f i n d i t i n language, and, as such, f a i l s t o grasp the Reason 
why i t can speak ( 4 ) * 
We f i n d , i n Blum, the most serious despair w i t h the p r o j e c t of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g ; i n Blum's terms, such a p r o j e c t i s incomprehensible i n i t s e l f , f o r 
i t i mplies a ' s o l u t i o n ' t o the problem o f the good of speaking which, by i t s 
very presumptive existence, means that i t has not been asked. I n terms o f our 
i n i t i a l problematic, the t h e o r i s i n g of Alan Blum r e j e c t s even the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h , f o r t r u t h , i n h i s terms, i s not a p o s s i b i l i t y i n d i s c u r -
s i v e terms, but only reveals i t s e l f i n the 'grasping', the ' s t r u g g l e ' , the 
' l i v e d experience' by way o f which the groundlessness of t h a t which appears 
i n being becomes apparent. 
Like Heidegger, however, Blum's t h e o r i s i n g makes o f the f i r s t question-under° 
standing-a superordinate task which precludes involvement i n the concrete, 
h i s t o r i c a l issues which are the l i v e d experience o f man-in-history. Like the 
ethnomethodology of G a r f i n k e l from which i t s p r i n g s , Blum's t h e o r i s i n g i s 
outside o f h i s t o r y , and concerned w i t h the pure, the c r y s t a l l i n e q u a l i t y of 
understanding, f o r Blum, i n a n a l y t i c , f o r Garfi n k e l i n concrete ( i f formalised) 
terms. 
The strong o b j e c t i o n s which I have r a i s e d t o the p o s i t i o n s adopted by these 
t h e o r i s t s have been based, very l a r g e l y , on the work o f W i t t g e n s t e i n and some 
developments o f i t i n the exegesis of Hacker and Baker. I n the preceding pages, 
I have sketched i n some o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which appear t o me t o e x i s t between 
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these p o s i t i o n s i n terms of a c e n t r a l problematic. The question a r i s e s , 
however, what other kind o f approaches to the problematic might there be? 
I n the body of t h i s work, I have a l l u d e d t o Wittgenstein's work at various 
p o i n t s t o claim t h a t t h i s provides argument against the various p o s i t i o n s 
which I have characterised. I should l i k e t o o f f e r an account of Gordon 
Baker's attempt t o apply these p r i n c i p l e s i n t o a systematic a l t e r n a t i v e t o 
what he c a l l s the p r e v a i l i n g " C l a s s i c a l Epistemological Theories". I f t h i s 
argument has any relevance f o r sociology, then I should l i k e t o argue t h a t 
t h i s i s because the t h e o r i s t s which I have de a l t w i t h below are a l l operating 
i n terms of such epistemologies. 
What has been c a l l e d the general p r i n c i p l e s o f a ' c l a s s i c a l ' semantical and 
epistemological theory have been expressed (5) as f o l l o w s . F i r s t , the sense 
of a sentence i s determined by s t a t i n g i t s t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , which are 
i n d i v i d u a l l y necessary and j o i n t l y s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h t h a t t r u t h . Second, 
what i s t r u e i s independent of what i s known t o be t r u e . Thus, the t r u t h 
t h a t i s intended i n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the sense o f a sentence i s independent 
o f what can be known about what the sentence r e f e r s t o by the human actors 
concerned i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h i r d , sense i s determinate, so t h a t the 
sense o f a sentence i s d e f i n i t e l y t r u e or f a l s e i n a l l possible worlds. With 
v a r i a t i o n s , these e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s can be seen i n most v a r i e t i e s of p h i l o -
sophical a n a l y s i s of meaning, and concommitantly, have been imported t o u t court 
i n t o s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , these t h e o r i e s of t r u t h and 
meaning have been placed alongside other arguments about the c e r t a i n t y of what 
we can know, so t h a t t h e r e , i t i s proposed, f i r s t "the sense of epistemolog-
i c a l l y problematic sentences can be established independently o f what counts 
as evidence f o r them, or whether they can be known to be t r u e , and o f how they 
can be known i f they can be known" ( 6 ) . Second, c e r t a i n t y i s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of doubt; and t h i r d , only deduction can t r a n s m i t c e r t a i n t y or knowledge ( t h i s 
i s inseparable from the separation of knowledge from mere opinion by the 
necessity o f the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt as a c o n d i t i o n f o r c e r t a i n t y ) . 
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Fourth, a l l r a t i o n a l inferences are e i t h e r deductive or i n d u c t i v e ; evidence 
f o r p r o b a b i l i t y i s i n d u c t i v e where inference allows of some doubt, w h i l e i n 
the case o f (p o s s i b l e ) c e r t a i n t y evidence i s ded u c t i v e l y r e l a t e d to propositions 
I hope i t can be seen t h a t the notions of t r u t h and c e r t a i n t y which i n f o r m 
s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g can be derived d i r e c t l y from such p r i n c i p l e s ; the 
o v e r r i d i n g problematic has been seen t o be what i t i s t h a t gives s o c i o l o g i c a l 
accounts t h e i r warrant i n the face o f the h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ( t h e 
m i r r o r image o f i n d e x i c a l i t y ) of t h e i r production on the one hand, and the 
irremediable c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y of t h e i r standards on the other. This, I would 
suggest, e x h i b i t s a conception of such standards which derives from the prin= 
c i p l e s j u s t o u t l i n e d . Now, throughout t h i s work I have used W i t t g e n s t e i n t o 
suggest ways i n which we might see various s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s as i l l u s o r y 
p u r s u i t s of some i d e a l ; I want t o suggest t h a t t h i s i d e a l derives from p r e c i s e l y 
the p r i n c i p l e s contained i n c l a s s i c a l semantic and epistemological t h e o r i e s . 
I propose t o o u t l i n e Wittgenstein's C o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory o f meaning as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o these c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , i n the hope that we may f i n d some 
p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g by t u r n i n g away from the 
i l l u s i o n s which these have generated. 
C r u c i a l l y , t h i s theory depends upon c r e a t i n g new understandings of the notions 
o f c e r t a i n t y and necessity. As we have seen, skepticism has been handled w i t h i n 
the p r i n c i p l e s o f c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s by proceeding from a c o n f l a t i o n o f the 
notions o f c e r t a i n t y and necessity; t h a t i s t o say, f o r c l a s s i c a l epistem-
o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s , c e r t a i n t y i s l i n k e d w i t h conclusive evidence, but i t does 
not d i s t i n g u i s h between evidence which i t i s not l o g i c a l l y p o ssible t o o v e r t u r n 
and t h a t which i t i s not l o g i c a l l y p o ssible t o improve. I t s n o t i o n of cert= 
a i n t y , then i s e i t h e r doomed t o actual s t a t e s of a f f a i r s where p r o b a b i l i t y can 
always be improved, or else i t must admit t h a t i t s concept of c e r t a i n t y i s 
impossible and incoherent, since, i f no evidence could ever make i t c e r t a i n , 
then what kind o f evidence could make i t probable? Thus, i f the cl a i m i s 
made t h a t the evidence f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n could be improved, then i t must also 
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be the case t h a t i t could be overturned, and i f i t can be overturned, then i t 
can also be improved,, Rather, W i t t g e n s t e i n , suggests, should we not see 
necessity and c e r t a i n t y as separate; thus c e r t a i n t y resides i n the p o s s i b i l -
i t i e s given w i t h i n a language game, so t h a t conclusive evidence i s r a t h e r 
t h a t which cannot be improved upon or strengthened, and not ' i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e ' 
i n the sense t h a t i t would n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l t h a t which i t i s evidence f o r 
i n a l l possible worlds. Thus, the co n d i t i o n s f o r doubt i n a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t 
theory would be c u r t a i l e d . Rather than accepting the s c e p t i c s ' account of 
the subversion of a l l possible accounts by t i e i n g them t o the conjunction of 
possible i l l u s i o n as a permanent p o s s i b i l i t y , W i t t g e n s t e i n proposes t h a t such 
a general p r i n c i p l e i s incoherent, i n terms of h i s a s s e r t i o n o f c r i t e r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s between the sentences of accounts. I f we separate out the notions 
of necessity and c e r t a i n t y which are c o n f l a t e d w i t h i n the p r i n c i p l e s of 
c l a s s i c a l epistemology, then w h i l e no instance of c r i t e r i a l support may not 
be subverted i n d i v i d u a l l y , c r i t e r i a l support does a f f o r d c e r t a i n t y i n terms 
of a language game. What Wittgenstein's i n s i s t e n c e on the separation o f 
necessity and c e r t a i n t y does achieve w i t h i n t h i s theory i s a l i m i t i n g o f the 
power o f l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y ; thus, w h i l e scepticism may remain as t o the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n a f f o r d e d by c r i t e r i a l support i t i s not t o be allowed f r e e r e i n ; 
what power i t may have i s on l y t o be decided i n terms of the th e o r y , r a t h e r 
than p r i o r t o i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n . This denies the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f a 
general breakdown of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r i n terms o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s t 
t h e ory, such a breakdown would not be p o s s i b l e , f o r the very p o s s i b i l i t y of 
subverting a c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n between sentences depends upon the general 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p ; t h a t i s t o say, on the one hand, the ' t r u t h ' 
which derives from the p r o p o s i t i o n s of c r i t e r i a l l y supported sentences i s not 
necessary t r u t h , i n the sense t h a t g e n e r a l l y , c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s give t r u e 
conclusions from t r u e premises, f o r t h i s i s not an e m p i r i c a l c l a i m leading 
t o t h i s p o s i t i v e conclusion, but r a t h e r , i s concerned w i t h denying the use-
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fulness o f the search f o r such ends. The claim o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s m i s t o exclude 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a general collapse of such r e l a t i o n s , which depends upon 
a l l o w i n g f o r the necessary p o s s i b i l i t y of collapse i n p a r t i c u l a r instances. 
Logical p o s s i b i l i t i e s are not brute f a c t s , and t h i s , W i t t g e n s t e i n argues, i s 
how they are t r e a t e d i n terms of c l a s s i c a l epistemologies. This i s t o say 
t h a t , once again, W i t t g e n s t e i n i s warning against the i l l u s i o n s o f an unexp-
l i c a t e d pervasive theory r a t h e r than proposing such a theory as an a l t e r n a t i v e . 
For c l a s s i c a l epistemology, mere p o s s i b i l i t y of doubt defeats any claims t o 
c e r t a i n t y . For C o n s t r u c t ! v i s t theory, doubt i s the necessary c o n d i t i o n under 
which knowledge i s p o s s i b l e . The argument i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t , since general 
breakdowns i n c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s are not p o s s i b l e , then i n p a r t i c u l a r instances, 
the mere p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t such an instance may be subverted i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
t o deny i t s c l a i m to c e r t a i n t y , since, i f we allowed such a p o s s i b i l i t y t h i s 
f o r c e , then we import a general p r i n c i p l e , since we do not provide f o r such a 
subversion as a special or p a r t i c u l a r case; thus, only grounded doubt can 
defeat a c r i t e r i a l r e l a t e d c l a i m to c e r t a i n t y . At the same ti m e , what we 
understand as the c r i t e r i a l support f o r the c e r t a i n t y o f a statement i s what 
determines our understanding o f the statement; only the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d d i -
t i o n a l evidence ( s u b s t a n t i a l grounds) can then defeat t h i s c l a i m , since the 
c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n i s not one of a p r i o r i evidence, but r a t h e r , a denial w i t h o u t 
a d d i t i o n a l evidence i n v o l v e s both changing the sense o f the sentence which i s 
doubted, and also assuming t h a t t h i s i s the nature of the c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n . 
Constructivism thus turns epistemology away from the search f o r necessary 
r e l a t i o n s which determine the t r u t h of sentences; r a t h e r than seeking t o 
e s t a b l i s h a systematic foundation which can r e a l i s e the u n r e a l i s e a b l e r e q u i r e -
ments of c l a s s i c a l epistemology, W i t t g e n s t e i n i s d i r e c t i n g our a t t e n t i o n t o 
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l grammar i n terms o f which such ends can be assessed. Rather 
than proposing t h a t h i s conceptions of necessity and c e r t a i n t y should respond 
to the programme o f such an epistemology, W i t t g e n s t e i n i s arguing that the 
257. 
e x p l i c a t i o n of t h i s grammar then makes c l a s s i c a l epistemology responsible f o r 
the sense which i t makes of necessity and c e r t a i n t y i n terms of i t s p r i n c i p l e s . 
That i s to say, he i s arguing f o r c e r t a i n t y and knowledge which we l o g i c a l l y 
can have, i n terms o f t h i s theory, r a t h e r than what c l a s s i c a l epistemology 
argues t h a t we should have. Rather than accepting the 'good' o f such a theory, 
should we n o t , r a t h e r , r e q u i r e t h i s 'good' t o j u s t i f y i t s own 'goodness'? 
In terms of a c r i t e r i a l account, any change i n c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s involves 
a change i n sense; t h i s i s t o oppose, on the one hand, the view which emanates 
from c l a s s i c a l epistemology th a t sense must be completely determinate, so t h a t , 
i f someone refuses t o recqgnise the usual c r i t e r i a f o r the sense of a sentence, 
he must be condemned on grounds which l e g i s l a t e f o r the 'real meaning' of the 
sentence. Rather, W i t t g e n s t e i n argues, the f l u c t u a t i o n between symptoms and 
c r i t e r i a as the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the sense o f sentences assures the possib-
i l i t y o f a f l u c t u a t i o n of meaning which does not n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t the t r u t h 
value of a sentence ( t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y common i n science). I t u s u a l l y 
passes unnoticed. 
This does not lead t o a vagueness i n the sense o f sentences, however; from 
w i t h i n the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory o f semantics, the only sense which i s a v a i l a b l e 
f o r the sentences of a language game i s afforded by the c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
between i t s sentences; thus, there i s no ext e r n a l view which could l e g i s l a t e 
f o r d e f i n i t i v e meaning, but t h i s i s r a t h e r a concept which has no place i n 
the theory* This i s a r e f l e c t i o n o f constr u c t i v i s m ' s i n s i s t e n c e on c e r t a i n t y 
as an achievement o f our language games, ra t h e r than an i d e a l p r i n c i p l e . I n 
terms of such an i d e a l p r i n c i p l e , d e f l n i t e n e s s of sense would seem t o be a 
desirable q u a l i t y which i s missing i n c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory; but i t i s also a 
q u a l i t y which i s only t o be seen as possible i n terms of an ext e r n a l view o f 
the process o f sense making. 
I t i s not the case t h a t c r i t e r i a are t o be searched f o r as the 'undoubtable' 
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foundation of sense i n any language game; i f we assume t h a t every sentence 
only has sense i f we can assign c r i t e r i a t o i t , and t h a t a l l sentences w i t h 
sense must have c r i t e r i a l support assigned t o them, then t h i s leads s t r a i g h t 
t o an i n f i n i t e regress, where i n f a c t , no sentences can have sense, since we 
would always have t o provide c r i t e r i a l support f o r the sentences which j u s t i f y 
i t , and so on. Rather than search f o r elementary sentences, which one could 
be tempted t o do, i t i s p r e f e r a b l e t o see the c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n as r e c i p r o c a l , 
so t h a t sentences which c r i t e r i a l l y support other sentences are also sensible 
at l e a s t p a r t l y i n terms of the sentences which they support. 
This f o r m u l a t i o n of Wittgenstein's remarks i n t o a systematic form i s , Baker 
concedes, only the p r e l i m i n a r y task t o developing a f u l l - b l o o d e d semantic and 
epistemological theory ( 7 ) ; i t i s no part o f my_ task here t o undertake t h i s e 
What I hope t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y f o r m u l a t i o n w i l l accomplish i s t o enable us t o 
explore the ways i n which t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n would a f f e c t the prob-
lems we have seen t o a r i s e i n s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , and provide us w i t h 
some way of seeing these problems i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . As has been argued, 
the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Wittgenstein's remarks can be used t o develop a f u l l blown 
theory, but t h i s i s a long way from accomplished, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y something 
which would, i n some senses, go against Wittgenstein's expressed i n t e n t i o n i n 
h i s work* His work does have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p r a c t i c e of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i s i n g , however, j u s t as i t does f o r philosophy, and i t i s the legacy of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n t h a t he provides f o r us a way o f l o o k i n g at t h e o r i s i n g which may 
lead us t o change our p r a c t i c e s , but does not force us t o do so; l i k e Blum's 
conception o f the Soc r a t i c t h e o r i s t , i t i s no p a r t of Wittgenstein's p r o j e c t 
t o force us t o speak what he speaks, but r a t h e r t o a l l o w us t o see what i t i s 
t h a t we do when we speak ( 8 ) . This philosophy leaves eve r y t h i n g as i t i s i n 
the sense t h a t i t does not propose a lebensform which supplants what has gone 
before, but r a t h e r , forces us, i f we can hear what i t shows us i n what i t says, 
t o be r e f l e x i v e upon our p r a c t i c e s , so t h a t t r a nsformation comes from w i t h i n 
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our p r a c t i s i n g , and i s not imposed i n terms of some superordinate p r i n c i p l e 
which we b r i n g t o i t . Constructivism as a theory, t h e r e f o r e , serves only as 
an instance of how theory operates, and seen i n t h i s way, allows us t o con-
s i d e r how theory operates w i t h i n our p r a c t i c e s as t h a t which we e l e c t i n the 
ends which we seek. At the same time, there are features of n a t u r a l language 
and t h e o r i s i n g which must be attended t o because, i t would seem o f the i n t e r n a l 
l o g i c of our attempt t o make sense o f the world as s o c i o l o g i s t s . I t seems 
t o me t h a t c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , as an epistemological theory, allows us t o attend 
t o those features i n ways which are a s i g n i f i c a n t improvement on the i d e a l s 
proposed by ' c l a s s i c a l ' epistemological t h e o r i e s . The working out of the f u l l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f c o n s t r u c t i v i s m i s beyond the province o f t h i s present work, 
and would also depend on i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n i n t o a f u l l blown theory. The 
c r u c i a l question would seem t o be the nature o f the sense which c r i t e r i a bestow 
upon sentences; we have seen t h a t c o n s t r u c t i v i s m would seem t o e i t h e r assert 
that c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s wholly determine sense because there are no r e l a t i o n s 
of entailment ( n e c e s s i t y ) at a l l , or else t h a t r e l a t i o n s of entailment derive 
from c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
In Wittgenstein's i n s i s t e n c e on the importance of n o r m a l i t y c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
understanding our form o f repr e s e n t a t i o n , Hacker suggests t h a t we f i n d a 
• t h i n analogue' of Kant's more p r o t r a c t e d argument t o e s t a b l i s h the necessity 
of u n i v e r s a l causal law as a general and fundamental c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i -
b i l i t y o f conceptualised knowledge ( 9 ) . For our concepts t o have any purchase 
on the w o r l d , then they must r e f l e c t three general r e g u l a r f e a t u r e s ; they 
must r e f l e c t the high degree o f r e g u l a r i t y i n nature, they must d i s p l a y a 
high degree o f r u l e governed connectedness, and they must manifest a general 
consensus between the i n d i v i d u a l s who employ them. While t h i s depends upon 
t h e i r being a manifest agreement between the e x t e r n a l world and our response 
t o i t , i t i s not the case t h a t we could not imagine a general breakdown i n 
t h i s c o n d i t i o n ; the p o i n t i s t h a t we would not have any use f o r the present 
p r a c t i c e s t h a t we employ i n accounting t h a t world should such a breakdown 
occur; weighing, science, colour concepts, and so on, a l l depend on, at one 
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and the same time, a correspondence between the ex t e r n a l world and our agreed 
ways of accounting t h i s . This correspondence i s not uniquely f a c t i c , however; 
language r e t a i n s i t s autonomy, and thus p r a c t i c e s can and do change. Only 
r a d i c a l changes would rob our conventions of t h e i r use. But there i s no 
sharp border l i n e between such r a d i c a l d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s (as we could imagine 
t o be p o s s i b l e ) and the normal c o n d i t i o n s under which our concepts are employed 
Where d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s do occur, we look f o r causes t o account f o r them; i f we 
cannot f i n d them, then e i t h e r the d i s c o n t i n u i t y i s t o l e r a t e d , or else the 
p r a c t i c e i n which i t occurs loses i t s usefulness. Usually, when we cannot, 
f o r instance, supply c r i t e r i a which would l e g i s l a t e once and f o r a l l f o r the 
o b j e c t i v e appearance o f an o b j e c t , we do not , thereby, say t h a t the c r i t e r i a 
which we do, i n f a c t employ, thereby give no sense t o the account of the object 
In c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s , t h i s case appears t o depend upon the law of the excluded 
middle. Where we have cases i n which c r i t e r i a do not o f f e r us a d e f i n i t i v e 
method o f seeing, then we are tempted t o assert = s u r e l y such q u a l i t i e s must 
be e i t h e r there or no? W i t t g e n s t e i n remarks: 
" E i t h e r i t i s r a i n i n g or i t i s n ' t , one i s i n c l i n e d t o say; 
how I know, how the i n f o r m a t i o n reached me, i s another 
matter". (10) 
In t h a t the law o f the excluded middle provides us w i t h t h i s k i n d o f p i c t u r e 
o f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , W i t t g e n s t e i n seeks t o emancipate us from i t s h o l d. The 
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of hol d i n g t h a t r e a l i t y i s completely determinate lacks an 
a p p l i c a t i o n ( 1 1 ) . Our p r a c t i c e s do not provide us w i t h any c r i t e r i a f o r 
s e t t l i n g the o b j e c t i v e existence; i f we accept h i s arguments f o r m u l t i p l e 
c r i t e r i a i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of expressions, c r i t e r i a r a t h e r than t r u t h 
c o n d i t i o n s determining sense, and the n o t i o n t h a t the c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n i s 
t h a t of ne c e s s a r i l y good evidence and so weaker than entailment, that the l i s t 
o f c r i t e r i a and t h e i r d e f e a s i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s i s indeterminate ~ a l l these 
lead us t o see the law o f the determinacy of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y (the law o f 
the excluded middle) cannot be defended. 
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J u s t i f i c a t i o n comes t o an end i n s o c i a l a c t i o n ; t h i s i s t o say t h a t , w h i l e our 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the world being as i t i s e v e n t u a l l y come to what i t (sub-
j e c t i v e l y ) appears t o me to be, what i t s u b j e c t i v e l y appears t o me t o come to 
i s not an i n t u i t i o n , but the p r a c t i c e of a s k i l l which i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y 
a v a i l a b l e ; i f we take the c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s e r i o u s l y however, t h i s does not 
provide us w i t h a " f i r m foundation" f o r epistemology and language, but merely, 
enables us t o see t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a foundation i s i l l u s o r y , and 
that j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes t o an end where a c t i o n must take i t s place. 
Thus, judging i s not learned on the basis of r u l e , i n the sense that we do 
not l e a r n \>nce and f o r a l l ' c r i t e r i a which must be s a t i s f i e d i f our judgments 
are t o be c o r r e c t ; we l e a r n t o accept the system w i t h i n which judgment has a 
place. We do not l e a r n t o believe s i n g l e p r o p o s i t i o n s , but r a t h e r , p r o p o s i -
t i o n s can only be believed as p a r t of the t o t a l i t y w i t h i n which they have 
sense, as a located nexus r e l a t e d to other p r o p o s i t i o n s i n mutually sense-
dominating c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The search o u t s i d e of such systems f o r the 
terms i n which they are i n t e l l i g i b l e i s based on the i l l u s i o n s which such 
systems generate of the nature o f t h e i r foundations. In r e f u s i n g t o accept 
t h e i r i n t e r - r e l a t e d n e s s , i n l o o k i n g f o r more than we have as the basis f o r 
knowledge, we deny the r o l e of grammar i n f i x i n g f o r us the l i m i t s o f possible 
knowledge. 
I n terras o f s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , we can see t h a t the C o n s t r u c t i v i s t e p i s t -
emology which Wittgenstein's work would seem t o suggest would provide us both 
w i t h a means of assessing the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e o r e t i c a l formulations of 
the nature o f s o c i a l phenomena, and also what l i m i t s are a c t u a l l y imposed on 
the search f o r knowledge of s o c i a l phenomena. To begin w i t h , i t appears t h a t 
the search f o r understanding i n the concepts which actors employ t o make t h e i r 
world sensible cannot proceed from the assumption t h a t only i n terms of an 
• i n s i d e r s ' use of the lebensform i s understanding t o be accomplished, f o r t h i s 
v i o l a t e s the view t h a t c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i n terms o f which sentences have 
sense, are both m u l t i p l e c r i t e r i a , and also t h a t the l i s t of such c r i t e r i a and 
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t h e i r d e f e a s i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s i s indeterminate, so t h a t no such ' i n s i d e r s ' 
view could ever be provided f o r except i n terms o f normalcy c o n d i t i o n s which 
s t i p u l a t e f o r a precise demarcation i n t e r n a l t o the s o c i e t y . As Wit t g e n s t e i n 
emphasises, there i s no such sharp demarcation, but the very nature of the 
p r a c t i c e s involved depends upon diverse p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and hence doubt, as a 
pr e l i m i n a r y t o knowledge; such a c o n d i t i o n , however, i s l i m i t e d by those 
p r a c t i c e s , so th a t doubt plays d i f f e r e n t p a r t s i n d i f f e r e n t language games, 
i n a l l o f which, however, i t s p o s s i b i l i t y i s p r e f i g u r e d by c e r t a i n t y which i s 
both undoubtable and also unknowable; that we can doubt proceeds from the 
fact t h a t , some t h i n g s , we do not doubt. 
The d e f e a s i b i l i t y o f c r i t e r i a , and the indeterminacy of t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s does 
not r e s u l t i n the indeterminacy o f sense, however, except i n terms of a 
su b s c r i p t i o n t o the p r i n c i p l e o f a possible e x t e r n a l view o f sense which 
c l a s s i c a l epistemology and semantics seem t o regard as necessary. The index-
i c a l i t y of the sense of sentences i s not a l i m i t on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e i r 
meaning unless we subscribe t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r being a 'once and f o r 
a l l ' d e f i n i t i o n of such meaning, and we are l e d i n t o the acceptance o f t h i s 
as a l i m i t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y by the p i c t u r e which c l a s s i c a l epistemological theory 
gives us o f the nature o f knowledge and c e r t a i n t y c o n f l a t e d w i t h necessity. 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n only comes t o an end w i t h s u b j e c t i v e appearance i n the sense 
tha t i n our c r i t e r i o n l e s s a s c r i p t i o n s of sense t o such appearance, we exercise 
s k i l l s which we acquire w i t h i n a community o f n a t u r a l language users, and our 
a s c r i p t i o n of sense t o our s u b j e c t i v e experience depends upon our previous 
a b i l i t y t o account the sense of the ex t e r n a l world. Thus, our d e s c r i p t i o n of 
our experience has no greater e v i d e n t i a l weight than our d e s c r i p t i o n s of the 
ext e r n a l world; but f u r t h e r , i t s sense i s t o be weighed i n terms of i t s place 
w i t h i n a set of p r a c t i c e s ; t h a t i s t o say, the value of p r i v a t e accounts of 
the meaning of experience i s only assessable i n terms of t h e i r place w i t h i n 
the system w i t h i n which they have sense. The uniqueness of p r i v a t e experience 
of meaning i s a 'geometrical' i l l u s i o n , since the meaning of any account i s 
what i s a v a i l a b l e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y i n the c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s between i t s e l f 
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and those sentences which form i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , which are an i n d e f i n i t e 
set, r a t h e r than some special and uniquely d e f i n i t e set which are only 
a v a i l a b l e t o the i n d i v i d u a l concerned. Thus, the o r d e r l i n e s s of sense 
derives from the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f , simultaneously, an i n d e t -
erminate set of c r i t e r i a i n terms of which sense i s assignable, and also the 
conventions of 'normal c o n d i t i o n s ' under which these are t o be used. Now, 
part o f these 'normal c o n d i t i o n s ' involves assigning t o actors ends i n terms 
of which they are t o be seen as opera t i n g ; we cannot remain i n d i f f e r e n t t o 
these ends i f we are t o ascribe meaning t o the sense of t h e i r utterances, 
whether or not we want t o do so. I f we choose t o suspend judgment on these 
ends, then we are l e f t without any means of deciding whether or not our 
accounts of the meaning of t h e i r a ctions are s i g n i f i c a n t ; we are producing 
naive u n c r i t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s which have no s t a t u s i n any t h e o r e t i c account. 
For t o have s t a t u s i n a t h e o r e t i c a l account, as Wittgenstein argues, there 
are a t lea s t three c o n d i t i o n s which must be s a t i s f i e d ; f i r s t , we must accept 
t h a t there i s general agreement between i n d i v i d u a l s about how concepts r e f e r 
t o the r e g u l a r i t i e s of natu r e , second, they must d i s p l a y a high degree o f 
r u l e governed connectedness, and t h i r d , they must show the high degree o f 
r e g u l a r i t y i n nature. The suspension of judgment on the conventions of 
•normal c o n d i t i o n s ' involves c a l l i n g i n t o question the very nature of order; 
i t must claim t o operate on n a t u r a l order, w h i l e , t o be sen s i b l e , i t simul-
taneously pre-supposes such order. Thus, ethnoraethodological studies depend 
on a denial o f t h e i r t h e o r e t i c i t y t o propose f o r themselves a d i s t i n c t i v e l y 
d i f f e r e n t place than other s o c i o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s , but, t o be se n s i b l e , t h e i r 
f i n d i n g s must r e l y on t h e i r place w i t h i n a t h e o r e t i c system. 
At the same time, the op e r a t i n g premises of what Ga r f i n k e l c a l l s 'construct-
i v i s t ' sociology e x p l i c i t l y propose the necessity of accepting such a frame-
work as the prolegomenon t o any s o c i a l t h e o r i s i n g . For Parsons, such a 
framework i s t o be taken over from science, as a s e l f conscious methodological 
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set of p r i n c i p l e s . What t h i s framework cannot deal w i t h , i n the terms t h a t 
i t sets f o r i t s e l f , i s the d i s j u n c t i o n between the "symptomatic" concepts o f 
a n a l y t i c a l schemes t o account f o r the world, and the c r i t e r i a of the everyday 
language games o f actors who c o n s t i t u t e i t s data; the only way t h a t Parsons 
sees of dealing w i t h t h i s i s i n terms o f 'primal i n v a r i a n t categories o f 
apprehension' (pace Kant). This i s t o argue t h a t , i n terms o f Wittgenstein's 
notions, the transcendent view of the n a t u r a l order i s t o be found i n master 
concepts, or some set o f fundamental c r i t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s which c o n s t i t u t e the 
necessary order o f the world; these cannot be 'thought away'. Insofar as 
science seems t o express b e t t e r than other frameworks the r e g u l a r i t i e s i n 
terms of which the world seems t o present i t s e l f , Parsons, l i k e Mannheim, takes 
t h i s t o be an i n d i c a t i o n o f the primacy o f p o s i t i v e , e m p i r i c a l thought i n 
apprehending nature, but also of i t s necessary i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h meta-
physical developments on such thought. This view of t h e o r i s i n g would assume 
t h a t necessary r e l a t i o n s are t o be found, and t h a t science provides us w i t h 
a d i s p l a y of the grounds from which they must emanate. I n terms of a const-
r u c t i v i s t epistemology, however, i t i s p r e c i s e l y the question o f necessity 
which must be addressed; t o assume t h a t i t must be solved, i n the way t h a t 
Parsons' c o n s t r u c t i v i s m does, i s t o appeal again t o the p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y 
o f f e r e d by c l a s s i c a l epistemology, and i n terms o f Wittgenstein's account, 
t h i s i s t o ignore the questions posed by the unquestionably s o c i a l nature o f 
our p r a c t i c e s o f apprehending the w o r l d . Theory may have t o r e l y on grounds 
which t u r n out, a f t e r a l l , t o be no more secure than an e x p l i c a t i o n of i t s 
p r a c t i c e s as s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , but t h i s i s s u r e l y p r e f e r a b l e t o an u n t h i n k i n g 
assumption o f necessity as a brute f a c t , r a t h e r than simply a p o s s i b i l i t y . 
This i s t o recommend, f o r s o c i a l t h e o r i s i n g , p r e c i s e l y the programme of 
e x p l i c a t i o n which Garfi n k e l proposes f o r everyday l i f e , but t o be seen as a 
fundamental p a r t of the f a m i l y of p r a c t i c e s of which such t h e o r i s i n g i s 
composed, r a t h e r than as an independent e n t e r p r i s e which has no r e p a i r s t o 
o f f e r t o sociology. As I have suggested i n the t e s t , ethnomethodology i s 
s e l f conscious about the nature of language use i n e x a c t l y the way t h a t con-
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s t r u c t i v i s t sociology i s not; I f u r t h e r want t o suggest t h a t such s e l f con-
sciousness i s a weakness i n sociology which i t i s worth r e p a i r i n g , w h i l e , i n 
ethnomethodology, t h i s s e l f consciousness tends t o lead t o i n d i f f e r e n c e t o 
t h e o r e t i c community t o which only i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the body of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
language games can o f f e r use. Thus r e f l e x i v e t h e o r i s i n g , I want t o argue, 
would be t h e o r i s i n g w i t h i n a community which encompasses the p o s s i b i l i t y , 
w i t h i n a d i v e r s i t y of language games, o f both accounting, d e s c r i b i n g , and 
ex p l a i n i n g s o c i a l phenomena i n terms of some t h e o r e t i c a l framework, which 
would be r e l a t e d t o the ends of the i n v e s t i g a t o r , and also e x p l i c a t i n g the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r i t s accounts i n terms which would both secure them t o the 
p r a c t i c e s of the community of s o c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t o r s , and also i n v e s t i g a t e 
the r e l a t i o n between the special language game of s o c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , 
and the language games of everyday l i f e t o which i t may not be reduced, but 
t o which i t i s nevertheless u l t i m a t e l y responsible f o r i t s purposes. 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s of Wittgenstein's c o n s t r u c t ! v i s t theory o f epistemology f o r 
G a r f i n k e l , then, I take t o be i n the r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of ethnomethodological 
studies w i t h the body o f s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g . With the surrender of the 
p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i f f e r e n c e , which I would argue i s the consequence of Wittgen-
s t e i n ' s a l t e r n a t i v e view of the r e l a t i o n between the language games o f science 
and commonsense, ethnomethodological s t u d i e s may f i n d t h a t they can recognise 
the t r u e community of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s w i t h s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , and r e -
define t h e i r p r o j e c t i n terms of the common i n t e r e s t of combining understanding 
w i t h the concrete h i s t o r i c i t y o f the l i f e - w o r l d . This i s not t o say t h a t 
ethnomethodology cannot continue i n i t s present c o n d i t i o n , but r a t h e r , t h a t 
Wittgenstein's work o f f e r s some p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the i r r e c o n c i l a b i l i t y o f i t s 
p r o j e c t w i t h t h a t of c o n s t r u c t ! v i s t sociology may no longer seem so, since 
the necessity o f i t s demarcation from sociology seems t o me t o proceed from 
the epistemological p r i n c i p l e s which i t shares w i t h sociology at the present 
time. The strong claim t h a t i t makes f o r the necessary i d e a l i s a t i o n o f any 
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g e n e r a l i s i n g theory, and hence the i n a b i l i t y of such theory t o deal s a t i s -
f a c t o r i l y w i t h the sense assembling p r a c t i c e s of men ' i n s i t u ' i s v i t i a t e d 
by the terms of Wittgenstein's c o n s t r u c t i v i s m i n the sense t h a t t h i s provides 
f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n of s e n t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n at t h i s l e v e l 
w i t h those at the second, t h e o r e t i c a l l y a b s t r a c t a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l . C e r t a i n t y 
i s seen t o be, i n terms o f t h i s account, only ever a v a i l a b l e i n the s o c i a l , 
and hence h i s t o r i c , p r a c t i c e s of members of language communities as they 
mutually act i n and on the wo r l d , both c o n s t i t u t i n g and transforming i t s 
meaning. Such c o n s t i t u t i o n and transformation i s only p o s s i b l e , i n terms o f 
Wittgenstein's theory of knowledge, i f we see the i n t e r - r e l a t e d n e s s as w e l l 
as the d i f f e r e n c e s between the worlds formulated by the language games which 
c o n s t i t u t e such communities. 
The fundamental import o f Wittgenstein f o r sociology l i e s , I b e l i e v e , i n h i s 
rescue o f the n o t i o n of t r u t h from the transcendental realm. For W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l l y an achievement of man i n the s o c i a l w o r l d , and given the 
view of language t h a t he formulates, can be nothing e l s e . To recognise t h i s 
i s at once t o recognise how language f u n c t i o n s i n order t o provide us w i t h 
' c e r t a i n knowledge', and t o see the task o f drawing the parameters o f such 
knowledge as i n v o l v i n g a r e c o g n i t i o n of the i l l u s i o n s i n t o which our forms 
of representation can lead us. I have argued t h a t the r o l e provided f o r value 
i n c e r t a i n types o f s o c i o l o g i c a l account proceeds from j u s t such an i l l u s i o n n 
and f u r t h e r , t h a t t h i s n o t i o n loses i t s place when we analyse the grounds 
from which i t derives. The pessimism t o which Parsons alludes i n "The 
Structure o f Social A c t i o n " w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g ( 
has long grown i n t o a despair w i t h the conventional means which sociology has 
developed t o account s o c i e t y , and the t h e o r e t i c a l asceticism of Garfink e l and 
Blum are the f r u i t s o f t h a t t r e e , j u s t as much as the p o l i t i c a l l y based 
arguments of Gouldner, and, i n another d i r e c t i o n , the C r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s of 
F r a n k f u r t , whom, r e g r e t t a b l y , I have not considered. 
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In terms o f the m a j o r i t y o f these t h e o r i s t s , a b e l i e f i n the s p i r i t o f Parsons 
Mannheim and W i t t g e n s t e i n betokens deep conservatism and an Utopian f a i t h i n 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u n i f i e d human knowledge. Hopefully, t h i s work provides 
an argument against these charges; i f n o t , my optimism about the f u t u r e f o r 
sociology may be equally i l l - s t a r r e d . 
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